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Since the 1980s, policy trends in US bilingual education (at the national and state level) 
indicate policy rollback. This is despite a long period of political incorporation of the main 
beneficiary of these policies, immigrants of Mexican descent. By contrast, policy trends in 
Islamic religious instruction in Germany indicate modest expansionary trends despite 
comparatively less political incorporation of and a shorter immigration history for its main 
beneficiaries, immigrants of Turkish descent. This belies the literature in political science 
that argues that entrenched groups are well positioned to secure/defend favorable policy 
outcomes in issue areas of interest.          
 Through a comparative study of national and sub-national variation in policy 
trajectories in Germany and the US, this study will argue that Turkish interests have been 
better positioned in Germany to attain their policy interests in religious instruction, situated 
in a setting characterized by corporatist interest intermediation and historic elite support 
for religious instruction as a means of integration. This contrasts with their Mexican 
counterparts in the US, whose prospects (historically) of attaining their desired outcomes 
in bilingual education policy have been less favorable. Mexican interests operate within 
the laissez faire, competitive, political marketplace of American pluralism where bilingual 
education has been a historically polarizing issue among elites. Through close rendering of 
primary and secondary sources, this study will build and compare national and subnational 
policy narratives in the issues areas of focus spanning from 1965 through 2010. 
Primary Reader: Adam Sheingate 
Secondary Reader: Steven Teles 
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THE PUZZLE OF COUNTERINTUITIVE POLICY TRAJECTORIES  
IN AMERICAN BILINGUAL EDUCATION AND ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS 
INSTRUCTION IN GERMANY 
 
Introduction 
Since the 1980s, policy trends in US bilingual education (at the national and state 
level) indicate policy rollback. This is despite a long period of political incorporation of 
the main beneficiary of these policies, immigrants of Mexican descent. By contrast, policy 
trends in Islamic religious instruction in Germany indicate modest expansionary trends 
despite comparatively less political incorporation of and a shorter immigration history for 
its main beneficiaries, immigrants of Turkish descent. This belies the literature in political 
science that argues that entrenched groups are well positioned to secure/defend favorable 
policy outcomes in issue areas of interest (Joppke, 1999; Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 
2010; Pierson, 1994; Richardson, 2000; Sheingate, 2000; Kurthen, 2009).    
 Through a comparative study of cross national and sub-national variation in Germany 
and the US, this study will argue that Turkish interests have been better positioned in 
Germany to attain their policy interests in religious instruction, situated in a setting 
characterized by corporatist interest intermediation and historic elite support for religious 
instruction as a means of integration. This contrasts with their Mexican counterparts in the 
US, whose prospects (historically) of attaining their desired outcomes in bilingual 
education policy have been less favorable. Mexican interests operate within the laissez 
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faire, competitive, political marketplace of American pluralism where bilingual education 
has been a historically polarizing issue among elites. In sum, the differences in attaining 
their desired policy prospects result from national differences in the institutional structure 
of the policy making process — the closed versus open policymaking systems in Germany 
and the US, respectively — combined with differences in how American and German elites 
have historically viewed bilingual education and religious instruction, respectively. 
In Germany, elite agreement concerning religious instruction, situated in 
Germany’s closed, corporatist policymaking context, allows for the maintenance of 
consistent sets of actors and policy venues in service of the policy definition that Islamic 
religious instruction is a means to integrate Muslims and the Islamic faith. This encourages 
institutional gatekeepers (the education ministry, Christian religious interests) to pursue the 
incorporation of palatable Muslim interests into the corporatist policymaking regime. 
Interest intermediation in the more open, pressure politics of American pluralism combined 
with historic elite disagreement concerning bilingual education results in the legitimation 
of new actors, venues, and policy definitions. This allowed for the legitimation of 
challenges to governing policy regimes and subsequently policy rollback after the 1970s. 
The study will investigate these variances in policy trajectories in US bilingual education 
and German Islamic religious instruction from 1965 - 2010.        
 The investigation will address the effects of elite views (historically) concerning the 
respective issues and open versus closed policy making systems through analysis of both 
national and sub-national policy trajectories and their variations in the US and Germany. 
California and Texas will be the sub-national (localities) foci of study in the US, and North 
Rhine Westphalia (NRW), Bavaria, and Berlin will be the focus in Germany. As 
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immigration politics is often locally construed and facilitated via local institutional and 
political contexts (Money, 1997), within these national variations, historic differences in 
local policy trajectories should also be expected (Money, 1997; Koopmans, 2004). The 
findings from the local cases of this study concur with previous findings (Money, 1997; 
Koopmans, 2004) concerning the local nature of immigration politics. Although the local 
cases conform to the varying trends in national policy trajectories explained in the opening 
paragraphs, local policy trajectories (intra-nationally) differ according to local variance of 
the two causal variables mentioned above: elite agreement/ disagreement and the open/ 
closed character of the policymaking systems.         
 In the US, the historic trajectories of elite perspectives towards bilingual education 
in California and Texas mirror one another throughout the period of study, 1965-2010. 
California, however, possesses the voter referendum as a policymaking mechanism while 
Texas does not, making California the more open policymaking system.  The study finds 
that bilingual interests fare significantly worse in California once elite divisions over 
bilingual education intensified from the 1980s through the 1990s.     
 With respect to Germany, there is elite support for religious instruction in North 
Rhine Westphalia and Bavaria.  Both of the policymaking systems are corporatist and 
closed as they are governed by Article 7 III of the Basic Law that guarantees religious 
instruction for recognized religious communities. Berlin, on the other hand, is not governed 
by Article 7 III — however the institutional arrangements which developed in religious 
instruction are still closed — and historically there has been elite disagreement concerning 
religious instruction. The study finds that North Rhine Westphalia and Bavaria are more 
accommodating to Muslim interests (although their policy trajectories also differ) while 
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policy negotiations were more conflictual in Berlin where Muslim interests only gained the 
right to offer Islamic religious instruction after winning a 20-year battle for state 
recognition in 2000 via court ruling. Assessing the local cases cross-nationally underscores 
the importance of particular national policymaking structures, integration schemes and 
elite relations. Yet, looking at the sub-national cases intra-nationally reveals how particular 
local institutional and political contexts likewise play a significant factor in the direction 
and quality of policy trajectories in these issues areas. 
The study has three main endeavors. First, it aims to provide a test case for Zolberg 
and Woon’s (1999) thesis that Spanish and Islam serve as comparable cultural threats to 
the place of English and Christianity in the US and Western Europe, respectively. This 
study aims to apply their theory to two issue areas that depict the threat that Spanish and 
Islam pose, and show how the different historical, political, and institutional settings 
facilitate how these threats manifest in policy outcomes where immigrants collectively 
organize to make claims on the state. Second, the study aims to apply Baumgartner and 
Jones punctuated equilibrium theory to more closed systems for comparative purposes. 
Lastly, the study aims to show how elite views (historically) concerning issue areas and 
institutional structure mitigate the supposed benefits (theorized in institutionalist literature) 
that political incorporation and entrenchment provide interests in their policy preferences. 
The argument will be established through creating policy narratives of policy 
evolution for the US-state and German Bundesland cases over the period of study. To build 
these local narratives, the study will use secondary sources to build historical accounts of 
policy development in these issues areas from 1965-2010. These secondary sources will be 
supplemented with primary documents. The goal is to use the narratives to document and 
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assess the historical trajectories of elite views concerning the respective issues. The 
narratives will also be used to pin point the various policy venues involved in the historical 
evolution of the respective issue areas. Lastly, the narratives will be used to assess how 
issues were problematized by the actors and institutions within different historical periods. 
This will also be revealed through a close rendering of [mostly] secondary and primary 
documents. Subsequently, the building of the narratives involves documenting the major 
players/ political entrepreneurs involved in policy development and the legislative process 
as well as the institutions involved in shaping the political context and the policy venues in 
which major policy development occurred.       
 The study will employ the following concepts in its analysis: open versus closed 
policymaking systems; elite agreement versus disagreement; policy expansion; policy 
rollback; retrenchment politics; restrictionism; political incorporation; political 
entrenchment; policy regime; policy (issue) definition (image)/ issue problematization/ 
issue paradigm; policy venue; venue shifting; and venue shopping in its investigation. 
These terms will be defined later in the chapter. 
 
The Argument 
In this study, the openness of the American system pertains to the multiple policy 
venues involved in bilingual education policymaking. This specifically refers to the 
availability of multiple interactive policy forums of varied policymaking authority which 
can have an expansive or a contractive effect on policy through legitimizing particular 
actors/interests and/or providing multiple forums for policymakers to find favorable 
settings to achieve their desired policy outcomes. These multiple policy venues provided a 
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forum for elite divisions — whether between federal and state policymakers, within levels 
of government (legislative v. executive v. judicial), or via political partisanship — over 
bilingual education to play out in policy outcomes throughout the period of study. 
 The openness of the system and elite divisions have led to both policy expansion 
and policy rollback depending on the evolving politics of the players in the various venues 
(especially the judicial branch). The shared/ overlapping policymaking responsibilities and 
checks and balances inherent in intergovernmental relations and among the various 
branches of governments at the various levels results in policy that often evolves from the 
interaction of multiple policy venues. In such a setting — building on the findings of 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) — governing policy definitions can be challenged by the 
legitimation of outside political actors and interests and the availability of alternative policy 
venues where new definitions can receive more favorable reception. Bilingual education 
policy in the US has evolved via the interactions of policy venues at the federal, state and 
local levels; from ordinances issued by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches at 
the federal and state level; and from the various state agencies involved in implementing 
state policy at the state and local level.   
Within such a dynamic policymaking system, elite agreement or disagreement can 
have profound effects on policy outcomes. As issues are multi-dimensional (Baumgartner 
and Jones, 1993), elite disagreement, especially within an open system such as the US, 
results in perpetual competition among elites to problematize an issue along a particular 
issue dimension. This results in the precarious equillibria described by Baumgartner and 
Jones (1993) whereby political consensus is perpetually vulnerable to increases in salience 
of alternate issue dimensions. Additionally, however, this study will argue that elite 
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agreement/ disagreement consist of more than simply the status of consensus around a 
salient issue dimension. Elite sub-groups (academics, political officials, media, 
independent governmental agencies, etc.) have particular preferences concerning an issue. 
During periods of elite agreement, these various interests dovetail. Perhaps these 
preferences loosely or rhetorically orient around a particular issue dimension. However, 
this study will argue that these particular preferences of elite sub-groups and how they 
historically dovetail(ed) and separate(d) play an independent role in periods of political 
consensus in addition to the effects rendered by the salience of particular issue dimensions. 
In the US, elite views concerning bilingual education have historically been 
ambivalent. State officials tolerated bilingual education locally in the 19th century 
(Crawford, 1999), and opposed it — successfully outlawing it once state capacity caught 
up to ideology (Blanton, 2004) — from World War I until the Civil Rights era; bilingual 
education enjoyed elite support in the late 1960s and early 1970s; and since, elites (at the 
federal and state level) have been divided or ambivalent concerning its use as a pedagogical 
tool. Housed within the institutional setting described, this has manifested in expansive 
policy trajectories (at the state and federal level) in the late 1960s and early 1970s and 
trajectories revealing policy rollback since the 1980s. 
From approximately 1965-1975, there was elite agreement in support of bilingual 
education. During this period, the interactions of these various venues and institutions 
resulted in issue expansion.1 This resulted in substantial expansionary policy change at the 
federal, state and local levels as the various venues built off of the policy outcomes/ politics 
                                                 
1 Baumgartner and Jones (1993) reference political scientists use of the term, issue expansion, to describe 
positive feedback effects that result when small changes in one venue lead to further and more substantial 
changes across related venues.   
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of the others. However, when there was elite disagreement (as increasingly became the 
case from the late 1970s forward), policy expansion was slowed and began to experience 
rollback of the policy gains of the 1965-1975 period. In the US, after the 1970s, 
expansionist policy was moderated or experienced rollback through venue shifting efforts 
to venues where policy rollback was more favored — a consequence of the relaxation/ 
reversal of federal and judicial mandates 2  concerning bilingual education, from the 
legitimation of local English Only groups/ bilingual education skeptics, and/ or from issue 
expansion resulting from the former two factors. Bilingual education policy trajectories 
were the byproduct of this dynamism inherent in the American policymaking process.   
However, as immigration politics is also local, and as the local institutional and 
political contexts vary, there was also local variation in the US cases under study. As 
mentioned, the historic trajectories of elite relations in bilingual education in Texas and 
California mirror one another. The policymaking system in California, however, permits 
policy changes through voter referendums. This is not possible in Texas. California’s 
policymaking system is subsequently more open than that of Texas as it facilitates more 
easy access to the policymaking process for outsiders. In California, the policy moderations 
and reversals culminated with the statutory elimination of bilingual education via the voter 
initiative, Proposition 227 in 1998 — an act of venue shifting by the English Only group 
English for the Children. In Texas (the more closed policymaking system), entrenched 
Latino interests were able to mitigate these English Only/ bilingual education skepticism 
                                                 
2 Most indicative of this dynamic was the change in ideology in the federal judiciary. As the federal judiciary 
(the venue most responsible for policy expansion in bilingual education in the 1970s) cooled towards 
bilingual education, policy increasingly began to trend towards policy rollback at both the national and state 
level. This helped to legitimate interests favoring policy rollback and alternative policy definitions of 




trends — the benefit of Mexican political entrenchment. Nevertheless, bilingual education 
policy arrangements still experienced moderate policy rollback in Texas because of the 
aforementioned trends (which were experienced in states across the nation). These were 
facilitated by dissolving elite support situated within the open American policymaking 
system. These trajectories are unexpected considering that California is the more 
progressive state — a fact that should make it more favorable for bilingual education 
interests.          
 Germany’s closed, corporatist setting is less dynamic. This references two aspects 
of German policymaking in religious instruction: corporatism and cooperative federalism.  
Regarding the former, German corporatism involves the divvying up of policy autonomy 
to para-public institutions (state-interest corporatist concertation) with broad autonomy 
over particular issue areas. Policymaking in these issue areas results from the partnerships 
— state-interest intermediation in non-competitive contexts — involved in these para-
public institutions. Concerning the latter, Basic Law sanctioned cooperative federalism in 
education policymaking, this places predominantly all policymaking power concerning 
education at the state level. When policy change does occur, it is moderate and iterative 
and major swings in policy are less likely as particular policy definitions can be secured 
and maintained by the governing para-public institutions. The availability of multiple 
policy venues and the comparatively more market oriented approach to issue-policy venue 
pairings of the American setting is absent in the German policymaking context. Issue 
expansion only occurs within the state and generally does not take on the federal-state 
dynamic of the American example. And once a policy is established, entrenched interests 
ensure its sustenance through their privileged institutional positions—often locking out 
 
10 
emerging challengers and/or minority interests (Cox and McCubbins, 1997). Elite division 
can lead to policy change, but it is less abrupt as there are fewer alternative venues in the 
closed system for challengers to exploit. Para-public institutions generally have monopoly 
power over an issue and thus can maintain particular issue definitions that enjoy sufficient 
elite consensus.  This minimizes the chances and scope of issue expansion. But as the 
Berlin example shows, venue shifting is still possible in this setting — but it is less 
dynamic.          
 Western German elites have supported (Christian) religious instruction as an 
integrative force for school children since the end of the Third Reich and support actually 
dates back to the Weimar Republic of the 19th century. After the terrorist attacks across 
Western Europe and the US in the early 21st century, as Islam was seen as the main 
stumbling block to integrating this growing population that was now perceived as a threat3, 
Islamic religious instruction came to be seen by all the major parties as an effective tool 
for the integration of this growing student population. However elite support for Islamic 
religious instruction at the local level dates back to the 1980s (or even the 1970s in the case 
of North Rhine Westphalia). With such elite consensus, ensconced within the institutional 
setting described, there has been moderate iterative policy expansion in Islamic religious 
instruction in the Western German states of this study since the 1980s and especially since 
the turn of the 21st century.         
 For Eastern German elites, religious instruction has been more divisive. The 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) stymied the churches, resulting in church affiliation 
                                                 
3 The terror attacks in New York, London, and Spain in the first half of the 2000s were carried out by terror 
cells that originated in Western Europe. One, the Hamburg Terror Cell, originated in Germany. This raised 
the issue salience of marginalized Muslim youth on the German political agenda and created an urgency for 
finding ways to integrate the growing Muslim population. 
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for only a minority of the population by the time of reunification in 1990. These 
demographics have persisted. In the eastern German state investigated in this study, Berlin, 
religious instruction is a divisive issue. Elites are split concerning support for mandatory 
religious instruction. The state is not governed by a constitutional amendment mandating 
religious instruction as a compulsory course (as is the case in the Western Bundeslaender). 
Nevertheless, religious instruction policy arrangements have evolved to take on a similar 
form to those of the Western Bundeslaender, and the policymaking system can also be 
described as closed. Still, elite support for religious instruction in general, and Islamic 
religious instruction in particular has been more ambivalent.  Subsequently, the 
incorporation of Islamic religious instruction has been more conflictual as elite 
ambivalence concerning religious instruction has resulted in elites being less 
accommodating than in the Western Bundeslaender concerning the incorporation of 
Muslim interests into the religious instruction policy regime.      
 In Berlin, policy expansion in Islamic religious instruction first occurred via venue 
shifting. There was elite consensus in opposition to the lead Muslim organization’s 20-year 
campaign for recognition, the Islamic Federation of Berlin (IFB). However, there was also 
elite ambivalence concerning the importance of finding an alternative partner due to elite 
disagreement over the benefits of religious instruction in general. The same 
accommodations that were made to find workable solutions in North Rhine Westphalia and 
Bavaria (with the failure in these Bundeslaender to find lead Muslim organizations with 
whom to form corporatist partnerships) were not explored in Berlin. Subsequently, the first 
Muslim group which was recognized by the state achieved this status via judicial ruling.  
However, the resolution of the Berlin episode via judicial ruling does show that venue 
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shifting to the courts could be a viable option for Muslim interests in the face of less 
accommodating German elites or implementation of Islamic religious instruction that is 
too iterative or incomplete (as could be argued is the case in North Rhine Westphalia and 
Bavaria). Hofhansel (2010) argues that the German courts are increasingly siding with 
Muslim interests in their claims to provide Islamic religious instruction according to Article 
7 III.  Thus, the courts appear to be a favorable venue for Muslim interests to achieve their 
policy goals. This differs from the US court system, which since the 1980s has grown more 
ambivalent towards bilingual education as the default pedagogical approach for Limited 
English Proficiency (LEP) students.       
 The practical implications of these findings are that due to the closed, corporatist 
policymaking system and support among German elites for religious instruction in general, 
and Islamic religious instruction in particular, as an integrative institution, Turkish groups 
advocating for Islamic religious instruction policies are better positioned politically and 
institutionally than their Mexican-American counterparts despite being less politically and 
institutionally incorporated and entrenched. In the US due to historic elite disagreement 
concerning bilingual education and the open policy system, advocates for bilingual 
education have had to fight a tougher battle to attain and maintain their policy goals. They 
were not only institutionally more vulnerable but also ideologically. The multiple policy 
forums involved in bilingual education policymaking provide forums for challengers and 
the strong support for English Only policies make bilingualism perennially controversial 
even in good political times. Subsequently, the institutional benefits of political 
incorporation and institutional entrenchment have less efficacy in the American setting 
whereas the non-competitive state-interest intermediation model of corporatism and 
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favored use of church-state relations as an integrative institution provide Turkish interests 
with a favorable political and institutional setting for achieving their share of the corporatist 
pie.    
 
Project Aim           
 According to Money (1999) political science has under theorized the causes of 
policy change in immigration policy (specifically in differentiating the politics of 
immigration control and immigrant integration policy). Givens (2005) has likewise argued 
that integration scholarship should further explore the politics behind policies that are 
targeted to integrate particular groups, how the intersection of party politics at the national 
and local level affect integration policy, and how theories in American politics, 
comparative politics and race can be combined to better explain the politics of integration. 
This study attempts to address these voids by identifying factors involved in shaping policy 
trajectories across these localities in US bilingual education and Islamic religious 
instruction in Germany. 
 This focus on policy areas that deal with political incorporation (such as education) 
is in recognition that these issue areas are sensitive to the increased issue salience of 
immigration. These issue areas involve the political and civic integration of immigrants 
into the society at large. In the localities affected by large populations of immigrants (via 
the social, political, and economic dislocations they render), immigrant integration policies 
are often a function of the politics created by the strains of immigrants on local resources 
and political institutions (Money, 1997). The local focus of this study, subsequently, 
pinpoints assessment on how the political and institutional domains affect immigrant 
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integration policy trajectories.    
Additionally recent scholarship has called for the theoretical expansion of notions 
of political incorporation beyond state-centered issues of citizenship and immigration law. 
Freeman (2004) argues for a disaggregated theory of immigrant incorporation. He argues 
immigrant incorporation involves the intersection of migrant strategies and the relevant 
regulatory regime involved in the particular sector of the polity to which the immigrant 
seeks incorporation. He identifies these sectors as the state, market, cultural, and the 
welfare state. Scholarship on immigrant incorporation must also look at forms of immigrant 
collective action especially those in reaction to perceived exclusion from the polity, such 
as campaigns for bilingual education (Okamoto and Ebert, 2010). As the two policy areas 
under consideration here are educational policies, this presents a good test case concerning 
the influence of racial and ethnic politics in education (a salient issue in both the US and 
Germany; see Joppke, 1999; Crawford, 1999; Hofhansel, 2010) and how this is facilitated 
through the politics and institutional configurations of the welfare state in general and 
education policy in particular. In periods of high immigration, the provision of state 
benefits to growing immigrant groups is a recurring political theme.   
       
Literature Pertaining to this Particular Puzzle      
 This puzzle is noteworthy since immigration and the pressure to integrate 
immigrants is an issue of growing salience throughout the developed world (Givens and 
Luedtke, 2005; Joppke, 1999; Money, 1999). Globalization and rights based politics have 
increased the demand for and decreased the ideational and institutional barriers to labor 
migration from the capital poor second and third world to countries in the capital-rich first 
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world (Joppke, 1999). As a consequence, immigration to these capital-rich countries has 
increased since the second half of the 20th century. Immigration creates political, social and 
economic dislocations for the receiving countries as these states must absorb additional 
populations with economic, political, and cultural needs — some of which may conflict 
with and/or create costs for the host population (Money, 1999). Immigration, however, has 
only recently received theoretical treatment in political science literature, leaving the issue 
mostly to the fields of sociology and anthropology (which investigate different aspects of 
the migration issue than political scientists) (Givens, 2007). Specifically, immigration 
policy and theories concerning the determinants of policy change and stasis has only 
recently received attention from political scientists (Hollifield, 1992; Joppke, 1999; 
Money, 1999, 2009; Freeman 2002; Givens and Luedtke, 2005). Mostly, when political 
science has addressed the issue of immigration, it has mostly pertained to political 
development in immigration and citizenship law (Tichenor, 2002), rates of individual 
political participation measured in the traditional indicators of voting participation and 
naturalization rates (Freeman, 2004; Okamoto and Ebert, 2010), and integration/ 
immigration regime typologies (Kurthen and Schmitter Heisler, 2009). And these 
treatments have tended to clump the different facets of immigration law — immigrant 
control and immigrant integration — as if they were conceptually identical, and thus shared 
the same political origins (Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Money, 1999; 2009). Although these 
are justifiable areas for scholarly focus, as Money (1999; 2009) and Givens and Luedtke 
(2005) argue, expanding the purview of immigration politics to focus on the sub-issue area 
of political incorporation can help to reveal the particular politics (and thus the factors 
involved in policy stasis or change) involved in immigrant integration policies (Givens and 
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Luedtke, 2005).   
This study will build on several streams in the immigration literature. These include 
the operationalization of immigration policy, the role of issue salience and government 
partisanship on policy outcomes, the role of political incorporation and entrenchment for 
state-interest intermediation outcomes, elite driven immigration politics, institutional 
change, and the institutional effects on state-interest intermediation rendered from the 
open/ closed American and German policymaking systems, respectively. As these areas of 
study are centrally relevant to this study, this dissertation will build on what others have 
already found. An extended literary review will follow in chapter 3. However, it is 
necessary to identify the theoretical foundations upon which this study will rest in order to 
justify the central argument of this study. 
Recent research has found that immigrant control policies in Western democracies 
have converged. Policies of immigrant integration have not, however, experienced this 
same convergence (Joppke, 1999; Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Money, 1999; Freeman, 
2004).  Theoretical work concerning the reasons behind national divergence in immigrant 
integration policies has been scant in political science (Money, 1999; Givens and Luedtke, 
2005; Givens, 2007). There have been attempts to disaggregate immigrant integration 
regimes, however (Freeman, 2004; Entzinger 2000; Mollenkopf and Cropper, 2010; 
Ramakrishnan and Epenshade, 2001). These researchers have argued that immigrant 
integration is facilitated via immigration law and pre-existing domestic institutions that 
facilitate individual interactions with the market, welfare state, civil society, and education 
arenas. Although these are useful metrics to help explain integration patterns across 
nations, they lack political explanations which in tandem with the aforementioned 
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institutions facilitate the incorporation of immigrants.   
Building on Money’s (1999) dichotomous operationalization of immigration policy 
(to be discussed below), Givens and Luedtke (2005) empirically tested the impact of issue 
salience and partisan politics on immigration control policy and immigrant integration 
policies. They found that issue salience led to more restrictive policies in immigration 
control and immigrant integration, but that partisan politics was a more relevant predictor 
of immigrant integration policy.  Additionally, governments controlled by political parties 
of the right were shown to be more restrictive (Givens and Luedtke, 2005). Joppke (2003) 
makes a partisanship argument concerning Leftist governments and immigration control 
policy, arguing that those governments tend to lower the barriers to citizenship.  
 However, issue salience and partisan politics do not adequately explain the variance 
of the aforementioned policy trends in bilingual education and Islamic religious instruction.  
In both Germany and the US, the partisan composition of local governments has sometimes 
yielded policy results contrary to Joppke (2003) and Givens and Luedtke (2005) with 
conservative governments at times pushing through more expansive integration policies 
(in Germany, conservative Bavarian officials have overseen the creation of quasi-Islamic 
instruction policy arrangements and the conservative American state of Texas’ long history 
of bipartisan support for bilingual education) than their theories would predict. This speaks 
directly to the dearth of research on the political origins of immigrant integration policies.  
With respect to issue salience, immigration has been increasing in salience since 
the early 1990s in Germany and the early 1980s in the US (Givens and Luedtke, 2005). 
This has affected policy trajectories in both US bilingual education and Islamic religious 
instruction in Germany, but these issue areas have trended in opposite directions over these 
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periods. Moreover, issue salience may be able to explain general trends in the US but not 
the variance of policies at the local level, including this study’s US cases of focus, 
California and Texas. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) theorize that issue salience can 
transform dormant issues to those primed for policy change. It is clear that issue salience 
has had an effect on these trends in both countries (Money, 1999; Joppke, 1999). However, 
issue salience cannot provide a complete explanation, of why particular policy changes 
occurred. For example, referencing two cases from this study, in North Rhine Westphalia 
(NRW) national anxiety over the increased presence of Turkish immigrants led to attempts 
by NRW officials to incorporate Muslim interests into the religious instruction policy 
regime. In California, however, similar anxieties led to the passage of the English Only 
language amendment and Proposition 227, which ended bilingual education. Issue salience 
can explain policy change but not the direction of policy change. Why have policy trends 
in the US and Germany taken on these particular trajectories? As national and sub-national 
policy trends do not conform to previous theoretical accounts of the effects of issue salience 
and partisan politics (Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Money, 1999), other factors must be at 
play. 
In addition, the study will build on Money’s (1999) dichotomous operationalization 
of immigration policy. Money argues that immigration policy consists of two sub-policy 
areas: polices of immigration control and policies of immigrant integration. According to 
Money (1999), the politics vary in these two policy areas and so investigations concerning 
the political origins of particular policy outcomes must be cognizant of this dichotomy. 
This study will treat bilingual education and religious instruction as integration policy areas 
in which causes of policy change and stasis are distinct from those of immigration control 
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policy (although particular factors may be influential in both policy areas) (Joppke, 1999). 
This investigation will address the politics of immigrant integration policymaking in these 
issue areas as they have been under theorized by political science yet are quite relevant in 
the US and Germany. Both nations experienced high immigration rates for most of the 
period of study. This led to the increased salience of the integration of these growing 
immigrant populations on the public agenda in both countries. Subsequently, these two 
issue areas were central in the debates concerning the incorporation of these respective 
immigrant groups during the period of study. 
The study will also build on literature on political incorporation that claims that 
Mexican Americans should have more favorable conditions for securing and defending 
favored policy positions (Kurthen, 2009; Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 2010). Mollenkopf 
and Hochschild (2010) argue that because of the historical symbiosis between immigration 
and nation-building, Americans have a favorable view of immigration. And according to 
Kurthen (2009), American immigrants naturalize at higher rates and face lower barriers to 
participation in the party system. The latter facilitates easier access to political 
representation through interest groups and office holding. Additionally, the presence of 
African Americans both places a more disliked minority with whom they can differentiate 
themselves in socially beneficial ways but also provides a template of how such a 
marginalized group can mobilize and secure favorable policies (Kurthen, 2009).   
 Concerning the latter, the successful African American civil rights movement and 
its iconic status in American culture, in addition to providing a blueprint for successful 
mobilization, also bequeathed an institutional legacy that minority immigrants have used 
to facilitate their incorporation (Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 2010; Joppke, 1999). Soysal 
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(1994) and Joppke (1999) also hold that the institutional legacy of the Civil Rights era —
civil rights liberalism — facilitated the political incorporation of post 1965 immigrants — 
permitting them to take advantage of redistributive policies (such as affirmative action 
policies in employment and education) that were originally designed to compensate for the 
historic discrimination of African Americans.  This was employed, for example, in the 
incorporation of the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 into the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act as Title VII of the education act. Institutionally the civic organizations and 
institutional mechanisms used to incorporate African Americans have been expanded to 
include the political incorporation of immigrants, greatly benefiting immigrants 
(Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 2010; Joppke, 1999). For example, the Voting Rights Law 
(originally enacted in 1965 to ensure the enfranchisement of southern blacks) was amended 
and expanded in 1975 to include voting rights protections for Spanish and Asian minority 
language populations (Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 2010; Crawford, 1999).  
Mollenkopf and Hochschild (2010) maintain that these two factors have a self-
reinforcing quality that encourages further political development in immigrant political 
incorporation.  They conclude that the post-war immigrants in Europe — as they were the 
first acknowledged wave of immigrants in Europe — lacked the ideological acceptance of 
immigration, the presence of a more despised minority with whom they could favorably 
differentiate themselves, and the institutional legacy established by a marginalized 
minority to facilitate their incorporation. 
This study will contest these accounts. It will argue that in the issues areas of focus, 
Turkish-German immigrants are in a more favorable political and institutional setting than 
their Mexican-American counterparts. 
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In addition, the study will build on literature in which elites are the main actors in 
immigration politics (Joppke, 1999; Faist, 1994; Freeman, 1995; Strahan, 1995). On the 
American side, the project of applying civil rights liberalism to the issue of incorporating 
the growing Latino population was a bipartisan endeavor (Joppke, 1999; Crawford, 1999; 
Freeman, 1995). Bilingual education was a byproduct of elites’ view that bilingual 
education was compensation for historic discrimination, a pedagogical improvement to 
punitive English Only methods (Blanton, 2004), electorally convenient, and/or as a way of 
appeasing/ courting the growing Latino interest coalition (Crawford, 1999). And this policy 
was pursued without much research proving the efficacy of the bilingual pedagogical 
approach nor public support for its enactment (Crawford, 1999).  
On the German side, Faist (1994), Joppke (1999), and Fuess (2007) discuss how 
German elites pursued religious instruction as a means to integrate the growing Muslim 
population.  German elites in general have historically bent to international human rights 
norms and pursued immigration policy that stressed family reunification (through 
administrative fiat as opposed to the politically polarizing avenue of immigration law 
reform) policies at the local level and encouraged integration via corporatist initiatives such 
as pilot programs in Islamic religious instruction (Joppke, 1999). These policies were 
pursued in the 1980s and 1990s before Germany officially acknowledged its status as a 
country of immigrants (at a time when immigration polarized the major parties) and amid 
growing public discomfort with the growing Muslim population (Joppke, 1999).  
The study will also build on Baumgartner and Jones (1991; 1993) theory that policy 
change results from the interaction between policy definition and policy venues. Their 
theory is based on the multidimensionality of issues and the limited attention spans of 
 
22 
political actors and the public (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). They hold that policy venues 
secure particular problematizations — the policy definitions — of issues (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1991). Periods of policy stasis result from the institutionalization of these 
problematizations and policy solutions that are either publicly accepted or register low on 
the public agenda but enjoy consensus among elites influential in this policy area. 
Generally, policy stasis involves an issue area problematized in a particular manner 
favorable to the participants of the governing policy venue — the political institutions 
involved in policy making. Political debate subsequently is oriented around this particular 
issue dimension. Periods of change (often rapid and dramatic) result when challenges to 
the governing problematizations, often staged in alternate policy venues, are successful in 
supplanting the legitimacy of the governing policy definition. Alternate venues serve as 
potential sites where alternate policy definitions can receive favorable reception (because 
of the alternate roster of participants in these venues) and subsequently result in policy 
change favorable for challengers. Baumgartner and Jones (1991) argue that in periods of 
high issue salience or if other exogenous occurrences allow for other dimensions to become 
relevant, outside venues or political challengers (political entrepreneurs) can stress 
alternative policy definitions, leading to venue shifting, the dilution of previous consensus 
and subsequently policy change via the building of a new consensus around a new policy 
definition/ issue dimension. Through its comparative focus, this study shows how the 
presence of a multitude of venues in the American case provide outsiders additional means 
to influence policy outcomes. Baumgartner and Jones (1991; 1993) imply that the openness 
of the American system inherently creates opportunities for alternate voices to influence 
policy, creating a system where political consensus is perpetually precarious. As it will be 
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shown in the chapters to follow, this study confirms their implication and discusses how 
this theory can be applied to non-American settings for comparative purposes. Specifically, 
this study will show how the relative openness and closeness, respectively, of the American 
and German local policymaking systems affect prospects for securing particular issue 
definitions and/or facilitating outside challengers to the status quo.  
Additionally, the study will maintain that there is a role played by elites 
independent of the governing issue dimension. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) assert that 
issue dimension is the key determinant of political consensus. It will be argued that when 
elite views toward an issue are looked at historically, the issue dimensions that vie for 
legitimacy are a function of the various debates that have oriented political discussion 
among elites concerning the issue. In the US, equality, efficacy and the role of English 
(integration/ assimilation v. imperialism/ ethnic persecution) have been the ideas around 
which bilingual education has been contested by elites (Crawford, 1999; Blanton, 2004; 
Joppke, 1999). In Germany, it has only been religious instruction as an institution of 
integration and the role of religion (religious instruction) in the modern German polity 
(Hofhansel, 2010; Nordbruch, 2011). The study will demonstrate how these issue 
dimensions have been a byproduct of elite views towards these issues. And thus, 
subsequently, the historic trajectory of elite views concerning an issue area plays a 
significant role in the issue dimensions that are at play. 
Lastly, the literature speaking to the open and closed characteristics of American 
and German policymaking systems, respectively, will provide another theoretical 
foundation for this study. Openness refers to the relative ease with which policy outsiders 
can influence policymaking. Berry (1993) refers to interest group proliferation in the 1960s 
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and the reform of the policymaking establishment to accommodate them in the wake of the 
Civil Rights movement. This made it easier for more interests to influence the 
policymaking system. Cooper (2009) discusses the institutional reforms coinciding with 
doctrinal evolution towards more plebiscitary forms of governing. These reforms emerged 
with the Progressive movement at the turn of the 20th century and came to fruition from 
the 1970s forward (Cooper, 2009). Through the democratization of the electoral and 
policymaking system throughout the 20th century, Progressive era reforms weakened 
political parties, eventually empowering interest groups, issue advocates, the media, 
financial donors, and the general population (Cooper, 2009). This led to policymaking that 
was closer to the perceived public will. The issue networks that govern the modern 
American policymaking systems are fluid as policy and political expertise are premium in 
gaining influence in the reformed modern American system. This has weakened political 
parties but increased the influence of the media, interest advocacy and individual political 
entrepreneurship on policymaking outcomes — as these groups have policy and political 
expertise (Berry, 1993; Cooper 2009). This has resulted in a system where, as Baumgartner 
and Jones (1991; 1993) theorize, the endogenous characteristics of pluralism have provided 
opportunities for challengers to contest governing policy problemitizations and, if 
successful, secure venue shifting that can lead to policy change. Additionally, the American 
policymaking process in education is more intergovernmental than in Germany. In 
education policymaking, local, state, and national policy venues have overlapping roles, 
leading to the interaction of policy venues and the potential for issue expansion as well as 
providing alternate venues for outsiders to influence the policymaking system. 
The closed German policymaking system has been described as ‘centralized’ and 
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corporatist in which issues are governed by concertation between the state and recognized 
interests — para-public institutions — in shared issue areas of concern (Musch, 2010; 
Lembruch, 1984). Katzenstein (1987) referred to this as the semi-sovereign state in which 
policy making was decentralized (also via cooperative federalism) but centralized under 
the various para-public institutions which have a high degree of autonomy in particular 
issue areas. These systems can be described as closed, as the state must recognize and 
sanction outsider entry into the policymaking process. Additionally, recognized lead 
organizations have monopoly power in interest representation, thus creating another 
gatekeeper to the policymaking process (Cox and McCubbins, 1997; Cawson, 1988).  
The study, subsequently, will demonstrate how the open and closed political 
systems provide different opportunities and hurdles for attaining, sustaining and 
challenging policy regimes and will, thus, provide an example of how Baumgartner and 
Jones’ punctuated equilibrium theory can be made transportable to more closed systems: 
issue expansion via the expansion of conflict is more limited and smaller in scope when it 
does occur. In more open systems, concurring with Baumgartner and Jones (1993), the 
multitude of access points provided by the preponderance of venues makes the expansion 
of conflict more likely. Change is subsequently more frequent in the more open system, 
and often more substantial in scope (policy/ ideological change in multiple levels of 
government) when it does occur as issue expansion is greater in scope. This leads to more 
substantial policy change as the larger number of venues provides more forums where the 
politics of change can be replicated during periods of issue saliency.  
The study will use these theories in this literature to depict how evolving elite views 




The Issue of Language and Religion as Cultural Signifiers in the US and Germany, 
Respectively 
The study will apply Zolberg and Woon’s (1999) theory that Christianity and 
English are cultural signifiers in Germany and the US, respectively. In comparing religious 
instruction policy in Germany and bilingual education policy in the US, the study applies 
Zolberg and Woon’s (1999) argument that Islam and Spanish pose cultural threats to the 
privileged positions of Christianity and English in Western European states (in this case 
Germany) and the US, respectively. This rests on the notion that Western European states 
are culturally rooted in Christianity4 and the US in English (Woon and Zolberg, 1999). The 
increased presence of immigrant populations with different languages and/ or religions, 
concentrated in particular localities, threatens established understandings of cultural 
identities (Zolberg and Woon, 1999). Issue areas concerning the incorporation of Islam and 
Spanish, subsequently become areas of political contestation. This theory will be 
disaggregated further in the literature review. Still, here it is important to note that this 
study will show how differing elite views, historically, of the particular issues and different 
institutional contexts facilitate how these threats are resolved in policy areas where 
immigrants collectively organize to make claims on the state.      
                                                                                        
Bilingual Education and Islamic Religious Instruction 
Bilingual education and Islamic religious instruction policy were chosen as the 
issue areas of focus as they are education policy areas involved in the incorporation of 
                                                 
4 The Protestant and Catholic Church enjoy corporate status in Germany, which permits the state to collect 
taxes on their behalf and permits the religious communities to provide social services on the state’s behalf. 
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second languages and Islam, respectively and/or the political incorporation of those who 
speak and practice these non-native cultural amenities. Building on the comparable 
dilemmas Spanish and Islam bring to the US and Europe from their respective immigrant 
streams, this study will treat bilingual education and Islamic religious instruction as 
comparable policy areas in integration politics in the US and Germany. The comparison is 
employed to assess how integration policy is processed in the two political and institutional 
settings. 
As immigration has been a constant throughout American history — ebbing and 
flowing since its inception — the English language has served as a cultural unifier, 
providing a common cultural bond for a society continuously diversifying because of 
immigration (Zolberg and Woon, 1999). In Germany, officially recognized religious 
communities — specifically Christianity — have served this role of unifying the various 
regions and classes of German society (Zolberg and Woon, 1999). As a consequence, 
political and cultural integration in these two polities is (along with national/local 
ideational and institutional configurations) facilitated by the politics associated with 
integrating particular populations. Language and religion are central fault lines in this 
debate in the respective countries. 
Additionally, religious instruction and bilingual education have been interpreted as 
civil rights issues as its target populations are to some extent entitled (constitutionally 
sanctioned) to their provision or similar provisions provided certain legal conditions are 
met.  However, in both the US and Germany not only are policy issues decided in the 
courts, they also result from legislation and thus are political decisions. In the US case, 
court rulings in the 1970s sparked issue expansion in bilingual education — those in the 
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mid-1970s accelerating policy expansion and those in the late 1970s contributing to policy 
rollback from the 1980s forward.  After 1980, elite support dissolved for bilingual 
education as English Only forces gained political support. Subsequently, for political 
reasons executive and legislative support dissipated for bilingual education. At the national 
level, by 2000 with George Bush’s No Child Left Behind (NCLB), the federal government 
no longer mandated bilingual education as the default pedagogical approach for English 
Language Learner (ELL) students. At the local level, local political decisions rolled back 
bilingual education policy arrangements — limiting the program in years and its 
pedagogical focus to mainstreaming students to all English instruction. Thus, politics also 
played a role in the fate of bilingual education.   
In the German case, the Basic Law guarantees that recognized religious 
communities are entitled to provide religious instruction in public schools. However, for 
the exception of the Ahmadiyya Muslims in Hessen (in 2013), no Muslim group has yet to 
meet the Basic Law criteria for recognition as a religious community. This relieves the 
federal state of its legal responsibility to grant requests from Muslim communities to 
provide religious instruction. Despite these favorable legal conditions for the continued 
exclusion of Islamic religious instruction, localities have increasingly embraced 
provisional and pilot programs in Islamic religious instruction. These are the result of 
political decisions. Nevertheless, the only Muslim religious community to have won the 
right to provide confessional religious instruction closely adhering to the Basic Law criteria 
attained it through a 2000 court ruling— the Islamic Federation of Berlin (IFB) in Berlin. 
And such favorable rulings are beginning to increase the pressure on German 
Bundeslaender officials to accommodate the requests of Muslim communities (Hofhansel, 
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2010). In total, policy outcomes originating from the political and legal institutions have 
also played a role in the policy evolution of Islamic religious instruction in Germany. 
The common political-legal nature of these two policy areas, makes this fertile 
ground for comparing how the institutional variations of the two policymaking systems 
and differing elite views (historically) of the issues affect the politics of these two 
comparable issue areas.   
              
Defense of Case Selections: Why Germany v. United States 
 Germany and the US present an ideal pair for comparing the effects of institutions 
and elite views on policy outcomes because of differences in their normative conceptions 
of immigration, the role it played in the state-building myth, the institutional characteristics 
of the policymaking systems, similarities in the timing of immigration waves, the role of 
judicial overview in immigration law, and the role of federalism in policymaking. The 
similarities allow for a focus on how the normative conception of immigration and 
incorporation — captured in elite debates concerning the issues of focus — and 
open/closed policymaking systems play prominent roles in shaping policy trajectories. 
 Concerning the similarities, the US and Germany share historic parallels in the 
timing of their current immigration cycles. Trends in political liberalization and economic 
neoliberalism have brought increased immigration to these countries since the latter third 
of the 20th century.  This has brought populations of different cultures, races, languages, 
and/ or religions to Germany and the US (Joppke, 1999).   
 In Germany, the Turkish immigrants arrived in large numbers via the guest worker 
program (Gastarbeiterprogramm) beginning in 1961. They soon became the largest 
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population of foreign labor. When Germany ended the guest worker program in the early 
1970s, the families of the mostly male immigrants migrated to Germany as immigration 
policy favored family reunification. Immigration from Turkey, subsequently, increased 
(through the 1990s) — the consequence of this immigration policy shift (Joppke, 1999).   
 In the US, the Immigration Act of 1965 ended the ethnic and racial quota system 
of the former immigration law (Immigration Acts of 1924 and 1952) which had 
substantially reduced immigration from 1930 through 1960 (Joppke, 1999; Ngai, 1999). 
Subsequently, from the mid-1960s through 2007, immigration increased, mostly from 
populations originating from Latin America, Africa and Asia — attracted by the labor 
needs from various sectors of the American economy (Joppke, 1999). The increase in legal 
immigration was accompanied by a concurrent flow of illegal immigration — also attracted 
by the labor demands of the US economy. Nevertheless, the American immigration 
increase occurred parallel to that of Germany. 
 Another similarity is that both German and American immigration policies are 
subject to judicial overview as immigrants enjoy substantial constitutional rights (Joppke, 
1999). This has been deepened by the institutionalization of egalitarian reactions to their 
respective atrocities of the past — America’s discrimination of non-whites and Germany’s 
Nazism — which legitimized the more egalitarian streams of constitutional law in both 
countries. This has benefited immigrants in both settings in times when their numeric 
and/or naturalization rates may have precluded an electoral influence on policy via the 
traditional democratic avenues. The courts in both polities have prioritized the protection 
of human rights over questions of citizenship as they relate to immigrant rights as non-
citizens. This is due to both the US Constitution and the Basic Law having legal 
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foundations based on the idea of universal human rights, which the state cannot supersede 
but should merely protect (Joppke, 1999). This aspect of immigration law in both countries 
has played a role in policy development in US bilingual education and Islamic religious 
instruction in Germany. 
 Moreover, federalism — a federal union which assigns basic competencies to its 
constituent states unless specified — plays a primary role in policymaking in both polities. 
Secular reforms have brought the two nations to similar power sharing relationships 
between the states and national governments, specifically in the realm of education 
policymaking (although the federal government plays a larger role in the American setting) 
(Joppke, 1999). This also drives the study’s methodological focus on localities of the study 
as these are the primary loci of education policy making in both nations.   
 As for the differences, ideationally, Joppke (1999) argues that Germany and the US 
— the world’s two largest permanent immigrant-receiving countries — are guided by 
different concepts of nationhood and have responded in fundamentally different ways to 
immigration. The US has been an official immigrant state since its inception while 
Germany has only acknowledged its status as an immigration nation since the turn of the 
21st century, ending its official stance as an ethnocultural state (Joppke, 1999; Givens, 
2007). The US is the classic settler nation where immigration is part of the state-building 
reality and lore as nationhood is built around a common creed not ethnicity (Joppke, 1999; 
Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 2010). The American response to immigration has been to 
see it (not without its conflicts and policy paradoxes) as an opportunity for periodic rebirth 
(Joppke, 1999; Zolberg, 2006). Thus, institutionally concerning immigrant incorporation, 
citizenship law and the criteria for entry are comparatively low. 
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 The American public has been more receptive to immigration than the German state 
(Mollenkopf and Hoschsild, 2010 23; Joppke, 1999). Survey data indicates that across a 
number of issues meant to represent immigrant acceptance, Americans indicate more of an 
acceptance of immigration than their German counterparts (Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 
2010 24-25).  
        Germany, on the other hand, is the classic ethnic nation where immigration is a 
historic anomaly (Joppke, 1999). For much of its history, Germany’s official raison d'être 
was to serve as the state of return for the forcibly dispersed German diaspora (a product of 
the 20th century World Wars and the Cold War) (Nordbruch, 2011). Immigration and 
citizenship policy developed in service of this state goal. Germany’s immigration regime, 
thus, developed a comparatively strict criteria for entry and citizenship of non-ethnic 
Germans, which had to be revisited and reformed after a torturous, protracted 
acknowledgment of its status as a nation with guest workers who had since become 
permanent settlers (Joppke, 1999; Nordbruch, 2011). 
 Subsequently, in the typologies of integration regimes literature, scholars have 
often categorized the US and Germany as opposing integration regime types (Castle and 
Miller, 2003; Brubaker, 1999; Kurthen and Schmitter Heisler, 2009; Mollenkopf and 
Hochschild, 2010). Despite the questionable empirical validity of such typologies 
(Freeman, 2004 948), there are stark differences in the two nations concerning the 
institutional and political contexts through which immigration policy is facilitated 
(Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 2010).  
 With respect to the governing institutions of the two countries, Germany’s 
governing institutions are also less susceptible to the political pressures of immigration. 
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The frequent elections and weak political parties of the American system, make American 
political officials vulnerable to polarizing issues such as immigration (as elaborated 
previously). Germany, by contrast, has strong political parties, which are ideologically 
weak; policy-making power is divided between the federal government, the Bundeslaender 
and para-public institutions, which interact in a corporate fashion via state-interest 
concertation (Katzenstein, 2005). German policymaking is, subsequently, consensual, 
marked by incremental policy evolution. The issue of immigration does also polarize the 
electorate as well as the political elites (Katzenstein, 2005; Green, 2001). However, since 
the German policymaking system is more closed, the political establishment, for example, 
could and did avoid the messy politics of the immigration debate until the 1990s when the 
simultaneous immigration spikes in asylum refugees, returning German diaspora and 
Turkish immigration created social and political dislocations that could no longer be 
ignored (Nordbruch, 2011). In sum, German elites have more political and institutional 
support to ignore reactionary, populist appeals (regardless of their popular support) and 
pursue egalitarian client politics.   
 
Local Case Selections 
 This study argues that elite consensus and the open/closed nature of the political 
system are determinative of policy trajectories in bilingual education and Islamic religious 
instruction in the US and Germany, respectively, over the period of study. These 
trajectories not only vary nationally but also intra-nationally per US state and German 
Bundesland. Case selections were chosen to control for these variables along with 
partisanship of the state government as this has been cited in the literature as a 
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determinative factor in immigrant integration policy direction (Money, 2009; Givens 2005; 
Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Joppke, 1999). Subsequently, the following local cases were 
chosen in the US and Germany. 
 
 US Local Cases 
 The historic trajectory of elite views towards bilingual education are essentially 
identical in California and Texas. Texas is the more conservative state while California is 
the progressive state with the more open system. However, policy outcomes have 
experienced more policy rollback in California since the mid-1980s — a finding that is 
contrary to the literature concerning the effects of partisanship on integration politics 
(Joppke, 1999). Thus, the choice of California and Texas is meant to show the effects the 
openness of the policymaking system (in interaction with elite relations) is a better 
explanation than partisanship of government in explaining policy trajectories in bilingual 
education. 
 
 The case of California 
 California serves as the left-leaning,5 more open political system with a ten year 
period of elite agreement concerning bilingual education from approximately 1965 through 
                                                 
5 The state legislature has been dominated by the Democratic party since 1959 except for 1969 to 1971 when 
Republicans controlled both chambers and from 1994 to 1996 when Republicans held a majority in the 
Assembly (balotpedia.org). From 1959 through 2011, California has elected 4 Republican and 3 Democratic 
governors. Governors Edmund Brown (D), Ronald Reagan (R) and Jerry Brown (D) supported bilingual 
education (the period from 1959-1983). From 1983-1999, the Governor’s office was occupied by two 
Republicans who opposed bilingual education, George Deukmejian and Pete Wilson. From 1952 to 1988, 
California’s electoral votes were cast for the Republican presidential candidate (270towin.com). Since 1988, 




 Concerning elite agreement pertaining to bilingual education, academic and 
bipartisan support existed for bilingual education among the state’s elites from the mid-
1960s through the early 1970s.6 From the late 1970s forward, California Republicans 
began to oppose bilingual education policy arrangements in larger numbers. This increased 
through the 1980s and 1990s as immigration rates spiked. 
 With regard to the openness of California’s policymaking system, it will be argued 
that it has a more open political system than Texas. This is mainly attributable to the voter 
initiative which allows policy legislation through direct voter initiatives and presents 
outside challengers and political entrepreneurs a venue to sell their alternative issue 
definitions directly to the voters. Provided that initiative sponsors satisfy the criteria for 
putting an initiative on the ballot, sponsors can affect policy outcome without having to 
overcome legislative institutional gatekeepers and/ or be subject to the institutional policy 
dynamics of retrenchment politics (this will be discussed in detail in the literature review) 
prevalent in settled issues in which only legislative action can change policy outcomes and 
a policy regime and/or a mobilized constituency are present to defend policy arrangements.   
 
 The case of Texas 
 Texas is the right-leaning,7 less open political system with a ten year period of elite 
                                                 
6 Both Governor’s Ronald Reagan and President Richard Nixon (from California) were supporters of state 
and federal legislation to expand bilingual education policy arrangements. The 1970 OCR memorandum was 
drafted by Leon Panetta, a prominent Republican lawyer from the state. Support from bilingual education 
was also bipartisan among local and state officials during the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
 
7 From 1963 through 1979, Democrats held the governor’s office. Beginning in 1979 with Bill Clemens, 
Republicans began to take a firmer hold of the office. Clemens was succeeded by Democrat Mark White, 
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agreement in support of bilingual education from 1965-1975. From the late 1970s forward, 
there was increasing elite division concerning bilingual education.  
 Concerning Texas’ comparatively closed political setting, this designation is only 
in comparison to California. Compared to the German localities, Texas (like all US states) 
has a comparatively open policymaking system. However, compared to California, it is 
less open as it does not have the voter initiative as a policymaking option. Consequently, 
education legislation must go through the district and/or state legislative bodies. Issue areas 
are subsequently controlled by policy subsystems which have gatekeeping power to 
preclude political outsiders and can rely on the dynamics of policy retrenchment (Pierson, 
1994) to favor the policy status quo.   
 
 German Local Cases 
 Compared to the American cases, the German cases will be considered closed 
policymaking systems. Policymaking in religious instruction is characterized by corporatist 
interest intermediation in non-competitive contexts where para-public institutions have a 
high degree of autonomy in issue areas and serve essentially as policy monopolies. 
However, the cases do vary in the historic partisanship of the Bundeslaender government 
                                                 
who was succeeded by Bill Clemens’ return to the office. Democrat Ann Richards succeeded Clemens and 
she was succeeded by George W. Bush in 1995. Since 1994, Texas has not elected a Democrat to the 
governor’s office or any statewide office. However, all of the aforementioned governors were supportive of 
or at least silent on the issue of bilingual education. The state legislature has been controlled by Republicans 
since 2003. Prior to that it had predominantly been in Democratic control. Through 1980, the state electoral 
votes were cast for Democratic presidential candidates. From 1980 forward, the state has supported 
Republican presidential candidates. Texas’ bipartisan history should not be confused for political 
moderatism, however. Texas is a fiscally and socially conservative state. Its partisan history is reflective of 
the south which went through a thirty year period of electoral realignment after the 1960s Civil Rights 
legislation made the Democratic Party officially the progressive party (shedding its southern segregationist 
ties). The realignment took effect first at the presidential level with the state legislatures following in the mid-
1990s as was the case for other Southern states.   
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and elite views concerning religious instruction. The German cases were chosen to show 
how differing elite relations concerning religious instruction in closed policymaking 
systems provide better explanations for policy outcomes than the partisanship of 
government. 
 
 The Case of North Rhine Westphalia (NRW) 
  North Rhine Westphalia was ruled by the SPD (the center-left party) for all but two 
years of the period of study. Elites supported religious instruction as a means for integrating 
the youth in general and Islamic religious instruction for Muslim youth in particular. 
Generally, the SPD is the party that immigrants of the guest worker (Gastarbeiter) 
generation and their descendants feel the most welcome by and, if they are voting, for 
whom they vote.  
 NRW has been governed by Article 7 III which mandates religious instruction in 
NRW public schools. Consequently, corporatist policy arrangements typified the 
Bundesland’s attempts to incorporate Muslim lead communities to establish corporatist 
para-public institutions for the provision of Islamic religious instruction. However, as the 
NRW authorities did not officially recognize a Muslim lead organization, the corporatist 
partnerships formed with various Muslim communities in the provision of NRW’s version 







 The Case of Bavaria  
 Bavaria was ruled by the CSU (the local sister party of the center-right CDU) 
throughout the period of study. As with NRW, elites have supported religious instruction 
and Islamic religious instruction as a means for integrating German youth and Muslim 
youth, respectively. Bavaria is likewise governed by Article 7 III, thus mandating religious 
instruction and establishing corporatist state-interest intermediation in the provision of 
religious instruction as the legitimate institutional paradigm. However, as in NRW, 
Bavarian officials were unable to find a suitable Muslim lead organization at the state level 
to recognize. Instead Bavarian officials eventually allowed localities to recognize local 
Muslim lead organizations. As this also did not satisfy Article 7 III requirements, these 
were also policy arrangements that operated outside Article 7 III but operated within the 
Article 7 III normative paradigm for the structure of state-interest intermediation. 
 
 The Case of Berlin 
 Berlin was ruled by the SPD for the period of study. Unlike the other cases, Berlin 
is not governed by Article 7 III. Instead, religious instruction is offered on a voluntary 
basis.  Elites in this Bundesland have been divided concerning religious instruction. This 
division led to a voter initiative that nearly made religious instruction mandatory. Although 
the status of religious instruction is less certain in Berlin, the policymaking system because 
of institutional practices and reforms to the education law is as closed as the other two 
Bundeslaender. The provision of religious instruction by the religious communities is 
heavily subsidized by the state and the accompanying policy arrangements closely 
resembled those called for by Article 7 III. Similar to Article 7 III regimes, the education 
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ministry maintains near monopoly control over which religious community it recognizes 
for subsidies and subsequently brings into the policymaking process. Thus, the policy 
arrangements pursued are also informal and are guided by the normative paradigm of 
Article 7 III for state-interest intermediation in religious instruction policymaking. 
 
Definition of Concepts Used in the Study 
 Elites: The following groups will be considered elites: political parties, government 
officials, public officials, academics, issue advocates, interest groups, political 
entrepreneurs and the media. These have been classic proxies used to describe elite 
behavior (Burk, 1999 60). The use of elites, however, will mostly refer to political elites, 
which includes all of the above with the exception of the media. 
 Elite Agreement: When there is general consensus among elites concerning the 
problematization of a policy area and its proposed solution. Opposition still exists but it is 
generally considered fringe or extremist or its political influence is not sufficient to control 
or affect the direction of policy outcomes. This will be ascertained primarily through a 
close rendering of secondary accounts of elite views concerning the relevant issues 
overtime. 
 Elite Disagreement: When there is general divisions among elites concerning the 
problematization of a policy and its proposed solution. This will also be ascertained via the 
methods described above. 
 Policy Venue: The institutional location of policymaking (Baumgartner and Jones, 
1991; 1993) 
 Venue Shifting: The change of policy venue via a strategic gambit by those outside 
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the policy regime to shift policymaking authority to another policy venue (Baumgartner 
and Jones, 1991) 
 Issue Definition: How a particular interest is problematized and the appropriate 
options for solutions (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).   
 Venue Shopping: The search by those outside the policy regime for more favorable 
policy venues for their alternative policy definitions (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).  
 Policy Regime: The set of ideas, interests and institutions that govern policy (King 
and Smith, 2005; 2008). 
 Learning English Proficient (LEP) students/ English Language Learner (ELL): 
These are the terms used for designating those students who are not proficient in English. 
They will be used interchangeably as they are also both used in the literature. 
 Bilingual Education: This is instruction that uses the native language in the 
instruction of LEP/ ELL students. And this does not include English as a Second Language 
(ESL) instruction. This is the distinction used in Texas. However, in California, ESL 
instruction is often categorized under bilingual education. Throughout the literature on 
bilingual education, the two instructional methods are separately characterized and thus 
this study will use the same operationalization. 
 Policy Retrenchment: This study will assume that initiatives to rollback bilingual 
education policy arrangements share similar political dynamics as retrenchment efforts — 
specifically, the political dynamic that the costs of rollback are concentrated while its 
benefits are diffusely spread among the population. This creates a status quo bias unless 
government officials can find ways to mitigate blame. Pierson (1994) establishes that 
initiatives to rollback or eliminate mature welfare state programs carries with it unique 
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challenges for its proponents. He argues that mature programs encourage policy feedback 
which leads to the development of administrative capacities and interests. These interests 
benefit from the program’s presence and thus have a stake in its existence.  Subsequently, 
retrenchment politics involves taking on these entrenched interests. This creates a dynamic 
in which the costs of retrenchment is concentrated on these interests and the benefits [to 
society at large] are diffuse. This leads to a situation that biases the status quo since the 
risks for elected officials — electoral retribution from the aggrieved interests — outweigh 
the rewards of retrenchment (Sheingate, 2000). Although bilingual education is an 
education program, it has also functioned as social policy subsidized by federal and state 
expenditures (Moran, 1988). Since its establishment, an administrative apparatus has 
developed at the federal and state level (bureaucratic administrators at the federal and state 
levels; and teachers locally) from which some of its staunchest advocates have emerged. 
An interest advocacy network (ranging from civil rights organizations to community parent 
and education professional activists groups) developed in the 1970s which not only have 
defended its existence, but also claim to speak for the program’s constituency, Latinos. 
Hispanics are the largest minority group in the US and are expected to become the largest 
ethnic group in the middle of the current century. Political officials throughout the period 
of study have recognized the potential political perils of repealing bilingual education 
programs — potentially waking the sleeping giant that is the Latino vote.   
 Client Politics: This study employs Joppke’s (1999) definition which states that 
policies in which the organized potential recipients of ‘concentrated benefits’ prevail over 
the non-organized carriers of ‘diffuse costs’ (Joppke, 1999 1). 
 English Only: This refers to the political movement that both aims to make English 
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the official language and is against policy arrangements that sanction bilingualism. 
 Official English: Official English refers to the political movement that aims to make 
English the official language of the nation and/or of particular states. 
 Restrictionism (concerning language): Prohibitions on the use of languages other 
than English (Galindo, 2000). 
 Restrictionism (in immigration): Efforts to reduce immigration streams. 
 Expansionary (concerning language): Initiatives to encourage bilingualism, 
multilingualism, and multiculturalism 
Immigrant incorporation/ political incorporation: The process through which 
immigrants become part of the mainstream (Okamoto and Ebert, 2010 529). 
 
Dissertation Outline 
 The remainder of the dissertation will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 will present a 
brief historical account of the political incorporation of Mexicans in the US and Turkish 
immigrants in Germany. It will also provide a summation of policy developments in US 
bilingual education and Islamic religious instruction in Germany to detail the varying 
policy trends in the two nations that inspired the study. Chapter 3 will offer a review of the 
literature upon which this study was built upon. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 will deal with the 
American case. Chapter 4 will offer as background information, the Politics of Bilingual 
education, showing how bilingual education has been a historically contested policy area 
among elites. This chapter provides a historical account of the politics of bilingual 
education with a focus on national level political development. Chapters 5 and 6 will deal 
with the individual cases of California and Texas, respectively. Chapter 5 and 6 will also 
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provide the subnational comparative analysis of the American cases, assessing the different 
prospects for Mexican interests in the two open policymaking settings. Chapters 7 and 8 
will deal with the German case. Similar to Chapter 4, Chapter 7 will provide a historical 
overview of the politics of religious instruction with a focus on national political 
development in religious instruction. Chapter 8 will present the three German cases, 
allowing for subnational comparisons of how differing elite views in the respective 
Bundeslaender concerning religious instruction play out in the closed German settings. The 
final chapter, Chapter 9, will provide a discussion mostly focused around the national 





















THE POLITICAL INCORPORATION OF TURKISH AND MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS 
AND COUNTER INTUITIVE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN ISLAMIC 
RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION AND AMERICAN BILINGUAL EDUCATION 
 
The first chapter introduces the rationale for why Germany and the US serve as excellent 
examples to illustrate the points made by Woon and Zolberg (1999). The following chapter 
provides a concise history of the political incorporation of Mexicans in the US and Turks 
in Germany followed by the current trends in these policy realms and historical 
backgrounds. This aims to provide an understanding of the more detailed history of the 
policies discussed in chapters 4 through 8.                                                                                 
 
The Political Incorporation of Mexicans and Turks in Comparison  
With respect to the immigrant groups themselves, Turkish immigrants in Germany and 
Mexicans in the US represent the largest immigrant populations but the least integrated 
according to standard measures of immigrant integration (Kurthen and Schmitter Heisler, 
2009). Mexicans and Turks also share many “similar demographic characteristics, such as 
age distribution, educational attainment, occupational position, household size, and labour 
market participation” (Kurthen and Schmitter Heisler, 2009).  
Due to the efforts of multiple research institutions, demographic data on Hispanics 
in the US has been well documented.  The same cannot be said of Muslims in Germany. 
Data collection of this subpopulation has only recently begun with the commissioned 
 
45 
efforts of the German Islam Conference. With respect to Hispanics in the US, the study 
will make use of data provided by the Pew Research Hispanic Center. In addition to 
showing the demographic similarities between Mexican immigrants in the US and Turkish 
immigrants in Germany, this data will also help to provide socioeconomic context for the 
subnational case studies to follow in Chapters 5, 6 and 8.   
According to the Pew Research Center, Hispanics represent 17 percent of the 
American population.  These numbers are up from 6.4 percent in 1980; 9 percent in 1990; 
and 12.5 percent in 2000. With respect to this study, all of the top 10 counties with the 
highest share of the Latinos among the population are in Texas, ranging from 88.1 to 95.6 
percent.  This trend has been prevalent since the 1980s. As ethnic concentration in the US 
has been a primary factor in immigrant political representation historically in the US 
(Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 2010), these numbers speak to the substantial increase in 
Latino (predominantly Mexican) political representation in Texas over this period (to be 
discussed below). The maps in the appendix (Appendix 1) provide visual evidence of these 
trends. These maps reveal increasing Latino concentration in California as well but to a 
lesser degree which speaks to the slightly lower numbers in political representation 
experienced in California since the 1980s. California does have a larger aggregate share of 
Latinos but proportionately, Latinos make up 38.2 percent of the population in both Texas 
and California. Since the 1980s Texas has experienced a 49.7 percent increase of its Latino 
population while California’s share of Hispanics has increased by 33 percent. And as 
mentioned and will be shown below this has translated into an increased political presence 
in the state legislatures in both states since the 1980s.   
Mexicans are by far the largest immigrant group making 64.2 percent of Latinos 
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nationwide. Among the Mexican population one-third is foreign born.  And similar to the 
Turkish population in Germany, Mexicans are substantially younger than native-
Americans: the median age of both native and foreign-born Mexicans is 27 compared to 
42 for White Americans. 
Concerning education attainment, Hispanics lag behind all other groups. Only 18 
percent of native-born Latinos and 10.6 of the foreign born have college degrees.  This is 
compared with the national average of 29.2 percent. 
Of those with less than a 9th grade education, Hispanics by far have the highest 
percentage at 21.1 percent with the foreign born being hit particularly hard in this area with 
32.3 percent with less than a 9th grade education. Poor educational outcomes have 
historically been a primary impetus for advocacy among Latino interests groups, and 
bilingual education has always been trumpeted by its supporters as (and detractors for 
failing at) addressing this issue.  
In terms of income, the median Latino household income is 9,500 USD below the 
national median income. Native born Latinos had a median income of 43,400 USD in 2012 
while the foreign born median income was 37,000 USD. Although these numbers are low, 
black household median income is still lower at 33,600 USD. Nevertheless this translates 
into the increased likelihood of Latino children living in poverty: 41.3 percent of Hispanic 
children live in poverty. These numbers only trump black children who are also more likely 
to live in poverty. 
Demographic figures for Muslims in Germany bare similar patterns. The largest 
immigrant group is of Turkish descent, making up 63.2 percent of the immigrant population 
(a comparable figure to the Mexican share of the American immigrant population at 64.2). 
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Additionally, the German micro census indicates that the German population with a 
migrant background are also far younger than their native German peers (Haug et al, 2009 
106). 
As evident from the table in appendix 2, 98.4 percent of all Muslims live in the 
Western Bundeslaender. The case studies under investigation here, are among the 
Bundeslaender with the highest distribution of Muslims with North Rhine Westphalia 
alone hosting 33.1 percent of all Muslims in Germany.  
Comparable to Latinos in the US, generally those in Germany with a migration 
background are less educated than their native counterparts (Haug et al, 2009 211). This is 
particularly true of Muslim immigrants: while 6.9 percent of the Christians (or of other 
religious persuasion) immigrants surveyed do not hold a high school diploma, 14.8 percent 
of Muslim immigrants stated that they had never graduated high school. The former group 
was also more likely to possess the highest secondary school diploma that allows them to 
attend university (42.2 percent), but only 34.1 percent of all Muslim immigrants stated the 
same. Of all Muslim groups, Shiites are doing the best while Alevites have the worst 
educational outcomes. This is connected with their respective homelands and their 
motivations for their initial emigration to Germany: while Shiites mostly fled from Iran, 
Alevites came to Germany via the guest worker program. The same pattern repeats itself 
with immigrants of the second generation (Haug et al, 2009 212ff).  
 These numbers show how Mexicans and Turkish immigrant populations in the US 
and Germany are equally marginalized socioeconomically but being younger with higher 
fertility rates than their native peers, are projected to be the majority populations later in 
the century. This has created an urgency among elites (both from the immigrant groups and 
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the political establishment) to integrate these populations. The politics and institutional 
structures, however, manifest in differing policy outcomes in issues pertaining to 
integrating these populations in the different national settings. 
As Turkish immigrants and Mexican immigrants are comparable populations, so 
are the issue areas in which they are the main beneficiaries. Both bilingual education and 
Islamic religious instruction are not institutions of political incorporation solely targeted at 
Mexicans and the Turkish population exclusively. However, they both make up the largest 
foreign born ethnic groups and more importantly, Turkish and Mexican interests have been 
the lead interests in establishing and defending policy arrangements in these respective 
policy areas (Crawford, 1999; Joppke, 1999; Nordbruch, 2011; Hofhansel, 2010).   
 As the demographic characteristics of Mexicans and Turks and the policy areas of 
bilingual education and Islamic religious instruction are comparable, they make for an 
appropriate comparison. This specifically allows for analysis on how preexisting 
institutional configurations and elite views at the local and federal level affect the politics 
of two policy areas involved in incorporating two similar demographic groups 
marginalized from these modern industrialized societies. 
 
The Long History of Political Incorporation and Entrenchment of Mexicans in the US 
 Mexican immigration to the US dates back to the late 19th century. Subsequently, 
immigrant destinations in the US for Mexican communities have developed in states and 
localities, such as Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, and Chicago, Illinois, and 
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recently expanding to more interior western areas, such as Colorado8 as well as the south 
especially Arkansas, North Carolina and Georgia (Singer, 2004; 2009). Present-day Texas, 
New Mexico, Nevada, Utah and California were annexed from Mexico after the Mexican-
American War with the Treaty of Hidalgo Guadalupe in 1848 (Ngai, 1999). Thus, Mexican 
populations predate the acquisition of these territories by the US. Mexicans have been able 
to naturalize since the Treaty. As of 2009, 40 percent of the Mexican population are citizens 
and, therefore, can exercise their vote in issue areas of importance (Okomoto and Ebert, 
2010).  
 As the previous paragraph makes clear, these older immigrant destinations have 
existed for over a century. This favors the incorporation of Mexicans. Once favorable 
institutional configurations have been established concerning immigrant integration, 
literature in policy retrenchment and path dependency argue that particular policy 
arrangements favorable to entrenched groups should make them well-positioned to impede 
initiatives in policy rollback (Pierson, 1994; Sheingate, 2000; Bamgartner and Jones, 1993; 
Joppke, 1999). Unfavorable policy change in issues of interests to Mexicans should be far 
more limited in a polity, such as the United States in which immigration is a normative 
aspect of its state building project, and because Mexicans are an immigrant group with a 
longer history of political, cultural, and social entrenchment in the US (Mollenkopf and 
Hochschild, 2010 22). This should also favor further policy designed to facilitate the 
continued political incorporation of this politically entrenched immigrant group 
                                                 
8
 Colorado was actually a destination hub for Mexican immigrants in the 19th century but immigration 
curtailed after the first two decades of the 20th century (Singer, 2004). 
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(Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 2010 22). In fact, there is ample evidence that client politics9 
has permitted continued unabated immigration to the US because of the entrenchment of 
Latino advocates despite the public’s lukewarm idea to liberal immigration control policy 
(Joppke, 1999; Givens and Luedtke, 2005). Especially when compared to a state such as 
Germany, where the normative idea of immigration as well as the incorporation of 
immigrant groups is relatively new, prospects should be more favorable for policy 
accommodation — path dependency10 or policy liberalization — concerning polices and 
structures to incorporate or integrate immigrants (Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 2010). 
 In addition, Mexican immigrant interest groups (or in combination with pan-ethnic 
Latino organizations) have been in existence since the late 19th century, campaigning 
against residential and educational segregation, for better working conditions, and bilingual 
education (Joppke, 1999). Through the 1950s, American Hispanic organizations mostly 
catered to Mexican-Americans. It was not until the 1960s that Mexican organization began 
to partner with other Hispanic ethnics or evolved into pan-Latino organizations. The 
historical political involvement of these groups as well as the political incorporation of 
Mexican-Americans will be the focus of the next section.   
 Joppke (1999) provides a detailed account of the history of the political 
incorporation of Mexican-Americans. A selective summation of the narrative 
(supplemented with other references) will be used to provide this account. Mexican 
political mobilization began in the early 1900s with the founding of the Japanese-Mexican 
                                                 
9 Wilson (1980) and Joppke (1999) found that client politics induces collective action problems where 
organized beneficiaries of concentrated benefits triumph over the unorganized bearing the diffuse costs 
(Givens and Luedtke, 2005). 
 
10 Where client politics and institutional inertia makes the costs of policy change not in the interests of the 
small group of policy beneficiaries. 
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Labor Association in 1903 (Latino Civil Rights Timeline). The Union consisted of over 
1200 Mexican and Japanese farm labor and would later become the first union to 
successfully win a labor dispute against the California agricultural industry (Latino Civil 
Rights Timeline). The oldest of the Mexican-American civil rights organizations is the 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) (Joppke, 1999). Formed in 1929, its 
rank-and-file membership extended across class lines — lower middle class professionals 
and businessmen. It was devoted to pursuing integration for Mexicans suffering from 
segregation in residence and in school. In service of this goal, LULAC pushed for English 
acquisition among its members in the pre-Civil Rights years (Joppke, 1999). In 1946, 
LULAC successfully won the first federal desegregation case in education, Mendez v. 
Westminster (discussed in the Politics of Bilingual Education chapter), ruling that 
segregating Mexicans was unconstitutional as they were not of the black race11 (Latino 
Civil Rights Timeline).   
 After the success of the African American civil rights movement in securing 
redistributive legislation designed to compensate for historic state-sanctioned 
discrimination (Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Education, 
Secondary Education Act of 1965), Latino organizations reoriented their organizational 
ideology and turned their focus to winning redistributive policy concessions. For example, 
the founding of the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) in 
the 1960s was a paragon of such political organization. Initially sponsored by a grant from 
the Ford Foundation, it was modeled after the National Association for Colored Peoples 
(NAACP). It represents Hispanics and is predominantly a litigation organization without a 
                                                 
11 This was the pre-Brown era where racial segregation in schools was still legal. 
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rank-and-file membership. It has been a lead organization in the fight for the political and 
legal rights of American Latinos. During the late 1960s, bipartisan courtship of Latinos, 
Nixon affiliates as well as those of the Ford Foundation encouraged MALDEF to organize 
and mobilize the growing Latino population into a formidable political force in the image 
of the African American Civil Rights movement. It has been the predominant player in 
most legal matters concerning the Hispanic community since its inception (Joppke, 1999). 
MALDEF contributed to the drafting of the Bilingual Education Act of 1967, which would 
eventually become the Bilingual Education Act of 1968. It was also the lead interest 
organization in securing passage of the 1975 and 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights 
Act, which legally recognized Latinos as a protected “language minority” (Joppke, 1999). 
Additionally, MALDEF was one of the primary litigators involved in the Lau v. Nichols 
(1974/1975) and Plyer v. Doe rulings (both will be discussed in the Politics of Religious 
Instruction chapter) (Joppke, 1999). Other interest groups/ congressional caucuses that 
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s include the National Council of La Raza, the 
Congressional Hispanic Caucus, the National Association of Latino Elected Officials, and 
the Tomas Rivera Policy Institute (DeSipio, 2006). 
 Immigration legislation historically has tended to be dominated by well-organized 
client groups as opposed to being dictated by public opinion (Joppke, 1999; Freeman, 
2004). This is especially true of Mexican political organization in which elite participation 
has far outpaced Mexican electoral participation (DeSipio, 2006). Nevertheless, this should 
be well suited to Mexican interests. As the previous paragraphs established, Mexican elites 
have had an organizational presence and a track record of achieving legislative 
accomplishments especially since the 1960s via elite interest mobilization. 
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 By the 1980s, the growing Latino population combined with its organizational 
presence at the national and local levels allowed Latino organizations to effectively 
influence national immigration legislation. Latino interests were able to both ward off anti-
immigrant policy, which they characterized as anti-Latino, and successfully coerce 
expansive legislation from officials weary of alienating the Latino constituency (Joppke, 
1999). Joppke (1999) cites the provisions added to the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986 as an example of the then growing influence of the Latino interest advocacy 
network. The 1986 Act legalized the status of approximately 3 million illegal immigrants 
and left the inflow of illegal immigrants unimpeded. Concerning the effectiveness of Latino 
groups in defeating restrictive measures in the original draft of the 1986 bill, Joppke adds 
that since the majority of illegal immigrants are Mexicans, Mexicans view anti-illegal 
immigrant policy as anti-Mexican policy. Latino interest used such a framing to 
characterize these policies as anti-Mexican, galvanizing support for eliminating or limiting 
anti-illegal immigration measures in the 1986 bill. This strategy was also employed in the 
Immigration Act of 1990. Mexican interests succeeded in securing additional amendments 
to the Immigration Act of 1990. The 1990 Act resulted in an overall increase in the cap on 
legal immigration — gestures to immigrant and business groups (Joppke, 1999). Since the 
normative political culture favors anti-discrimination in the post-civil rights era in public 
and private spheres, this has allowed Latino groups to effectively defeat restrictive 
measures, claiming that defeating these measures equated with defeating provisions that 
fostered ethnic discrimination against Mexicans. Joppke cited Latino victories in blocking 
employer sanctions and gaining amnesty for 3 million immigrants in the 1986 bill as a 
significant moment in Latino political history, showing the rise of Latino immigrant groups 
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and their ability to block federal legislation contrary to their perceived interests. Such 
political influence would appear to advantage Latino groups in the bilingual education 
argument as well, since anti-bilingual education provisions (which predominantly 
benefited Mexicans) were also sold by Latino leadership as anti-Latino and anti-Mexican 
in Latino communities.        
 Additionally, according to Mollenkopf and Hochschild (2010) the American 
electoral process is more open to insurgency candidates (such as Mexican candidates, who 
were not home grown in one of the major parties), responsive to geographically 
concentrated demographic groups, and less dominated by party control. Parties gain power 
by mobilizing ethnic and/ or interest concentrated groups to support party candidates. Party 
leaders are less inclined to exercise veto power in candidate selection if it goes against the 
will of party supporters. Thus, insurgency candidates can place themselves on ballots 
through mass mobilization even when lacking the support of party leaders. Less stringent 
naturalization processes (compared to Germany) make this process more open to 
immigrants. Subsequently, as the US has a tradition of immigrant mobilization and 
immigrant political participation, there are a plethora of non-profit organizations devoted 
to immigrant political incorporation (Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 2010).  
 These factors have allowed for Latinos to hold political office dating back to the 
19th century (DeSipio, 2006). Latinos have a history of holding major political offices in 
California, New Mexico, Texas and New York — all states with concentrated Latino 
populations (Manning, 2014; DeSipio, 2006). Because of poll taxes and gerrymandering, 
however, political representation was stifled from the turn of the 20th century to the 1960s 
— coinciding with the disenfranchisement of African Americans in the South. From the 
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1960s forward, however, Latino political representation has increased dramatically at the 
state level. The following details the increase of Latino representation in state legislatures 
across the nation from 1952-2010: 
 In 1952, 22 Latinos served in state legislatures. Nineteen of them served in New 
Mexico with 1 each in the state legislatures of Colorado, Arizona and Texas. Between 1952 
and 1962, the number of Latinos in state legislatures increased to 35 with Texas increasing 
from 1 to 7 (including its first senator) and California from 0 to 2 (the first representatives 
since 1907). Between 1962 and 1970, the number of Hispanic representatives increased 
from 35 to 59 with California holding at 2 and Texas increasing to 12. New Mexico 
continued to have the most representatives, increasing to 36. By 1980, there were 111 
Latinos in state legislatures across the country with California increasing to 7 
representatives and Texas to 24. However making up 26 percent of the population in the 
1990 census, the California Hispanic population remained a meager electoral presence, 
making up only 5 percent of the electorate. Their share of the electorate would increase to 
14 percent by 1998 (much of this inspired by the passage of Proposition 187) (see 
California chapter). The number of Latino state representatives increased to 120 by 1984. 
By the 1990 election, the number of Latino representatives increased to 128 with Texas 
increasing to 27; however, California dropped to 6. By 1995, the number would increase 
nationwide to 163; Texas increased to 33 and California increased to 14. By 2000, this 
number would increase to 198 nationwide; Texas jumped to 35; and California to 27. In 
both states Hispanics made up 32 percent of the population by 2000. However, they only 
made up 17.8 percent and 16.5 percent of the electorate, respectively. Nevertheless they 
experienced increases in Hispanic representation in the legislature between 1996 and 2003. 
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Texas increased from 27 to 33 and California from 14 to 27 during this period. By 2004, 
the number of Latino state representatives nationwide increased to 231. By the 2010 
election, Latinos in the state legislature increased to 246 nationwide (Schmal, 2011).   
 Latino politicians at the federal level that serve in Congress are organized in either 
the Congressional Hispanic Caucus or Congressional Hispanic Conference. As of 2014 
(the 113th Congress), there are currently four US senators of Latino descent serving in the 
Senate and 33 representatives of Latino descent in the US House of Representatives 
(representing 4 and 7 percent of those respective bodies). This is comparable with two 
African American (a minority group of similar population size) US senators and 42 
members in the House of Representative (Manning, 2014).   
 These are fairly high numbers for an immigrant group that only makes up 14 
percent of the overall population (comparable to African Americans who make up 12 
percent of the population and generally have a comparably high voter turnout rate) and in 
a body, the US Congress, that has historically and disproportionately been dominated by 
white males. Furthermore, 40 percent of Latinos are eligible to vote. And with 30 percent 
of the population under the age of 18, these numbers are expected to increase. The real 
difference, however, is in the aggregate numbers of political representatives of Mexican 
descent at both the state and national level. This will become apparent when the 







Turkish Political Representation in Germany   
 Non-German ethnics have only been able to naturalize since the early 1990s.  
Subsequently, their political representation in the German parliament is a recent 
phenomenon (to be discussed below). In the German example, there are only a handful of 
Turkish political officials in higher political office. Both major parties, the SPD and CDU, 
proclaimed an urgent need for regeneration and backlog demand, respectively, when it 
comes to attracting and promoting potential candidates with migration background. 
 After the last federal election in 2013, the number of members of the Bundestag 
(the German parliament) with Migrationshintergrund (migration background) rose from 
21 to 35 which represents 5.6 percent of the total number of the body’s membership (After 
the second-to-last election, the share was only 3.4 percent). The number of people of 
migration background in the German population at large is more than three times as high 
(19 percent).12 The number of members of parliament of Turkish descent has more than 
doubled and is currently 11, up from 5. Those with Turkish roots in Germany represent 3.7 
percent of the German population while those 11 current parliamentarians represent only 
1.75 percent of total number of members of the Bundestag (Haug et al, 2009).  
 At the Bundesland level, the lack of non-German presence is similar. In 2010, out 
of the 1825 members of the 16 parliaments of the Bundeslaender, 46 had a migration 
background. That is a (massive) jump over 2000 when only 12 members of the parliaments 
were either born abroad or whose parent(s) were/was born abroad. 
 NRW has one of the highest number of migrant representatives in Germany: 80 
members with migration background were voted into the various city councils in 2009. To 
                                                 
12  This percentage can be slightly different depending on who is counted as a person with migration 
background, see Gathmann and Keller (2014 6) who cite 13 percent. 
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put this in perspective, at the time of the election, between 13 and 20 percent of the 
population in NRW’s cities had migration backgrounds, but only 4 percent of the elected 
council members were non-Germans ethnics. In the current NRW Landesparlament, six 
members have migrant backgrounds; all but one were of Turkish descent (three for the 
Green Party, two for the SPD, and one for the CDU). 
 Berlin currently has 12 Senat (this City-Bundesland’s parliament) members of 
migration background; 8 of them have Turkish roots. Again, the majority of them belonged 
to the SPD, followed by the Greens (Gruene) Party, the Left (Linke) Party, and the CDU.  
 Before the 2013 Landesparlament election in Bavaria, a total of 13 candidates with 
migration background were nominated by the SPD, Gruene, Linke, FDP and Pirate Party. 
The Bavarian CSU did not have a candidate. In the end, only the SPD candidate prevailed 
and is now a member of the Landesparlament in Munich. This is the first time that a 
Turkish-born German has served in the conservative Bundesland parliament. 
  As is evident, these numbers are on the rise — similar to the Mexican rates — 
however, the Turkish presence in the Bundestag and at the Bundesland level has a far 
shorter history than that of its Mexican counterparts and has a much smaller presence 
currently. 
 This, thus, should speak to the favorable conditions under which Mexicans should 
be able to exercise their political will as compared to the Turkish population. The long 
history of immigration, the political entrenchment of Mexican/ Latino organizations in 
national and political life, the naturalization rates of Mexicans, and the long history of 
bilingual education for Mexicans all indicate that policy regimes, such as those associated 
with bilingual education, should be able to defend against political attack (according to the 
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logic of concentrated costs and diffuse benefits, iron triangle policymaking, and client 
politics). Current political trends, however, indicate a move away from bilingual education. 
This is one of the central questions of the puzzle to be solved in this study.  
 
Political Incorporation of Turkish Immigrants 
 The Turkish population is also considerably smaller as they comprise 
approximately 4 percent of the German population as opposed to the 10.3 percent that 
Mexican Americans account for in the US population.13 This being the case, they are not 
large enough to affect public policy as a voting bloc (although their growing numbers 
locally are changing this political dynamic) (Pfaff and Gill, 2006). Also, they have not been 
incorporated into any of the major political parties, despite the recruitment efforts from all 
parties. 14  Subsequently, their interests have been represented by various Muslim and 
Turkish interest groups (Pfaff and Gill, 2006). These groups, however, have remained 
fragmented, thus, precluding the formation of national Muslim interest groups similar to 
pan-Latino national organizations in the US (Pfaff and Gill, 2006).  
 With respect to the political incorporation of Turkish immigrants, it pales in 
comparison to their Mexican counterparts (as outlined above). With respect to 
naturalization, Turkish immigrants were mostly15 excluded from citizenship through the 
                                                 
13 Mexicans make up 10.3 percent of the population as July 2009 (US Census Bureau 2009). If the 7 million 
undocumented Mexican immigrants are included in the Mexican immigrant population total, their percentage 
increases to over 28 percent (as of 2008).  
 
14 Especially the conservative CDU have realized that they could not leave the political playing field to the 
left-of-center parties, which have been the traditional party for citizens of Turkish descent. 
 
15
 An exception was made for immigrant offspring born on German soil who could become citizens after the 
age of 16 with residency in Germany of at least 15 consecutive years. 
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early 1990s because of Germany’s citizenship law, which was based on the possession of 
German blood (jus sanguinis). Prior to 1991, only German ethnics could legally naturalize 
— there was no official law concerning the naturalization of immigrants of non-German 
ethnicity (Gathmann and Keller, 2014 7). After 1991, adolescents (ages 16-22) could 
naturalize after 8 years of residency and adults (those over 23) could naturalize after 15 
years of residency (Gathmann and Keller, 2014 7). Reforms in 2000, lowered the residency 
requirements to 8 years for adults and allowed naturalization for those born on German soil 
provided at least one parent had been a legal resident for 8 years and held a permanent 
resident permit for at least 3 years (Gathmann and Keller, 2014 7-9). In comparison to the 
5-year residency requirement for American naturalization and the automatic citizenship for 
those born on US soil (regardless of the parents’ legal status), German naturalization 
criteria, post reform, are still stiffer than their American counterparts (Mollenkopf and 
Hochschild, 2010). Also, lower naturalization rates (20 percent of Turks have German 
citizenship) and German law concerning non-citizens (prior to the early 1990s) have 
precluded Turkish migrants from forming political parties and holding public office — two 
important ingredients involved in political incorporation (Pfaff and Gill, 2006). 
 As mentioned, according to Mollenkopf and Hochschild (2010), the party system 
is also less open to ethnic insurgency.  The more stringent naturalization requirements have 
discouraged large numbers of eligible ethnic voters (Gathmann and Keller, 2014 6).  
Proportional representation and strong centralized parties preclude candidate insurgency 
and dilute the power of concentrated populations (even if naturalized).  Candidates must 
serve in the party for years before party leaders will back their candidacy for major office 
which (at least partially) explains the low numbers of persons of Turkish descent at the 
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national and Bundeslaender level (Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 2010).  
 In addition, the history of Turkish immigration to Germany is significantly shorter 
as it primarily dates back to the 1950s. The increase in immigration caused by families 
joining guest workers in the 1970s sparked the development of Islamic civic organizations 
as the Turkish population took on a more permanent nature. From the 1970s, these groups 
began to advocate for Muslim interests, one of their primary pursuits was the recognition 
of a Muslim religious community. As the Basic Law sanctions corporate status (which 
comes with educational and political privileges) to recognized religious communities, this 
became an avenue for the political incorporation of Muslim immigrant groups. Islam’s 
decentralized institutional structure, however, has made it problematic to satisfy the Basic 
Law’s structural prerequisites for religious communities. Subsequently, no Muslim group 
has been granted corporate status at the national level and only recently at the state level 
(in Berlin in 2000 and Hesse in 2013). It would, thus, appear that Muslim interests 
(consisting mostly of Turkish organizations) lack the political incorporation necessary in 
the German system to secure favorable policy positions. The political efficacy of these 
Turkish organizations pales in comparison to the history of advocacy and incorporation 
afforded Mexicans in the American setting.  Thus, the process of moving from outsider to 
insider status — placing immigrants in an institutional position to influence policy and 
fight for their interests — is less established in Germany (Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 
2010). 
 In total, the political incorporation of Germany’s Turkish immigrants is less 
substantial than its Mexican immigrant counterparts in the US. Turkish immigrant history 
in Germany is shorter, their rates of naturalization are less, the barriers to naturalization are 
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higher, the incorporation of Islam into the official German policymaking system has yet to 
occur, and Muslim incorporation into the normative conception of German culture is a 
polarizing issue. It is only in this last issue where there is a similarity with the plight of 
Mexican interests in the US. Latino immigration in general and bilingual education in 
particular are polarizing issues. However, the aforementioned levels of incorporation of 
Mexican immigrants should place them in a better position to fight for or defend policy 
arrangements that favor bilingual education. Since the 1980s, however, this has not been 
the case.  Despite the lesser degree of political incorporation and the polarizing nature of 
Islam in Germany, policy trends in the German state have moved towards incorporating 
Islamic religious instruction into the public school curricula. While in the US, the 
entrenched Mexican immigrant community is increasingly impotent in defending or 
establishing (in the southern US states where they are not entrenched) bilingual education 
programs.   
 
Overview of Policy Developments to Date: Efforts to Roll Back Bilingual Instruction v. 
Efforts to Establish/Expand Islamic Religious Instruction 
 The discussion will now turn to a review of current policy trends in bilingual 
education and religious instruction. The discussion will begin with current trends in 







 United States: Current Trends in Bilingual Education and Historical 
Background 
Excluding local projects of bilingualism in pre-20th century America, normatively, 
American immigration has operated on the assumption that all immigrants must learn 
English (Ngai, 1999; Zolberg and Woon, 1999). This changed in the 1960s with the 
enactment of the Bilingual Education Act of 1968, which induced localities to offer 
programs designed to assist language minority students in exchange for limited federal 
assistance. All localities with the requisite language minority populations were eligible. 
The OCR memorandum of 1970 and the Lau ruling (1974/75) mandated and led to the 
adoption of bilingual education at the state level as the preferred method to address the 
educational instruction for LEP students. Additionally, in 1974, Congress passed the Equal 
Education Opportunity Act, which made it legal for citizens to bring civil action against 
districts when they were denied equal education opportunity — the legal rational that was 
often invoked by linguistic minority plaintiffs in suits claiming inadequate support from 
districts in addressing their needs. In sum, by the mid-1970s, bilingual education policy 
trends were expansionary at the state and national level, sanctioned by all three branches 
of the federal government. These were bilingual education programs that, while they 
stressed English language acquisition and proficiency, also had as pedagogical goals, 
cultural maintenance and bilingualism. Bilingual education also enjoyed bipartisan support 
at the local, state and federal level during these years (Petrzela, 2010; Crawford, 1999). 
This was part of the 1960s legacy of liberalization in immigration and racial policy in the 
US — a political and institutional legacy of the Civil Rights movement.   
Over time (beginning in the late 1970s and accelerating in the mid to late 1990s), 
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however, this political consensus in support of bilingual education dissolved. Bilingual 
education policy arrangements across localities nationwide increasingly came under 
political attack in the 1980s and 1990s, ending some such as in California in the mid-1990s. 
At the local level, (spurred by 3-year federal funding caps) state initiatives were passed 
which modified bilingual education to 1-3 year transition programs after which students 
were transferred to English immersion instruction; bilingual education programs were 
reformed as strictly transitional bilingual education (TBE) programs, eliminating cultural 
maintenance and bilingualism as pedagogical goals; and/or states eliminated bilingual 
education programs completely. The initiatives that statutorily ended bilingual education 
arrangements at the state level include Proposition 227 California English for the Children 
Initiative (1998) in California; the 1999 Utah state initiative that promotes English Only 
laws in state government (including education); Proposition 203 (2000) in Arizona; and 
Question 2 in Massachusetts in 2002.   
Nationally, beginning with the 1978 Congress, federal funding to states began to 
be restricted to only those programs considered transitional bilingual education (TBE) — 
programs with the goal of mainstreaming students. For the next decade, little money was 
directed towards state bilingual education programs that encouraged cultural maintenance 
or bilingualism (Crawford, 1998). As these multicultural/ cultural maintenance paradigms 
fell out of political favor, defenders of the bilingual programs focused less on the 
multicultural/ bilingual rationales (Crawford, 1998). By the end of the 1980s, political 
discourse surrounding the normative goals of bilingual education, instead, existed within 
the language (lack of English proficiency) as the problem paradigm (Crawford, 1998).  
Bilingual programs were debated solely on the merits of whether or not they contributed 
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to mainstreaming LEP students (Crawford, 1998). Victories for proponents of bilingual 
education, subsequently, resulted in federal funds devoted to programs aimed at 
mainstreaming children (Crawford, 1998). In the 1990s, this political trend intensified and 
by the middle of the decade, federal reauthorizations of BEA placed a 3-year limit on state 
bilingual education programs after which LEP students were to be transitioned to English 
instruction.  
In 2002, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) effectively ended the Bilingual 
Education Act, replacing it with the English Language Acquisition, Language 
Enhancement, and Academic Achievement Act. The Act afforded localities pedagogical 
discretion in dealing with English Language Learning (ELL) students, but stressed English 
acquisition as the normative pedagogical goal for public schools. NCLB aimed to create 
accountability structures/ goals for student performance. Schools were required to meet 
Annual Yearly Progress (AYP) targets. Those schools which failed to meet such targets for 
three straight years risked losing federal funding or closure. NCLB requires that all Limited 
English Proficiency (LEP) students must pass their state’s accountability test by 2014 
(regardless of their length of stay in the United States (Wright, 2006). Thus, normatively, 
NCLB stressed English acquisition through mainstreaming students as quickly as possible 
so that they too could be subjected to the testing assessment paradigm sanctioned by 
NCLB. NCLB created incentives for states to abandon bilingual education since meeting 
AYP targets and meeting the 2014 accountability test equated with more students 
performing at standardized performance goals [in English] (Wright, 2006). 
In conclusion, bilingual programs at the state and national level have either ended 
or their pedagogical goals have been significantly altered. The bilingual education 
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programs that emerged in the 1970s at the state level stressed cultural maintenance and 
bilingualism in addition to English acquisition. All three branches played a role in 
enforcing bilingual education as the chosen pedagogical method to address the educational 
needs of Latino (mostly Mexican) students. And these initiatives had bipartisan and 
academic support from the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s. However, beginning in the 
late 1970s, the elite agreement in the three branches of government that spurred 
expansionary policies began to dissolve. Elements of the federal government (Congress 
and the executive branch), the courts and academics began to change their tune towards 
bilingual education, creating majorities in favor of policy rollback. Major academic studies 
questioned its pedagogical efficacy in improving student outcomes. The courts 
subsequently permitted the use of other pedagogical approaches if it was proven to be 
endorsed by pedagogical scholarship.  And Congress began to withhold funding for all 
bilingual programs except those dedicated to transitioning students to all English 
instruction. By 2001, the No Child Left Behind Act ended the Bilingual Education Act 
replacing it with the English Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement, and 
Academic Achievement Act. The Act permitted bilingualism but stressed English 
acquisition. State policies also had increasingly either transitioned to using only transitional 
bilingual education, using bilingual education for limited periods or ending their bilingual 
education programs all together.   
Locally, however, policy trajectories have varied. Although policy trajectories have 
trended towards policy rollback in bilingual education programs nationwide, bilingual 
programs were ended in some states (California, Arizona, Massachusetts) while in others, 
they simply trended towards policy rollback, such as Texas.  In the latter, programs have 
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dropped cultural maintenance and bilingualism as pedagogical goals and have become 
more oriented strictly towards transitioning students to English only instruction.  
       
Germany: Current Trends in Religious Instruction and Historical Background         
As Germany reformed its immigration and citizenship laws in 1999 
(Bundesregierung of 1999), the issue of religion’s role in the state (especially concerning 
the place of Islam in Germany) rose on the political agenda (Nordbruch, 2011). The Basic 
Law implicitly sanctions religious pluralism and civic religious pluralism. However, since 
Germany only opened its borders to immigration in the latter half of the 20th century 
through temporary measures to fill labor needs (Gastarbeiterprogramm) and for political 
asylum applicants, religious pluralism only pertained to German [ethnic] citizens and the 
various permutations of Christianity (specifically the Catholics and the Protestants) 
typically practiced by ethnic Germans. The permanent presence of Muslim immigrants — 
and the official recognition of this fact — challenged this normative conception 
(Hofhansel, 2010). 
 Article 140 and Article 7 III institutionalize the recognition of religious 
communities as public corporate entities, enabling them (in conjunction with the respective 
German Bundeslaender) to provide religious instruction courses among other privileges 
(Avenarius, 2006). However, the incorporation of Islamic communities into the German 
polity via state recognition has become a political and cultural debate over how this will 
affect the national political and cultural character of the German polity (the so-called 
Leitkultur which roughly translates to “leading culture”) and if Islam is compatible with 
the German polity (Nordbruch, 2011).  
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Since the 1970s as it became apparent that a significant faction of the Turkish 
immigrant population would not be returning to their homeland, 16  Islamic religious 
communities have campaigned for recognition in the various Bundeslaender with sizable 
Muslim populations (Hofhansel, 2010; Nordbruch, 2011).  One of their primary goals has 
been to attain official recognition to create and provide Islamic religious instruction in 
German public schools (as Christian religious communities are afforded through state 
recognition as public corporate entities). However, aside from the Alevites — whom some 
Muslim religious communities do not recognize as Muslims — only the the Islamic 
Federation of Berlin (IFB), a lead Muslim community in Berlin, and the Ahmadiyya 
Muslims in Hessen in 2013, another Muslim sect with scant support from the more 
established Muslim groups in Germany, have been officially afforded the privilege of 
providing religious instruction. National and Bundeslaender authorities have repeatedly 
ruled that the various Muslim applicants do not meet the criteria for recognition. This has 
relieved Bundeslaender of their legal obligation to provide Islamic religious instruction. 
Nevertheless, German Bundeslaender authorities have pursued accommodating the 
requests of selected Muslim local communities. Bundeslaender authorities have supported/ 
lead pilot initiatives in Islamic religious instruction in selected localities. Many have 
expanded to other localities since implementation. Localities in Bavaria, Berlin, North 
Rhine Westphalia, Hesse (prior to the official recognition of Ahmadiyya Muslims in 2013), 
Baden Wuerttemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, Lower Saxony, and Hamburg have (since the 
1980s) offered some form of Islamic religious education.   
                                                 
16 It should be noted, however, that a majority of the guest workers eventually returned to their homeland. 
This was partially encouraged by the German government’s 1982/1983 "Gesetz zur befristeten Förderung 
der Rückkehrbereitschaft von Ausländern.” 
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 As mentioned, the western Bundeslaender and the German federal authorities have 
been reluctant to grant corporate status to Muslim religious communities (The process for 
corporate recognition will be discussed further in the Politics of Religious Instruction 
chapter). This has prevented these religious communities from offering Islamic religious 
instruction on par with the Christian communities as sanctioned by the Basic Law. 
Subsequently, Islamic religious instruction policy regimes across the various 
Bundeslaender have taken on sundry approaches.  More importantly, instruction has been 
provided mostly by German education officials as opposed to a representative of a Muslim 
community as enumerated in the Basic Law. Thus, most programs have fallen short of the 
Basic Law requirement that religious instruction is confessional instruction offered by 
members of the community as is the case with the recognized Christian religious 
communities. In 2000, Berlin became the first state to officially grant a Muslim community 
the privilege to provide Islamic religious instruction, closely approximating the provisions 
called for in Article 7 III of the Basic Law17 and (as mentioned) Hessen became the first 
state to grant public corporate status to a Muslim community. The latter falls outside of the 
purview of this as study as it occurred in 2013. However, it underscores the German aspect 
of the puzzle of this study: German policy trends in Islamic religious instruction have been 
moderately expansionary. 
 
                                                 
17
 However, since Berlin is not governed by Article 7 III. Religious instruction is heavily subsidized by the 
state which unofficially recognizes religious communities. The Islamic Federation of Berlin had 
unsuccessfully campaigned for over 20 years for similar recognition from the Berlin state. The Berlin 
education ministry had continually declared that the IFB was not a religious community according to Article 
140 of the Basic Law. An administrative court in 2000 ruled that the Berlin education ministry could not 
deny the IFB recognition based on Article 140 since it is not governed by Article 7 III. This will be discussed 
further in the Politics of Religious Instruction chapter. 
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As mentioned however, locally, these trends have varied. Although Berlin’s IFB 
has become the first Muslim group to be officially recognized, they had to fight a 20 year 
court battle to achieve this status. And their recognition has been opposed across the 
political spectrum due to their official designation as a terrorist organization. Meanwhile, 
although a Muslim group has not been officially recognized in the other western states 
outside of Hessen, pilot projects in Islamic religious instruction have gradually expanded, 
providing a semblance of Islamic religious instruction with increasing influence from 
Muslim organizations as these programs mature.  
The eastern Bundeslaender have minuscule immigrant populations and majorities 
of the respective populations are not affiliated with a religious community (because of the 
GDR’s historic antagonism towards the organized churches; see Politics for Religious 
Instruction chapter for a more detailed explanation). Subsequently, Islamic religious 
instruction is not an issue in the eastern Bundeslaender. The eastern Bundeslaender of 
Brandenburg, however, has adopted a solution similar to Berlin. Neither are governed by 
Article 7 III and the majority of their populations are not affiliated with a religious 
community. But they do have sizable Muslim immigrant communities. Brandenburg, like 
Berlin, does not offer a mandatory religious instruction course but allows the respective 
religious communities to provide religious instruction courses. These are by offered on a 
voluntary basis.18 The provisions are solely the responsibility of the respective religious 
communities although they have come to be heavily subsidized the by Bundeslaender.            
                                                 
18
 The Bundeslaender subsidizes these classes. Students are required to take a mandatory ethics course (Le-
bensgestaltung— Ethik— Religionskunde (LER)). However the issue of religious instruction is also contro-
versial as religious communities have continually campaigned for religious instruction to be at least on par 
with LER. A 2001 court ruling brought by the religious communities brought religious instruction on more 
equal footing with LER (increased state funding and provided a way for students to be exempted from LER). 




In sum, the issue of Islamic religious instruction is an issue that pertains mostly to 
the western Bundeslaender. Thus, to conclude and compare, in the US, since the 1980s, 
bilingual education programs have come under fire and/ or have been terminated while 
Germany [incrementally] eases its way towards providing Islamic religious instruction. 
Nevertheless, within both settings, and considering these general trends, policy trajectories 
























 Using a comparative study of policy trajectories in US bilingual education and 
German Islamic religious instruction in 5 localities, this study will make the argument that 
Turkish-German interests are better situated in Germany’s closed, corporatist setting than 
are their Mexican-American counterparts in the more open, laissez faire political 
marketplace of American pluralism. This literature review discusses the literature upon 
which this study was built, extending the discussion from chapter 1. First, the chapter will 
review the literature that forms the foundation of this study: justifying the comparison of 
Spanish in the US and Islam in Europe, and the chosen issue areas of bilingual education 
and Islamic religious instruction. The review will then cover literature concerning the 
respective political contexts. It first deals with immigration politics (with a focus on the 
elite driven, clientele politics of immigration policy) and the incorporation regimes in the 
US and Germany and then moves on to the respective national contexts and policymaking 
systems. Concerning the latter, the discussion will focus on the literature pertaining to what 
specifically makes the two respective policymaking systems more open or more closed. It 
will conclude the discussion of the literature with a review of literature on policy change 
(institutional dynamics, policy retrenchment, and policy feedback) as the crux of the study 




Importance of English and Christianity in the US and Germany and Their Respective 
Effects on the Issue of Immigration 
 This is a comparative study of the politics of bilingual education and religious 
instruction. These are issue areas of immigrant incorporation as they facilitate the 
institutionalization of Spanish and Islam into the American and German polity (Fetzer and 
Soper, 2005; Woon and Zolberg, 1999).   
 The comparative aspect of the case selection rests on the Zolberg and Woon (1999) 
assertion that English and Christianity perform similar functions for the US and Western 
European cultures, respectively. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Zolberg and Woon (1999) 
argue that based on the cultural, ethnic histories and institutional settings of the respective 
polities, English and Christianity have served as cultural unifiers. The institutionalization 
of English and Christianity in the US and Germany, respectively, has been beneficial 
(politically and institutionally) to the ethnic majorities/ political establishments of both 
countries. Growing immigrant populations in both countries present challenges to the 
cultural/ political hegemony of English and Christianity in the US and Germany 
respectively — a development that has made efforts of immigrant incorporation 
problematic (Zolberg and Woon, 1999; Kastoryano, 2004). Such efforts have, thus, become 
contentious as debates focus around the cultural conflicts brought into relief through the 
integration of immigrant cultures (Zolberg and Woon, 1999 8; Kastoryano, 2004).   
 Zolberg and Woon (1999) base this argument on their theory of boundary 
formations by collectives. This refers to a self-referential process whereby a collectivity 
distinguishes themselves by delineating who they are and who they are not (Zolberg and 
Woon, 1999 8). The authors argue that this process manifests itself in the creation of 
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cultural boundaries and theorize how these boundaries are negotiated and/or transcended 
in the process of immigrant integration. They establish the concepts of boundary crossing, 
boundary blurring, and boundary shifting to theorize the different means by which 
immigrant incorporation is resolved in this theoretical paradigm (Zolberg and Woon, 1999 
9).  
 The category of boundary blurring is especially relevant to this study. They 
theorize this term as the acceptance of multiple memberships and an overlapping of 
collective identities via a structural change (legal, social, or cultural boundaries) to the 
polity — domesticating what was once seen as alien (Zolberg and Woon, 1999 9). The two 
examples they provide are public bilingualism and the institutionalization of immigrant 
faiths (such as public recognition). This study will use their conceptualization of English 
and Christianity as cultural unifiers and compare how the politics in US and Germany 
concerning policy areas involving boundary blurring (bilingual education and Islamic 
religious instruction) play out in the different institutional and political contexts.  
 Zolberg and Woon (1999) argue that the US presents an unprecedented situation 
concerning the expected structural changes that will move the US more towards 
bilingualism. The dominance of Spanish among the post-1965 immigrants, legal legacies 
of the Civil Rights movement, and market embrace of Spanish because of the growing 
Spanish speaking middle class will move the US to increasingly incorporate Spanish 
institutionally into the polity. Concerning religion, Zolberg and Woon (1999) hold that the 
history of anti-semitism and the institutionalization of religious plurality that it spawned as 
an institutional remedy ensures that Europe will move incrementally towards incorporating 
Islam in a manner conducive with the institutionalization of already established religions. 
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This study compliments this argument, addressing the debate over structural changes 
invoked through public and official responses to the immigration booms since the 1960s in 
the US and Europe. There is an assumption by Zolberg and Woon (1999) that the market’s 
embrace of bilingualism combined with public policy responses will eventually transcend 
the boundaries that empower English and Christianity and exclude Spanish and Islam in 
multiple settings in the US and Western Europe.  This study will assess the state of that 
assertion by focusing on how local institutional arrangements and elite views affect cultural 
boundaries and prospects for structural change.  
 Alba (1998) previously had expanded on the immigrant-ethnic majority boundary 
theories which were also an aspect of Zolberg and Woon (1999).  Alba (1998) argues that 
these boundaries are varied in types and are permeable. Alba employs the same conceptions 
of boundaries used in Zolberg and Woon (1999) to discuss the varying quality of immigrant 
assimilation and the various ethnic boundary constructions.  These ethnic boundary 
constructions are based on the existing institutionalized boundaries in the receiving country 
and the various histories of the respective immigrant groups (Alba, 1998). Alba maintains 
that these boundaries are not constructed anew with the arrival of the immigrant 
populations but are the results of path dependent processes present in the receiving 
countries prior to the arrival of immigrant groups in significant numbers (Alba, 1998 22). 
Alba (1998) uses the constructions of boundaries in citizenship, religion, language, and 
race to illustrate the contextual, contingent, path dependent nature of the construction of 
these ethnic boundaries. He references the boundaries created by the historic involvement 
and institutional embedded-ness of Christian faiths in the process of state building in the 
German polity (Alba, 1998). Despite the Basic Law protection of religious pluralism, this 
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has resulted in the institutionally induced privileged status of Christianity in various policy 
and public areas of the German polity (Alba, 1998). For example (with respect to this 
study), the criteria necessary to grant corporate recognition to religious communities is 
based on the Christian notions of hierarchical administrative organization. This has 
impeded the recognition of Islamic communities as corporate entities (Alba, 1998 32). This 
is not the only example as the existence of the head scarf debate amid widely visible 
Christian symbols in Bavarian schools brings into relief the privileged status of Christianity 
and the outsider status of Islam despite the Basic Law’s protection religious pluralism 
(Alba, 1998 32).  
 In his discussion of boundaries, Alba (1998) argues that language boundaries are 
more blurry than religious boundaries as bilingualism is easier for the individual and 
society to reconcile in various settings compared to practicing two religions.  Intermarriage 
rates of Jews in the US from the 1960s through 1990s offers conflicting evidence of this 
claim, however (Alba, 1998 35). Alba holds that immigration societies are often tolerant 
or accommodating of immigrant languages in public settings where large populations of 
immigrants who use the language are present (Alba, 1993 35). Thus, bilingual signage or 
services are available in immigrant cities such as Paris, France and Los Angeles, USA 
(Alba, 1993 35). Alba also refers to the blurred boundaries in the public schools of the US. 
In the US, a foreign language requirement is often standard in American public schools, 
and Spanish is the most widely studied language these days (Alba, 1993 35). The researcher 
notes that these findings differ from France and Germany where Arabic and Turkish are 
not widely available nor studied in the respective public schools (Alba, 1993 35). Alba, 
however, in reference to the blurriness of language boundaries exempts from discussion 
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the issue of bilingual education, which he notes are limited to minority students and are 
highly contested programs (Alba, 1993 35). These findings beg the question why bilingual 
education is so contested in a polity which embraces the study of Spanish— the 
predominant language minority at which bilingual education is aimed.   
 A common feature of the literature on Muslims in Germany and Latinos in the US 
is that religion and language (respectively) play pivotal roles in the incorporation process 
(Kastoryano, 2004; Sanchez, 1997; Soper and Fetzer, 2007; Ngai, 1999). 
 In the US, English has been considered a part of the Americanization process 
required of immigrants since the mid-19th century (Ngai, 1999; Sanchez, 1997). It is also 
viewed as a core concept of what it means to be American (Sanchez, 1997). Thus, since 
the 19th century, issues of immigrant integration have often involved English acquisition 
(Sanchez, 1997). In Germany the politics of immigrant integration has evolved differently. 
The influence of religious wars and the Reformation on Germany’s state building project 
allowed religious communities (specifically Christian religious communities) to assume a 
corporate character in relations with the German state (Kastoryano, 2004 1234).  
Prior to the mid-1990s public discourse concerning integration and incorporation 
had been solely in terms of German ethnic identity— reuniting the German diaspora in 
Germany. Beginning in the late 1990s, however, immigrant integration/ incorporation 
began rose on the political agenda due to the increasing Muslim presence — Islam’s 
cultural conformity with the German culture (Nordbuch, 2012). Nordbuch (2012) argues 
that German reunification in the early 1990s and citizenship reform that came with the 
1998 election of the SPD/Green government— transforming Germany to a jus soli polity 
— settled the debate concerning the unification of German ethnics. Debate transitioned to 
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integrating its remaining guest worker population (the majority of who were Muslims) 
(Nordbruch, 2012). Nordbruch (2012) argues that Islam’s compatibility with secular 
German democracy became the core issue of the integration debate. Hence, Islam’s cultural 
conformity became the new issue dimension of focus in integration politics (Nordbruch, 
2012 9). 
 
Political Incorporation As a Collective Action Problem 
 As discussed above, this study will treat bilingual education and Islamic religious 
instruction as forms of political incorporation. Political incorporation scholars have 
traditionally focused on the fate of immigrants as individuals, and subsequently, their rates 
of naturalization, voting behavior, and other forms of political participation (financial 
contributions, protest involvement, partisanship, community organization involvement, 
etc.) have been the main variables tracked (Okamoto and Ebert, 2010 530; Brubaker, 1992; 
Joppke, 1999; Ramakrishnan and Epenshade, 2001 870). Specifically concerning the 
preoccupation with citizenship, the argument was that only through citizenship can 
immigrants enjoy full membership in the polity and thus access to the full array of state 
protections and benefits (Money, 2009). Much of this research involves assessments of 
citizenship policy, typologies and analysis of policy trajectories (Money, 2009; Brubaker, 
1992; Joppke, 1999; Money, 2009b). 
 However, it is also argued that scholars have prioritized the individual at the 
expense of a focus on the contextual factors involved in immigrant collective action 
(Okamoto and Ebert, 2010 531). Kastoryano (2004) offers that a focus on individual rates 
of naturalization and voting miss the collective action in service of cultural, religious, 
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identity related collective goods, which is a major aspect of the integration experience. 
Rocco (2010) also questions the limited focus on individuals and the electoral process, 
arguing that such a focus only addresses a limited aspect of full immigrant incorporation 
in US society (Rocco, 2010 40). He describes full incorporation as involving collective 
action. Such collective action is pursued across multiple dimensions of political activity 
including local interest groups, non-profit organizations, labor groups, student groups, and 
professional organizations (Rocco, 2010 40). Relying solely on the traditional 
individualistic assimilationist model problematizes political incorporation as pertaining 
only to individuals who have or have not naturalized (Okamoto and Ebert, 2010 532). With 
respect to this study, this ignores most of the political activities of both Mexicans and Turks 
(as a majority of both populations are non-citizens) as well as the contextual factors 
involved in collective action measures pursued by elites representing these minority 
communities.   
 To address the political participation of non-citizens, other studies have expanded 
the criteria for political participation by looking at forms of participation outside efforts 
that require naturalization. These studies have measured rates of participation in protests, 
contacting media and government officials directly, signing petitions, and working in 
political organizations (Junn, 1999 and Ulainer, Cain, and Kiewiet, 1989).   
 Okomoto and Ebert (2010) compliments the former literature with research 
concerning the collective action efforts of minority communities to secure favorable public 
policy arrangements, arguing that such a perspective provides a more comprehensive 
assessment of the process of political incorporation (Okamoto and Ebert, 2010 533). 
Okamoto and Ebert (2010) contest that these processes can capture activities outside of 
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naturalization and voter behavior where migrant political sentiments are incorporated into 
the polity via the political endeavors of collectives. Collective action by migrants can 
develop in response to imposed categorizations by the host society concerning the 
migrants’ perceived differences from (and sometimes threat to) the host society (Alba, 
1999; Okamoto and Ebert, 2010; Woon and Zolberg, 1999). These categorizations can 
emerge through policy responses to perceived threats against full social and political 
immigrant integration or via the economic and residential segregation of immigrants 
(Okamoto and Ebert, 2010 534-536). Both conditions encourage group solidarity to defend 
immigrant interests via forms of exclusive immigrant congregation, an inherent part of 
residential or economic segregation (Okamoto and Ebert, 2010 534-536).   
 In the American and German cases, bilingual education and Islamic religious 
instruction are examples of such collective action projects of political incorporation 
brought about by the social conditions and political opportunities19 available to immigrants 
(Wenner and Warner, 2006; Joppke, 1999; Soper and Fetzer, 2007). In these examples, 
migrants respond to the host polity. In both the German and American cases certain cultural 
attributes (in this case language and religion) of the migrants have been categorized as 
different than their counterparts in the host society and thus problematic in terms of 
incorporation (Woon and Zolberg, 1999; Okomoto and Ebert 2010 533). Additionally, the 
individual polities provide particular national/ local political opportunity structures that 
encourage collective action (Joppke, 1999). In the German case, the Basic Law provisions 
concerning religious instruction and its institutionalization of particular and potential 
                                                 
19
 This study will use Tarrow’s (1994) definition of political opportunity as stated used by Okomoto and 
Ebert (2010): “elements and conditions of the political environment that provide incentives for political ac-
tion” (Okomoto and Ebert, 2010 532). 
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policy actors shapes the political opportunity structure. This pre-existing church-state 
institutional configuration has structured the political mobilization of Muslim communities 
in the campaign to establish Islamic religious instruction.   
 Civil rights legislation of the 1960s in the American case institutionalized the 
policymaking template for aggrieved minority collectives to secure policy arrangements 
that sanction government protection and/ political integration. Bilingual education was 
incorporated into the umbrella meriting state intervention in these two areas.  As political 
incorporation is an interactive process (Woon and Zolberg, 1999), migrants formulate 
group identities based on the categorization imposed upon and opportunities available to 
them in the host society (Okomoto and Ebert, 2010). As the differentiation between natives 
and immigrants is replicated in multiple settings, immigrants, subsequently formulate 
group identities around these markings and political opportunities imposed by/ available in 
the host society. Immigrant political entrepreneurs and/or interest groups use these to 
mobilize immigrants (Alba, 1998). These markings and opportunities can also evolve into 
issues that represent real or symbolic political incorporation depending on the 
institutionalization of the particular markings and political opportunities available 
(Okomoto and Ebert, 2010). This study will operate under the assumption that bilingual 
education and Islamic religious instruction are issue areas that serve as real forms of 
political incorporation.   
 
Political Elites 
 In Germany, political elites pursued policies to incorporate its Muslim immigrants, 
such as Islamic religious instruction pilot programs (Joppke, 1999). In doing so, political 
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elites pursued the resuscitation of Germany’s international reputation 20  and ignored 
growing public aversion to the incorporation of Islam into the Germany polity (Joppke, 
1999). In the US, the civil rights legislative victories of the 1960s ushered in political 
development via redistributive policies targeting aggrieved groups. These policies were 
elite driven (as the population as a whole was still ambivalent concerning the social and 
legislative progress made by the Civil Rights movement) by a Democratic Party that had 
finally won a substantial majority, but also emancipated itself from southern Democrats 
who had frustrated progressive initiatives in the decades prior to the 1960s (Cooper and 
Bombardier, 1968 1015-1016; Joppke, 1999). These redistributive institutional apparatuses 
were originally designed to fully incorporate (politically, socio-economically, and socially) 
African Americans. However, by the early 1970s they would expand to also include 
women, the disabled, environmental groups, and (with respect to this study), linguistic 
minorities (Joppke, 1999). Joppke (1999) argues that the aforementioned political and 
institutional contexts privileged elite driven, clientele politics. This is despite polling in 
both countries that a majority of both populations had a growing aversion to the increases 
in immigration rates (Joppke, 1999).  
 Freeman (1995) also holds that clientele politics typifies immigration policies as 
employers, ethnic advocacy groups, civil and human rights groups are the recipients of 
concentrated benefits while the diffuse public bares the costs (as cited in Money, 2009). 
                                                 
20 International human rights norms have also affected the German case. Joppke argues that the negative 
international media attention brought by the refugee violence in the early 1990s led to the compromise the 
brought both refugee policy and citizenship policy closer in line with other western polities (Joppke, 1999).  
This led to a more restrictive refugee policy but a transition of the German polity from juis sanguinis based 
citizen to jus soli based citizenship (Joppke, 1999). Joppke argues that international pressure and the German 
elite desire to rebuild Germany’s international standing in wake of the refugee controversy but also as a part 
of its post war project to compensate for its Nazi mistake (Joppke, 1999; Nordbruch, 2012).  
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Thus, the former are more incentivized to overcome the costs of collective action (Money, 
2009). Consequently, Western democracies tend towards liberalization of immigration 
policy via clientele politics (Money, 2009).   
This study will build on the theories of Freeman (1995) and Joppke (1999). As they 
argue, since the 1960s, clientele politics typifies immigrant policies due to the incentives 
created by international and domestic norms concerning immigrant and ethnic relations in 
Germany and Civil Rights-induced political development in the US. Both of these theories 
argue that elites drove these policies serving clientele groups while ignoring popular 
opinions concerning these incorporation projects. This study will concur with Joppke 
(1999) that elite consensus concerning incorporation of Muslims via religious instruction 
is an important determiner of policy trajectories. Likewise Joppke (1999) holds that US 
immigration politics has ultimately been driven by elite politics, especially political elites 
responding to the pressure of mobilized minority interests due to the dynamic of 
concentrated costs and diffuse benefits of retrenchment politics (Joppke, 1999; Pierson, 
1994; 1993; Sheingate, 2000). This has become especially true for both polities after the 
traumatic protests in the late 1960s as elites looked for ways to institutionalize aggrieved 
minority protest (Crawford, 1999).    
 Joppke (1999) further argues that this tension between popular support for 
immigration restrictionism and the clientele politics of immigration (control) policy 
brought about the California initiative trilogy in the mid-1990s. The study will build on 
Joppke’s contention concerning the retrenchment politics of the California initiative trilogy 
of the mid-1990s. Instead of merely arguing that this was a populist reaction to 
expansionary elitist policies lacking popular support, this study will argue that the 
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California example provides evidence of a situation when retrenchment policy can be 
successful — when venue shifting to the voter initiative venue is possible. The initiative 
forum provided a venue where the dynamics of retrenchment politics (to be discussed later 
in this chapter) — concentrated costs and diffuse benefits — was eliminated, allowing for 
outside actors to make their case directly to the voters instead of to public officials fearful 
of alienating a mobilized clientele. This differed from Texas (the other US case of focus) 
where such an option was not possible and policy rollback efforts failed due to the 
dynamics of retrenchment politics. 
 Another stream of the literature, what Stratan (2003) calls the racist public thesis, 
focuses on elites’ role in shaping immigration politics and stresses a more involved role in 
public opinion and how it influenced restrictionist trends in immigration law in the 1990s 
and early 2000s. In this line of the literature in the heat of party competition, elites shape 
the contours of debate, problematizing issues through the prism of xenophobic stereotypes 
of non-European immigrants often as a last resort when challenging incumbents. They 
argued that the manner in which an issue is politicized played a great role shaping the 
political context 21  within which party competition occurs. Thus elites simultaneously 
respond to and contribute to shaping the political context. Elite politicization of 
immigration structured how the mass public viewed the immigration issue, but also how 
other issues were supposedly affected by immigration. Elites created the range in which 
public opinion would develop and the contours of debate. This also provided opportunities 
for political entrepreneurs to exploit macro contexts to scapegoat immigrants for the 
societal problems (Strathan, 2003 168). However, again elite — civil society, media elites 
                                                 
21 The political context refers to the mass public and the macro conditions that affect politics such as  the 
economy. The aspect that elites can shape is the mass public. 
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— are the players politicizing immigration to affect mass popular opinion in a particular 
direction.  
 Faist (1994) discusses how German elites constructed an immigration ideology that 
denied that Germany had become a de facto immigration country in the decades after World 
War II and the political consequences of such an ideology.  The author finds that through 
an ethnocultural conception of citizenship, German elites legitimized ethnic German 
immigration and stigmatized non-ethnic German immigrants (especially Muslim 
immigrants) as illegitimate (Faist, 1994). Subsequently, issues of integration concerning 
the guest workers were not addressed within the traditional public forum. Non-ethnic 
Germans were viewed as a problem, taxing the increasingly scarce resources (welfare state 
and employment) of the German state. Guest workers were stigmatized as taking advantage 
of the German welfare system and asylum seekers of the asylum process to then unfairly 
tax the resources of the state.    
 Subsequently, if elites are the primary game in town, historical trends concerning 
their conflict and consensus within a policy area should be an important causal mechanism 
in the direction of policy outcomes. 
 
(Local) Immigrant Incorporation Literature 
 The counter intuitiveness of the central puzzle concerning variances in policy 
trajectories in bilingual education and Islamic religious instruction is based on theories 
concerning the benefits of political incorporation: Because of Mexicans’ longer history of 
immigration and political incorporation in the US, they should be more likely to secure and 
maintain policy outcomes in issues areas of interest. Bilingual education is such an issue 
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area (Crawford, 1999). Latino interests pursued and secured bilingual education policy 
arrangements at the national and state level in the 1960s and 1970s and successfully 
maintained those through the 1980s. However, beginning in the late 1970s, policy trends 
in bilingual education began to reveal policy rollback, a trend that continued through the 
mid-1990s. And from the mid-1990s through the early 2000s rollback increased as 
bilingual programs were eliminated at the state and national level including in California 
via Proposition 227 and with the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act at the national 
level.   
The study will build on literature in political incorporation that Mexican Americans 
should have more favorable conditions for securing and defending favored policy 
positions. Mollenkopf and Hochschild (2010) argue that because of the historical symbiosis 
between immigration and nation-building, Americans have a favorable view concerning 
immigration. American immigrants generally naturalize at higher rates, face lower barriers 
to participation in the party system. The latter facilitates easier access to political 
representation through interest groups and office holding. Additionally, the presence of 
African Americans both places a more disliked minority with whom they can differentiate 
themselves in socially beneficial ways and an example of a marginalized group that 
successfully mobilized to secure favorable legislation for its political and social integration 
while concurrently becoming influential in electoral politics at the state and national level. 
The successful African American civil rights movement and its iconic status in American 
culture provided a blueprint for successful mobilization as well as an institutional legacy 
that minority immigrants have used for facilitating incorporation (Mollenkopf and 
Hochschild, 2010 28). Joppke (1999) also argued that the institutional legacy of the Civil 
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Rights era — civil rights liberalism — permitted post-1965 immigrants to take advantage 
of redistributive policies (such as affirmative action policies in employment and education) 
that facilitated their political incorporation. Mollenkopf and Hochschild (2010 28) argue 
these two factors have a self-reinforcing quality that encourages further political 
development in political incorporation for immigrants. They conclude that the post-war 
European immigrants — as they were the first acknowledged wave of immigrants — 
lacked both the ideological acceptance and the institutional template that facilitated the 
incorporation of their American counterparts (Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 2010 26-28).   
 Soysal (1994) argues that immigrant incorporation is a function of the emergence 
of rights based politics as an international paradigm. This international paradigm structures 
state domestic politics and nation-specific institutional configurations, which she terms 
“models of membership” (Soysal 1994 36). Models of membership are institutional 
resources and legitimated models for interest to forge membership in the polity. These 
interest intermediation models that facilitate membership are replicated to resolve the 
problem of integrating immigrants. From this, Soysal (1994) offers a 4-part typology from 
a 2 dimensional operationalization of her models of membership: liberal, corporatist, 
statist, and fragmental. Germany is categorized as a statist-corporatist model for its reliance 
on corporatist intermediaries that are centrally organized.   
 This argument certainly applies to both the US and Germany in the cases of study.  
International human rights norms coerced German administrators at the Bundeslaender 
level to implement family reunification interpretations of immigration law in Germany, 
which led to the increase of Turkish populations after the OPEC-induced recruitment stop 
in 1973. Subsequently, when increasing demands from Turkish populations increased with 
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their growth in the 1970s and 1980s, localities applied existing religious instruction policy 
arrangements to integrate Turkish youth via quasi-religious instruction courses in the 
teaching of Islam.    
 The same holds true for the US, where the increasing legitimacy of human rights 
legitimized the plight of America’s ethnic and racial minorities in the post-war years. This 
was amplified within the Cold War paradigm of the era. Political development resulting 
from Civil Rights victories led to redistributive policy arrangements aimed at integrating 
racially and ethnically persecuted minorities. Latino immigrants were incorporated as 
linguistic minorities. Bilingual education policy arrangements resulted from the legacies 
of this Civil Rights-induced political development (King and Smith, 2005). 
 
Immigration Regime Typologies 
 The most typical way in which the literature has assessed the variation in 
immigration incorporation across states is via typology (Money, 2009). The general 
argument is that the different types of immigrant incorporation models provide crucial 
insights into how the state incorporates its immigrants. These typologies are relevant for 
this study as they all provide heuristics concerning the different institutions and opportunity 
structures available to immigrants and sympathetic interests concerning immigrant 
incorporation. These opportunity structures facilitate state-interest intermediation 
concerning the respective interests that campaign for bilingual education and Islamic 
religious instruction. This study will build on the general consensus of this scholars that 
particular national institutional configurations which facilitate the incorporation of 
immigrants will have varying effects (as these configurations vary per state or as some 
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argue per sector or issue area within the polity) on immigrant integration and specifically 
on policy trajectories for relevant issue areas. However, they in and of themselves cannot 
explain the policy variations in this study especially those at the local level. 
 Freeman (2004) criticizes the integration regime typology literature that aims to 
group nations into categories that describe their overall integration regimes. He finds that 
this is far too simplistic a characterization of the incorporation process. Instead Freeman 
(2004) maintains that states incorporate immigrants via pre-existing institutional 
configurations. Four sets of regulatory institutions of the polity are relevant to the 
immigrant integration experience according to Freeman (2004): states, welfare, culture, 
and market. Freeman argues that incorporation varies for immigrants depending on the 
particular regulatory institutional sector as these configurations vary. These domains are 
also independent and thus incorporation in one domain has little effect on prospects for 
incorporation in another. Subsequently, national regime categorizations miss much of the 
complexity of the immigrant integration experience. Freeman, however, does cluster the 
Western democracies into what he coins syndromes consisting of particular combinations 
of regulatory institutional configurations. He slots the US into the syndrome with open 
citizenship and immigration practices, a liberal welfare and market economy, and laissez 
faire and formal multiculturalism (961). Germany, on the other hand, he slots into the 
syndrome with restrictive citizenship practices and permanent settlement but which is open 
to labor recruitment (961). Germany also has coordinated market economies and corporate 
welfare states (961). Freeman (2004) does argue that western democracies have merged 
towards a “middling” form of immigrant integration. Its neither straight line assimilation 
nor formal multiculturalism. It seeks to integrate immigrants as it rejects permanent 
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exclusion due to the legitimacy of the international rights-based paradigm. Although he 
cites a general trend towards this ‘middling’ integration, he argues that national 
incorporation institutions facilitate integration and thus outcomes vary per state (nation) as 
individual states have varying combinations of regulatory institutional configurations 
(Freeman, 2004 945). 
 Ireland (1994) employs the concept of institutional channeling to explain patterns 
of migrant mobilization. Institutional channeling refers to the different national forms of 
institutionalized participation and this shapes political activism. In his comparison of 
migrant political activism in France and Switzerland, he finds that comparable migrant 
groups mobilize differently in the two countries. Thus, he concludes that national 
institutional configurations are a better explanation of the efficacy of migrant mobilization 
than ethnicity or class (as cited in Koopmans and Statham, 2000).   
 Koopmans and Statham (2000) compare the effectiveness of three models— post-
nationalist, the multiculturalist challenge, national modes of incorporation— in explaining 
the quality and kind of claims making and its effects on the sovereignty of the state. The 
post-nationalist challenge refers to the international human rights norms that coerce nation-
states to conform to liberal citizenship laws. The multiculturalist challenge refers to the 
effect of pluralism in the context of mass immigration and its effects for the cultural and 
political coherency of the nation-state. The national modes of incorporation refers to the 
effects of national opportunity structures in shaping the quality and kind of claims making 
immigrants make on the state. Koopmans and Statham (2000) find that the national modes 
of incorporation model is the most explanatory concerning immigrant incorporation. 
 Castles and Miller (2003) offer a three-part typology of immigrant incorporation 
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schemes based on the “histories, ideologies and structures” (Castles and Miller, 2003 cited 
in Money, 2009) of the relevant states: the differential exclusion model; assimilationist 
model; and the multiculturalist model. Germany is categorized as the differential 
exclusionist model while the US is slotted as a qualified multiculturalist state (due to its 
lack of social provisions). In the differential exclusionary model, immigrants are 
segmented into lower pay jobs in the labor market, segregated in housing via residential 
policies, and discriminated in the provision of social policies. Barriers to citizenship are 
comparatively high. The assimilationist model argues that immigrants are assimilated into 
society and granted equal access to housing, employment and social provisions provided 
that they acquire the language and cultural traits of the state (Castles and Miller, 2003 as 
cited in Money, 2009). Citizenship is accorded via a form of the jus soli model and is thus 
the criteria for attaining citizenship is comparatively modest. The multiculturalism model 
concedes that the formation of immigrant communities is part of the process of immigrant 
incorporation. Thus the state provides these communities access to services to facilitate 
incorporation (Money, 2009). Although this typology partially captures how bilingual 
education fits into the assimilation strategies of the US (and why it is contested), with 
respect to religious instruction, this categorization does not capture the political 
opportunities structures available to Muslim groups in Germany especially the informal 
ones at the local level that are of focus in this study. Religious corporatism has provided 
Muslim groups with institutionalized access to negotiate with the state that is almost on par 
in some localities with their American counterparts. Additionally, it does not speak to the 
local variations in historical developments, political and institutional structures that also 
manifest in differing policy trajectories. 
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 The trichotomous scheme offered by Castles and Miller (similar to Brubaker, 1992 
jus soli v. jus sanguinis typology) theorizes how incorporation regimes affect the process 
of integrating migrants into the polity. Although as argued in the institutional section, such 
typologies do not account for the local institutional opportunity structures at work in the 
cases of this investigation, the regime type does structure the national debate (which 
subsequently filters down to the state level). This plays out in redefinition efforts and venue 
shifting as particular issue dimensions and venues are more prominent in particular 
incorporation regime types. 
 Kurthen (1997) argues that Germany and the US represent opposing immigrant 
incorporation models. Germany is classified as a corporatist welfare state offering aliens 
comparatively easy access to welfare benefits but is highly restrictive in its access to 
naturalization and citizenship (Kurthen, 1997 722). He classifies the US, on the other hand, 
as a pluralist liberal capitalist immigration model (Kurthen, 1997 722-723). Lacking the 
corporatist structure of Germany, immigrant incorporation is structured by the ideology of 
individual responsibility to work, equality of opportunity in the labor market and a 
subsequent preference for laissez faire market forces over government intervention in 
matters of immigrant incorporation and integration (Kurthen, 1997 722). Access to 
citizenship is comparatively more open in the US while access to welfare benefits is more 
restricted (Kurthen, 1997). Thus, in Germany, debates in political incorporation concern 
corporate recognition to secure the policy and institutional benefits of German corporatism. 
In the US political incorporation involves pluralist competition for policy outcomes that 
contribute to bettering the individual’s ability to compete in the American economy. 
Subsequently, Islamic religious instruction contestation is oriented around the recognition 
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of Islam as part of the German corporatist state. Its realization would mean the German 
state subsidizing the teachings of Islam as a means of integrating Muslim youth — thus 
placing Islam on par with Christianity’s well-established role in doing the same for 
Christian youth. Bilingual education concerns cultural recognition and incorporation and 
questions of pedagogy for immigrant students. These concern creating individuals that can 
effectively compete in the American market place. 
 In summation, these typologies offer incomplete heuristics in understanding how 
national institutional configurations involved in immigrant integration affect policy 
trajectories in related issue areas. They are incomplete concerning the puzzle of this study 
as they do not account for local variations and changes in policy trajectories (as is the case 
in the US example with its trending towards policy rollback in bilingual education after the 
1970s). 
 Koopmans (2004), however, attempts to address this gap in the literature (also see 
Money 1997). Koopmans (2004) builds on Koopmans and Stratham (2000) findings in his 
comparative study of German, British and Dutch localities. In his work Koopmans (2004) 
tests the theory that national regimes of incorporation and citizenship law are less 
explanatory than supranational and international norms concerning immigrants as well as 
the transnational forces that had become fashionable in the explanations of immigrant 
politics and integration (see Joppke, 1999). Koopmans (2004) conducts an intra-national 
comparison of German localities and international comparison of localities in Germany, 
Britain and the Netherlands. He finds that local integration regimes in Germany are 
determinative of claims making in German localities. In those regimes that have 
progressive, pro-immigrant integration regimes (such as Berlin and Frankfurt), immigrants 
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are more involved in public discourse and make more public claims concerning immigrant 
rights and integration policies. Those in more exclusive immigrant regimes (such as 
Bavaria), immigrants are less involved and make less claims concerning immigrant rights 
and integration policies and are more concerned with the politics of the homeland.22   
 These findings, however, do not negate the effect of national regimes on immigrant 
claims making. When German localities are compared to those of Britain and the 
Netherlands, immigrants in German localities make less public claims and are less involved 
in public discourse concerning immigrant rights and integration issues than their brethren 
in British and Dutch localities. These findings lead Koopmans (2004) to the conclusion 
that that although local political opportunity structures are determinative of immigrant 
integration prospects, national political opportunity structures are still the determinative 
institutional paradigm for immigrant integration. Local political opportunity structures 
vary within the national political opportunity structures facilitated by national immigrant 
integration and citizenship regime types.  
 Along these same lines, Money (1997) argues that actor interests are filtered 
through local institutions. More specifically, the geographical concentration of immigrants 
leads to geographically specific interests (both for and against immigration) because of the 
uneven costs and benefits of immigrant concentration (Money, 1997 687). Immigrant 
concentration creates strains on local education systems, employment markets and benefit 
provisions. These can be beneficial to immigrants but problematic for natives (Money, 
1997 687). These are then filtered through state (national and local) institutions, greatly 
affecting coalition building and mobilization efforts (Money, 2009). This study will focus 
                                                 
22 This will be further discussed in the chapter on Religious Instruction in Germany. 
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on policy developments in German Bundeslaender and US states, building on this idea that 
geographical concentration of immigrants in localities means their incorporation will be 
facilitated by local institutions. Differences in these institutions affect prospects for 
incorporation, and in this study, policy trajectories for issues of interests to the collective 
action pursuits of immigrants. 
 Koopmans (2004) and Money’s (2009) findings are relevant for this study as their 
theories support the research design of this dissertation. As the study offers sub-national 
comparisons of policy trajectories in bilingual education and Islamic religious instruction 
as well as national comparisons of policy trajectories in the aforementioned issue areas, it 
also aims to build on the conclusions drawn by Koopmans (2004) and Money (2009): 
although local political opportunity structures facilitate prospects of collective 
mobilization, these political opportunity structures share national characteristics; 
consequently, despite local variations, prospects for collective mobilization will have 
national variations that trump those of the local.  
 Specifically, this study will focus on church-state relations and its effects on policy 
development in Islamic religious instruction in Germany. The Basic Law guarantees and 
corporatism structures the politics of religious/ political incorporation for Muslim 
immigrants. While in the US, incorporation efforts are a function of market forces, ethnic 
and race relations, and the institutional developments that facilitate policymaking in issue 
areas concerning welfare provisions, ethnic and race relations (Portes, 1997). Local 
institutional and political configurations — variations of these national integration regime 
types — however, were determinative of policy trajectories in the issue areas of focus.  
Both the politics of bilingual education and religious instruction are facilitated through 
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local policy networks and institutional configurations because of the predominance of local 
policy venues in these issue areas.  
 Other relevant themes in the incorporation literature are the roles played by race, 
ethnicity, and religion in the migrant experience, especially with respect to immigrant 
incorporation into the host society. This next section will treat the relevant literature in 
these areas as the politics of race, ethnicity and religion are a crucial aspect to the politics 
of immigrant incorporation in these two issue areas. 
 
Immigration and Nativism 
 Immigrant incorporation is not uncontested. Contestation plays a role that is 
sometimes muted by the elite nature of these politics but periodically can prove decisive in 
policy trajectories at critical junctures. This study focuses on two contested issue areas of 
political incorporation. Scholars have suggested that the political problems of immigration 
surges have led to an inevitable nativist backlash (Calavita, 1996; Johnson, Farrell and 
Guinn, 1997; Huber and Espenshade, 1997; Sanchez, 1997; Espenshade and Calhoun, 
1993; Calavita, 1996; Nordbruch, 2012). Despite the differences in immigration policy 
history and philosophy in the US and Germany, attitudes on immigration have been 
comparable. In American history, immigrant backlashes have accompanied every 
immigration wave since the mid-19th century with claims of society’s peril if immigration 
was not better controlled/ restricted (Ngai, 1999; Calavita, 1996). American nativism has 
been documented in reaction to German immigration in the mid-19th century, Asian 
immigration in the late 19th century, Southern and Eastern European immigration in the 
beginning of the 20th century and now because of Latino immigration in the late 20th 
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century/ early 21st century (Ngai, 1999; Calavita, 1996; Sanchez, 1997). And language 
often factored as a state provision to promote integration or an area of contestation (usually 
over bilingualism, such as was the case with the Germans and now with Latinos) (Calavita, 
1996; Furhman et al, 2007).   
 In Europe the politics of immigration is mostly a post-1960s phenomenon. Yet 
nativism in response to increased immigration from the developed world especially Muslim 
immigrants has led to similar alarms that German/Western European culture is in danger 
of extinction or ruin (Sarrazin, 2011; Huntington, 1993). In Germany, public aversion 
accompanied the increasing guest worker population in the 1970s and 1980s, the refugee 
influx from Eastern Europe of the early 1990s and now the integration of second and third 
generation immigrants in the late 20th century and early 21st century (Nordbruch, 2012, 
Thielmann, 2010). Concerning the latter, SPD member Thilo Sarrazin in his book, 
"Deutschland schafft sich ab,” (German Does Away with Itself), argues that Muslim 
integration (the cultural threat their high birthrates and a 'backwards' value system mean 
for German culture; the drain on the resources brought about by Muslims’ low participation 
in the labor market but high claims on the welfare state) will lead to the denigration of 
German society (Kern, 2010).   
 Such sentiments are evident in the politics of localities as they are affected acutely 
by immigrant waves (Money, 1997). If present, this should be manifested in clear 
differences in political views of different groupings depending on the effect of immigration 
on them personally (Johnson, Farrell, Guinn, 1997; Calavita, 1996). This may affect 
mobilization of particular movements for or against immigration-related issues depending 
upon the ethnic/ racial makeup of the residential areas of the localities affected. 
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 Simon and Lynch (1999), in their six country comparative study of public opinion 
data from 1970-1995, find that a majority favor decreasing the legal rate of immigration, 
the amount of colored (non-Northern European) immigrants, and prefer that priority in 
immigration law should rest with special skills over family reunification (464). Their study 
assesses public opinion data in the US, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France, and Japan. 
Simon and Lynch (1999) do concede that these restrictive sentiments vary throughout the 
period of study and the variation differs per country (465). 
 On the American side, in their study of the effects of immigration on interethnic 
relations, Johnson, Farrrell and Guinn (1997) argue that the influx of immigrants into Los 
Angeles in the midst of deindustrialization created interethnic competition for dwindling 
resources. They chronicle the economic and political changes (such as deindustrialization 
and welfare state retrenchment) that coincided with the influx of immigrants into the Los 
Angeles area between 1970 and 1990. They argue that the economic and political context 
played a great deal in inter-ethnic relations and subsequently on immigration related issues 
(such as bilingual education) (Johnson, Farrell, and Guinn, 1997).   
 Calavita (1996) argues that developments in political economy and the emergence 
of symbolic politics shaped the restrictionism of late 20th century American nativism.  
Specifically, he argues that nativism (which he holds is prevalent during economic 
downturns, social transformations, and national security scares) emerges within the context 
of the current economic, political, cultural debates of the day. In that sense, Calavita (1996) 
echoes Kingdon's (1984) theory that nativism (like all policy entrepreneurship) emerges 
from the marriage of a policy solution to a politically resonant issue. 
 Espenshade and Huber (1997) discuss the merging of neo-isolationism and fiscal 
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conservatism in the US among the public and its effects on policy outcomes. They argue 
that this ideological fusion translated into restrictive public policies at the federal and state 
level against immigrants and a retrenchment of the welfare state (Espenshade and Huber, 
1997). They define neo-isolationism as the meeting of isolationism in foreign policy and 
balance budget conservatism brought on by economic insecurity and the change in 
population demographics brought on by the post-1965 immigration boom. Neo-
isolationism is a preference for reduced US involvement internationally (diplomatic/ 
military commitments), restricted immigration, and less government spending on the 
welfare state. Balanced budget conservatism is the preference for reducing public spending 
across the board to reduce the national/ state debts (Espenshade and Huber, 1997).  These 
studies discuss public opinion and depict the potential for the mobilization of coalitions to 
enact restrictionist/ retrenchment policy. In this sense, Espenshade and Huber (1997) echo 
Pierson’s (1994; 1996) discussion of systemic retrenchment efforts— taking advantage of 
macroeconomic factors (budget scarcity, unemployment concerns and slow growth— a 
culture of austerity) to argue for retrenchment.23 Specifically, they show how the social and 
political dislocations created by immigration increases can manifest in opportunities for 
policy change at the local and national level— legitimated via plebiscitary politics. 
Although these studies refer to plebiscitary politics as evidence of the enactment of nativist 
public sentiment into policy, plebiscitary politics is not theorized as an aspect of policy 
change. This study will add to this by showing how plebiscitary institutional and political 
configurations can be a mechanism to give this sentiment more influence on the 
policymaking process, allowing for advocates of policy rollback to overcome the 
                                                 
23 However, contrary to Pierson, interests supporting redistributive policies were more marginalized than 
their brethren, the old-pension lobby, in US social security (see Pierson 1994; 1996). 
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institutional dynamics of retrenchment politics that make such initiatives difficult to 
achieve. This subsequently provides a contribution to retrenchment politics literature (to 
be discussed below) — offering institutional settings when retrenchment politics is more 
feasible. 
 
American Integration Structures 
 Joppke (1999) focuses on the institutionally-induced aspect of immigrant 
incorporation practices to bring into relief his theory concerning immigration politics in 
both the US and Germany: Despite negative public sentiments towards immigrants, evident 
in polls in both the US and Germany, liberal immigration policy persists. Joppke (1999) 
argues that clientele politics and national/ international human rights norms are the primary 
factors in the convergence towards liberal immigration policies in the developed Western 
world (Joppke, 1999). In the US, the institutional and normative victories of the African-
American Civil Rights movement concerning equality and political incorporation were 
extended to all categories of subpopulations defined as minorities (ethnic, linguistic, 
disabled persons, gender, etc.) (Joppke, 1999). As mentioned above, the redistributive 
policy arrangements that followed were the result of clientele politics: the concentrated 
costs and benefits of integration policy as well as the institutional contexts encouraged 
immigrant collective action whereby the diffuse benefits of anti-immigration policy 
discouraged mobilization of anti-immigrant forces (also see Ellermann (2009) for the 
effects of client politics on deportation policy in the US and Germany), at least within the 
legislative arena (see HoSang, 2010 for anti-fair housing voter initiative in California in 
the 1960s that overturned civil rights fair housing legislation). Immigrant interests 
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resonated with the emergent international human rights norms and rights-based politics 
(Levin and Landy, 1995; see also Soysal, 1994 for the effects of international human rights 
norms on domestic immigration policy), which used the redistributive institutional 
apparatus designed to compensate for a systemically sexist, racist, ethnist polity (Joppke, 
1998; Levin and Landy, 1995; also see Hollifield 1992 for a discussion of rights triumphing 
over market forces).   
 
Race and Immigration 
 Race has also been an important aspect. Racial contestations have led to political 
development resulting in particular institutional configurations that not only affect race 
relations but have also facilitated immigrant integration. Ngai (1999) cites the substantial 
influence of ethnic prejudice and racism in the creation of the 1924 Immigration Act in the 
US. The racial nature of this Act set the political stage for Immigration Act of 1965, which 
aimed to remove race from immigration law. Joppke (1999) refers to the role of affirmative 
action redistributive institutional arrangements — the institutional legacy of the Civil 
Rights movement — and their effects on the political incorporation of immigrants from the 
post 1965 immigration wave. King and Smith (2005) cite the effect of racial contestations 
on the immigration debate and the institutional development, which has greatly affected 
immigrant incorporation — an effect rendered not only through its effect on coalitions 
which overlap in issues of race and ethnic incorporation, but also institutionally as 
dominant political orders successfully altered institutional arrangements, redistributing 
status, power, and resources along racial lines. This subsequently affected the institutions 
charged with facilitating immigrant incorporation.   
 Although American immigration theorists speak of the cyclical character of nativist 
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backlash with every new immigrant wave (Ngai, 1999; Calavita, 1997), there is also a 
general acknowledgement of a racial element in the immigration debate. King and Smith 
(2005) within their paradigm of race and American political development included 
immigration as a related issue area affected by racially induced political development.  The 
research team holds that American political development has been substantially influenced, 
historically, by the outcomes of racial orders contestations (King and Smith, 2005). They 
describe racial orders as coalitions of institutions, political actors and elites united in their 
preferences to publicly authorize, secure and structure institutions and coalitions to serve 
what are perceived as particular racial distributions of power, status and resources (King 
and Smith, 2005 75). Periodic contestations concerning race relations produce victors who 
win authority over the control of institutional configurations, securing particular kinds of 
institutional configurations that allocate power, status and resources along racial lines. 
Immigration is a particular area in which this racial order contestation plays out (King and 
Smith, 2005 78). The authors operationalize two competing orders: an egalitarian order 
and a segregationist order (which would later evolve into a non-expansionist order devoted 
to containing or ending race conscious policies (75). With respect to this study, the 
institutional configurations created by the victory of the egalitarian racial order— civil 
rights liberalism— became the dominant institutional paradigm through which post-1965 
Latino immigrant incorporation would be facilitated (Joppke, 1999).     
 The Bilingual Education Act of 1968 was Title VII of the Elementary, Secondary 
Education Act (a Civil Rights bill) and the legal foundation of the Lau ruling as well as the 
1970 OCR memorandum, which mandated districts to make accommodations for LEP 
students, was Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (as well as the 14th Amendment — won by 
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the egalitarian order after the Civil War). Both ESEA and the Civil Rights Act were 
legislation secured by the egalitarian racial order in the mid-1960s. The Office of Civil 
Rights (OCR) was part of the bureaucratic expansion to enforce Civil Rights legislation, 
which also resulted from the victories of the egalitarian order in the 1960s. These were 
three of the primary pieces of legislation/ executive mandates/ bureaucratic expansion that 
drove bilingual education expansion at the district level in the 1970s.   
 Later in the 1970s when the political fault line between the racial orders changed 
from segregation/ desegregation to the battle over the use/ legitimacy of race conscious 
policies, the politics of bilingual education would also change as it was viewed as part of 
the race conscious policies of the pro-Civil rights (egalitarian racial order) political order. 
Bilingual education was viewed as linguistic affirmative action by its critics on the right 
(Crawford, 1999; Moran, 1988). The politics of English Only and especially that of the 
restrictionist/retrenchment voter initiative trilogy in California in the mid-1990s were 
continuations of the backlash against big government/ civil rights liberalism (Crawford, 
1999). The non-expansionary racial order was among the main players in the English Only 
and California initiative movements (King and Smith, 2005; Crawford, 1999).  
 Subsequently, this study will build on the findings of King and Smith (2005; 2008), 
investigating how these national trends played out in the linguistic politics of California 
and Texas. 
 Joppke (1999) fits within this Civil Rights institutional explanation for particular 
policy trajectories in immigration politics in his assessment of the ideational and 
institutional structures that structured immigration policy and incorporation strategies 
pursued by the US, Germany, and Great Britain. Concerning the US, he contests that the 
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institutional outcomes of the Civil Rights era (redistributive affirmative action policy) 
structured immigrant incorporation (Joppke, 1999). Immigrants qualified for affirmative 
action policies, and these policy arrangements structured immigrant political efforts 
towards incorporation (Joppke, 1999). Soysal (1994), Freeman (1995) and Mollenkopf and 
Hochschild (2010) also concur that the Civil Rights movement provided the institutional 
and rhetorical framework that framed immigrant incorporation politics in the decades that 
followed. These show the historic influence of race in both the institutional configurations 
of immigration policy and the opposing coalitions that contest for policy control in issue 
areas of immigration. Both of these aspects affect strategies for venue shifting and 
redefinition efforts, which will be a focus of this study on the American side. 
 Ngai (1999) describes the deep involvement of race historically in the politics 
concerning the Immigration Act of 1924. The researcher outlines how race played a role in 
the provisions concerning the establishment of the racial quota for the Southern and Eastern 
European immigrants, the barring of Asians from immigration, and the racialization of 
Mexicans through associating illegal immigration solely with them (and not their European 
counterparts) (Ngai, 1999). Additionally, Ngai (1999) argues that the legacy of this Act is 
relevant for current immigration debates. The racial nature of the 1924 Act politically set 
the stage for immigration reform in the mid-1960s when the Johnson administration and 
the 94th Congress were politically set to implement major civil rights reforms. The 1965 
Immigration Act that resulted changed the racial and ethnic composition of immigration 
(immigrants instead of originating from Europe, afterwards mostly came from Latin 
America, Asia, the Caribbean, and Africa). Additionally, the racialization of Mexicans 
equating them with illegal immigration is a trope that has endured and influenced 
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immigration politics including the politics of bilingual education (Crawford, 1999). 
 Several studies focus on immigration in California to discuss the political impact 
of demographic changes induced by mass immigration since the 1965 Act. California is 
the most ethnically diverse state in the US. Thus, political problems in California are 
viewed as forbearers of political issues that will develop in the rest of the nation as 
immigrant populations spread across the US (Calavita, 1996; Johnson, Farrell, Guinn, 
1997; Joppke, 1999). As California is one of the cases in this study, these studies are of 
relevance. Specifically, the voter initiative policymaking mechanism in California 
permitted the macroeconomic issues that these studies reference to have more of an impact 
on the politics of bilingual education. English for the Children could be more easily 
reframed within the policy venue of the voter referendum than in the legislature as the 
anxiety created by macro-context changes (such as a slowing economy and rising 
unemployment) could have more of an impact on voter decisions than in the legislature 
where legislators also had to take into account the future political costs of alienating a 
mobilized Latino collective.   
 
German Integration Structures         
 On the German side, Brubaker (1992) discusses the role of ethnicity in the 
incorporation of non-German ethnics. Brubaker (1992) holds that the citizenship by blood 
requirement of German citizenship law through the 1990s created second and third 
generation “aliens” (as cited in Money, 2009).   
 Nordbruch (2012) outlines the evolution of the immigration debate from one of 
ethnicity to one of religion in the 1990s. He maintains that the German elites had long 
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pursued the reunification of the German diaspora as the polity’s raison d’être (Nordbruch, 
2012; also see Brubaker, 1992). Thus citizenship law was based on ethnic blood lines (jus 
sanguinis). The reunification of Germany in 1991 and return migration of German ethnics 
reconciled this pursuit. Citizenship reform transitioned the debate to integrating its non-
German migrants (who had become second and third generation “aliens” as noted by 
Brubaker, 1992) and the emergence of the subsequent problem of cultural compatibility of 
Islam (Nordbruch, 2012). This became the paradigm within which immigrant integration 
was debated. 
 Several studies have addressed church-state relations as a way of addressing the 
political incorporation of Muslim immigrants. In these articles religion is seen as a tool of 
mobilization and organization for immigrants, but also as an established institutional 
mechanism for dealing with this new “problem” of integrating Muslim populations. In this 
sense, this literature speaks to Pierson’s (1994) policy feedback theory of learning effects 
— applying established institutional policy configurations to new policy issues. These 
arguments as mentioned in the institutional section treat the new migrants as the latest in a 
long tradition of European states negotiating with religious communities (Kastoryano, 
2004, Warner and Wenner, 2006; Soper and Fetzer, 2007). Hence, the preexisting 
institutional structures and political biases will structure the incorporation of Islam in the 
different European states (Kastoryano, 2004; Warner and Wenner, 2005; Soper and Fetzer, 
2007).  
 These studies are relevant for the German case as church-state institutions and the 
closed, corporative nature of these arrangements facilitate the incorporation of Turkish-
Germans. Specifically, historical and international pressures (see Nordbruch 2012; Joppke, 
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1999; Soysal, 1994) have led to elite consensus concerning state initiatives to integrate 
Turkish-Germans. The church-state institutions are closed, corporatist policymaking 
environments where interest intermediation operates in relative isolation from the 
increasing anxiety that the increasing presence of Islam in public life has for the German 
population. The heterogeneity within the Muslim community has created difficulties for 
the Muslim community to unify behind an umbrella organization that could serve as a 
corporate partner with the German state. Nevertheless church-state institutions and elite 
consensus have both encouraged Muslim attempts at umbrella groups as well as 
encouraged Bundeslaender with elite consensus in support of religious instruction to 
pursue alternative arrangements to incorporate Muslim communities via religious 
instruction church-state institutions.   
 
German National Institution Context 
 Laurence (2009) argues that the recent proliferation of European state-Islam 
councils fits within the European neo-corporatist tradition of state initiatives to incorporate 
potentially threatening, underrepresented minority groups in hopes of both encouraging 
policy demands from Muslim interests that are more moderate and state friendly and the 
articulation of these demands through democratic institutions as opposed to violent or 
disruptive protests. These councils normally take on the tripartite form of corporatism 
including members from the European state (in an advisory or steering capacity), chosen 
representatives of palatable Muslim lead organizations, and representatives of the relevant 
Muslim states (308). This trend emerged from the political opportunity structure of existing 
church-state relations in European states (306). This created an incentive among Muslim 
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associations for state recognition so that the state could address policy demands with 
respect to religious practice, religious education as well as addressing issues that have made 
the increasing presence of Muslim populations in public life controversial (such as, what 
are Muslim communities’ loyalties to their European states of residence?) (303).   
 Laurence (2009) traces this to corporatism’s origins in the late 19th century.  During 
this period, European states pursued extra-parliamentary means for incorporating 
minorities which could not be done through the democratic politics of the party system 
(304). European states pursued similar corporatist initiatives to incorporate Jews and 
radical labor groups. Laurence includes the German-Islamic Conference (Deutsche 
Islamkonferenz, DIK) among similar state-Islam councils in France, Belgium, Austria, 
Spain, Italy and the Netherlands as attempts by these governments to influence the 
development and policy demands of various Muslim associations through informal 
recognition and partial political incorporation for these chosen organizations.  
 According to Musch (2012), the German federal government has historically 
attempted to influence immigrant integration via informal round table initiatives in which 
the German state invites acceptable immigrant lead associations to informal discussions 
concerning issues of interest (85). She uses Lehmbruch’s expression when she calls this 
process “administrative interest intermediation” and categorizes it as typical of Germany’s 
“ephemeral corporatism” (this is contrary to the strong corporatism with more formalized 
linkages between the state and society found in the Netherlands and Austria; see 
Lehmbruch, 1984; Molina and Rhodes, 2002). The latter refers to Germany’s practice of 
informal state-society relationships where the state seeks consensus with representatives of 
civil society via informal consensus-oriented collaborations (Musch, 2012 86). She 
 
109 
contests the political opportunities literature, which argues that interest group formation is 
a bottom up process based on the group’s recognition of the institutional configurations 
that facilitate interest group influence (Musch, 2012). The bottom-up political 
opportunities argument is that groups subsequently shape their strategies according to and 
their structures are shaped by the external institutional configurations they must navigate 
in order to have influence (Musch, 2012 85). Instead Musch (2012) argues that the German 
government has a history of acting as mediators and organizers of interactions of chosen 
lead organizations representing immigrant interests (85). Typically, the goal of the German 
state is that through invitation to round tables the German government can convey an 
informal recognition to immigrant-lead organizations (Musch, 2012 85). In exchange for 
this informal recognition, German administrators hope to gain expertise concerning 
immigrant issues and concerns, political control and support of state policy prerogatives 
from lead organizations concerning integration policies (Musch, 2012 85). In this sense, 
Musch (2012) builds on Lembruch’s (1984) neocorporatist exchange paradigm, whereby 
consensus among conflicting parties results from a bartering of resources.   
 Musch (2012) details the federal government’s historic record in pursuing such 
concertation concerning Turkish immigrant integration (86). She notes that such attempts 
in the arenas of education, religion, and cultural affairs have often been problematic at the 
federal level because of German federalism which assigns most responsibility in these 
areas to the individual Bundeslaender. This, thus, has influenced how the German 
government has responded in these areas (Musch, 2012 86). This study will build on these 
findings of Musch (2012). In North Rhine Westphalia and Bavaria, the state governments 
took the initiative in a similar fashion to foster arrangements with lead Muslim 
 
110 
organizations to foster the provision of Islamic religious instruction, as the case studies 
illustrate. These efforts have proceeded despite the inability to conceive corporatist 
partnerships with lead Muslim organizations at the Bundeslaender level. Additionally, that 
these initiatives were Bundeslaender initiatives speaks to Musch’s (2012) assertion that 
German federalism precludes such initiatives occurring at the federal level. Thus, this 
provides further support of the research design: a focus on Bundeslaender policy 
trajectories in the issue area of Islamic religious instruction.   
 Additionally, the German state has been described as a semi-sovereign state 
(Katzenstein, 1987). Kurthen (1997) describes Germany as a corporatist welfare state. Its 
political parties are non-ideological and tend towards consensual politics; para-public 
institutions have vast amounts of autonomy in issue areas. The institutional setting of the 
German polity also allows for many veto points for recognized participants and encourages 
consensus politics, all of which favors the status quo (Katzenstein, 2005 293; Nordbruch 
2012). Subsequently, contrary to the American example, policymaking is governed by a 
more fixed policy subsystems consisting primarily of para-public institutions (government 
officials and recognized interests) (Katzenstein, 2005 293). This often results in path 
dependent policy where reform occurs through incremental adjustments (Katzenstein, 2005 
293). However, elite consensus concerning the integration of Muslims via Islamic religious 
instruction has made policy expansion feasible. In North Rhine Westphalia and Bavaria, 
consensus among the major parties, academics and Christian religious groups have led to 
incremental inclusion of Muslim influence via pilot projects and state-initiated variations 




German Opportunity Structures 
 Much of the relevant literature on incorporation of Muslims in Europe deals with 
the existing church-state institutional structures and how they facilitate both Muslim 
incorporation and collective action among Muslim interests. 
 Alba (1998) argues that the corporate structure of German church-state relations, 
and the small non-Christian population for most of the 20th century has resulted in a 
German polity that has institutionalized Christian normative conceptions in multiple public 
settings and political processes (Alba, 1998). This has had the effect of problematizing the 
incorporation of Islam despite the Basic Law’s protection of religious pluralism (Alba, 
1998). 
 Kastoryano (2004) argues that a focus on church-state relations provides the most 
insightful view of the immigrant experience of Muslim populations in Western Europe. 
According to Kastoryano (2004), as it is the immigrants’ religion which is seen as a threat, 
church-state relations will play a significant role in the integration process. Kastoryano 
(2004) offers that a focus on individual rates of naturalization and voting miss the collective 
action in pursuit of cultural, religious, identity related collective goods that is a major 
aspect of the integration experience.    
 Soper and Fetzer (2007) argue that church-state practices structured state 
accommodations of the religious needs of its Muslim immigrant populations. They hold 
that the current literature on the Muslim immigrant experience concentrates solely on the 
political and economic effects of Muslim immigration to the West (Soper and Fetzer, 
2007). While acknowledging the value of this work, they argue that academic focus should 
also look at how religion is incorporated since religious difference seems to be at the core 
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of the controversy over Muslim immigration (Soper and Fetzer, 2007 934).    
    Warner and Wenner (2006) argue that Western fears of the growing Muslim 
presence leading to a Muslim electoral bloc that fundamentally transforms Western 
societies are wildly exaggerated. They demonstrate that the decentralization of Islam (both 
institutionally and theologically) has resulted in immigrant populations that lack the 
political and social homogeneity to produce the suggested electoral bloc with homogenous 
interests. This heterogeneity exists not only between Western states which have sizable 
Muslim immigrant populations, but within the immigrant populations in these states (as 
the hundred plus Muslim organizations can attest) (Warner and Wenner, 2006 458). Citing 
the lack of literature on the effects of the institutional features of organized religion, they 
aim to use Islam in Europe as a case study in how the institutional features of Islam 
preclude collective action on the level feared by Western immigration-phoebes.   
 Pfaff and Gill (2006) offer a complimentary argument concerning collective action 
by Muslims in Berlin. They also argue for focusing on the church-state relations of the 
receiving country, the institutional features of Islam, and the political and social 
stratification of the Muslim diaspora as the best approach to offering prognoses concerning 
the political potential of Muslim immigrants. They find that the heterogeneity of the 
Muslim diaspora both ideologically and organizationally create incentives for 
organizations to act as spoilers (Pfaff and Gill, 2006). These spoilers disrupt the coalition 
building necessary to build representative entities that can participate in German 
corporatism. 
 Hofhansel (2007) adds to the findings of Pfaff and Gill (2006) and Wenner and 
Warner (2006). He concedes that the institutional features of Islam and German church-
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state practices are important in understanding Muslim integration, but they are not the 
whole picture. He argues that these institutional features are funneled through the local 
politics and practices and vary per issue area. Using the case of Germany, Switzerland and 
Austria, Hofhansel (2007) finds that local politics and varying practices per issue area are 
as determinative of policy accommodations to Muslim groups as the countries’ church-
state relations and the institutional features of the country’s Muslim diaspora. In this sense, 
Hofhansel’s (2007) argument compliments Koopmans (2004) and Money (1997) by adding 
the church-state institutional configurations to the local contexts, arguing that both of these 
make up the local contexts that are determinative of immigrant integration. 
 This study will build on these findings citing the importance of institutional features 
of Islam, German church-state relations in structuring political opportunity, the particular 
historical and local politics through which attempts at policy change must contend, and the 
varying practices (institutions and politics) per issue area that affect policymaking.   
 
The Influence of National Contexts - Plebiscitary Politics Literature 
 In Cooper’s (2009) discussion of the transformation of the American political 
system — from one characterized by congressional preeminence to one of presidential 
preeminence — Cooper theorizes the emergence of plebiscitarian politics in the 1980s as 
the realization of the progressive doctrine — equating popular representative rule with 
governing according to the people’s will (318). Twentieth century institutional reforms 
allowed for more popular and special interest participation and influence in agenda setting, 
candidate selection, electoral and policy campaigns (Cooper, 2009 318). All of this came 
at the expense of state and local party leadership in these realms. Plebiscitarian politics was 
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suited for the emergence of a political system focused on policy goals and greatly affected 
by media coverage (Cooper, 2009). This, according to Cooper (2009), contrasted with the 
traditional party system which focused on party loyalty and party patronage (378). Anti-
bilingual education forces in California (but also in other states) employed the rhetoric of 
plebiscitary politics to legitimate their campaign to end bilingual education. They argued 
that these were failed programs, controlled by and for the sole benefit of special interests, 
operating without public support. This study will argue that the plebiscitary policymaking 
mechanism provided an alternative policy venue to challengers to bilingual education that 
was free of the legislative dynamics that favor entrenched interests such as Latino interests 
groups in California.   
 As mentioned, Joppke (1999) cites the California plebiscite movement of the 1990s 
as an important signpost of the incongruence between policy outcomes produced by post-
1960s rights-based elite politics (Levin and Landy, 1995) and public sentiment (Joppke, 
1999). This is the ideological core of plebiscitary politics (Laycock and Barney, 1999). 
This study will take Joppke’s findings and address them from another angle: how does 
plebiscitary politics function within policy subsystems/ issue networks of the post- 1960s 
institutional and political context. 
 Lupia and Mutsusaka (2004) address traditional theories of direct democracy, 
highlighting new findings. They argue that studies of direct democracy prior to the 1990s 
were mostly descriptive and normative. New studies they contend apply these questions to 
more scientific methodological treatment— inferring scientific propositions which “could 
be evaluated theoretically and tested empirically” (Lupia and Mutsusaka, 2004 464). One 
of the issues addressed is the effect of money. Traditional theories have argued that policy 
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outcomes can be bought via wealthy initiative sponsors. Lupia and Mutsusaka (2004 472) 
cite findings that show that policy outcomes are more dependent on policy legitimacy 
which requires legitimation by well-known elites or institutions. Money has more of an 
effect when marshaled to defeat proposals than in sponsorship for enacting such legislation 
through direct democratic means (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004 472). The researchers, thus, 
conclude that pre-existing public support is an equally important factor in the passage of 
citizen-initiatives24 (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004 472).   
 Lupia and Matsusaka (2004) also assess recent research on the effects of direct 
democracy on policy outcomes. Direct democracy legislation has not always been 
conservative. They cite evidence from Matsusaka (2004) and Gerber (1999) revealing that 
liberal trends in policy outcomes in the first half of the 20th century gave way to 
conservative trends in recent fiscal and social policy since the latter half of the 20th century 
(Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004 473). During the first half of the 20th century (1902-1942), 
direct democracy legislation led to general increases in state government spending as 
opposed to current trends of fiscal austerity (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004 474). 
Subsequently, they conclude that the presence of direct democratic institutions tend to 
move policy back to a median voter position. The authors maintain that these findings are 
important for those who make claims that direct democracy encourages policy movement 
to the right (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004 474). 
 There is debate within the plebiscitary literature whether plebiscitary politics 
sanctions tyranny of the majority. This is especially relevant to bilingual education since a 
                                                 
24 Referendums — the other most commonly used form of direct democracy — are initiated by legislatures. 
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sizable portion of the target group, Mexicans, are not citizens and subsequently cannot vote 
in addition to being a minority 25  in the electorate. 26  With respect to the effects of 
plebiscitary politics on minority rights, the literature offers contradictory findings.   
 Butler and Ranney (1994) argue that [theoretically] plebiscitarian politics can strive 
for two goals: It can be a mechanism used by political elites to augment or legitimate 
representational democracy, or it can be used to circumvent mediational actors in pursuit 
of a more pure form of direct democracy. The former has traditionally been the normative 
foundation of plebiscitarian instruments (Butler and Ranney, 1994). The latter has played 
an increasing role in the increased use of plebiscitarian instruments since the 1970s (Butler 
and Ranney, 1994 13). In either of its varieties, Butler and Ranney (1994 20) find that fears 
of majority tyranny are exaggerated, arguing that evidence indicating the restriction of 
minority rights through referendum-induced legislation is marginal at best. They highlight 
that most referendums are initiated through governing elites— thus are subject to the same 
processes of deliberation in the formation of their wording. And citizen initiatives 
formulated by citizen demand which lack the backing or sponsorship of political elites 
rarely succeed (Butler and Ranney, 1994 21). The Unz anti-bilingual education campaign, 
English for the Children, is the exception to this theory. It lacked sponsorship from 
California legislators even from the Republican officials (Crawford, 1999). The latter 
feared alienating the Latino constituency as was the case with Republican support of 
Proposition 187 (HoSang, 2010; Crawford, 1999). 
                                                 
25 Approximately, seventy-three percent of the electorate were non-Hispanic whites during the 1990s when 
the California voter initiative trilogy.  Although the passage of Proposition 187 did spark a substantially 
naturalization bump among Latinos in California.   
 
26 According to the PewResearch Hispanics Trends Project, only 36 percent of all eligible Mexicans have 
naturalized in the US.  
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  Magelby (1999) cites the agenda setting power of citizen initiatives as the major 
reason for its increased use by political elites from the mid-1970s forward (218). By the 
mid-1970s, the traditional party system of the 19th century had been completely dismantled 
as congressional reforms weakened party leaders and committee chairs, completing the 
aforementioned Progressive era reforms detailed by Cooper (2009). The political system 
became more oriented towards representing the popular will — bringing to fruition an 
ideological development that began in the late 19th century (Cooper, 2009).  Concurrently, 
the emergence of interest group politics, party polarization — secular party realignment 
which made the parties more ideologically consistent — the emergence of the media’s role 
in policymaking, and issue advocacy required aspiring political office holders and 
incumbents to rely more on independent political resources (and less on party resources as 
political parties had weakened) to influence their political fate (Cooper, 2009 318). 
Subsequently, influence in issues of saliency became a prized commodity for political 
officials looking to strengthen their political position without the assistance of the Party. 
Thus, agenda setting power became an important tool to employ for these [now] 
independent political actors.   
 In this sense plebiscitary politics is used to disrupt policymaking subsystems that 
subsist through elite representational subsystems disconnected from popular politics.  
Using the rhetoric of plebiscitarian politics, politicians have used specific initiatives to 
facilitate their own electoral and political interests (Magelby, 1999 234). The initiative 
process can enable politicians to raise visibility on an issue in which their association with 
the issue can embolden them politically (appealing to outside constituencies and attracting 
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financial support from issue activists27) (Magelby, 1999 234). Initiatives also make for 
good copy and thus tend to attract media attention (Magelby, 1999 236), which is helpful 
for destabilizing policy conceptualizations (Jones and Baumgartner, 1993; 2002)— a 
quality beneficial to outside actors looking to increase their influence and political profile. 
 Additionally as a result of the emergence of plebiscitary politics, more direct forms 
of democracy were legitimated for the purpose of reorienting policy goals so that they were 
more in line with the will of the people. The marked increase nationally, cited by Magelby 
(1999), in the titling and petition-circulation of popular initiatives since the 1970s is 
indicative of the emergence of plebiscitarian politics and the agenda setting power of direct 
democratic mechanisms. Gerber (1996) found that the introduction or even threat of an 
initiative can change legislative behavior by placing formerly ignored issues (or particular 
dimensions of issues) on the policy agenda (Gerber, 1996 as cited in Lupia and Matsusaka, 
2004 472).   
 Successful initiatives in one state can also influence similar initiative campaigns by 
similar groups and legislative behavior in other states — increasing issue salience in other 
localities (Magelby, 1999 239). The various incarnations of the English for the Children 
voter initiatives — the Ron Unz led voter initiative campaigns to outlaw bilingual 
education — are indicative of this dynamic. Beginning in California in the late 1990s, the 
campaign was successful in putting anti-bilingual education voting initiatives on election 
ballots in Arizona, Colorado, and Massachusetts in the early 2000s. However, the issue 
salience brought about by the Unz initiative failed to change the legislative behavior in 
                                                 
27 These are two are benefits political officials once depended on the Party to provide but now have to secure 
on their own (Cooper, 2009). Thus, the employment of plebiscitarian politics can also be traced to the 
weakening of political parties (Cooper, 2009). 
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Texas as it lacked a voter initiative policymaking mechanism. This study thus will show 
how the lack or presence of the voter initiative as a policymaking mechanism altered the 
prospects of policy rollback in bilingual education in Texas and California.   
 Also, as mentioned previously, since voter initiatives also have the effect of 
influencing attention to particular issues in other states or nationally, early activity in the 
initiative process can encourage increased activity in the form of counter mobilization from 
those whose interests are targeted by the initiatives (Magelby, 1999 239; Calavita, 1996). 
This also has potential to alter the political context of an issue area. With respect to the 
latter, Magelby (1999) contends that this agenda setting power of direct legislation and its 
use of majoritarian politics presents a threat to minority interests if courts are not willing 
to protect the infringement on minority rights by democratically sanctioned majorities 
(Magelby, 1999 241).   
 In their study on the outcomes of direct democracy legislation for issues of interest 
to and those targeting minorities, Gerber, Hanjal, and Louch (2002) find that minority 
voters are not significantly more likely to be on the losing side of initiative or referendum 
votes than non-Hispanic whites. Gerber, Hanjan, and Louch (2002) use a more 
comprehensive definition for policies that affect minorities, expanding the definition 
beyond simply those policies that target ethnic and racial minorities. They expand the 
analytical focus to direct democratic legislation in which minorities vote as a cohesive 
block, and those in which polls reveal that these issues were the most important to these 
groups (Gerber, Hanjal, and Louch, 2002 172). In finding that non-whites were not 
significantly less likely to be on the winning side of direct democracy legislation, they 
theorized that tyranny of the white majority had been overstated in the literature (Gerber, 
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Hanjal, and Louch, 2002). Specifically, the existence of tyranny of the white majority 
requires voting cohesiveness from white voters and/ or that the voting preferences for 
whites and non-whites had to be in direct opposition (Gerber, Hanjal, and Louch, 2002 
172).  These conditions only seemed to be present in legislation targeted at ethnic and racial 
minorities (Gerber, Hanjal, and Louch, 2002 172). Subsequently, with respect to direct 
legislation that targeted ethnic and racial minorities, Gerber, Hanjal, and Louch (2002 171) 
did find that minorities were more likely than whites to be on the losing side of initiative 
and referendum votes. This was especially true for Latinos who were found to most 
consistently lose out on initiatives and referendums targeted at them (Gerber, Hanjal, and 
Louch, 2002 171). They conclude that Latinos should be concerned with the potential for 
direct democratic legislation targeted at their rights or important issues (Gerber, Hanjal, 
and Louch, 2002 171). The authors hypothesize that the prime target of anti-minority policy 
is the rapidly increasing Latino population in California with the goal of quelling their 
increasing political, economic and social influence (Gerber, Hanjal, and Louch, 2002 171-
172). This finding is relevant for the present study. The study’s findings concerning the 
effect of plebiscitary politics on policy arrangements in this issue area will contribute 
insights into the plebiscitary effect on integration issue areas related to Latinos.   
 Calavita (1996) found that fiscal restraint especially towards retrenchment in 
redistributive policies that target marginalized minorities had significant and growing 
public support in the 1990s. This sentiment was manifested in policy through voter 
initiative legislation in California that pursued reducing spending on social services and 
affirmative action for marginalized groups. The author illustrates how public sentiment 
(created by economic insecurity) and voter initiatives can produce substantial policy 
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change without the backing of elites (Calavita, 1996). 
 Lastly, HoSang (2010) maintains that initiative campaigns provide a new forum to 
problematize issues, removing them from the institutional dynamics that had sustained 
policy regimes. Initiative forums presented policy outsiders with an open forum where the 
issue areas could be debated anew [without the institutional advantages afforded to policy 
regimes because of the dynamics of retrenchment politics]. With respect to this study, the 
presence of the voter initiative provided a forum where alternative issue definitions could 
receive a more equal public hearing. As restrictionism in immigration, and retrenchment 
in social policy and budgetary issues had gained popular support among the electorate, the 
voter initiative forum proved more favorable to those interests in California supportive of 
policy rollback in bilingual education. The study will build on HoSang’s (2010) finding, 
arguing that the initiative forum presented policy rollback entrepreneurs with a policy 
venue less susceptible to the obstructionism of the institutional gatekeepers of the bilingual 
education policy regime and one that did not require the support of legislators fearful of 
alienating the mobilized (in the wake of Proposition 187) Latino community. 
 These are important assertions with respect to this study. As restrictive immigration 
policies are in many cases preferred by a majority of the electorate, a well-crafted initiative 
with the goal of restrictive immigration policy should stand a good chance of passage. This, 
subsequently, would allow for voters/ political entrepreneurs to circumvent the policy 






Theorizing Political Change 
Building on this expansive notion of political incorporation, how can issues 
of policy direction, policy change, and policy stasis be theorized? 
 Focusing on explanations for policy direction and policy change, Givens and 
Luedtke (2005) employ an empirical study to investigate the impact of issue salience and 
partisan politics on immigration control policy and immigrant integration policies. They 
found that issue saliency led to more restrictive policies in immigration control and 
immigrant integration, but that partisan politics was only relevant in immigrant integration 
policy (Givens and Luedtke, 2005). Concerning immigrant integration, right parties were 
more restrictive (Givens and Luedtke, 2005).   
 Joppke (2003) argues that the presence of left or right governments is a predictor 
of policy direction in citizenship law. He holds that left governments pursue policies that 
lower the barriers of citizenship to foreigners. He terms this ‘de-ethnicization’ (Joppke, 
2003). Right governments pursue ‘re-ethnicization’ — citizenship policies with high 
barriers for foreigners but lower barriers for the co-ethnic diaspora. Joppke argues that 
identification of the party in power is a good indication for policy direction (as cited in 
Money, 2009).          
 Likewise, Howard (2007) discusses the role of political parties in restrictive policy 
change. Howard (2007) agrees with Joppke (2003) that elites are inclined to pursue 
liberalizing policies but only in states with restrictive laws (as there is pressure for them to 
meet the standards of more liberal states) (as cited in Money, 2009). More importantly, 
Howard (2007) finds that the capacity of elites to pursue liberalizing immigration policies 
depends on the presence of right-wing, anti-immigrant parties (as cited in Money, 2009). 
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The presence of anti-immigrant parties and the concurrent issue salience of immigration is 
a better predictor of liberal policy change than the partisanship of government. 
 These works, however, cannot explain the policy trajectories identified in the 
localities of focus in this study. Bavaria has a conservative immigration regime 
(Koopmans, 2004), yet it has been inventive in its attempts to provide Islamic religious 
instruction. Bilingual education regimes have fared better in Texas — a conservative state 
— over the period of study than in California —an overall liberal state. Hence partisanship 
of the government is not the explanatory variable in this study. Concerning the presence of 
right wing parties, it is true that Germany lack a strong right wing party and that policy 
trends towards liberalization in integration issues can be explained as elites pursuing 
movement towards more immigrant inclusion amid international pressures to do so. 
However, Howard (2007) cannot explain the varying policy trajectories in Berlin versus 
the western Bundeslaender. Specifically, why were policy debates in Berlin concerning 
Islamic religious instruction more contested? This study employs an alternative argument 
based on Baumgartner and Jones’ (1991, 1993) theory of endogenous policy change.  
 Baumgartner and Jones (1993) is the standard bearer for and the work referenced 
most by scholars studying endogenous institutional change. They argue that issue salience 
and policy image are the main variables in policy change. Their theory is based around the 
agenda-setting model (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993 4). This model is used to theorize how 
policy arrangements experience long periods of stability and rapid periods of change before 
new policy arrangements settle at new points of consensus where a new period of stability 
begins. These periods of stability for policymaking arrangements take the form of policy 
monopolies. Policy monopolies are particular understandings of an issue (policy 
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definitions, policy image) supported by institutional arrangements that reinforce this 
understanding via policy outcomes (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993 6). Policy monopolies 
form when particular understandings resonate with the public and/or among a subset of 
elites who support these particular understandings leading to institutional arrangements to 
reinforce such understandings in policy outcomes. Such arrangements then persist either 
through public acceptance of these understandings or because such understandings are only 
important to a subset of elites/ the population, allowing these institutional arrangements to 
persist with minimal challenge. These policy monopolies both secure a particular 
understanding of an issue via policy outcomes and insulate the regime from outside actors 
who aim to challenge the governing policy image.  Based on an assumption of the 
multidimensionality of political issues, they argue that issue salience leads to the increased 
likelihood of issue redefinition efforts and/or venue shifting of policymaking 
responsibility. In their theory issue salience allows for the entry of new actors into the 
policy making process which increases the likelihood of policy redefinition and venue 
shifting (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2002). This results in positive feedback where new 
issue definitions resonate in other policy venues leading to changes across policy venues. 
However, issue saliency and partisan politics do not adequately explain the variance 
of the aforementioned policy trends in bilingual education and Islamic religious instruction. 
In both Germany and the US, the partisan composition of local governments has sometimes 
yielded policy results contrary to the findings of those (Joppke, 2003; Howard, 2007; 
Luedtke and Givens, 2005) that claim that partisanship of government has the most 
explanatory power. For the localities of focus, there are examples of government 
partisanship and the policies they produce (in Germany, Bavaria making accommodations 
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to establish quasi-Islamic instruction and in the US, Texas’ long history of bipartisan 
support for bilingual education) that do not conform to this theory. With respect to issue 
saliency, immigration (specifically restrictionist sentiments) has been increasing in 
saliency since the early 1990s in Germany and the early 1980s in the US (Nordbruch, 2012; 
Givens and Luedtke, 2005 5). However, in Germany changes to policy arrangements in 
religious instruction in which new policy arrangements were developed to allow for 
religious instruction in Islam either preceded emergence of immigrant integration as an 
issue high on the political agenda or were counterintuitive to the issue salience of 
immigration restrictionism that was prominent in the 1980s when many of these policy 
arrangements first took hold. In the US, trends have been consistent with the saliency of 
restrictionism since 1980 but local trajectories in California and Texas have varied enough 
that issue saliency provides an incomplete explanation. 
Additionally, bilingual education in the US and religious instruction in Germany 
have trended in opposite directions (trending which is counterintuitive to their duration and 
degree of political incorporation as well as irrespective of increasing issue salience).  
German trends can be partially explained by international norms and the plight of German 
elites to erase their Nazi past (Joppke, 1999; Nordbruch, 2012; Thielmann, 2010). Yet, 
these do not specify the causal mechanism that explain how international norms manifest 
in domestic policy outcomes contrary to public opinion. Specifically, how can elites 
eschew the effects of public opinion during periods of high issue saliency? In response to 
those that argue client politics can provide an explanation (Joppke, 1999), why was client 
politics ineffective in the cases where restrictive policy change occurred?  
Nordbruch (2012) argues that there is a growing discontent in German public 
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opinion with the pace and character of immigration. Public preferences differ from elite 
policy preferences. Joppke (2012), Calavita (1996), and Johnson, Farrell, and Guinn (1997) 
also discuss the nativist sentiment brewing that presents challenges to more liberal 
immigration related policy outcomes. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) theorized that issue 
saliency can transform dormant issues to those primed for policy reform. As both countries 
have experienced policy change in the issue areas of focus, it has been asserted that issue 
salience played a role in these trends in both countries (Nordbruch, 2012; Thielmann, 2010; 
Joppke, 1999; Calavita, 1996). However, why have policy trends in the US and Germany 
taken on their particular trajectories? Why has public opinion followed in one case, but 
eschewed in another?   
This is not to say that partisan politics and issue salience have not played a role in 
these different developments. However, as these cross-national policy trends do not 
conform to previous theoretical accounts of the effects of issue salience and partisan 
politics (Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Money, 1999), other factors must be at play. 
 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory 
 This study will look at the policy areas of focus over a 45-year time span. This 
period has included periods of policy stasis and periods of policy change. Subsequently, 
this study will build on Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) Punctuated Equilibrium Theory as 
this theory aims to theoretically account for periods of policy stasis marked by periods of 
substantial policy change. To do so this study will trace national and subnational policy 
trajectories in bilingual education and religious instruction over a 45-year time span.  
During this time, policy trajectories in both countries experienced periods of policy stasis 
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and periods of change (dramatic change in the US case). Religious instruction throughout 
most of its history in Germany until the late 20th century equated with instruction in 
Christianity. The historically contingent combination of German reunification and violent 
attacks directed towards non-German refugees in the early 1990s led to the liberalization 
of citizenship policy later in the decade (Nordbruch, 2012). Nordbruch (2012) maintains 
that despite legal interpretations further institutionalizing policy restrictionism, several 
German localities in response to appeals from Muslim groups embraced moderated 
versions of Islamic religious instruction. However, initiatives in North Rhine Westphalia 
and Bavaria began in the 1970s and 1980s respectively, prior to the supposed rise in issue 
salience of immigrant integration brought on by anti-foreigner violence and reunification. 
In Berlin, elites chose not to purse pilot programs in Islamic religious instruction despite 
its supposedly liberal immigrant integration regime (Koopmans, 2004). Islamic religious 
instruction was legalized through successful court action by the Islamic Federation of 
Berlin in 2000. In the American example, bilingual education experienced dramatic policy 
change in California and Texas in the 1960s and early 1970s, policy stasis from the late 
1970s through the 1980s with incremental restrictionism beginning in the mid-1980s. The 
1990s, however, brought dramatic policy change to California but continued policy stasis 
with incremental restrictionism in Texas. What led to the variation of policy change in the 
localities in both nations? Are there regional commonalities/ differences internationally/ 
intra-nationally?  Specifically what causal mechanisms were responsible for the transition 
from periods of policy stasis and incrementalism to periods of dramatic policy change? 
And with respect to the central question of this study, what influenced the direction of 
policy change? As the political and institutional contexts that govern policy periods differs 
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(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), understanding this period of change is critical to theories 
incorporating a comprehensive understanding of the policy system and factors involved in 
particular change (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002).   
 Contrary to much political science of the 1970s and 1980s, which focused on 
processes of policy and institutional stability or (separately) on causes of institutional 
change, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argued that theories of institutional and policy stasis 
are not comprehensive reflections of political reality. They concede that the political world 
is marked by periods of stability but that policy and institutional change do occur. They 
conclude that theories on political stability were at best only part of the story or at worst 
incomplete accounts of political reality (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Those that did 
account for political change attributed it to changes in macro political forces (such as 
exogenous shocks or party realignment). According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993), 
American politics, specifically political change, was not governed solely by macro political 
forces. They saw the policymaking process operating in national, state, and local settings 
with periods of policy stasis, but also episodic periods where the entrance of new political 
interests expanded the scope of conflict. This led to major episodic shifts in policy that 
were independent of the macro political forces of partisan politics and policy subsystems 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). For Baumgartner and Jones (1993), issue saliency is the 
catalyst — facilitated by historical factors — behind punctuated policy change that occurs 
outside of macro trends (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993 xxi; 6-7). Issue saliency creates 
attention for new policy conceptions of the problems and solutions underlying policy. 
Subsequently, this brings new interests into the policy network (Baumgartner and Jones, 
1993 8). This upsets the tenuous “structure-induced equilibrium,” setting the stage for 
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dramatic policy change (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993 8).   
 Baumgartner and Jones (2002) argue that a complete view of the policy process 
must include a theory for long-lasting policy stability and rapid, substantial policy change 
(2). Central to their argument are the concepts of multidimensional problems, negative and 
positive feedback, and institutional design (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002).  Problems are 
often complex and multidimensional. However, because of limited attention capacity of 
political actors, policy outcomes are unidimensional — dealing with only one dimension 
of the issue area. Institutional design ensures agenda, coalition and subsequently policy 
outcome consistency. Specifically, institutional design fixes the participation of a 
consistent set of pro-policy actors/institutions, restricts the participation of 
actors/institutions opposed to the consensus policy, and institutionalizes particular issue 
conceptualizations and policy processes (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002 12; 24). This leads 
to negative feedback where the costs of policy change outweigh its benefits (Baumgartner 
and Jones, 2002 12; 24). Policy stasis is the result. Any policy change is incremental 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 2002). Much of the study of policy arrangements focused on this 
latter dynamic (Pierson, 1994).   
 Baumgartner and Jones (1993) contested this, arguing that such arrangements are 
vulnerable to an activated public — issue saliency. Specifically, issue saliency can affect 
the legitimacy of the governing issue conceptualization of the underlying problem 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 2002). A reverse process occurs during periods of issue saliency: 
policy conceptualizations are reassessed, legitimizing outside challenges to the policy 
authority of actors and institutions of the policymaking process; this increases the 
likelihood of policy/ institutional change, which legitimizes further challenges to 
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jurisdictional authority and current policy conceptualizations making additional policy 
change more likely (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002). Baumgartner and Jones (2002) refer 
to this process as positive feedback. During these times, the likelihood of policy change 
encourages new actors/ new institutions, and new conceptualizations of the problem which 
further increases the likelihood of policy change. The reformist process can result in 
dramatic policy change over short periods of time (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002 22).   
Subsequently, institutions should be viewed as both endogenous and exogenous to the 
policy process — subject to the effects of issue saliency on a multidimensional problem 
which has only received a unidimensional policy treatment. The symbiotic relationship 
between issues, policies and the institutions that regulate the policymaking process leads 
to interactive effects that in periods of low issue saliency result in negative feedback and 
positive feedback in periods of high issue saliency. Baumgartner and Jones (2002 7-8; 25) 
hold that a complete theory of the policy process must account for institutional stability— 
policy stasis and incrementalism — and institutional change — dramatic, substantial policy 
change — as institutions and the relevant actors respond to the changing political context 
(political mobilization, altered understandings of the issue, etc.). 
 At the core of their theory is the notion that policy monopolies are difficult to 
maintain in the open American political system (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993 8). The 
openness of the American political system provides a plethora of venues for political 
entrepreneurs to offer competing policy definitions, thus challenging those who benefit 
from the governing policy image. This study’s focus on the US and Germany aims to depict 
how the openness/closeness of the system affects the prospects of minority interests for 
favorable policy outcomes. The policy image of religious instruction as an institution of 
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integration is maintained throughout German history while the issue dimension of bilingual 
education transitions from education opportunity to accountability issues, subsequently 
affecting the politics of the issue. Additionally, however, this study will show how elite 
views towards an issue interact with the institutional structure to influence policy 
trajectories. Baumgartner and Jones (1991; 1993) argue that changing the issue salience of 
particular dimensions of an issue can alter political consensus without changing elite 
preferences. This implies that elite preferences have a minimal role in policy stasis or 
change. In tracing elite preferences concerning the issues of focus, this study aims to 
modify this claim. In the German setting, elite preferences concerning religious instruction 
are determinative of policy trajectories in the cases of focus. In the American setting, the 
historic trajectory of elite views concerning bilingual education compliments explanations 
that rely on solely issue dimension, providing a more complete account of the politics 
involved in support for bilingual education between 1965 and 1975, and the disintegration 
of this support in the decades following. As this study will trace the evolution of religious 
instruction and bilingual education policy over 40 years — a period of time in which policy 
stasis and change occurred — this study will build on Baumgartner and Jones’ (2002) 
assertion that understanding the policy process requires longitudinal studies which assesses 
the reasons for policy stasis and policy change within the same issue over time. 
 
Policy Feedback 
 Baumgartner and Jones (1993) incorporate notions of policy feedback into the 
endogenous processes of policy stasis and change. They argue that both positive and 
negative feedback should be incorporated into theories of the policy process (Baumgartner 
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and Jones, 1993 18). Negative feedback results in path dependent policy trajectories and 
incremental change. Positive feedback occurs when small changes “catch on” leading to 
greater changes across policy venues (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993 17).   
 Pierson (1993) reviews what he considers important literature in policy feedback 
up through 1993, discussing the important contributions the reviewed scholars made to the 
subfield while also discussing the methodological shortcomings of these works and the 
field in general. Pierson (1993 626) categorizes policy feedback along two axes: types of 
feedback mechanisms and actors affected by feedback mechanisms. Types of feedback 
mechanisms include resources and incentive effects and interpretive effects. Actors 
affected by feedback mechanisms include government elites, interest groups, and mass 
publics. He discusses the literature which make convincing cases showing the various 
policy feedback produced when various types of feedback mechanisms interact with the 
different actors affected by feedback mechanisms (Pierson, 1993). However, Pierson 
(1993) argues that these studies are mostly illustrative as they do not show how these 
particular case studies can be transportable. Specifically, these studies do not specify under 
what conditions policy feedback takes place and which influences are most important for 
policy feedback to occur.   
 A policy feedback explanation could be provided for the policy trajectories of 
Islamic religious instruction in Germany and bilingual education in the US for the period 
of study. Concerning the former, German elites were presented with a growing Muslim 
population who they felt needed integrating. Policy learning could provide a possible 
explanation as to why there was broad based elite support for applying religious instruction 
policy initiatives as a means of integrating Muslim youth. Religious instruction had 
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historically played this role in Germany, and Islam was considered the stumbling block to 
Muslim integration. In the US, civil rights initiatives created legal and institutional 
opportunity structures incentivizing Mexican advocates to organize in pursuit of 
redistributive legislation and legal protection from the federal government. Their success 
galvanized counter-mobilization from English Only advocates. However, these 
explanations only provide case specific illustrations and are also merely illustrative. This 
study argues that elite support for religious instruction and the closed, corporatist 
policymaking system provided the setting enabling modest policy expansion in Islamic 
religious instruction. Elite support for religious instruction in the closed German setting — 
where issue dimension could be held constant and challengers to issue autonomy could be 
excluded — led policy expansion through policy learning. The American system offers a 
contrary political and institutional context: elite division concerning bilingual education 
within the open, competitive political marketplace of pressure politics pluralism. In such a 
system, multiple venues are available, providing ample opportunities for elite divisions to 
result in less stable policy consensus where issue dimensions are more fluid, resulting in 
punctuated periods of policy change.   
 
Retrenchment Politics         
 This study will assume that the politics of policy rollback in bilingual education 
presents similar issues for its proponents as those pursuing retrenchment initiatives.  
Although bilingual education is not a social policy with a powerful constituency, it is a 
program that has the backing of an advocacy network that speaks for a constituency, 
Latinos, who although they have not voted in numbers proportionate to their growing 
 
134 
population, they could play kingmakers if mobilized by the right issue.  This has been the 
view of government officials from Nixon to public officials in both parties in Texas and 
California throughout the period of study (Tatalovich, 1995; Davies, 2002; Navarro, 1985). 
And the dramatic increase in their rates of naturalization and political participation in 
California after the passage of Proposition 187 speaks to this potential (see California 
Chapter 5). Additionally, an administrative apparatus (administrators as well as teachers) 
developed at the federal and state level to implement bilingual education law, from which 
advocates for the pedagogical approach emerged (Moran, 1988; Crawford, 1999).  They 
have been among its most staunch supporters. Specifically, Republicans in Texas have 
been cognizant of the potential of mobilizing the Mexican community through their support 
of measures to repeal bilingual education and initiatives to make English the official state 
language.  Subsequently, they been have susceptible to the lobbying of the Latino advocacy 
network (San Miguel, 2011; Tatalovich, 1995). For all of these reasons, this study will 
assume that policy rollback initiatives in bilingual education face many of the same 
institutional dynamics as retrenchment issues — specifically the dynamics associated when 
the costs of rollback are concentrated and the benefits are diffusely spread among the 
population. 
 In the US case, policy expansion in bilingual education in the 1970s is followed by 
a period of restrictionist politics in linguistic politics at the national and state level that 
permeates into the politics of bilingual education. One of the main foci of this study 
concerns how the dynamics of retrenchment politics in bilingual education plays out in 
California and Texas. California has the voter initiative referendum as a policymaking 
option and venue. Texas does not. This study argues that the additional venue provides an 
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opportunity for redefinition efforts and venue shifting by proponents of policy rollback 
seeking a more favorable venue. 
 Pierson (1994) argues that the causal mechanisms involved in retrenchment are 
distinct from the factors involved in the expansion of the welfare state. His main argument 
hinges on his contention that the development and maturity of welfare state programs 
encourage policy feedback which leads to the development of administrative capacities and 
interests. These interests benefit from the programs’ presence and thus have a stake in the 
continued existence of these programs. Subsequently, retrenchment politics involves 
taking on these entrenched interests and not necessarily the interests (such as labor unions 
or left of center governments) that were originally responsible for their emergence and 
initial expansion. Subsequently, retrenchment politics involves strategizing methods for 
taking on these interests without catalyzing counter-mobilization movements seeking 
electoral retribution. These methods involve eliminating accountability for retrenchment 
initiatives.  
 With respect to effects of national institutional contexts on such prospects, Pierson 
(1994) argues that national institutional contexts present varied opportunities and pitfalls 
to particular strategies. The decentralized political context of the US (policymaking 
systems that often involve a matrix of intergovernmental policy venues and interests with 
relatively easy access to decision makers) presents different opportunity structures for 
retrenchment policy than more centralized policymaking systems where interests are more 
vertically integrated (Pierson, 1994 31-36). Nevertheless, Pierson (1994) argues that since 
policymaking structures vary per social policy program, internationally (for welfare state 
policies in general), and even within their particular national policymaking structures, 
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sweeping conclusion concerning retrenchment politics are suspect (Pierson, 1994 36). This 
study will build on this argument. It will employ a national and sub-national comparison 
of policy trajectories of two specific issues in localities to render how the politics of 
immigration with respect to these issue areas plays out in the particular localities. The study 
finds — concurring with Pierson (1994) — that particular issues have particular 
policymaking structures; these comparable issues are set within particular national 
institutional configurations, which also vary intra-nationally per locality. These 
subnational and national differences influence the prospects of interests attaining and 
maintaining their policy preferences. 
 Coleman, Atkinson and Montpetit (1997) apply Pierson’s (1994) thesis to 
retrenchment in agriculture via a comparison of farm policy in France and the US in the 
1990s. They concur with Pierson (1994) that policy feedback led to the development of 
strong agricultural interests willing to defend against retrenchment initiatives. They also 
found strong support for the systemic and programmatic reforms that can enable 
retrenchment efforts through obfuscation of the causal chains of retrenchment policy — 
thus limiting the blame that politicians assume for retrenchment politics. In the final 
assessment, however, they found that the differing structures of interest intermediation 
were determinative of prospects for defending against retrenchment efforts (Coleman, 
Atkinson and Montpetit, 1997 473). In France, vertically organized interests, situated in 
corporatist policy arrangements were better positioned to fend off retrenchment initiatives 
than fragmented farm interests in the US situated in pressure pluralist policy networks 
(Coleman, Atkinson and Montpetit, 1997 473). French farm interests were more 
coordinated and viewed as “social partners” of the state, functioning within corporatist 
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policy networks (Coleman, Atkinson and Montpetit, 1997 473). This was especially the 
case once the right — aligned with farm interests — returned to power after the 1993 
election.  US farm interests, on the other hand, were fragmented and not integrated in 
formal state-interest policymaking systems. This discouraged a coordinated response from 
US farm interests. They were, subsequently, unable to coordinate a united defense against 
retrenchment (Coleman, Atkinson and Montpetit, 1997 473).  
 Sheingate (2000), in his study of agriculture policy retrenchment in the US and EU 
in the 1990s, finds that employing the concepts of venue shifting and redefinition efforts 
has more explanatory power in explaining why successful retrenchment efforts early in the 
decade were reversed by the end of the decade — with the US and EU returning to increases 
in farming subsidies. The author holds that policy redefinition and venue shifting are 
particularly important explanatory variables in retrenchment politics because of the 
asymmetry between costs incurred by the beneficiaries of the target polices versus diffused 
benefits the general public would receive (Sheingate, 2000 338). Citing Riker (1986), 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and Pierson (1994), Sheingate (2000 337) argues the policy 
status quo rests with the policymaking power of a particular institutional venue that secures 
a particular policy definition and from which entrenched interests reap most of the policy 
rewards. Politicians, operating according to the dynamic of blame avoidance/ fearful of 
electoral retribution incurred from cutting programs that benefit a mobilized constituency, 
will avoid pursuing retrenchment efforts as the costs outweigh the benefits (Sheingate, 
2000 338). Thus, a primary obstacle to retrenchment policy are well-placed interests 
capable of enacting electoral retribution on retrenchment entrepreneurs (Sheingate, 2000 
338). Subsequently, there is a “status quo bias” as mobilized interests are 
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disproportionately powerful in the policymaking process with respect to quelling 
retrenchment efforts and maintaining their preferred policy outcomes (Sheingate, 2000 
339). Unless politicians can reduce blame for retrenchment policies, they are not worth the 
costs they incur (Sheingate, 2000 339).   
 Sheingate (2000) criticizes Coleman, Atikinson and Monpetit (1997) as being more 
of a descriptive account of the effects of interest intermediation regime type on 
retrenchment prospects than actually identifying the causal mechanism enabling or 
frustrating retrenchment efforts — which he cites are venue shifting and issue definition.  
This study aims to build on both their work by showing how German corporatist 
arrangements benefitted Turkish interests by maintaining a policy definition that viewed 
inclusion of Islamic religious instruction as an integrative tool for Turkish youth despite 
increasing aversion among the public to the growing Muslim populations. With respect to 
the US, the California case shows how the initiative forum provided a venue where 
retrenchment could be achieved and legislators would not be blamed. Ron Unz recognized 
that the voter initiative forum could be used to side-step the retrenchment dynamics of the 
legislature that allowed bilingual education policy regimes to persist amid ambivalent 
public support (Crawford, 1999).   
 
Conclusion 
 Subsequently, applying the theories of immigrant incorporation, and institutionalist 
policy change this study aims to add to the literature by specifying how policy trajectories 
vary nationally but within this variation are locally determined.  Theories of policy change 
involving issue definition and venue shifting are important to explanations concerning the 
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insulation and maintenance of policy definitions amid growing popular aversions to the 
increased presence of Islam and Spanish in German and American public life, respectively 
— the threats cited and theorized by Zolberg and Woon (1999). Maintaining or changing 
issue definitions/ policy venues is determinative of policy direction. This speaks to the 
importance of policy retrenchment theories in explaining when and how retrenchment 
efforts can be successful and why they are difficult. As the literature argues, corporatist 
arrangements are more immune to unexpected re-definition and venue change initiatives 
as the state-interest concertation involved integrates interests into the policymaking process 
in a manner not dependent on political context as is the case with pressure politics 
pluralism. As interests are more centrally coordinated, it also enables entrenched interests 
to better mobilize to defend cherished policy arrangements. However, elite agreement in 
support of particular issue definitions is also intricate in securing the status quo as this 
further encourages concertation. This study with its subnational and national, comparative 
focus aims to synthesize the aforementioned literature. The aim is that through applying 
these theories to the local cases, the study can contribute to efforts to show in which 
instances immigrant interests can expect favorable results from mobilization and in which 
contexts immigrant interests must continually campaign to maintain their entrenched 
position. This study concurs with the literature that Muslims in the German setting— 
because of elite support for church-state institutions for purposes of integration and the 
corporatist interest intermediation setting— are better situated to attain policy goals 







THE POLITICS OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION 
 
Politics of Immigration – Politics of Language in the US 
 This chapter provides a historical account of political development in bilingual 
education. This historical account focuses on the influence of two factors: elite 
agreement/disagreement over bilingual education and how this has been facilitated by the 
institutional configuration of the policymaking system. In describing the historic evolution 
of elite agreement and disagreement over bilingual education, the chapter will use the King 
and Smith (2005; 2008) racial orders operationalization of the competing political forces 
involved in their historic account of the role of race in American political development. 
Linguistic politics has been tied to racial politics throughout American history involving 
many of the same players, political alignments and political debates (Fenner, 2012; King 
and Smith, 2008). This historical account of bilingual education politics, thus, will build 
on the contributions of King and Smith (2005; 2008). It will show how periods of elite 
agreement involve hegemonic periods for a particular racial order as significant defections 
from the opposing order tipped the balance of power. A reordering of coalitions is sparked 
as the politics of the day permitted successful reassessments of the governing 






A Summary of the Historical Evolution of Bilingual Education Policy 
 In the 19th century, public education was in its infancy. Localities organized and 
funded public education arrangements. In areas where immigrant communities emerged, 
community elites established bilingual arrangements. As public education consolidated at 
the state level, state officials allowed these arrangements to persist in exchange for the 
assistance of these localities in providing public education at the local level under the 
auspices of the state (Blanton, 2004).   
 In the first two decades of the 20th century, elite consensus developed concerning 
English Only pedagogy as those supporting progressive pedagogy, nativism and white 
supremacy shared the same goal: English should be the language of instruction in public 
education (Blanton, 2004). During this period as the institutional structures at the state level 
became more capable of enforcing state mandates on localities, state officials successfully 
moved to eliminate bilingual education arrangements (Blanton, 2004). English Only 
pedagogy would enjoy elite support through the middle of the 20th century.   
 From the 1950s, elite preferences evolved with the growing federal and judicial 
involvement in education over issues of educational equality and educational opportunity.  
This brought more elites into the policy conversation concerning bilingual education as the 
salience of civil rights rose on the public agenda. And accordingly the scope of conflict 
expanded, bringing the English Only problematization of instructing second language 
students into disrepute (Crawford, 1999; Blanton, 2004). Increasingly, members from both 
parties favored experimentation with second language instruction. 
 By the middle of the 20th century, the politics of the Cold War, civil rights and 
academic consensus began to move elites towards embracing bilingual education for the 
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growing Spanish language population (Blanton, 2004). The former two would also increase 
pressure on the national government to play more of a role in public education policy. 
These two policy trends came to fruition in the mid-1960s with the passage of the 
Elementary, Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) and the Bilingual Education Act of 
1968 (BEA). ESEA made federal funds available for localities with under privileged 
students — some of these funds were directed towards experimental bilingual education 
programs. BEA provided federal funds to localities for efforts to address the needs of 
language minorities.   
 The 1960s transformed the policymaking process from one characterized by iron 
triangles and sub governments to one of issue networks (Berry, 1993). Advocacy players 
were legitimized and incorporated into the policy process via this transformation (Cooper, 
2009). Bilingual education advocates became well-entrenched during the 1970s when 
bilingual policy arrangements spread nationally throughout locales with sizable Spanish 
speaking populations. From the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s, there was general elite 
support for bilingual education. Elite agreement involved support from national and state 
political officials from both the Democratic and the Republican party, the federal and state 
courts, and the executive branch. Federal and judicial policy/ mandates resulted in the 
passage of bilingual education law in states and localities with sizable Latino populations 
in the 1970s. Additionally, as the Civil Rights movement legitimated advocacy politics, 
Latino advocacy groups became politically entrenched in the education policymaking 
system. As bilingual education policy arrangements developed through their advocacy and 
entrenchment, these groups used their favorable institutional positions to defend these 
policy arrangements in the decades following the 1970s when political trends in bilingual 
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education reversed and favored policy rollback. 
 Latino advocates for bilingual education were able to stave off English Only 
movements that were part of the anti-expansionary racial order (to be defined below) and 
gained power throughout the 1980s and 1990s at the federal and state levels.  However, in 
states that offered the voter initiative, English Only advocates were often able to venue 
shift policy-making to the direct initiative venue and pass ordinances making English the 
official language/ eliminate bilingual education arrangements (Galindo and Vigil, 2000). 
In areas without the initiative option, English Only policies were only successfully passed 
in those areas lacking entrenched Latino advocacy, such as the South in the 1980s and 
1990s (Singer, 2004). Subsequently, during this period, in areas with entrenched Latino 
advocacy, local institutional structures were determinative of how elite conflict played out 
in policy outcomes in linguistic policy. 
 Federal mandates and the changing politics of the late 1970s resulted in a political 
backlash against bilingual education. The decades following were a period of elite/ partisan 
division over bilingual education. As conservative elites — sympathetic to English Only 
pedagogy — became more prevalent at all levels of government (empowering conservative 
advocacy groups), the interactive dynamic of American intergovernmental relations, which 
had formerly led to expansionism, resulted in more restrictionist policy trends in 
immigration politics in general. In the 1980s and 1990s, this backlash came to fruition in 
linguistic politics in English Only movements to make English the official language at the 
national and state levels as well as challenges to bilingual education arrangements at the 
national and state level. Official English ordinances passed in many states, but bilingual 
education arrangements resisted these movements until 2001 at the national level and the 
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late 1990s in states and localities with entrenched Latino advocacy.   
 Nevertheless, bilingual education arrangements, in prevailing through these 
restrictionist political trends, experienced policy rollback during this period. Specifically, 
pedagogical methods favoring more use of English instruction/ immersion and less of 
native language instruction became more prevalent at the state and national level as BEA 
reauthorizations increasingly shifted more fiscal support towards these English oriented 
pedagogical approaches. Additionally, cultural maintenance bilingual education programs 
were virtually eliminated by the end of the 1970s at the national level and late 1980s at the 
state level.  
 These trends culminated at the state level in the late 1990s. Voter initiatives were 
passed in several states, ending bilingual education arrangements. These initiative 
movements were reactions to challenges that had previously failed via the traditional 
legislative policy process. Bilingual education arrangements persisted in states with 
entrenched Latino advocacy but without voter initiatives as a policymaking option.  
However, as mentioned, policy evolution incrementally continued in which bilingual 
education policy arrangements experienced policy rollback via further support of English 
oriented/ assimilationist pedagogical approaches. 
 At the national level, in 2002, the Bilingual Education Act was not reauthorized.  
Instead it was replaced by the English Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement, and 
Academic Achievement Act (Title III of the No Child Left Behind Act). This act removed 
the language of bilingualism and stressed English acquisition as the normative pedagogical 
goal for public schools (although it did not forbid the usage of bilingual education). 
 The remainder of the chapter will detail how the interaction of elite consensus and 
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institutional structure of bilingual education policy arrangements facilitated policy 
development in bilingual education. 
 
English as a Cultural Unifier— Transcending the Heterogeneous American population 
 In the United States, official recognition of religious communities is not an issue of 
contention as it is in Germany. Religious pluralism combined with a more sharp division 
between church and state characterize church-state relations. However, political 
contestations over language are more similar to those concerning religion in western 
Europe (Zolberg and Woon, 1999; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006). In the US, there is public 
consensus around the idea that language, specifically English, serves as cultural unifier 
necessitated by the religious, racial, and ethnic diversity of its population (Zolberg and 
Woon, 1999; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006). Most Americans view speaking English as a 
hallmark of being truly American (Citrin et al, 2003 3). In the 1996 General Survey, for 
example, 71.3 percent of respondents indicated that speaking English was extremely 
important to becoming “truly American” (Citrin et al, 2003 3). This places the largely 
Spanish-speaking immigrants of the post 1965 immigration wave as the threatening other 
(Zolberg and Woon, 1999) — they predominantly speak Spanish and their rapid population 
growth has population growth forecasts projecting them to be the majority population by 
the middle of the 21st century, thus, “threatening” the hegemony of English. This has been 
a core aspect of the ideology of the English Only movement since the 1980s.   
 Such anti-immigrant sentiment has historical antecedents as previous immigration 
waves such as the Irish and Germans in the 19th century and immigration from Southern 
and Eastern Europe between 1880 and 1930 prompted a backlash in the first decades of the 
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20th century against the increasing presence of foreign languages and cultures in public 
life (Citrin et al, 1990 535). The anxiety of Americans towards immigration was not quelled 
until the passage of immigration quotas in 1921 and 1924 — the latter culminating with 
the Immigration Act of 1924 — that essentially eliminated all non-northwestern European 
immigration until the mid 1960s (Citrin et al, 1990 537; Ngai, 1999). Elite agreement 
during this period supported the pursuit of English as the nation’s common language. This 
agreement concerning the hegemony of English was held by a majority of members from 
both parties and academics (in the form of the eugenics movement and pedagogical experts 
who cited that bilingual education led to depressed educational outcomes for immigrants) 
(Blanton, 2004; Ngai, 1999). 
 
The History of Race and its Connection to Bilingualism—Racial Institutional Orders 
and Their Effects on Bilingualism 
 This study will argue that elite agreement and disagreement over bilingual 
education is an explanatory factor in the historic evolution of bilingual education politics.  
Race has been integral to elite views concerning bilingual education. Referencing the racial 
component of linguistic politics, Terrence (2004) proffers that restrictive linguistic 
intolerance and racism have been closely linked throughout American history (as cited in 
Wiley and Wright, 2004 145). This characteristic is attributable to America’s British roots 
(Terrence 2004 146). The British justified their colonial conquests (to the Americas as well 
as previous colonial initiatives, such as their conquest of Ireland), purporting their right as 
a superior culture to civilize the uncivilized (Takaki, 1993; Terrence, 2004 146).  This 
became a dominant paradigm of American national culture in the 19th century (Terrence, 
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2004 146). Linguistic acculturation for its inhabitants was part and parcel of this process. 
Throughout the colonial period and through the turn of the 20th century, linguistic policy 
that stressed English acquisition was used as a form of social control towards various 
minority groups whose culture was seen as a potential threat to the hegemony of the white 
Anglo Saxon establishment (Terrence, 2004 146). In the early 19th century, the English 
settlers attempted to do this with the Indians — creating boarding schools with the sole 
purpose of Americanizing the Native American population (Flores and Murillo, 2001). 
Molesky (1988) asserts that such acculturation initiatives were responsible for the “severe” 
erosion of Native American languages, traditional family structure, and culture (as cited in 
Flores and Murillo, 2001). These Americanization projects were implemented on all other 
immigrant groups including European immigrants — German, Dutch, Polish, French, 
Spanish, Russian, and Swedish — during the first third of the 20th century (Flores and 
Murillo, 2001). The goal was to Americanize these immigrant communities through 
English acquisition (Flores and Murillo, 2001).  
 Historically, elite politics concerning race have had periods of general agreement 
and more open disagreement/ conflict. This chapter uses the King and Smith (2005; 2008) 
racial orders conceptualization in describing the periods of elite agreement and elite 
disagreement and the various directions linguistic politics took during the historical periods 
discussed. 
 King and Smith (2005; 2008) argue that US political development has evolved 
according to the contestation of competing racial orders. One racial institutional order has 
historically pursued policy arrangements to advantage whites — a white supremacist order; 
the other has pursued egalitarian policies or those aimed at reducing or eliminating policy 
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arrangements designed to advantage whites, an egalitarian order (King and Smith, 2005  
76).   
 Linguistic politics has typically been incorporated within the policy agenda of these 
competing racial orders especially in the post slavery era (since 1896) (King and Smith, 
2005 81; 2008 688). Concerning bilingual education, those interests for and against have 
ended up joining one of the two racial orders as elites have viewed linguistic policy areas 
as part of the competition to establish policy that allocated power, resources and/ or status 
along racial lines (King and Smith, 2008). This is due to the racial character that has always 
been a part of the politics of Latino immigration and the Spanish language in the American 
polity (Takaki, 1993; King and Smith, 2005; 2008; Terrence, 2004) — a characteristic of 
the interconnected political battles that were waged for racial equity and immigration rights 
throughout the 20th century (Tichenor, 1994 341).  
 The remainder of the chapter will present the historic role elite agreement/ 
disagreement and the intergovernmental/federalist structures played in the evolution of the 
politics of bilingual education. Initially a short discussion will outline the evolution of 
bilingual education policy in the 19th and early 20th century. This will show the similarities, 
specifically the racial aspect of immigration and subsequently linguistic politics. The 
middle of the chapter will focus on the period of elite consensus, 1965-1975. This captures 
how bilingual education was incorporated by King and Smith’s (2005; 2008) egalitarian 
order (race conscious liberalism). The final part will deal with the period after 
approximately 1978 of elite division over bilingual education. This period saw the rise of 
the color-blind racial order (the white supremacist racial order remodeled for the post-civil 
rights, race-conscious policy era). It gained control of the executive and judicial posts and 
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made significant inroads in the legislative branch at the national and state level (King and 
Smith, 2008 688). This commenced a period of elite conflict over bilingual education that 
persists to the present day.  
 
Nineteenth Century Nativism and Linguistic Politics 
 American patriotism in the form of white supremacy emerged in the immediate 
aftermath of World War I. The labor competition created by the immigration and internal 
migration waves of the 19th and early 20th century created anxieties within white 
majorities, facilitating populist reactions (Ngai, 1999). The population shifts contributing 
to this angst included black migration to the northeastern urban centers (encouraged by the 
industrial boom in the northeast), the 1880-1930 immigration wave that brought southern 
and eastern Europeans to the same city centers, Mexican immigration to the southwest 
(encouraged by the commercial boom in agriculture), and Chinese and Japanese 
immigration to the West (sparked by the railroad boom and gold rush) (Ngai, 1999). These 
all created anti-immigration, nativist, and racial backlashes that came to a peak in the early 
1920s (Ngai, 1999). There was much public debate and quasi-scientific theory (the 
eugenicist movement) that argued that the current immigrant crop were disastrous for the 
future of America as (according to the eugenists) these immigrants were biologically an 
inferior race to the Anglo Saxon white population that made up the political and social 
establishment (Ngai, 1999).   
 Concerning immigration, prior to this anti-immigrant backlash in the 1920s, 
bilingual education was commonplace in localities with large immigrant populations 
(Terrence, 2004 146). These English acquisition projects were implemented in response to 
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the established institutional arrangements that facilitated bilingualism in public life. These 
were political decisions made by localities where ethnic groups were in high concentration 
— a byproduct of the various immigration waves. These arrangements — such as schools, 
churches, newspapers — had allowed for the maintenance of immigrants’ native languages 
(Flores and Murillo, 2001). For example, German-English bilingual schools were fairly 
common in areas with high German populations (for example in the Midwest) (Flores and 
Murillo, 2001; Terrence, 2004). However, anti-German politics emerged as American 
involvement in World War I war increased (Terrence, 2004). In California and Hawaii, it 
was the language of Japanese that encouraged such ordinances (Terrence, 2004 146). Anti-
bilingual ordinances also occurred in the case of the Mexican immigrants in the 
southwestern territories of the US in the 1910s and 1920s as a response to the bilingual 
arrangements made in the Mexican neighborhoods. Such immigrant aversions prompted 
fifteen states to pass laws requiring English instruction in schools between 1900 and 1920 
(Citri et al, 1990 537), and between 1917 and 1922, 34 states passed English-only 
instruction ordinances (Terrence, 2004 146). The anxiety of Americans towards 
immigration was not quelled until the passage of immigration quotas in 1921 and 1924 — 
the latter culminating with the Immigration Act of 1924 — that essentially eliminated all 
non-northwestern European immigration until the mid-1960s (Citrin et al, 1990 537). 
 In the 1920s, in the immediate aftermath of World War I, the American racial state 
was at its most comprehensive (Marable and Mulling, 2000 237). Advocates of white 
supremacy and racial segregation had majorities in all three branches of the federal 
government, virtually all southern and most western political offices, and many other local 
institutional offices and legislatures (Marable and Mullings, 2000 237; King and Smith, 
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2005 81). This resulted in a national project to institute white supremacy in race and ethnic 
relations, immigration law, and American foreign policy (in support of America’s 
imperialist initiatives) (King and Smith, 2005 81). As this elite consensus underwriting the 
white supremacist order moved to implement its comprehensive white supremacist policy 
goals, mandating an English monopoly in public life was viewed as a key aspect in this 
governing order — to ensure the cultural hegemony of the Anglo Saxon culture. A central 
idea of the “Americanization” movement in the first two decades of the 20th century was 
that a stable polity required a common culture and language (Citrin et al, 1990 536). During 
this period, there was broad base elite support for English as the nation’s common language 
(Citrin et al, 1990 536).   
 Concerning immigration, elites sympathetic to the white supremacist order 
racialized immigration and naturalization infrastructures. First, Chinese exclusion acts, 
passed at the local (mostly in California) and national level (Chinese Exclusion Act of 
1882), barred the Chinese from citizenship (Ngai, 1999). Congress expanded this to Asian 
exclusion from naturalization via the creation of “barred Asiatic zones” (Ngai, 1999 80). 
This made immigrants spanning from Afghanistan to the Pacific (except for Japan) 
ineligible for citizenship by 1917 (Ngai, 1999  80). Second, the Immigration Act of 1924 
institutionalized immigration policy along racial and ethnic lines by ranking white ethnic 
groups and banning immigration from Asian nations.   
 With respect to this study, this period also included, according to Ngai (1999 90), 
the racialization of Mexican immigrants as an illegal population. Commercial agriculture 
had created a demand in the southwest for labor, which was mostly supplied by Mexican 
migrant populations (Ngai 1999 88). This led to the emergence of segregated Mexican 
 
152 
communities as Mexican immigration reached an all-time high by the late 1920s (Ngai 
1999 89). The increased Mexican presence in the Southwest created a “race problem” as 
the majority white population viewed Mexicans as their racial inferior. However, this 
problem of controlling the Mexican population via racial lines proved more problematic 
than had excluding Asians from immigration and citizenship. The Treaty of Hidalgo 
Guadalupe, the labor demands of southwestern commercial agriculture, and the mixed race 
heritage of Mexicans precluded both a formal restriction of immigration and naturalization 
of Mexicans and clear cut racial identification of Mexican immigrants. According to Ngai 
(1999), the federal government, subsequently, moved to racialize Mexicans as illegals 
through controlling their population growth via administrative means (Ngai 1999 90). This 
was accomplished through restricting the issuance of visas and establishing the 
infrastructure to prosecute illegal immigrants. The latter was institutionalized through the 
creation of Border Control in 1925, the criminalization of illegal entry in 1929, and the 
creation of the Mexican racial category in the 1930 Census (Ngai 1999 90f). Ngai (1999 
89) argues that these institutions of immigration law enforcement mostly targeted the 
Mexican population (as opposed to their southern and eastern European immigrant 
counterparts). For example, half of deportations and over 80 percent of voluntary 
departures in the late 1920s were comprised of Mexican immigrants (Ngai, 1999 89).  
 This white supremacist order also played a central part in American linguistic 
politics. From the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo through the period of Anglo migration into 
the southwestern territories of the continental US, public schooling, specifically language 
was used as a tool for Americanizing the Mexican inhabitants (Flores and Murillo, 2001). 
The late 19th century saw the increase of support for white supremacy from the Republican 
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Party (formerly the party of racial egalitarianism in the 19th century) (King and Smith, 2005 
81). This in effect gave the white supremacist order control of the Congress, Presidency 
and the judiciary from the 1870s through the middle of the 20th century (Smith and King, 
2005 81). Republican support was also supplemented with the emergence of local officials 
in the west and southwest who were sympathetic to white supremacist policies (because of 
western expansion) in the late 19th century (Ngai, 1999 81, 90). These officials looked to 
remake the political order in the western regions in a more white supremacist fashion. As 
English preeminence was a core aspect of this normative paradigm, these officials 
catalyzed the political/ ideational shift by targeting bilingual policy arrangements in the 
region. This was evident in the increase of anti-bilingual ordinances in the west against 
Chinese and Japanese, and in the southwest against the Mexicans (Ngai, 1999 90). 
 With respect to Mexicans, bilingual institutional arrangements were challenged and 
overturned amid calls for the Americanization of Mexican immigrants. As labor demand 
increased with the expansion of commercial agriculture, the increased Mexican presence 
created a “racial problem” (Ngai, 1999 90). Since treaty obligations only allowed for the 
deportation of illegal immigrants, the Mexican population could not be eliminated as could 
the Asians through immigration law reform. Thus, the Americanization of the Mexicans 
was the next best choice for the political establishment.  In the late 19th century after locally 
controlled public schooling proved too inefficient at Americanizing Mexican inhabitants, 
Anglo-American officials began pushing for schools to practice a subtractive 
Americanization approach to acculturating the Mexican inhabitants of the newly acquired 
southwestern territories (Flores and Murillo, 2001).  This involved replacing local Mexican 
control through the removal of Mexicans from assemblies and school boards as well as the 
 
154 
establishment of English Only policies (Flores and Murillo, 2001). This erosion of local 
support for Mexican cultural maintenance occurred both by concerted efforts and the 
demographic changes caused by the Western expansion of Anglo-Americans (Flores and 
Murillo, 2001). This subtractive approach initially began with the replacement of Catholic 
schools (which had permitted local control and the use of Spanish as a way of spreading 
Catholicism) with Protestant schools, which practiced a more subtractive28 approach to the 
acculturation of Mexican students (Flores and Murillo, 2001). As American Western 
expansion increased encounters with Mexican inhabitants (as Whites and Mexican began 
to live together in neighborhoods), nativist movements flourished. Anglo-Protestant school 
officials —supporters of the white supremacist racial institutional order — sought Anglo 
cultural purity, the consolidation of the nation through the establishment of a common 
culture under a common language, and the preservation of white political power (Flores 
and Murillo, 2001).  
 
Segregation of Mexican School Children 
Segregation of whites from non-whites was a foundational aspect of the elite 
support for white supremacy. And education was an important venue in which this ideology 
and the eventual debate over racial segregation would play out. Throughout American 
history, this pursuit of white cultural dominance has manifested itself in the segregation of 
non-white school children from white school children. The segregation of African 
                                                 
28 San Miguel (1999) defines subtractive Americanization as “devaluing particular minority groups and their 
specific cultural heritages” and then replacing these identities with an idealized American version. 
Subtractive Americanization also refers to the removal of “minority communities, languages, and cultures 
from the curriculum and educational structures” (San Miguel (1999) as cited and quoted in Flores and 
Murillo, 2001 192) 
 
155 
American children is well documented. Segregation of Latino children, however, was 
likewise practiced and the legal battles occurred parallel to those of African Americans for 
school desegregation (Flores and Murillo, 2001). School officials in areas where Latinos 
concentrated used language as a means for segregating Latinos from Anglo students 
(Blanton, 2004; Crawford, 1997). As bilingual education fell out of favor politically and 
pedagogically in the 1920s, non-native speakers of Latino descent were often segregated 
into classes where they could receive English instruction. These students were also often 
categorized as remedial students and pulled out of mainstream class to receive special 
instruction (Blanton, 2004; Crawford, 1997). In the decades between the Americanization 
movement and the Civil Rights movement, Latino advocacy groups fought parallel to 
African American civil rights organizations for equal access to segregated institutions for 
Latino (mostly Mexican) students (Meier and Steward, 1991 2). As a majority of elites 
supported segregation of Mexican students, Mexican advocacy groups (like the African 
American civil rights legal advocacy) pursued venue shifting to the judiciary. As 
segregation laws enumerated the segregation of whites from blacks, Mexican advocacy 
groups fought for Mexicans to be legally declared as white to gain access to public goods 
and segregated institutions, such as education (Meier and Stewart, 1991 2). Subsequently, 
they did not join the cause for desegregation until the 1960s (Joppke, 1999).  
 In the 1931 case, Alvarez vs. The Board of Trustees of the Lemon Grove School 
District, the California Supreme Court ruled that the California constitution did not 
sanction segregation of Mexican children based on race and that such segregation 
negatively affected their acquisition of English (Flores and Murillo, 2001). This was the 
first successful legal challenge to segregation (Flores and Murillo, 2001). 
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 By the 1940s, the political tide began to turn against the segregation of Latinos 
(Blanton, 2004). In 1945, Mexican-American parents brought suits against California 
public schools for unfairly segregating their children.  In the Mendez v. Westminster case, 
the Supreme Court ruled in their favor (Latino Civil Rights Timeline, tolerance.org). In the 
1946 case, the federal court ruled that the Westminster school district in California had 
illegally gerrymandered the school district to ensure the segregation of Mexican children. 
This was the first federal ruling in the area of school segregation (Flores and Murillo, 
2001). In 1948, a Texas court ruled in Delgado v. Bastrop that segregation of Spanish 
speaking children was discriminatory and illegal (Flores and Murillo, 2001). Additionally, 
the pedagogical approach of ‘sink or swim’ English immersion increasingly came under 
criticism from the pedagogic academic community (Blanton, 2004).  
 Political tides further changed in the 1950s and 1960s. The Brown v. Board of 
Education ruling in 1954/55, which ended de jure segregation, overturning Plessy v. 
Ferguson (1896), brought political attention to the issue of education equality (TEA, 2006 
11). This informed future judicial rulings and congressional politics concerning the 
education of LEP students. The Brown ruling created a legal precedent for the right to 
education equality for racial minority students. This provided advocacy groups a legal 
paradigm within which to frame their appeals for education reform (TEA, 2006 11). The 
successful launch of the Sputnik rocket in 1957 by the Soviet Union prompted elite calls 
for improvements in education, which included support for bilingual education to develop 
bilingualism among the youth — preparing them for what was believed to be an 
increasingly global society (Fenner, 2012 88).   
 Concurrently, in the 1950s, especially following the Castro revolution, refugees 
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from Cuba emigrated to the US (Fenner, 2012 88; Smith, 2012 27). These refugees 
intended to return to Cuba and were also viewed sympathetically, politically, as they were 
seen as fleeing an oppressive regime in search of the freedom and democracy of the US 
(Fenner, 2012 89). Concerning the latter, as the refugees were fleeing from the Communist 
revolution in Cuba — the new American Communist nemesis — programs for these 
refugees were viewed as aiding a Cold War ally (Smith, 2012 27). Additionally, they were 
mostly upper middle class and of European ancestry, both of which made them culturally 
less offensive to white Floridians (Fralick, 2007 13). This period saw the birth of Spanish-
English bilingual education programs to facilitate the education of their children (Fenner, 
2012 89). Two-way bilingual education programs were started in several Miami area 
schools (Smith, 2012 27).  In 1963, Miami Dade County launched the nation’s first 
bilingual initiative which involved the usage of bilingual education in a number of mostly 
primary schools. Politically, these were not controversial as it was believed by political 
officials and the refugees themselves that they would eventually return home (Smith, 2012 
27). Bilingual education for Spanish-speaking students of Mexican descent re-emerged in 
the southwest during this period (Fralick, 2007 13). The success of the programs initiated 
in the Miami area (the Coral Way program in Miami being the most well known) prompted 
the development of bilingual programs in California, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and 
New Jersey (Fenner, 2012 89).     
 The period of the mid-1960s through the mid- to late 1970s was a period of elite 
consensus over bilingual education. This period coincided with a period of transition for 
the competing racial orders paradigm. According to King and Smith (2005; 2008), during 
this period, the political fault line of the racial orders contestation transitioned from de jure 
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segregation/ white supremacy to race conscious policies. The emergence of elite consensus 
over bilingual education coincided with the complete delegitimization of white supremacy 
and de jure segregation. The white supremacist order had been completely delegitimized 
by the legislative and political successes of the Civil Rights movement (King and Smith, 
2008). Most elites (mainstream politicians, academics, media editorial pages) expressed 
support for ending de jure segregation and white supremacy.  Concerning bilingual 
education, this manifested in bipartisan support for bilingual education which included the 
support of prominent conservatives such as Ronald Reagan (as governor of California) and 
President Richard Nixon in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This bipartisan elite support 
lasted until race conscious policies became the political fault line separating the egalitarian 
order and the newly repurposed white supremacist order, the non-expansionary order. This 
period of the 1960s through the late 1970s will be elaborated further in the following 
section. 
 
Displacement of the White Supremacist Order by the Egalitarian Order and its Effects 
on Bilingual Education 
By the 1960s, officials sympathetic to the egalitarian transformative order occupied 
all three branches of government (King and Smith, 2008 6887). The 1964 election marked 
the transition of power to officials sympathetic to the goals of the egalitarian order (King 
and Smith, 2008). They in turn implemented reforms that recognized the rights (economic, 
political, civil, and social) of minority individuals and created institutions to secure these 
rights. According to Levin and Landy (1995), their victories, the subsequent legislation 
passed — Civil Rights Act of 1965 (which effectively ended de jure segregation), Voting 
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Rights Act of 1964, the Elementary, Secondary Education Act of 1965, Immigration Act 
of 1965 — and the institutional changes rendered to the system constituted a new 
constitutional order. Replacing the constitutional order of 1789 — limited, fragmented 
national power — which was designed to protect “life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness,” this new “rights-based constitutional order" required a sufficient expansion of 
governmental authority into more aspects of civil life to secure the ends of the new 
expanded rights based polity (Landy and Levin, 1995). This created and empowered 
institutions that would assume authority in policy areas deemed judicially as meriting 
government protection of minority rights. Civil rights equality — the goal of the egalitarian 
transformative order — came to include not just those pertaining to race, but also animal 
rights, the rights of the disabled, language minority rights, Asian Americans' and women's 
rights (King and Smith 2005 83). Interest groups sprang up to champion these claims, and 
the egalitarian transformative order incorporated them politically and institutionally. These 
interest groups had a new rights-based power —  both politically and institutionally — 
which they exploited to establish policy outcomes that protected minority rights or 
allocated status, power, and/ or resources to minority populations in an attempt to equalize 
what these elites viewed as unequal outcomes. Bilingual education was an example of such 
a policy outcome which Mexican elites and those supportive of the egalitarian order argued 
would provide education equality and/or cultural empowerment for Mexicans (and other 
second language minorities). 
Education had long been a focus of advocates for civil rights. By the 1960s, 
education policies for language minorities became an issue area of interest for government 
intervention as part of their initiatives to improve opportunity in education for racial and 
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ethnic minorities. This involved initiatives from all three branches of government which 
encouraged federal oversight of localities and their treatment of LEP student populations. 
First, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 distributed federal 
assistance towards localities with high percentages of underprivileged students that 
established initiatives to meet the special needs of their student populations. The goal was 
to increase education equality nationwide. Early experimental plans in bilingual education 
used ESEA funding. Second, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) was created with the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and it played a role in coercing states to adopt 
bilingual education policy by deeming education of language minority students a civil 
rights issue. Lastly, the judicial system, congress and executive branch supported and 
enforced OCR mandates in the early to mid-1970s. 
Civil Rights activists, by the late 1960s, however, did not view the ending of de 
jure segregation as sufficient to bring about material equality and subsequently began 
pushing for race conscious policies, such as affirmative action and bilingual education 
(King and Smith, 2008 688). The late 1960s to the late 1970s, subsequently, was a period 
of transition from the era when segregation was the main focus of race relations to race 
conscious policies becoming the new orientation through which racial alliances formed and 
contested (King and Smith, 2008 688). This debate concerning the appropriateness of race 
conscious policies as an antidote to continued material inequality experienced by 
racial/immigrant minorities continues to be the central debate of the racial institutional 
orders (King and Smith, 2008). Debate, concurrently, moved beyond issues of de jure 
inequalities amongst blacks and whites and has more overtly extended to areas such as 
immigration, further extending the reach of the competing racial orders across party lines 
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(King and Smith, 2008; Crawford, 1997).   
Bilingual education emerged during this period when the central issues of race 
relations reoriented around issues of race conscious policies. From the 1920s through the 
1950s, there was little interest in bilingual education among public officials nationwide at 
the state level (Andersson and Boyer, 1970 20). From this point through the 1970s, 
however, there was a spike in interest in bilingual education both nationally and at the state 
level (Andersson and Boyer, 1970 20).    
 
Passage of the Bilingual Education Act (BEA ) 1968 
 The Bilingual Education Act of 1968 was added to ESEA as Title VII in 1968.  
The bill resulted from the advocacy of Chicano groups, and groups/ political officials 
sympathetic to the plight of Mexican students in the southwest. As poor education had been 
the norm for Mexican-Americans in this region, the National Education Association (NEA) 
conducted a survey of public school teachers known as the Tucson Survey of 1965-66 
(Crawford, 1999 41). NEA surveyed a group of Tucson public school teachers on 
educational opportunities for Mexican-American students in the region (Fralick, 2007 13). 
The Association hoped that recommendations emerging from the survey could be 
incorporated into the reauthorization of ESEA, which was coming up for reauthorization 
in 1968 (Fralick, 2007 13). NEA organized a conference in October of 1966 which brought 
together sympathetic academics —  most of whom had begun to recognize the benefits of 
native language instruction — with government officials (such as Texas senator Ralph 
Yarborough and state senator Joe Bernal — the architect of the original BEA of 1967 and 
one of the main state advocates in Texas for bilingual education, respectively) who 
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increasingly became sympathetic to Hispanic issues in education as political trends favored 
federal attention upon this growing demographic group (they had been largely passed over 
in civil rights legislation of the 1960s) (Crawford, 1999 40). The attention brought about 
by the survey and the conference helped to galvanize political momentum for a bilingual 
education bill at the federal level (Crawford, 1999 40).   
The Bilingual Education Act (BEA) emerged in the 1960s from a coalition of 
institutions, political advocacy and government officials committed and/or loosely 
committed to egalitarianism and/or in pursuit of capturing the growing Latino vote (King 
and Smith, 2005; Crawford, 1999; Davies, 2002). Trujillo (1998) argues that Title VII in 
addition to its purpose as a federal redress for educational inequities experienced by 
Mexican Americans, was also partially the result of the federal government attempting to 
preclude potentially violent Latino public protests similar to that witnessed by African 
Americans in the 1960s.  
The original bill — the Bilingual Education Act of 1967 — was sponsored by the 
aforementioned Texas senator Ralph Yarborough, who viewed the Miami Dade program 
favorably (Smith, 2012 27). In Texas, 80 percent of students of Mexican descent had to 
repeat the first grade (Davies, 2002 1407). Subsequently, there were 12 times as many 
Mexican students in first grade as in twelfth — four times the state’s overall ratio (Davies, 
2002 1407). Yarborough did not feel that ESEA had done enough to address the education 
of LEP students in his state (Davies, 2002 1407). Additionally, the senator was about to 
embark on a tough reelection fight in 1970 and hoped to garner the support of the state’s 
Mexican population through his sponsorship of the bill (Davies, 2002 1407). Yarborough 
introduced the bill in 1967 to provide federal funding to assist Spanish-speaking students 
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via bilingual education (Smith, 2012 27). President Johnson (also a liberal Democrat from 
Texas), however, offered the most resistance towards the bill (Crawford, 1999 40; Davies, 
2002 1407). The Vietnam War and the Great Society had begun to strain federal resources 
and the Johnson administration hoped to preclude any initiatives that would require further 
tax increases (Crawford, 1999 40). Initially, the Johnson administration argued against 
creating an additional title — funding source — under ESEA, arguing ESEA Title I or III 
funds were sufficient to provide federal support for local LEP-focused programs 
(Crawford, 1999 41; Davies, 2002 1407). This view was endorsed by the US Office of 
Education (USOE) (Davies, 2002 14407). The administration also criticized BEA of 1967 
for only addressing the language needs of Mexican students (Crawford, 1999 41). There 
was a growing sentiment led by Democratic Senator, Edwin Muskie (ME) that the Act 
should be open to all second language English-speaking students (Davies, 2002 1407). 
Hispanic groups recognized the political problems with the limited focus of the original act 
and offered support for proposals that would extend BEA’s coverage to include other 
linguistic minorities. Eventually, Representative James Scheuer of New York offered a 
compromise proposal that extended BEA to cover those children who came from 
households where a language other than English was the dominant language (Crawford, 
1999 41). With growing bipartisan support for a federal bilingual education bill (37 
bilingual education bills were introduced in the 90th Congress) and political trends 
favoring support for Hispanic initiatives, the Johnson administration relented in its 
opposition and offered its support for Title VII (Crawford, 1999 441). Subsequently, the 
Bilingual Education Act of 1968 — the bill that would eventually emerge from Congress 
— did not specify LEP demographic groups. However, it also did not specify bilingual 
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education as the mandated mode of instruction (Smith, 2012 27).   
Federal fiscal support of BEA, however, was initially sparse due to the 
aforementioned budgetary concerns of the Johnson administration (Crawford, 1999 42).  
Congress, under pressure from the Johnson administration, offered no fiscal support for 
Title VII in its inaugural year (Crawford, 1999 42; Davies, 2002 1407). In 1969, Congress 
appropriated $7.5 million, which was sufficient to cover 26 local programs serving 27,000 
students (Crawford, 1999 42; Davies, 2002 1407). Although this was a paltry amount, it 
led to the doubling of bilingual education enrollment nationwide (Crawford, 1999 42).   
Crawford (1999) finds that the Bilingual Education Act took a two-track approach: 
federal provisions supporting programs aimed at addressing the needs of LEP students and 
addressing the civil rights issues — pursuance of equal education opportunity — of LEP 
students. Federal fiscal support of local programs for LEP students was initially addressed 
in the Bilingual Education Act. The Civil Rights issues would not be addressed until the 
early 1970s. The Act was strictly compensatory in nature (as was its parent act, the 
Elementary, Secondary Education Act) as it aimed to address the needs of poor or 
disadvantaged children — and in the case of LEP students, their language deficiencies in 
English categorized them as disadvantaged (Crawford, 1999 41).  
Concerning federal funding of local programs, as Title VII of ESEA, the Bilingual 
Education Act authorized the provision of federal funds to localities with substantial ELL 
(English Language Learners) students to develop programs to ensure quality education for 
this student population, train teachers, provide instructional resources and encourage 
parental involvement (Crawford, 1999 41). Federal grants were awarded from three to five 
years, after which states had to assume fiscal responsibility (TEA, 2006 11). Although the 
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act did not mandate bilingual education programs, it did allow for bilingual education 
without violating segregation laws (Smith, 2012 27). It concurrently endorsed multicultural 
goals, the acquisition of English, and the use of native languages other than English for 
instruction of LEP (Limited English Proficient) students (Smith, 2012 27). This ambiguity 
in program goals would later become an issue of contention among proponents and critics 
as the goal of cultural maintenance and transition to English were often framed as 
contradictory especially by its critics (Smith, 2012 27; Crawford, 1999 41). And as the 
issue was never fully addressed at its onset nor was there much consensus among 
proponents of bilingual education, the ambiguity was exploited by critics — eventually 
resulting in transitional bilingual education being the only viable political option  
(Crawford, 1999 41).   
 
What Were the Goals of Bilingual Education? 
 The vagueness of the specific goals of BEA 1968 is notorious amongst educational 
researchers (Moran, 1988 1263-164). Moran (1988) argues this resulted from divisions 
among legislators concerning the program’s intent (1263). This left the ideational 
conception of the problem subject to variation depending upon the bilingual education 
policy regime in power. Using Ruiz’s (1984) “orientations in language planning,” 
Crawford (1999) lays out the three ways in which bilingual education has generally been 
conceptualized by policy elites involved with the issue of ELL students and linguistic 
pedagogy in general: 1) Bilingual education as an anti-poverty initiative — to remedy the 
problem of limited English proficiency (LEP) amongst lower income students with English 
language deficiencies; 2) Bilingual education as an anti-discrimination initiative — to 
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guarantee equal educational opportunities to LEP students; and 3) Bilingual education as 
an experiment in multicultural education — to “foster bilingualism” amongst LEP and 
native English students. A fourth ideational conception can be added to this list: 
bilingualism as a tool for cultural maintenance — allowing LEP students to both transition 
to English language mainstream instruction while learning that their native culture had 
cultural import (Crawford, 1998 52). Elite disagreement concerning which of these four 
was the main purpose of bilingual education or if these goals were complimentary or 
contradictory led to contestation even among the pro-bilingual camp concerning its 
efficacy and pedagogical goals. This has ultimately aided critics of bilingual education. 
Bilingualism as an anti-poverty initiative versus bilingualism as an experiment in 
multiculturalism has been a fault line between two sides of the pro-bilingual camp. Both 
camps have contested the English Only proponents who believe that any form of bilingual 
education takes away valuable time and resources from what they feel should be the 
primary goal of education for ELL students: improving English proficiency. Those 
professing to it as an anti-poverty initiative have debated whether instruction in one’s 
native language is the most efficient mechanism for getting LEP students up to speed.  
Opponents of bilingual education often favor various kinds of English immersion programs 
instead to address this issue.  
 With respect to the bilingual education as an experiment in multiculturalism, the 
original (especially Hispanic constituencies) proponents of BEA stressed the multicultural 
aspect (Crawford, 1999 47).  In its 1971 instructions to receivers of the BEA grant, the 
Office of Education instructed recipients that the program’s ultimate goal was a student 
who functioned well in two languages on any occasion (Crawford, 1998 55). However, this 
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was not the consensus view among national lawmakers (Crawford, 1998 55). The 
ambiguity resulted in programs that varied by state and contention among lawmakers 
concerning the goal of bilingual education (Crawford, 1998 55). In addition, studies of 
bilingual education programs found that the programs were not successful in promoting 
bilingualism or in improving student performance (Crawford, 1998 55). The multicultural 
focus by education officials in combination with poor reviews helped to spark the a 
backlash against bilingual education as opponents began to exploit public skepticism — as 
bilingual education was viewed by many as a repudiation of the classic assimilationist 
Americanization process practiced (and revered) by immigrants of former generations 
(Citrin et al, 1990 538). As a result, the multicultural pedagogical aim has been used less 
as a defense of bilingual education since the 1980s.   
 There has also been contestation along the fault line of bilingual education as an 
anti-discrimination initiative versus bilingual education as an anti-poverty program. This 
has manifested itself in the debate of whether bilingual education should be a mechanism 
to help maintain the immigrant culture or whether bilingual education should be used as a 
mechanism to transition students from instruction in their native language to English 
instruction (to ultimately better their economic prospects). In the 1970s, when bilingual 
education programs were first introduced, these goals were viewed as compatible 
(Crawford, 1998 55). As the egalitarian transformative order controlled two of the three 
branches of government during the 1970s, it was thought that bilingual education programs 
should be used to show the value of the immigrant culture in American society as well as 
a mechanism to transition students to English instruction (Crawford, 1998). This was a 





Post-Passage of the BEA 1968 
After its passage, states began offering bilingual education programs (Smith, 2012 
27). In the late 1960s and 1970s, national and state legislation — catalyzed by the Bilingual 
Education Act of 1968 and supported by judicial decisions — institutionalized bilingual 
programs in American public schools (Citrin et al, 1990 537). These programs combined 
English instruction with native language instruction as a method of both learning English 
and cultural maintenance (Citrin et al, 1990 537). The US Office of Education was tasked 
with managing this federal relationship between the national government, the state and 
local educational institutions responsible for assessing LEP student needs and developing 
appropriate programs. By the mid-1970s, many states either mandated bilingual instruction 
or permitted its use in the education of LEP students (Smith, 2012 27). The support of the 
courts in championing bilingual education as a remedy to the civil rights issues — lack of 
education equality — was the main factor leading to states mandating bilingual education 
as the pedagogical approach for its LEP student population. 
 
Bilingual Education, Education Equality and the Role of the Office of Civil Rights 
 As the Civil Rights Act awarded protection to minority groups, Latino advocacy 
groups (mostly Mexican groups employing the identity politics en vogue in the era) fought 
for the declaration of Latinos as a language minority (Citrin et al, 1990 537). And as in the 
African American struggle for civil rights, education became a node for initiatives aimed 
at improving civil rights for language minorities. 
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 Education equality concerning language issues was first addressed at the federal 
level (as mentioned) via Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Gandara and Rumberger, 
2009 764). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, or national origin in federally assisted programs and activities.  It also made 
grant-making agencies responsible for compliance. Subsequently in 1968, the Johnson 
Administration established the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) in the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. During this late 
1960s period, the federal government broadened its civil rights focus to include Latinos. 
The Bilingual Education Act was the first piece of legislation in this federal initiative. But 
as mentioned earlier, it was quite modest in concerning its fiscal assistance and pedagogic 
intent. Nevertheless, it was an attempt by Latino proponents to broaden civil rights 
legislation as prior to 1970, federal attention concerning discrimination in education was 
mostly directed towards the plight of blacks in the South (Crawford, 1999 43).   
 In Texas in 1970, Chicano advocacy began stressing the novel idea that Mexican 
students suffered from education discrimination because of their lack of English 
proficiency — English Only instruction meant denial of equal education opportunity 
(Crawford, 1999 42).  La Raza Unida, a militant Chicano organization, organized protests 
against schools in Crystal City, Texas to draw attention to the discriminatory treatment of 
their Spanish-speaking student body (Crawford, 1999 42). Among their demands for fair 
treatment of Spanish-speaking students was a call for establishing bilingual education 
programs (Crawford, 1999 42). La Raza Unida soon won a majority of seats on the local 
school board and implemented bilingual education programs in the school under the 
board’s purview (Crawford, 1999 42). Concurrently, Mexican Americans, Chinese and 
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Puerto Rican parents in other localities began filing lawsuits claiming unequal treatment of 
their non-English speaking student-children (Crawford, 1999 42).   
 By 1970, it was well known that linguistic minority students were falling behind in 
education outcomes (Crawford, 1999 42). However, there was no consensus that schools 
districts or states were liable for their poor performance (Crawford, 1999 42). In 1970, 
spurred by the aforementioned Chicano advocacy, the Office of Civil Rights in the 
Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) began assessing state and district 
treatment of LEP students concerning their compliance with the new Civil Rights Act 
(TEA, 1998; Rodríguez, n.d.). Specifically, the OCR found that compliance reviews of 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 revealed that some districts were in violation in 
their treatment of LEP students — denying them equal educational opportunity (TEA, 
1998). In May of 1970, the OCR issued a memorandum, the National Origin Memorandum, 
to districts with at least a 5 percent population of national-origin minority students (TEA, 
2006 12). The OCR Memorandum detailed the responsibilities of states concerning 
educational equality and the role of language (Gandara and Rumberger, 2009 764).    
 
The Republican Party and the Latino Vote in the Early 1970s  
 Polling conducted by the Committee to Re-elect the President (CREEP) [Nixon] 
had found great animosity among Latinos towards blacks and the special government 
programs they had won in the 1960s (1414). The Nixon administration subsequently set 
out to court Latinos — the second largest and fastest growing minority group and a group 
perceived to have latent Republican sensibilities (1410-1415). The fruits of this strategy 
had been proven by California Governor Ronald Reagan’s successful courtship of the 
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Mexican vote in the gubernatorial election of 1966 (1410). The polling by CREEP 
convinced the Nixon administration that Latinos could be won over by the Republican 
Party. However, according to Davies (2002), the problem with courting the Latino vote 
was that Latinos lacked an issue that united Cubans, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. 
Additionally, the lobbying presence of Latinos was lacking. Conservatives in favor of 
promoting Latino mobilization were in regular contact with MALDEF and other Latino 
advocacy groups encouraging them to step up their efforts in mobilizing their community. 
However, without an issue to galvanize mobilization, Republican efforts stalled. Polling 
found that bilingual education was an issue that had wide support among the Latino 
community — it was really the only issue at the time to command such broad base support 
among Latinos (Davies, 2002 1417-18). 
 According to Davies (2002 1418), the OCR Memorandum was the brainchild of 
Californian Leon Panetta, head of OCR, and approved by fellow Californian and HEW 
(OCR’s parent organization) head, Secretary Robert Finch. Davies (2002) argues that 
Panetta, who had fallen out of favor with Nixon by 1970, looked to recast OCR away from 
its anti-segregationist stance — which had helped make him unpopular with Nixon — and 
reorient the agency towards the administration’s goal of courting Latinos. Panetta’s 
ultimate aim was carving out a new role for OCR along these lines. The memo drafted by 
Panetta was eventually published by his successor J. Stanley Pottinger. Assuming 
leadership of OCR after Panetta’s forced resignation and taking over an agency at odds 
with the administration, policing bilingual education offered an opportunity (recognized 
by Panetta) to appease both the agency’s egalitarian stalwarts— a substantial majority of 
the agency staff as they were holdovers from the Johnson Administration— and the Nixon 
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Administration (Davies, 2002 1417-18).   
 The Memorandum clarified HEW policy concerning the responsibilities districts 
had to the needs of their LEP student population (TEA, 2006 12). The Memorandum stated 
that school systems were responsible for assuring that students were not denied 
opportunities available to others based on their race, color or national origin— thus, 
requiring compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (TEA, 2006). In the 
memorandum issued on May 25, 1970, OCR stated that districts where more than 5 percent 
of the student body belong to a “national origin minority group” with difficulties speaking 
and understanding English must take “affirmative” steps to resolve the situation, so that 
these students can actively participate in their education (TEA, 1998). OCR detailed 
criteria that districts receiving federal funds were required to follow and accommodations 
they were required to make to stay in compliance with Title VI.   
 OCR’s declaration established the legal foundation for addressing the issue of 
educational outcomes via legal rationales focused on equal opportunity (Fenner, 2012 91). 
The OCR memorandum prepped the legal context for judicial developments that would 
transform bilingual education in the states. This was an example of advocacy leading to 
executive actions that transformed the legal context, ultimately, coercing state action (TEA, 
1998). There was little state and district response to the OCR Memorandum, however 
(Crawford, 1999 43). Most districts simply reclassified their existing programs to 
nominally reflect the language of the law. For example, historian Colin B. Stein found that 
in Belleville, Texas the local superintendent simply reclassified the vocational track to 




The Court’s Courtship of Bilingual Education in the 1970s 
 The courts at the state and federal level, however, were able to coerce states to 
reform their education policies concerning their treatment of linguistic minorities 
(Crawford, 1999 43).  In Serna v. Portales Municipal School, in 1972, Mexican American 
parents successfully won a court order mandate of bilingual education. A federal judge 
issued the ruling as part of the district’s desegregation plan. Two years later, the ruling was 
upheld by the Tenth U.S. Circuit Court of appeals, which ruled that Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act gave Hispanic students the right to bilingual education. Serna v. Portales was 
the first court mandate of bilingual education (Crawford, 1999 43). 
 Keyes v. School District No.1, Denver, Colorado was the first case in 1972 to 
equate Latinos as a group that experienced systemic segregation on par with African 
Americans. In the ruling, Justice Brennan argued that Hispanics, historically had 
experienced segregation of educational opportunity in a manner similar to African 
Americans and thus merited similar protection from constitutional violations accrued 
because of segregation. This allowed Latino advocacy groups to push the equal education 
opportunity argument which would eventually result in the next influential federal ruling, 
the Lau ruling. 
 A Puerto Rican advocacy group, Aspira, successfully filed a suit against New York 
City on behalf of 150,000 Hispanic students. It won a consent decree, guaranteeing 
bilingual education to Spanish speaking students in 1974 (Crawford, 1999 43). In the 
Petchogue-Medford, New York, school district, a suit was filed against the school district, 
accusing the district of violating the rights of LEP students by offering an insufficient 
bilingual education program (Crawford, 1999). The program was deemed inadequate 
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because the bilingual education program mostly relied on ESL and offered no bicultural 
component (Crawford, 1999 44). 
 In 1981 in US v. Texas, US District Judge William Wayne Justice offered the most 
comprehensive ruling on the rights of language minority students (Crawford, 1999 44).  
Justice ruled that the state of Texas not only segregated non-English speaking students in 
inferior schools but also “vilified the language, culture, and heritage” of theses students 
with disastrous consequences for their education outcomes (Crawford, 1999  44). Justice 
mandated a bilingual education program for grades K through 12 throughout the state.  The 
ruling was overturned a year later, however, by a federal appellate court citing that Justice’s 
ruling relied on insufficient evidence of discriminatory practices and because the 
legislature had recently passed an adequate bilingual education bill (SB 477 of 1981; see 
Texas chapter) (Crawford, 1999 44).  
 In the 1970s, the Supreme Court ruled in various rulings that providing language 
accommodations for Latinos at the poll (1972) and in school (1975) was a right guaranteed 
by the 14th Amendment (Meier and Steward, 1991 3). Latino organizations employed the 
group/ identity politics of the civil rights movement, claiming that minority linguistic 
groups were constitutionally entitled to linguistic rights (Fralick, 2007 13).  They called 
for government to actively promote bilingualism in American schools (Citrin et al, 1990 
537). And from this point forward, Latino advocacy pursued educational opportunity rather 






Lau v. Nichols 
The US Supreme Court weighed in on the rights of linguistic minorities in Lau v. 
Nichols. The case originated with a poverty lawyer in San Francisco, Edward Steinman, 
who initiated legal action against San Francisco Unified School District upon learning that 
his friend’s child was having problems in school, because he could not understand the 
language of instruction (Crawford, 1999 44). Steinman proceeded to file a class action suit 
on behalf of Kenny Lau along with 1789 other Chinese students who suffered the same 
problems from English Only instruction (Crawford, 1999 44). The suit claimed that these 
children were denied equal education opportunity (according to the governing standard 
established in the Brown v. Board of Education ruling of 1954) because they were 
instructed in a language that they could not comprehend (Crawford, 1999 44). San 
Francisco officials denied the claim, arguing that different from the Brown case, the 
Chinese students were neither segregated nor subject to different treatment (Crawford, 
1999 44). According to the San Francisco officials, the students were afforded the same 
instruction as the other students and although their language deficiencies were unfortunate, 
the district was not liable for the problems it rendered (Crawford, 1999 44). Federal district 
and appeals courts agreed with the San Francisco ruling (Crawford, 1999 44). However, 
Judge Hufstedler of the Ninth Circuit Court offered a strong dissent.  Hufstedler argued 
that although language differences were not created by state policies, state policies that 
ignored these differences and subsequently perpetuated them were as damaging in effect 
as segregationist policies — denying said students of equal education opportunity 
(Crawford, 1999 44-45).   
Finally, in Lau v. Nichols (1974), the Supreme Court overruled the district and 
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circuit court rulings, embracing the logic of Hufstedler (Crawford, 1999 45). The Supreme 
court via a unanimous decision sided with the Chinese students against the San Francisco 
School District, ruling that the failure to provide language assistance to LEP students 
amounted to denying them meaningful access to education (TEA, 1998). The Court ruled 
that Chinese immigrants were entitled to instruction in a language that they could 
comprehend (De Jesus and Perez, 2009). They ruled that failure to do so was a violation of 
Title VI — equal protection clause — of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (TEA, 1998). The 
Court ruled unanimously that providing equal facilities and access to resources without 
ensuring that students understand the language of instruction did not amount to the 
provision of equal opportunity in education (TEA, 1998). The court also found that the 
OCR 1970 memorandum correctly interpreted the Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(TEA, 1998; Fenner, 2012 92; TEA, 2006 12). Subsequently, the Lau ruling gave the OCR 
memorandum the weight of law through its mandate that linguistic minorities had a right 
to instruction in a language that they could comprehend based on protections guaranteed 
by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and the 14th Amendment (TEA, 1998; Fenner, 2012 92; 
TEA, 2006 12; Lyons, 1990 72). However, Justice William O. Douglas’ ruling “did not 
reach” or invoke any Constitutional guarantees (Crawford, 1999 45). Justice Douglas 
argued that protections spelled out in Title VI (passed by Congress in 1964) were sufficient 
protection— adhering to the general Supreme Court tradition of ceding to Congressional 
intent when viable (Crawford, 1999 45). Nevertheless, the ruling changed the issue of 
bilingual education from a program that localities could voluntarily participate in to receive 
Title VII funding to one which was constitutionally sanctioned (De Jesus and Perez, 2009). 
 Eventually, the Lau ruling mandated that schools should identify LEP students and 
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provide programs to assist them. Although the Supreme Court and OCR censured districts 
for not addressing the language needs of its LEP populations, it did not mandate bilingual 
education (Policy Research Report, 1998 5). Bilingual education remained an option 
among others to address the needs of LEP students and ensure district compliance with 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (Policy Research Report, 1998 5). Critics of bilingual 
education have since cited the Court’s silence on mandating a pedagogical approach as the 
ruling’s intent to provide localities with the flexibility to respond to the needs of its LEP 
population at their discretion (Crawford, 1999 45).   
 It would be the OCR-issued Lau Remedies (as the directives came to be called) that 
institutionalized bilingual education in schools districts. During this period, federal 
requirements became more strict (TEA, 1998). These directives also resulted from the 
advocacy of Latino advocacy groups, politically empowered by the Lau ruling (Moran, 
1988 1280).  In 1975, OCR officials made preliminary visits to 334 school districts and 
discovered that most of them were in violation of the OCR memorandum and subsequently 
the Lau ruling (Crawford, 1999 46). The OCR established a task force steered by Martin 
Gerry to develop guidelines for districts to establish appropriate educational approaches 
for district compliance (Crawford, 1999 46).  The task force consisted of bilingual 
educators, lawyers and language minority advocates (Moran, 1988 1280). In 1975, US 
commissioner of Education Terrel Bell enumerated the Lau Remedies which provided 
districts with guidelines for implementing the Lau ruling in district policy (Fenner, 2012 
92; Crawford, 1999 46). These OCR guidelines discouraged the use of ESL (arguing that 
ESL did not facilitate the “affective nor cognitive development of students”) and favored 
the use of bilingual education programs (including bicultural, multi-cultural, and 
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multilingual programs) to meet the prescriptions offered in the Lau ruling (Fenner, 2012 
92; Fralick, 2007 16; Crawford, 1999 46; Moran, 1988 1281).   
 The Lau remedies were quickly drafted and thus did not provide sufficient 
opportunity for public comment as is required with official federal regulations (Crawford, 
1999 47). This was predominately due to the controversy caused by the Lau remedies’ 
focus on prescribing transitional bilingual education and bilingual-bicultural programs as 
the remedy for LEP student issues (Olsen, 2009 821; Moran, 1988 1280). They, thus, did 
not carry the legal status of federal regulations (a characteristic that critics would 
successfully exploit later in the decade) (Crawford, 1999 47). However, at the time with 
the full backing of the federal government and threatened with the loss of federal funding 
if districts resisted (Fralick, 2007 17), they had the practical effect of federal regulations 
through the late 1970s (Crawford, 1999 47). Executive officials, subsequently, used the 
Lau remedies to coerce recalcitrant states/ districts to negotiate consent agreements which 
resulted in districts adopting bilingual education as the chosen policy response to 
addressing the needs of its LEP student population (Crawford, 1999 47).   
 With the implementation of the Lau Remedies after the 1974 ruling, the Office of 
Education implemented an aggressive program of enforcing the Lau Remedies between 
1974 and 1981 (Crawford, 1998 58). This involved the OCR policing school districts with 
high language minority populations (Crawford, 1998). Enforcement also included the 
provision of federal funds for the establishment of Lau centers which were set up across 
the country to provide districts with the necessary technical assistance in order to comply 
with the Lau rulings and Remedies (TEA, 2006 12).. The Lau Remedies required that 
districts submit voluntary Title VI compliance plans if they had 20 or more students of the 
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same language group— this differed from the OCR Memorandum which only pertained to 
districts which had at least a 5 percent linguistic minority population (TEA, 2006 13). Each 
school found in violation of the ruling had to submit a plan to the OCR detailing how it 
would eliminate inequities towards its LEP student population or risk losing federal 
funding under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) (TEA, 1998 7). And 
as mentioned, states faced the loss of federal funds for non-compliance (Fralick, 2007 17) 
After the Lau Rulings outlawed the ‘sink or swim’ method of English acquisition 
and the Lau Remedies mandated aggressive enforcement of the Lau ruling, the Department 
of Education all but mandated bilingual education programs for school districts with high 
percentages of ELL students. This led to the proliferation of bilingual education programs 
in those localities with high percentages of ELL students (Trujillo, 1998). These 
institutional mechanisms — institutions that came into existence via an interpretation by 
all three branches of government (now secured by the egalitarian racial institutional order) 
that the problem of educating ELL students concerned denial of equal rights — provided 
proponents of bilingual education institutional mechanisms to secure the provision 
bilingual education in localities with high concentration of LEP students. Additionally, as 
interest groups developed to support and defend bilingual education, they became 
entrenched in the policy regimes at the national and local levels and used their favorable 
positions to defend bilingual education programs. These groups included civil rights 
activists, professional teachers organizations and unions, Latino community-based 
organizations, civil rights and Latino rights lawyers education scholars as well as bilingual 




The Equal Education Opportunity Act (EEOA) 
 In the same year as the Lau Ruling, Congress passed the Equal Education 
Opportunity Act of 1974. This act permitted the Attorney General or aggrieved citizens to 
bring civil action when they were denied equal educational opportunity. It also held 
districts accountable if educational agencies failed to take affirmative steps to provide 
equal education opportunity for its linguistic minority students (TEA, 2006 13; Moran, 
1988 1271). Non-compliance under this law also included if a district program had a 
negative impact on the LEP student and thus federal oversight included more than simply 
policing discriminatory intent (TEA, 2006 13). EEOA mandated that all school districts 
comply with the Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and the OCR 1970 Memorandum— and 
not just those receiving federal dollars (TEA, 2006 13). The law subsequently made access 
to equal educational opportunity a right in all schools, not just those schools receiving 
federal aid (TEA, 1998). Consequently, this encouraged all schools— not just those 
receiving federal grants — to comply with the OCR memorandum and Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act (TEA, 1998), further encouraging the development of bilingual education 
programs in states with sizable LEP populations.   
 Latino groups had already began to sue school districts on behalf of LEP students 
supposedly neglected by their school districts as litigation became another of the primary 
mechanisms to enforce the Lau ruling. The passage of the Equal Education Opportunities 
Act by the US Congress in 1974 further encouraged this trend (TEA, 2006 12).   
 These institutional developments in the executive, legislative and judiciary 
branches of the mid-1970s changed the behavior of states and local school districts as these 
localities either (to preempt government intervention or in response to legal challenges) 
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created and implemented bilingual education programs in localities with high LEP student 
populations (Crawford, 1998 58).  
 
Reauthorization of the Bilingual Education Act in the 1970s 
 The Bilingual Education Act (BEA) was reauthorized in 1974 and 1978. As BEA, 
1968 only extended funding through 1973 and encouraged by the political momentum 
created by the Lau ruling, Congress took up the reauthorization effort in 1974 (Moran, 
1988 1273). By 1974, the Bilingual Education Act had substantial support on Capitol Hill 
(Crawford, 1999 47). Additionally, the Latino advocacy network had coalesced and 
effectively pressured Congress to act given their new political leverage because of the Lau 
ruling (Moran, 1988 1273-1275). Moreover, academic studies had revealed that district 
programs were not meeting the needs of LEP students. The program was only serving 6 
percent of LEP students nation-wide. In additions it had done little to support training and 
development of professional staff, and had not enumerated a clear set of goals and policy 
direction for Title VII (Crawford, 1999 47). One specific study, given to the Act’s sponsor, 
Senator Edward Kennedy, touted the effectiveness of bilingual education programs. Lastly, 
the Lau ruling had created an urgency among state officials concerning the fiscal costs of 
compliance. They thus pushed for increased federal assistance to comply with the Lau 
ruling (Moran, 1988 1273-1275). 
 Senators Kennedy and Walter Mondale spearheaded the reauthorization effort to 
address these inadequacies (Crawford, 1999 47; Moran, 1988 1273). Kennedy and Senators 
Alan Cranston and Joseph Montoya had actually begun drafting the reauthorization bills in 
1972 (Moran, 1988 1272). Kennedy (a strong supporter of bilingual education) and 
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Cranston originally drafted separate bills that restricted federal funding to bilingual-
bicultural programs with cultural maintenance and bilingualism as end goals. Although 
their eventual joint bill was modified when reconciled with the House bill, the final 
legislation that was passed retained much of their enhancements of the BEA, 1968 
legislation (Moran, 1988 1273-1278). 
 The 1974 reauthorization led to the expansion of bilingual education. The Bilingual 
Education Act of 1974 expanded federal funding to districts with LEP student populations, 
removing the low-income requirement (TEA, 1998). It also provided the first federal 
definition of a bilingual education program. The Act defined a bilingual education program 
as one that used the native language of the LEP student to the extent necessary for the 
student “to progress effectively through the educational system” (TEA, 1998). It also 
explicitly permitted LEP students to enroll in bilingual education to encourage cultural 
maintenance and (as did the Equal Education Opportunity Act (EEOA)) codified the Lau 
ruling’s call for states and districts to take affirmative steps to meet the educational needs 
of its ELL population (Fenner, 2012 92). It did place English mastery as its end goal (and 
not bilingualism or cultural maintenance) — thus, rendering cultural maintenance as 
secondary while also removing the experimental nature of the original BEA legislation 
(Trujillo, 1998 37; Lyon, 1990 69). However, the reauthorization still left all pedagogical 
options on the table, offering no specification of a particular pedagogical approach 
(Crawford, 1999 49). The reauthorization of the Bilingual Education Act in 1974 also 
called for the expansion of federal funding towards increasing the program’s bureaucratic 
structure and specifying bilingual education as the program method of choice (Lyon, 1990 
69). The increased bureaucratic structure came in the form of increased monitoring 
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capacity to ensure that states and districts used federal funding towards LEP student 
populations (Moran, 1988 1279-1280).   
 
Beginnings of a Restrictionist Turn 
 These subsequent ideational movements toward transitional programs were in part 
a response to the politics of the late 1970s (as mentioned previously), which became 
increasingly reactionary towards big government programs, and specifically, programs 
which attempted to alter the traditional American assimilationist model that English 
acquisition encouraged and cultural maintenance programs rejected (Citrin et al, 1990 538). 
These programs were linked with other compensatory programs such as affirmative action, 
which aimed to address historic discrimination through ethnic/ race conscious government 
intervention (Crawford, 1999 49). 
   It was during this period that elites supportive of bilingual education began to move 
away from the multiculturalist/ cultural maintenance model. President Jimmy Carter 
favored transitional bilingual education over teaching LEP students "ethnic culture" at the 
time (Crawford, 1999 50). Hispanic advocates feared that bilingual education programs 
were becoming a means of de facto segregation (Crawford, 1999 51). Bilingual programs 
began to complicate civil rights efforts to rectify segregation as the courts sought to balance 
segregation with quality programs for LEP students (Crawford, 1999 51). Supporters of 
the cultural maintenance model argued that this apparent contradiction between bilingual 
education and desegregation was due to ill-conceived programs by school administrators 
and was not inherent to bilingual education (Crawford, 1999).   
 The 1978 reauthorization of the BEA set out to address these concerns. It continued 
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the trend of increasing funding (mostly towards bureaucratic structural increases), but 
addressed the cultural maintenance controversy by clearly enumerating that the program’s 
goal was English acquisition (Crawford, 1999 51). In 1978, Congress voted to restrict 
federal funding to transitional bilingual education (TBE) programs — programs with the 
goal of mainstreaming students (Crawford, 1998 56). The reauthorization of BEA in 1978 
stated that the purpose of bilingual education was for transitioning the ELL students to 
English Only-mainstream instruction — a middle ground between the cultural maintenance 
approach and the assimilationist approach (Fenner, 2012 92; Fralick, 2007 17). The 1978 
reauthorization removed the ban on bilingual programs designed to teach native English 
speakers a second language, but qualified this new amendment by stating that such 
programs ultimately should contribute to the English acquisition of LEP students (and by 
implication, not to encourage bilingualism) (Lyon, 1990 69). The reauthorization 
addressed the desegregation issue by allowing up to 40 percent enrollment of native 
English speakers into bilingual education classes as a way of assisting the acquisition of 
English for LEP students (Crawford, 1999 51). The 1974 and 1978 reauthorizations also 
limited the duration students could receive native language instruction (Trujillo, 1998 37).  
 For the next decade, little money was directed towards bilingual education 
programs that encouraged cultural maintenance or bilingualism (Crawford, 1998 56).  As 
these normative programmatic paradigms for bilingual education fell out of political 
fashion, defenders of the bilingual programs focused less on the multicultural/ bilingual 
rationales by the end of the 1980s (Crawford, 1998 56). As the decade of the 1980s closed, 
the bilingual education political debate was instead framed within the language (lack of 
English proficiency) as the problem paradigm. Bilingual programs were debated solely on 
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the merits of whether or not they contributed to mainstreaming ELL students. Victories for 
proponents of bilingual education, subsequently, resulted in federal funds devoted to 
programs aimed at mainstreaming children. 
 
The Backlash Against Big Government and its Effects on Bilingual Education  
By the end of the 1970s, the transitionary period for the racial orders paradigm —
after the delegitimization of white supremacy and de jure segregation — had come to an 
end. King and Smith (2005; 2008) argue that race conscious policies became the new fault 
line of the competing racial institutional orders (King and Smith, 2005 83; 2008 688).  
These mechanisms of government intervention helped to ferment a political backlash 
against the big government programs of civil rights liberalism that evolved out of the pro-
civil rights legislative and judicial rulings, respectively, from the mid-1960s through early 
1970s. Bilingual education was a policy aimed at addressing inequities, funneling federal 
funds directly for the benefit of a subpopulation. This placed the issue in the political debate 
among the competing racial institutional orders concerning the appropriateness of race-
conscious (in this linguistic-minority focused) redistributive policies in the American 
polity (King and Smith, 2008). In addition, the ideational paradigm of bilingual education 
proponents fluctuated per locality between transitional English programs and cultural 
maintenance programs. The latter offended proponents of the assimilationist model of 
immigrant incorporation. As this deviated from the traditional immigrant assimilationist 
model of ‘sink or swim’ English Only instruction, it suggested a repudiation of the 
assimilationist melting pot ideal in favor of a multicultural, pluralist conception of 
American identity (Citrin et al, 1990 537). Many assimilationist proponents were 
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proponents of the non-expansionist racial institutional order. However (as previously 
mentioned), some coalition members of the egalitarian transformative order (including 
blacks, conservative Democrats, and conservative Latino groups) also opposed cultural 
maintenance programs. These sentiments against bilingualism also coincided with the 
political winds of the late 1970s that opposed big government programs. Such opposition 
often took on a racial undertone as many big government programs were charged with 
addressing the needs of minority groups and/or the poor at the expense of the American 
middle class. The peeling off of support for bilingual education from marginal supporters, 
such as African Americans and some Latinos, allowed for restrictionist sentiments (such 
as the move away from cultural maintenance programs towards bilingual education as a 
strictly transitionary/ mainstreaming pedagogical tool) to gain policy traction at the 
national level.   
 Additionally, the aggressive institutional approach also encouraged this political 
backlash as local school boards often resented federal intrusiveness of what was thought to 
be a local issue (Crawford, 1998 58). Contestations over OCR’s bilingual education 
mandates by officials in Fairfax, Virgina, Texas and Alaska began to gain political and 
legal resonance. These local officials found sympathizers in the growing anti-big 
government, Republican movement of the late 1970s (Crawford, 1998 58). Additionally, 
since the Lau Remedies were never formally established, they lacked the power of official 
regulations. Opponents claimed that the Lau Remedies were quasi-formal guidelines. A 
federal court agreed that the rule-making process was illegal and forced the Carter 
administration to develop formal Lau Regulations (Crawford, 1998 58). In 1980, the rules 
produced by the Carter administration were met with near unanimous opposition from the 
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education community. The administration’s Lau Remedy proposals required bilingual 
education in any district with at least 25 LEP students of the same minority language group 
for two consecutive grades (Crawford, 1999 52). Amid the negative reaction in an election 
year, Congress voted to block the implementation of the Carter Lau regulations until mid-
1981 (Crawford, 1999 52). Upon assuming office in 1981, Reagan (who campaigned on 
an anti-government red tape platform) repealed the Lau Regulations (Crawford, 1998 59).  
The Department of Education subsequently withdrew the Lau Remedies (Fenner, 2012 92). 
Thus, the process was stripped of regulations to guide executive enforcement. This, 
subsequently, ended the executive policing of localities with high LEP student populations.  
 
Political Fallout from Demographic Changes Rendered From the Immigration Act of 
1965 
 The backlash was also in response to demographic changes caused by the 
Immigration Reform Act of 1965, which eliminated the national origin quotas and stressed 
family reunification. These changes had the unforeseen result of increasing immigration 
from Latin America, Asia, and Africa (Citrin et al, 1990 538). In addition, to the language 
differences of the immigrants (a feature they held in common with European immigrants 
of the turn of the 20th century immigration wave), the post-1965 immigration wave led to 
the growing presence of populations which were also racially different than the majority 
population (who were mostly descendants of European immigrants). Consequently, 
bilingualism (and bilingual education) politically pitted mainly Spanish-speaking 
immigrant groups against the mainstream public (Citrin et al, 1990 538).   
 This political backlash manifested in English Only campaigns, whose members 
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viewed the normative goals of bilingualism as a critique of the American assimilationist 
cultural model, and a model which segregated the immigrant and threatened the unity of 
the polity (Citrin et al, 1990 538; Imhoff, 1990 57). In the late 1970s, Republicans (led by 
Senator Hayakawa of California) rehashed the old political adage that the promotion of a 
national language was necessary to prevent the cultural polarization and divisions 
experienced by other linguistically diverse countries, such as Canada and Belgium (Citrin, 
1990 538).  
 
Renaissance of the English Only Movement 
 According to Crawford (199963), the English Only movement of the 1980s 
changed the politics of bilingual education, capitalizing on the anti-big government 
political wave that helped elect Ronald Reagan in 1980. It helped to reframe the debate in 
bilingual education, discrediting not only the importance of cultural maintenance, but also 
transitional bilingual education by successfully portraying English as a cultural signpost of 
American culture (Crawford, 1999 64).       
 The English Only movement emerged in the 1980s and called for the elimination 
of bilingualism in public life. It first appeared on the national scene via US English 
(Crawford, 1999 64). US English was a sub-group of the Federation for American English 
Reform (FAIR), a DC-based lobbying organization advocating for stricter controls of 
immigration (Crawford, 1999 64). It was founded by Senator S.I. Hayakawa and John 
Tanton. Hayakawa served as a senator from California from 1977 to 1983 and was the first 
sponsor of the English Language Amendment — an amendment proposal to the US 
Constitution that would have made English the official language. Tanton was an 
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environmentalist and population control advocate (Crawford, 1999 64). Established in 
1983, US English quickly outgrew FAIR — by 1988 it claimed to have 350,000 dues-
paying members and an annual budget of $7 million (approximately five times that of 
FAIR) (Crawford, 1999 64).   
 Crawford (1999) argues that US English helped bring linguistic politics to the 
national agenda. Formerly, linguistic politics had been a minor issue nationally, but US 
English exploited an unease among Anglo Americans (Crawford, 1999 64). They perceived 
the new crop of immigrants as segregating themselves in their own communities where 
they could use their own language in all facets of life. Crawford  (1999 64) contests that 
Anglo-Americans were opposed to the federal government subsidizing this behavior 
through programs like bilingual education. US English advocated that English had been the 
‘social glue’ that facilitated the development of a shared American culture (the famed 
American melting pot). Subsequently, US English campaigned against government support 
for multilingualism as they viewed it as undermining the role of English and encouraging 
what they viewed as ethnic balkanization. Instead, they argued that the English language 
needs government protection to ensure its role in the polity (Crawford, 1999 64-65).   
 US English initially attempted to initiate passage of a constitutional amendment 
declaring English as the national language. Such calls led to proposals for Constitutional 
amendments to declare English the official language beginning in 1981. Measures were 
again introduced in 1983 and 1985 (Citrin, 1990 538). However, neither of these measures 
made any progress through Congress (Citrin, 1990 538).  
 After it became apparent that a supermajority of the nation’s states were not in favor 
of such an amendment, English Only movement turned its sights to state constitutions and 
 
190 
initiatives (Citrin et al, 1990 538). Before 1980, only three states had declared English the 
official language. By 1998, only 3 states (Maine, Vermont, and Alaska) had not considered 
similar official laws (Citrin et al, 1990).   
 Citrin et al (1990) finds that although the restrictions on using non-English 
languages in public life sanctioned by these initiatives varied per state (English Only 
ordinances were often symbolic in effect), the political rhetoric surrounding the issue was 
similar. Proponents of “official English” believed that linguistic pluralism threatened the 
long-term harmony and stability of the polity. They argued that previous immigrant 
generations had shown that the acquisition of English promised social mobility and 
political, cultural, economic incorporation into American society. To deviate from this 
‘tried and true’ practice was to eliminate the one institution that united the heterogeneous 
American population. Thus, contrary to proponents of bilingualism, the elimination of 
bilingualism was not exclusionary, but pursued with the goal of social cohesion, 
specifically to safeguard against the ghettoization of linguistic minorities (both 
economically and culturally) (Citrin et al, 1990 538).  
 Countering these arguments, proponents of bilingual education (or bilingualism in 
public life) argued that “official English” measures and amendments were initiatives of 
exclusion, asserting that sanctioning English by law equated to institutionalizing the 
inferiority of linguistic minorities (Citrin et al, 1990 538). Critics of US English (Hispanic 
advocacy organizations, liberals) argued that English Only policies were divisive, did not 
encourage (but discouraged) assimilation, and did not quicken the process of acquiring 
English (Crawford, 1999 73). Concerning its divisiveness and its discouragement of 
assimilation, critics argued that English Only policies sent a message to immigrants that 
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their culture was not welcome and thus encouraged segregation (Crawford, 1999 69). Thus, 
in addition to eliminating [bilingual] services that facilitated the process of assimilation, 
these initiatives also betrayed the American tradition of tolerance and equality (Citrin et al, 
1990 538). 
 Lastly, English Only opponents argued that English Only mandates were also 
unnecessary as studies showed that immigrants desire and find a way to learn English 
regardless of available resources to assist them (Citrin et al, 1990 538). Studies in the 1980s 
found that the majority of immigrants used predominantly English in public and private 
life by the second generation, a quickening of the process of English acquisition when 
compared to the immigrant wave of the early 20th century (Crawford, 1999 71). 
 US English countered such criticism by appointing Linda Chavez as its president 
in 1987 (Crawford, 1999 67). Chavez, a former Reagan appointee and familiar with the 
workings of Washington, crafted a counter message to Hispanics’ claim that US English 
was anti-immigrant (Crawford, 1999  67). She argued that requiring LEP students to learn 
English quickly was a civil rights issue as English was the language of assimilation, social 
mobility and economic prosperity (Crawford, 1999 67). Bilingual education was impeding 
this civil rights imperative that LEP students learn English (Crawford, 1999 67). Such 
rhetoric proved effective, especially from a Latina, in countering US English’s supposed 
anti-Hispanic bias (Crawford, 1999  67).   
 Crawford (1999) cites that US English did lose some of its mainstream credibility 
with the public when allegations of racist affiliations and comments from its co-founder 
became public. First, a letter by co-founder John Tanton was leaked to the press. The letter 
argued that high birth rates from immigrants threatened white-Anglo political hegemony 
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and that white-Anglos would not relinquish their political power peacefully.  Revelation of 
the letter embarrassed Chavez, who subsequently resigned. Other high profile supporters, 
such as Walter Cronkite, ended their public support of US English.  Cronkite (the premier 
network news anchorman of his day) left his post on the supervisory board of US English 
and asked them to cease using his name in their promotional efforts (Crawford, 1999 68-
69).  Nevertheless, the core theory of English Only movements— that English should be 
the language of the US— still retained their political appeal 
 In assessing the state initiatives to declare English the official state language, Citrin 
et al (1990 540) found that states with high immigrant populations were not the states that 
actually passed “official English” initiatives. In most cases, states with low immigrant 
populations were more successful than states with large immigrant populations. They 
found that English Only ordinances were predominantly passed in Southern states with 
largely Anglo-Saxon populations and small immigrant percentages. They argued that 
immigrant associations in states with large immigrant populations successfully organized 
counter mobilization efforts to discourage legislators from passing official English 
ordinates.  As immigrant interest groups were more steadfastly united in opposition to anti-
bilingual education reforms than their more diffuse opposition— mostly parents and 
conservative intellectuals— the former were successfully able to ward off reform proposals 
(Citrin et al, 2003 5). Although, Southern states did have low immigrant populations in the 
1980s and 1990s, these states (Georgia, North Carolina, and Arkansas, specifically) 
experienced the the most rapid immigration increases between 1980 and 2000 (Singer, 
2004). However, as Latinos were not politically incorporated (as evidenced by their low 
naturalization rates and low levels of political organization) in these Southern states, 
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passage of English Only ordinances faced little resistance (Singer, 2004). The significance 
of the latter finding plays out in this study as well-entrenched Latino advocacy groups were 
able to successfully stymie movements to pass Official English amendments and English 
Only instruction legislation in Texas in the 1980s and 1990s. Their favored positions would 
also prove decisive in resisting calls to end bilingual education programs in the 1990s. 
 In addition, bilingual education was not a salient issue through the late 1990s, thus, 
giving immigrant associations (with a vested interest) more motivation to pressure 
legislatures against anti-bilingual education reforms (Citrin et al, 2003 5). Still, Citrin et al 
(2003) find that official English proponents in states with high immigrant populations were 
successful getting these initiatives passed where citizens could pass legislation through 
initiatives (thus bypassing the legislature). Often well-financed English Only movements 
were able to exploit the social tensions caused by increased immigration through voter 
initiatives — effectively bypassing legislator’s hesitant to offend potential immigrant 
constituents and their sympathizers (Citrin et al, 1990 540). Leaders of the campaigns were 
able to exploit the importance of English to the American cultural identity as well as 
favorably exploit negative sentiments the majority population had towards immigrants —  
their nationality, race, and/or culture (Citrin et al, 1990 556). The best example of this is 
California, which passed both an Official English constitutional amendment and outlawed 
bilingual education by citizen initiatives in 1986 and 1998 respectively. Both Texas and 
California and the effect of citizens initiatives on the prospects of English Only legislation 
will be a focus of this study  
 Crawford (1999 63) argues that although the official English laws were mostly 
symbolic in nature, their political effect was real. Even as US English waned politically at 
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the national level, it subsequently moved its efforts to the state level where it had more 
success. There was general consensus among state leaders to have these remain mostly 
symbolic, Crawford (1999 71) finds. However, they did tap a sentiment with a broad swath 
of society across partisan, racial, and ethnic lines. And this was the continual resonance of 
the American melting pot ideal — one-way assimilation — and the critical role English 
played in that process. Subsequently, as more research established that good bilingual 
programs lasting upwards of 7 years were effective in improving LEP student performance, 
this proved anemic in countering calls for less bilingual education.  Assimilation was more 
important for immigrants than an effective, well-meaning program that appeared to retard 
the assimilation process (Crawford, 1999 73).  
 Winning the rhetorical battle concerning the importance of English (these English 
Only proposals often enjoyed 60-90 percent approval ratings) helped to create a lack of 
confidence in bilingual education policies, which were already in a precarious political 
state because of the negative or ambivalent research that became public in the early 1980s 
(Crawford, 1999 63).   
 Within this political climate, US English did not directly go after repealing Title 
VII. Its more conservative counterpart English First called for the complete elimination of 
Title VII funding (Crawford, 1999 74). Crawford (1999 73) argues that this was consistent 
with the sentiments of the far-right which saw bilingual education as government 
encouragement of ethnic separatism, and among some, as supporting ethnic subversion. In 
the 1980s, however, such sentiments as well as outright opposition to Title VII were still 
considered extreme (Crawford, 1999 74). Yet, according to Crawford (1999 74), US 
English proved to be more politically effective. They advocated that more Title VII dollars 
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to be shifted to English immersion courses and for reduction in the duration of bilingual 
education programs. English immersion programs were categorized under "special 
alternative" programs, which were generally instruction programs that used English 
instruction or focused on English acquisition (using native language instruction for the 
purpose of transitioning to all-English instruction). This proved effective in the political 
environment created by US English where assimilation and English acquisition were the 
normative paradigms (Crawford, 1999 74). Anti-bilingual education forces successfully 
used such appeals, moving Title VII in a restrictionist direction as increasing funding began 
to be directed to English immersion or ESL programs in the 1980s. Additionally, a three 
year cap was placed on Title VII funding to bilingual education programs beginning in the 
mid 1990s (Crawford, 1999 73). 
 Proponents of bilingual education responded with a multicultural campaign called 
English Plus. Founded by the League of United Latin Americans and the Spanish American 
League Against Discrimination, English Plus acknowledged that LEP students needed to 
become proficient in English. Still, monolingualism was not in the national interest as it 
did not produce students who could be productive in a globalizing world.  Additionally, it 
was contrary to the multilingual, multi-ethnic, multicultural traditions from which the US 
originated (Crawford, 1999). They campaigned that multilingualism needed to be 
encouraged for all, not discouraged as English Only proponents argued (Crawford, 1999 
77). They urged states and municipalities to declare themselves multilingual and/or 





Reversal of the Courts’ Support for Bilingual Education  
 Additionally, the courts also began to side against enforcement of the Lau 
Remedies. Crawford (1999) contests that the Bakke (1978) 29  decision concerning 
affirmative action policies also brought the legality of the Lau ruling into question (58). In 
Bakke, the court ruled that governmental policies that resulted in racially disparate 
outcomes did not violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act nor were they unconstitutional 
under the Fourteenth Amendment unless discriminatory intent could be proven.  Extending 
this logic to linguistic policy in education, a school teaching all of its students in English 
regardless of their language might be legal. Castaneda v. Pickens, 1981, addressed this 
question and established the governing legal precedent/ criteria for legally assessing a 
district LEP program's compliance with Lau (Crawford, 1999 58).   
 In Castaneda v. Pickens, 1981, referencing EEOA protection, Mexican-American 
student plaintiffs argued that Pickens school district in Texas was in violation of EEOA 
because inadequate provision and training of bilingual education instructors precluded the 
district from offering a bilingual education program that provided Mexican-American 
students with an education equal to their mainstream counterparts (Fenner, 2012 93). The 
district court ruled in favor of the defendants and the case was sent to the Fifth Circuit 
Court on appeal from the plaintiffs (Fenner, 2012 93). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled in favor of the defendants. They reasoned that the Lau Remedies were not official 
administrative law as they were not published in the Federal Register, and thus the courts 
were under no obligation to defer to them (Fenner, 2012 93). Additionally, the Appeals 
                                                 
29 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) was a landmark case decided by the US Supreme 
Court.  It upheld the use of affirmative action in university admissions — arguing that race could be used as 
one of several factors in assessing applicants — but declared the use of set aside quotas as unconstitutional 
(Regents of University of California v. Bakke text) 
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Court questioned the rationale of the Lau rulings upon which the Lau Remedies relied.  
Finally, conceding that Congress enacted legislation to formalize the Lau Remedies in law, 
the language of the legislation, specifically the legislation’s language that states take 
“appropriate action” to remedy issues of inequity, according to the court, suggested that 
Congress intended for states to have discretion in addressing such issues of inequity 
(Fenner, 2012 93). The courts, subsequently, developed a discretionary test upon which 
district educational systems should be judged to determine their adequacy in meeting the 
needs of its students. It detailed three criteria that districts had to meet in order to receive 
federal aid for their LEP programs:  
1. a program had to be based on sound education theory; 
2. a program was required to effectively incorporate an educational theory; 
3. a program that failed to produce adequate results after a sufficient period of time to 
provide for the English language progress of LEP students would no longer be 
considered an appropriate response by the school to the needs of its LEP population (de 
Cos, 1999 16; Fenner, 2012 93).  
      The Castaneda test became the discretionary test used in future court cases 
concerning the legal adequacy of education programs aimed to address the needs of LEP 
students (Fenner, 2012 93). It has since remained the means for testing whether a 
program is in compliance with the Lau decision as the decision had been reinterpreted 
by the Fifth Circuit of Appeals (Smith, 2012 30). Still, as is evident in these criteria, 
bilingual education was not required to meet the court’s standards. Districts could meet 
these standards by taking “appropriate action to overcome language barriers” through 
“well implemented programs” that satisfied the aforementioned criteria (EEOA text). 
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 The Horne v. Flores ruling, according to Fenner (2012 94), severely limited the 
reliance on EEOA in affecting change in bilingual education programs. The plaintiffs in 
the case claimed that the district’s bilingual education program was inadequate and in non-
compliance with EEOA in remedying the language issues that precluded their right to an 
equal education (Fenner, 2012 94). Initially, the Federal District Court from Arizona 
entered an order against the district and extended it to the entire state, requiring districts to 
change their funding for ELL students as the previous funding system was deemed 
inadequate for the required ELL instruction (Fenner, 2012 94). The Arizona legislation 
responded with HB 2064 which increased ELL funding amid other technical changes to 
the funding formula (Fenner, 2012 94). Once HB 2064 was passed, the state sought relief 
from the 2000 ruling citing changed circumstances (Fenner, 2012 94). The District Court 
declined the state request citing flaws in HB 2064. Most importantly the District Court 
cited that HB 2064 funding changes were not rationally connected to the education needs 
of the ELL instruction (Fenner, 2012 95). The Ninth Circuit Court upheld the District Court 
decision. The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed the Ninth Court 
ruling. The Supreme Court ruling stated that both the District Court ruling and the Ninth 
Court ruling failed to give the proper deference to the state’s right of control over budgetary 
decisions and that EEOA limits court-ordered decisions to only those essential for 
remedying specific denials of equal opportunity or equal protection laws. The lower court 
rulings thus were not flexible enough to allow for a return of state control for this 
constitutionally protected state function. Referencing the Horne precedent, it stated that 
EEOA decisions had to give great deference to state discretion in formulating responses to 
EEOA violations especially in the area of funding.  According to Fenner (2012 95), this 
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precedent greatly precluded judicial advocacy on the part of pro-bilingual education forces 
in enacting particular programmatic change via EEOA litigation. Fenner (2012 95) 
concludes that this has left the court with little leverage in promoting particular models of 
bilingual education at the state level.   
 
Negative Research Concerning the Efficacy of Bilingual Education 
 In addition, the Lau Remedies demanded accountability of bilingual education’s 
effectiveness (Crawford, 1998 59). Studies conducted between the late 1970s and mid- 
1980s produced mixed results, however (Imhoff, 1990 48). And these helped to transition 
the issue dimension away from education equality and more towards education 
accountability. As early studies presented mixed results concerning bilingual education’s 
effect on educational outcomes, this proved to be a political boon for its opponents and 
political problem for its proponents.  
 The most politically damaging was the American Institute for Research (AIR) 
report of 1978 (this will be discussed further below). The report evaluated 16 bilingual 
education programs nationwide and claimed that bilingual education with the goal of 
teaching bilingualism interfered with improving student achievement in school (Fralick, 
2007 17; Crawford, 1998 55). Although the evaluations indicated an improvement in the 
self-perceptions, attendance, and cultural understandings for LEP students, the report could 
not consistently find higher educational achievement resulting from these programs 
(Fralick, 2007 16). Although the reasons given for the inefficacy of the programs was more 
indicative of problematic implementation than the programs themselves, the final 
conclusions of the study had the most political resonance. They were the first program 
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evaluations of bilingual programs at the time and as implied in the following adage, ‘first 
impressions are everything’ (Fralick, 2007 16).     
 In 1983, the federal government commissioned Baker and de Kramer to evaluate 
federally-funded bilingual education programs nationwide (Fralick, 2007 17). They found 
that these bilingual education programs were not effective in increasing educational 
achievement for the target groups and recommended an English immersion approach as a 
remedy (Fralick, 2007 17). These researchers contested that poor educational outcomes for 
LEP students were due to insufficient English skills among the students (Fralick, 2007 17). 
These students, they concluded, needed to be more proficient in English to succeed in 
school and that more exposure to the language was the remedy for their academic issues 
(Fralick, 2007 17). Opponents of bilingual education used this to cite the program’s 
ineffectiveness especially if the goal was not restricted to quickly “mainstreaming” 
students to English instruction (Crawford, 1998 55). Further, they maintained that due to 
its ineffectiveness, ELL students often languished in this transitional state for years, 
effectively segregating them from native English students, and, thus, further interfering 
with the acquisition of English skills— learning through contact with native English 
speakers (Citrin et al, 2003 4). This final point— bilingual education’s failure to efficiently 
mainstream ELL students— would later become one of the rallying points for Ron Unz's 
English for the Children ballot initiative movement in California, Arizona, Massachusetts, 
and Colorado from the late 1990s through the early 2000s (Citrin et al, 2003 4). 
 In sum, these studies undermined political support for bilingual education. The 
initial reviews of bilingual education were negative, arguing that English immersion was a 
better approach. At best, these studies found that bilingual instruction (and/or cultural 
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maintenance programs) provided negligible or no academic benefit for students, and at 
worst, these programs retarded students’ progress. It had been academic reviews in the 
1950s and 1960s that had helped foster the political environment for pro-bilingual 
advocates to reframe the issue. And the negative reviews of bilingual education in the late 
1970s and early 1980s did the same — creating political pressures during the 
reauthorizations of the 1980s to reduce the funds directed towards any program whose 
eventual goal was not English instruction. Critics of bilingual education began to question 
the logic of restricting federal funding of district programs to a pedagogical approach that 
showed little or adverse effects on the target student group (Crawford, 1999 54).   
 
Evolution from Equity to Accountability 
 Federal government involvement in educational matters has evolved from ensuring 
equity to enforcing quality through mandating accountability measures. These were the 
issue dimensions — problematization of the issue — within which elites contested 
education policy. The change of issue dimensions to educational quality concerns began 
with the publishing of A Nation At Risk: The Imperative For Educational Reform report 
by President Reagan’s National Commission on Excellence in Education in 1983 
(McGuinn, 2003 1). However, as mentioned, this transition began in the late 1970s in 
bilingual education with the publishing of the AIR report. Nevertheless, this ideational 
evolution continued to impact the bilingual educational debate. Since the late 1970s, 
opponents of bilingual education have often attacked bilingual education by critiquing its 
efficacy. This is a different tone than those enjoyed by proponents of bilingual education 
in the early and mid-1970s where the issue dimension of equity (and the threat of civil 
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rights suits) forced states to implement bilingual education programs.  Since the 1980s, 
many of those programs have come under attack for their lack of efficacy. This shift to the 
issue dimension of accountability has helped to change the terms of the debate (Crawford, 
1999 54). This led to a reordering of coalitions to match the new issue dimension. This 
reordering of elite coalitions changed the balance of power towards the anti-bilingual 
forces. This was most evident in the increasingly lukewarm support bilingual education 
received from prominent Democrats such as President Carter (as mentioned) and later with 
Bill Clinton and much of the Democratic establishment during the Proposition 227 debate. 
 By the 1980s, the federal focus began to shift from ensuring equal access for 
targeted groups to program quality and education accountability for all students (Fuhrman 
et al, 2007 44). President George H.W. Bush’ s America 2000 proposal, Clinton’s 
Improving America’s School Act of 1994 (IASA) and his Goals 2000, and later with 
George W. Bush’s No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, the federal government embraced 
standards-based reform for all students. This moved the federal bilingual education policy 
in the direction of English acquisition — as language proficiency was legitimated as the 
problem LEP students faced. However, since states still retained autonomy concerning 
setting specific performance standards, designing of assessments, and applying sanctions, 
the federal government was still dependent on the capacity and willingness of states to 
implement federal standards (Fuhrman et al 2007 45). Subsequently, there is vast variation 






The 1984 BEA Reauthorization 
 In 1983, BEA was up for reauthorization amid the political climate that was a 
byproduct of the negative reviews bilingual education received and the small government 
philosophy of the Reagan administration (Crawford, 1999 54). Education Secretary Bell 
proposed eliminating the native-language instruction requirement for receiving Title VII 
funding (Crawford, 1999 54). Senator Hayakawa, sponsored Reagan’s BEA 
reauthorization bill that aimed to reduce the role of bilingual education in Title VII 
programs (Crawford, 1999 54). Hayakawa also proposed a constitutional amendment to 
make English the official language of the nation (Crawford, 1999 54) as discussed above. 
Although Congress considered neither bill, this was the political context that supporters of 
bilingual education faced in 1983 (Crawford, 1999 54). Proponents of bilingual education 
recognized the anti-bilingual education political tone of the political climate and postponed 
debate on reauthorizing BEA until 1984 — an election year (Crawford, 1999 54). 
According to Crawford (1999 54), this proved to be a sage move. The 1984 election year 
was the first election that the Republicans actively courted the Hispanic vote, leading 
Reagan to change his public tone concerning bilingual education and to officially recognize 
successful bilingual education programs (Crawford, 1999 54-55). This positive outreach to 
the Hispanic community by the Republican Party set the tone of the 1984 BEA 
reauthorization debate (Crawford, 1999 55).   
 A deal was quickly struck between Republicans and Democrats— a political 
compromise that had benefits for supporters of bilingual education (Crawford, 1999 55).  
Democrats Dale Kildee (Michigan) and Baltazar Corrrada (Puerto Rico) introduced and 
made a deal with Republican Senators John McCain (Arizona) and Steve Bartlett (Texas) 
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(Crawford, 1999 55). The compromise involved increasing funding to Title VII overall by 
allowing for up to 10 percent of those funds to be directed for LEP oriented programs that 
used no-native tongue instruction (Crawford, 1999 55). These programs were categorized 
under special alternative instruction proposals (SAIPs) (Crawford, 1999 55). In the early 
1980s, Congress incorporated Structured English Immersion within BEA under the SAIP  
pedagogical designation (Fenner, 2012 92). This provided districts with a pedagogical 
option that involved minimal use of the primary language or did not encourage 
maintenance or development of primary language proficiencies under BEA (Fenner, 2012 
92). Lastly, Congress put a three-year limit on the enrollment of ELL students in bilingual 
education programs (Fenner, 2012 92). Meanwhile, extra funding was directed towards 
making Title VII programs move beyond the compensatory model and towards the 
development model for LEP students. New funds would be used for several new programs 
and a stronger focus on teacher training and academic goals of Title VII programs 
(Crawford, 1999 55).   
 
Consequences of the 1984 and 1988 BEA Reauthorizations 
  Overall, however, the 1984 and 1988 reauthorizations of BEA produced a funding 
system that increasingly directed funds towards transitional bilingual education programs 
and increasingly monolingual English programs as opposed to cultural maintenance and 
programs with the goal of bilingualism. Development bilingual programs were offered in 
the 1984 (as mentioned) and 1988 reauthorizations. However, the reauthorizations only 
allowed for the residual funding to be allocated toward these development programs 
(Lyons, 1990 77). Nevertheless, the inclusion of developmental bilingual education 
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programs was a significant advance in bilingual education. These programs had not been 
an official part of the BEA since similar provisions were dropped in the conference 
committee of the original Bilingual Education Act in 1967 (Lyons, 1990 76).  Despite this 
change in the content of the bill, federal funding was primarily devoted to transitional 
bilingual education programs by the end of the 1980s.   
 
OCR’s Laissez Faire Stance under Reagan 
 After Bell withdrew the Lau remedies, Civil Rights enforcement was without 
direction according to Crawford (1999 56). OCR attempted to draft new regulations that 
would provide districts more discretion in addressing the needs of their LEP student 
populations as was the philosophy of the Reagan administration. During debates 
surrounding this process, the new general counsel for the Department of Education, Daniel 
Oliver, questioned the legality of Lau policies. Oliver argued that discriminatory intent as 
opposed to discriminatory effects should be the threshold for violating Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act (Crawford, 1999 56). Not providing any program for LEP students should be a 
violation, Oliver held. Still, a district that provided a program based on a theory backed by 
experts should be sufficient to comply with Title VI unless discriminatory intent could be 
proven. Oliver’s proposal was controversial within OCR and consensus could not be 
reached on new regulations. The OCR operated without regulatory direction until 
December of 1985 when OCR proclaimed that it would enforce Lau on a ‘case by case 
basis’ (Crawford, 1999 56). OCR did not offer elaboration of how it would assess Lau 
compliance. It stated that there was considerable debate among experts concerning the best 
policies for LEP students and argued that they were not pedagogical experts, but were 
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simply charged with enforcing the law (Crawford, 1999 57). Subsequently, OCR permitted 
districts discretion in choosing the program best for their student body; it only required that 
they make a reasonable effort towards accommodating LEP students' need. Concerning 
assessing the success of district programs, OCR held that a successful program is one that 
moves LEP students to mainstream instruction in a "reasonable amount of time" 
(reminiscent of Brown's "with deliberate speed") (Crawford, 1999 58).   
 Subsequently per Crawford (1999), OCR enforcement of Lau dropped significantly 
(58). Districts were less likely to be monitored, and OCR was less likely to follow up on 
those districts it did find in violation. The Office defended its actions claiming their job 
was to enforce the law and not to make pedagogical decisions concerning the best policies 
for LEP students. Its critics (among them the Multicultural Education and Training 
Advocacy — META and MALDEF), however, argued that OCR had abdicated its role in 
enforcing Lau (Crawford, 1999 57). 
 
The OCR under George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton 
 This lax attitude continued under the Bush and Clinton administrations (Crawford, 
1999 58). Bush toned down the strident rhetoric concerning bilingual education but his 
OCR functioned in a fashion similar to Reagan’s laissez-faire OCR: OCR essentially 
permitted the states to police themselves. Upon Clinton's election, he selected former 
Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) attorney as assistant 
secretary of education for civil rights (Crawford, 1999 58). She immediately doubled the 
Lau reviews. However, the Clinton administration showed little interest in readdressing 
questions concerning the best pedagogical approach for LEP students and establishing the 
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minimum requirements district programs needed to meet for Lau compliance (Crawford, 
1999 58). Subsequently, according to Crawford (1999 58), Clinton continued the laissez-
faire attitude of his previous two Republican predecessors. 
 
The 1994 BEA Reauthorization 
 In the 1990s, the political trends continued to be influenced by the language as a 
problem paradigm. The mainstreaming of students was the normative goal of bilingual 
education programs (Crawford, 1998 56). By the middle of the decade, reauthorizations of 
BEA placed a 3-year limit for bilingual education programs to transition students to English 
instruction (Crawford, 1998 56). The 1994 reauthorization of BEA, however, reestablished 
bilingualism as an end goal (Gandara and Rumberger, 2009 765). The Act while focusing 
on the development of English proficiency, also aimed at developing proficiency in the 
primary language for LEP students (Gandara and Rumberger, 2009 765). The 1994 
reauthorization also reflected the goals of two other federal initiatives, ‘Goals 2000’ and 
Improving America’s School Act of 1994 (Gandara and Rumberger, 2009 765). The latter 
called for the use of Title VI programs to help language minority students meet the same 
educational standards expected of mainstream students (Gandara and Rumberger, 2009 
765).   
 
No Child Left Behind 
 In 2002, the No Child Left Behind Act effectively ended the Bilingual Education 
Act, replacing it with the English Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement, and 
Academic Achievement Act (Title III of the NCLB Act) (Gandara and Rumberger, 2009 
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765; TEA, 2006 15). This act removed the language of bilingualism and stressed English 
acquisition as the normative pedagogical goal for public schools (Gandara and Rumberger, 
2009 765). Title III, like Title VII, did not endorse any specific pedagogical program and 
thus, most states elected to use Title III funds to support ESL or bilingual education 
programs (Smith, 2012 31). Part A of the law encouraged English fluency and academic 
achievement while Part B of the law stressed multilingual fluency, understanding of 
multicultural issues, academic achievement in English and other languages (Fralick, 2007 
19). Part B also included calls for data gathering and research on the issues affecting ELL 
students (LEP— Learning English Proficient— was renamed ELL— English Language 
Learner— to reflect the new English focus of Title III) (Fralick, 2007 19). The NCLB Act 
aimed at creating accountability structures and goals for student performance. Schools 
were required to meet Annual Yearly Progress (AYP) targets. Those schools which failed 
to meet such targets for three straight years risked losing federal funding or closure 
(Wright, 2006  22).   
Concerning LEP students, The Act’s goals included:  
- to help insure that LEP students attain English proficiency and are able to meet the same 
standards that all students are expected to make; 
- to assist all LEP students to achieve at high levels in core academic subjects; 
- to develop high quality language instruction educational programs designed to assist state 
educational agencies in teaching LEP students; 
- to assist state and local educational agencies in developing and enhancing their capacities 
to prepare LEP students for the transition to mainstream all English instruction; 
- to streamline language instruction educational programs into a program carried out 
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through formula grants and state and local educational agencies  
(TEA, 2006 16; Smith, 2012 31; Fralick, 2007 19). 
 To track the performance of various student subgroups, schools were permitted to 
divide their student population into observable subgroups.  Educational funding was then 
allocated according to the needs of predefined population subgroups. One goal that NCLB 
requires is that all ELL students pass their state’s accountability test by 2014 (regardless 
of their length of stay in the United States (Wright, 2006 22). Meeting this goal required 
that ELL students meet the same academic standards as mainstream students (Gandara and 
Rumberger, 2009 766). This goal was to be achieved despite the greater challenge for ELL 
students and with little increase in funding to overcome these challenges (Gandara and 
Rumberger, 2009 766). The Lau Rulings have precluded schools from abandoning 
bilingual education programs completely without offering an adequate pedagogical 
replacement (as these districts could be susceptible to legal suits from the parents of 
aggrieved ELL students). Yet, the AYP targets and the 2014 deadline have created extra 
pressures for schools to improve the performance of ELL students and in some cases has 
encouraged localities to seek other methods of instruction for ELL students (Wright, 2006 
22). The penalties for not meeting AYP targets for schools are great including potential 
school closing and personnel changes, as mentioned above (Smith, 2012 35). Hence, 
normatively NCLB stressed English acquisition through mainstreaming LEP students as 
quickly as possible so that they too could be subjected to the testing assessment paradigm 
sanctioned by NCLB.   
 Title III was (and still is) a formula grant that provides funding based on the number 
of LEP students reported by the state (20 percent of the funding is based from the state 
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report) and the 2000 US Census (80 percent of the funding based on the most up to date 
US Census) (TEA, 2006 16; Smith, 2012 31). This differed from Title VII which provided 
funding on a competitive basis via grants of one or more years (TEA, 2006 16).  In 2003, 
$477 million was distributed through the Title III State Formula Grant Program, reaching 
80 percent of the 5.1 million LEP students (Smith, 2012 31). Prior to NCLB, only 15 
percent of students were reached through federal programs (Smith, 2012 32).  This, thus 
was an improvement over Title VII (although Title III incentivized abandoning bilingual 
education for methods that stressed quick English acquisition). Additionally, NCLB 
coerced all states into developing and implementing English language proficiency 
standards and annually assessing ELLs (Smith, 2012 32). This was a first (Smith, 2012 32). 
NCLB required more accountability from states in assessing the progress of ELL students 
as well as coercing states to verify the accuracy of student classifications (which in the past 
was responsible for the classification of ELL students as remedial). Thus, federal 
enforcement in these areas became stronger than those in place in most states (Gandara and 
Rumberger, 2009 766). Additionally, NCLB legitimated the idea that assisting LEP 
students and providing the pedagogy necessary to do so should be integrated to all subjects 
of the curriculum and not separated or reserved for only ESL, bilingual education or other 
LEP assistant pedagogies (Smith, 2012 31). Research had found that successful LEP 
pedagogies focused on developing content area knowledge and mastery of academic 
language (Smith, 2012). And this was most effective when this was made a focus in all 
subject areas of the curriculum (Smith, 2012 30).   
 Critics of NCLB charge that the assessments used for AYP in the schools were 
meant for native English speakers and thus not appropriate for ELLs (Smith, 2012 32). 
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Others worried that teachers would only teach to the tests because of the intense pressure 
to meet AYPs (Smith, 2012 32). The potential mislabeling of schools if their students were 
making progress but failing to meet AYP standards was another concern (Smith, 2012 32). 
Lastly, critics opined that too much was expected of states to reach AYP (such as achieving 
sufficient improvement to reach AYP benchmarks with students who had challenging 
backgrounds) with out sufficient funding (Smith, 2012 33).   
 Gandara and Rumberger (2009) hold that although federal policy has changed over 
the years, often resulting in contestation between the Department of Education and 
immigrant advocacy groups, little direction has been given to states concerning addressing 
the needs of its LEP population despite a growing body of research (767).  Ideological 
debate has mainly manifested in the funding of comparative assessments of English Only 
and bilingual education — indicative of how the debate has overshadowed the real issues 
that students face. A growing body of research views this as the wrong question and also 
one that is unanswerable (Gandara and Rumberger, 2009 767). Researchers that hold that 
opinion cite the need for an investigation of teacher training that focuses on the varied 
needs of the diverse ELL population (Gandara and Rumberger, 2009). Gandara and 
Rumberger (2009 767) conclude that perhaps the greatest benefit of federal policy has been 
that Title VII funding helped to recruit and train personnel to deliver instruction to ELL 








 As depicted in this historical account, bilingual education has been a highly 
contested issue. Only during the heyday of civil rights liberalism, 1965-1975, was there 
elite agreement in support of bilingual education. Beginning in the late 1970s, however, 
the conservative backlash against race-conscious liberalism ended this period of support 
for bilingual education. The multiple forums in the American system provided ample 
venues for proponents and opponents to find favorable venues for alternative policy 
dimensions.   
 However, as was made evident in the historical account, the politics of race and 
immigration as well as education were highly determinative of the issue salience of 
particular issue dimensions. During the peak years of the Civil Rights movement and the 5 
to 10 years following, educational opportunity was the governing issue dimension.  During 
those years, policy venues at the federal level and the courts were highly sympathetic to 
arguments appealing to the need to ensure equal opportunity in education for linguistic 
minorities. From 1978 forward, venues at the federal level and the courts cooled to the 
equal opportunity policy dimension. Academic findings questioned the efficacy of 
bilingual education simultaneously as the policy dimensions in education policy overall 
transitioned to educational outcomes and holding schools responsible for education 
outcomes. This policy dimension favored opponents of bilingual education as research was 
ambivalent concerning the efficacy of bilingual education.   
 By the 1990s, surging immigration rates as well as macroeconomic insecurity 
further encouraged policy rollback in bilingual education policy arrangements. Bilingual 
education was viewed as a pedagogical approach that was questionable in its effects on 
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education outcomes targeted at a population whose growing numbers but poor academic 
outcomes presented a threat to the American polity.   
 Nevertheless, by the 1980s, bilingual education interests were well-entrenched in 
the policymaking system. Subsequently, the dynamics of retrenchment politics made 
ending bilingual policy arrangements difficult politically. Policy arrangements at the 
national and state levels experienced policy rollback but the federal BEA persisted until 
the enactment of NCLB in 2001. And even then, bilingual policy arrangements at the state 
level were permitted and received funding from NCLB.   
 However, restrictionist forces did manage to change most bilingual education 
policy arrangements at the national and state level to transitional bilingual education 
programs— ending (for the most part) cultural maintenance and bilingualism as policy 
goals. And in those states where policy changes can be enacted via voter initiative, most 
have ended their bilingual education arrangements (Colorado and Oregon being the 
exceptions).   
 Subsequently, elite politics and the open policymaking system have permitted great 
swings in the politics of bilingual education. As the Latino population continues to grow 
and their political influence increases, the open political system provides opportunities for 










   THE CALIFORNIA CASE STUDY 
THE EFFECT OF THE VOTER INITIATIVE ON POLICY TRAJECTORIES IN 
BILINGUAL EDUCATION IN CALIFORNIA 
 
Introduction 
 Since the late 1970s, bilingual education has increasingly been a polarizing issue 
nationwide.  Conservative elites (for the exception of Cuban elites) have mostly opposed 
bilingual education — instead favoring English-oriented pedagogies — while liberal elites 
have favored the use of the pedagogical approach. Bilingual education policy trajectories 
in California and Texas, however, have defied this political logic. Despite being a more 
liberal state overall, policy trends in bilingual education reveal policy rollback in California 
beginning in the 1980s and continuing through the late 1990s. This chapter argues that the 
openness of the policymaking system and the dissolution of elite agreement concerning 
bilingual education provide a better explanation for policy trajectories in California and 
Texas than the state’s partisan history.  
 This argument will be made over the course of the this and the following chapter, 
which analyzes the factors behind Texas’ bilingual education policy trajectory from the 
mid 1960s through the end of the 2000s. Over the period of study, the historic trajectories 
of elite views concerning bilingual education in the two states are identical: elite agreement 
from approximately 1965-1975; elite disagreement from the late 1970s forward. And as 
will be discussed below, policy trajectories in bilingual education in Texas and California 
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were practically identical until the 1980s when the effects of the voter initiative on 
linguistic politics began to take effect in California. By presenting these chapters together 
and showing the historic similarities of elite views concerning bilingual education and 
policy trajectories through the mid 1980s, these two chapters aim to depict how structural 
differences in the policymaking process in Texas and California — the presence of the 
voter initiative and lack thereof — affected linguistic politics in general and led to varying 
policy trajectories in bilingual education in the two states from the mid 1980s forward. 
 As mentioned, from the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s, California’s bilingual 
education policy trajectory was similar to that of Texas. After the mid-1980s, however, the 
policy trajectory in California took a decidedly more restrictionist turn, beginning with the 
sunsetting of the Chacon-Moscone Bilingual-Bicultural Education Act, and culminating 
with Proposition 227 which statutorily ended bilingual education in the state.  The variation 
in policy trajectories is attributable to the presence of the voter initiative in California — a 
policymaking mechanism absent in Texas — which legitimated and permitted policy 
rollback in bilingual education policymaking in California (Crawford, 1999; Czegledi, 
2004). The existence of policymaking via voter initiative makes California a more open 
policymaking system than Texas. And it is this openness (and the particular institutional 
dynamics of the voter initiative) that allows for policy rollback — the voter initiative 
provided an institutional mechanism for legitimating and passing policy that rolled back 
policy arrangements in bilingual education while also allowing political officials to escape 
blame for such policy. 
 This chapter lays out how elite views concerning bilingual education and the 
openness of California’s policymaking system contributed to the policy trajectory in 
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California’s bilingual education policy. Specifically, it will present how after a period of 
elite agreement which resulted in the establishment of a bilingual education policy regime 
in the 1970s and early 1980s, the passage of English Only initiatives via the voter initiative 
led to a restrictive turn in linguistic politics in general and bilingual education policy in 
particular from the mid 1980s forward. The voter initiative in California permitted the 
passage of English Only legislation which legitimated and allowed for policy rollback in 
bilingual education policy in California. In Texas, which lacks this policymaking feature, 
English Only politics led to more incremental policy rollback in bilingual education 
beginning in the 1980s. Before addressing the historical evolution of bilingual education 
policy, the next section will provide a more detailed explanation of the aforementioned 
factors involved in bilingual education policy evolution in California. 
From the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s, there was general elite support for 
bilingual education. This existed among local and state government officials as well as 
among pedagogical and education scholars. From the late 1970s forward, bilingual 
education has been a polarizing issue among political elites and academics. Generally since 
the late 1970s, liberal political/ government officials at the state level have supported 
bilingual education and conservatives have opposed the instructional approach. Academics 
from the late 1970s have also been more ambivalent concerning the efficacy of bilingual 
education.           
 Concerning the comparative openness of the California policymaking system, it is 
the direct democracy policymaking option, the voter referendum, which allowed the 
electorate a more direct influence on policy outcomes. Additionally, the referendum forum 
mitigated the institutional dynamics of concentrated costs/ diffuse benefits— 
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policymakers’ tendency to avoid politics that will alienate a mobilized, entrenched 
constituency, fearing political retribution from affected, entrenched interests (Sheingate, 
2000; Pierson, 1994) — that drives retrenchment politics in the more closed legislative 
policymaking forum. Instead policy outcomes were determined by the electorate: voter 
initiatives provided a policy forum where retrenchment policies could be (re) framed and 
offered directly to the electorate while also freeing [sympathetic] government officials 
from direct association with said policies (a necessity of successful retrenchment politics 
per Pierson, 1994).   
 
Summary of Policy Development in Bilingual Education in California and the role of 
elite consensus and intergovernmental interaction in policy evolution 
 The two factors mentioned above play out in the evolution of bilingual education 
policy over the period of study. In the late 1960s, local bilingual policy initiatives garnered 
the attention of national policymakers as elites from both political parties and Latino 
(mostly Chicano) advocates concurred that bilingual education was an appropriate tool to 
address the endemic inequalities in education, segregation, and cultural impoverishment 
that Mexican-Americans had experienced historically through the late 1960s (Crawford, 
1999; Petrzela, 2010). Additionally, pedagogical scholars increasingly became critical of 
the efficacy of English Only instruction, calling for the use of native language instruction 
to assist in the education of LEP students. Chicano advocacy, specifically, benefitted from 
the political opportunity structure created by emerging academic and bipartisan support for 
bilingual education— pushing for the implementation of bilingual education as a remedy 
for the civil rights and educational problems of LEP students but also for its symbolic 
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importance as a representation of cultural pride and empowerment (Trujillo, 1998).   
 In this early phase of policy evolution in the late 1960s, the interaction of policy 
venues at the local, state and national level led to issue expansion in bilingual education 
policy as major pieces of legislation were passed at the local, state and federal level.  This 
legislation had bipartisan support from both state and national officials and pedagogical 
support from the academic establishment. Bilingual education was viewed as an 
appropriate civil rights remedy for past discrimination, pedagogically sound for addressing 
the needs of LEP students, and politically expedient to court the growing Latino population. 
This gave bilingual education wide appeal across the political spectrum from the late 1960s 
through the early 1970s.  These factors also legitimated pro-bilingual education actors at 
the federal, state, and local level, and resulted in venue shifting to federal and judicial 
venues via the lobbying of sympathetic interest groups and advocates for bilingual 
education (such as Chicano activists and the Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Education Fund- MALDEF). 
 Local initiatives in bilingual education led to the passage of SB 53 in 1967. This 
state legislation overturned English Only ordinances, allowing for localities to develop 
instructional programs that used native-languages in instruction. These local initiatives 
additionally influenced the prospects of bilingual education legislation at the national level 
by providing examples of its successful implementation (Petrzela, 2010). At the national 
level, elite agreement consolidated the political momentum created by localities such as 
those in California and Texas, resulting in the Bilingual Education Act of 1968, which 
provided minimal federal funding for district programs designed to address the needs of 
LEP students (Crawford, 1998; 1999). 
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Through the mid-1970s, federal and judicial mandates increased the legal 
commitment of districts to bilingual education policy arrangements and led to the passage 
of further state legislation. In the early and mid-1970s, these mandates included federal 
legislative actions (the reauthorization of the Bilingual Education Act in 1974, the Equal 
Education Opportunity Act, 1974), executive actions (1970 OCR Memorandum 
concerning state responsibilities to its LEP students; the Lau Remedies in 1975), and 
judicial rulings (most notably the Lau Rulings, 1974, 1975). Collectively, these deepened 
the legal responsibilities districts had to their non-English speaking population concerning 
their instructional needs while also prescribing bilingual education programs as the 
appropriate remedy. State policy consolidated these mandates in the form of state law. The 
California legislature passed Chacon-Moscone Bilingual-Bicultural Education Act 
(1976)— a response to the Lau ruling and the 1970 OCR memorandum concerning state 
responsibility to its LEP student population.   
 Beginning in the late 1970s, elite agreement began to dissolve— part of the political 
backlash against government interventionism (King and Smith, 2005; Crawford, 1999; 
HoSang, 2010). Officials sympathetic to those opposing bilingual education began to 
assume positions in the various policy venues of influence — providing forums for 
challenges to existing bilingual education policy arrangements — at the federal and then 
eventually at the state level in the 1980s. Additionally, support from education and 
pedagogy scholars for bilingual education began to dissolve. High profile national studies 
questioned the efficacy of bilingual education beginning in the late 1970s. Both the 
judiciary and federal government began to relax their mandates on bilingual education 
policy. Specifically, English immersion methods were legitimized via judicial rulings and 
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policy developments at the national and state level that permitted and funded their use as a 
curricular option to addressing the needs of LEP students. Nevertheless in 1980, California 
officials passed the Bilingual Education Improvement and Reform Act, continuing 
Californian districts’ legal commitments to bilingual education policy arrangements.   
 By the mid-1980s, the political climate had changed, as the aforementioned 
opposition towards bilingualism began to influence Californian politics. The English Only 
movement, which among other goals called for the official recognition of English as the 
national/ state language and for the elimination of bilingualism in public life, gained 
political legitimacy at the national and state level. After failing at the national level to pass 
a constitutional amendment making English the official language of the US, English Only 
movements began to sweep the nation (with the passage of voter initiatives making English 
the official language in Arizona, Colorado, and Florida among other states in the mid-
1980s).   
 In 1986, California’s electorate passed the voter initiative, Proposition 63, which 
made English the official language of state business. Proposition 63 played a decisive role 
in changing linguistic politics and policy in the state. This affected the politics of bilingual 
education and, specifically, the Bilingual Education Improvement and Reform Act, which 
had a sunset clause set to take effect in 1987 (Czegledi, 2004; Crawford, 1999). The 
Bilingual Education Improvement and Reform Act was allowed to expire— most notably 
Governor Deukmejian vetoed two reauthorization bills in 1986 and 1987.  For the next 
eleven years, the legislature was unable to pass another bilingual education bill. However, 
sunset statutes were passed that allowed districts to continue to provide bilingual education 
programs and receive state and federal funding in support of these programs. Proposition 
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63 legitimized the politics of policy rollback in bilingual education (Czegledi, 2004; 
Crawford, 1999) by allowing for English Only policy outcomes that exploited anti-
immigrant sentiments in the electorate,  but without requiring a legislative majority 
associated with its passage. This differed from Texas—which lacked a voter initiative 
option for policymaking. Repeated attempts to put English Only constitutional 
amendments on the state ballot, subsequently, died in the legislature amid Republican fears 
of evoking the electoral ire of their Latino constituents  (Tatalovich, 1995).   
 Additionally, the bilingual education policy dimension of focus among policy 
makers shifted from equal educational opportunity to education efficacy (or policy 
accountability).  The publication, “A Nation At Risk,” found that American students were 
regressing. This helped kick off school reform movements nationwide (as well as in 
California) that stressed accountability as opposed to pedagogical methods (McGuinn, 
2003). As high profile studies began to cast doubt on the the efficacy of native tongue 
instruction (dating back to the late 1970s) on educational outcomes while also calling for 
the use of English Only instructional methods, this change in policy dimension proved 
politically problematic for bilingual education proponents. Proponents of bilingual 
education were increasingly on the defensive from the early 1980s forward. 
 In 1998, the voter initiative allowed for policy rollback in bilingual education that 
the legislature had impeded in the period after the expiration of the previous bilingual 
education act. In 1998, Ron Unz's30 English for the Children voter initiative campaign 
successfully put Proposition 227 on the June 1998 ballot. It passed with a significant 
majority (winning 61 percent of the vote). Proposition 227 outlawed bilingual education 
                                                 
30 Ron Unz was the sponsor of the English for the Children voter initiative. He is a multi-millionaire software 
developer and was also a former gubernatorial candidate (Crawford, 1999). 
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except for those qualifying for waivers. 
 Unz specifically used the voter initiative to bypass the legislature, taking his 
argument concerning bilingual education straight to the electorate. He believed the 
legislature was captured by Latino interests. Subsequently, he believed ending bilingual 
education would not be possible through traditional legislative means (Crawford, 1998; 
1999; Olsen, 2009).  
 Since the passage of Proposition 227, educational officials throughout the state 
have continued their practice of playing fast and loose with state mandates. When bilingual 
education was mandated by the state, many pedagogical approaches were called bilingual 
education (including methods that mostly used English instruction). Since the passage of 
227, districts have continued to employ this same philosophy. They have mostly continued 
using the same approaches they used before, only in the post-227 era, claiming their 
practices to be in compliance with the new anti-bilingual policy ordinances.   
 However, consistent with this disconnect between the politics of Proposition 227 
and the pedagogical practices of district officials, bilingual education politics has typically 
been detached from the reality at the district level.31 The politics of Bilingual education has 
been driven more by the dynamics of symbolic politics— what bilingual education means 
to the targeted groups, supporters, opponents and to society as a whole (Olsen, 2009 820; 
Moran, 1987). Subsequently, this study focuses on how this politics plays out in policy 
outcomes as opposed to how it actually affects instructional practices for LEP students. As 
issue definitions drive political consensus (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), how the politics 
                                                 
31 To give one example, at peak enrollment, only 15 percent of the state’s LEP students were enrolled in 
bilingual education programs. Yet opponents of bilingual education claimed the pedagogical approach was 
the reason for low academic performance of LEP students. 
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plays out will ultimately determine how issues within districts are treated, and thus it merits 
an independent focus.   
 The rest of the chapter will exposit in further detail this history of bilingual 
education policy evolution and how the two factors — the open policymaking system 
(specifically, the voter initiative) and elite divisions — contributed to shaping the policy 
evolution of bilingual education from 1965 - 2010.  
 
Bilingual Education Policy Evolution in California- The interaction of local, state, and 
national policymaking 
 In the 1960s, during the initial period of the bilingual education policy renaissance 
in California, policy evolved via the interaction of local, state, and national policy venues, 
resulting in issue expansion across these three levels of government.  Additionally, these 
efforts were bipartisan in nature — thus depicting the elite agreement in support of 
bilingual education characteristic of this period.   
 
Local Bilingual Education Initiatives Before the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 
 Petrzela (2010) provides a historical account of pre BEA policy developments in 
California bilingual education that set the stage for the national and state initiatives in 
bilingual education that would follow in the late 1960s. This section will rely heavily  on 
Petrzela’s account as it provides one of the few glimpses of the experimentation in second 
language pedagogies that were used in the 1960s before the Bilingual Education Act.   
 In 1959, the California state legislature had passed legislation prohibiting 
instruction in a language other than English. This presented a problem for state officials 
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after the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965. The Act greatly altered the population 
demographics of California. Petrzela (2010 407) cites accounts claiming that nearly 1200 
immigrants entered the state on a daily basis after passage of the Act.32 The 1959 law 
strained the ability of local education officials to respond to the changing demographics 
brought about by the 1965 Immigration Act as local officials viewed that these students 
required language assistance to receive a quality education. Some localities ignored the 
English Only instruction ordinances and implemented experimental programs which used 
the native language in instruction. The 1959 law, however, made such efforts legally 
tenuous (at best).  
 In 1967, before the Bilingual Education Act mandated localities to create programs 
to address the needs of LEP students, several California localities began experimental 
programs featuring ESL pedagogy. Elite agreement was a factor in the development of 
these programs as they were spearheaded by both progressive and conservative local 
officials and would eventually serve as model programs once federal legislation became 
politically feasible — at the time of the drafting of the Bilingual Education Act, education 
professionals studied California programs in second language pedagogy to acquire an 
understanding of how to develop and implement successful programs for LEP students 
(Petrzela, 2010 418).    
 In the pre-BEA era, ESEA funding was made available for districts experimenting 
in programs to assist LEP students. Local officials in San Diego, San Ysidro, Carlsbad, and 
                                                 
32 Rates continue to increase dramatically throughout the 1970s, 80s, and 90s. The percentage of immigrant 
children increased three-fold in the following two decades after the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965. 
Significant influxes of immigrants children from Mexico and Central America, refugees from Southeast Asia, 
and depressed birthrates among native-born population were the factors behind the growing proportion of 
immigrant children during this period (Olsen, 2009 822). 
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San Dieguito — areas with large concentrations of Mexican students — used ESEA Title 
III funds to develop experimental ESL programs.33 Although ESL would lose favor with 
progressives within a few years for being the most conservative approach to addressing 
LEP student needs, in early 1967, this model was considered experimental as its use 
involved local officials’ acknowledgment of the cultural adjustment — the relevance of 
the Mexican culture — issues faced by Mexican students and the effects this could 
potentially have on educational outcomes (Petrzela, 2010  417).  
 Additionally, Superintendent Rafferty (an archconservative) led state and local 
efforts to address the educational needs of LEP students. In 1965, he led a textbook 
exchange pilot program with the Mexican Ministry of Education to Mexicali schools which 
also introduced the possibility of a teacher exchange. These programs resulted in the use 
of Spanish textbooks for Mexican-Americans as well as Anglo students in localities with 
high percentages of Spanish speaking students. Similar to the ESL programs of the 1960s, 
these programs were also revolutionary as they did not segregate LEP students, allowing 
them to remain in classes with students whose mother tongue was English. Additionally, 
they focused on cultural education as well as language acquisition for both its Anglo and 
Mexican students. This program, in essence, was a type of dual language-dual culture 
program, making it a program that would be considered progressive by contemporary 
standards (Petrzela, 2010 417).   
 Another example of experimentation occurred in the boarder town of Calexio. 
Anglo officials also established a bilingual, bicultural program in the early 1960s. The 
program was bolstered by Rafferty’s exchange program. Calexico’s population was a true 
                                                 
33 The ESL Center for California headed these programs, which were funded through earmarks for Projects 
to Accelerate Creativity in Education (Petrzela, 2010 417).  
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multicultural town in which Anglos, Mexican immigrants, and Mexican-Americans were 
able to establish political consensus via Anglo leadership concerning their schools’ 
pedagogical approach. Calexico’s Anglo superintendent, Carl Varner, went on to become 
a prominent national pioneer in bilingual education (Petrzela, 2010 418).   
 Subsequently, during the early years of the Bilingual Education Act’s 
implementation, California’s relative success with educating Latinos prior to the 
implementation of the Bilingual Education Act attracted attention from other states and 
national officials. The following example of an early Title VII program shows the influence 
of local California initiatives of the 1960s. California’s Project Frontier was a fusion of 
local and national funding and a model for pedagogical innovation in bilingual education 
— pioneering in its use of bilingual education in middle and secondary schools.  Its 
combination of federal, state and local funding served as a template for Title VII projects. 
The program also had a revolutionary pedagogical approach that was neither assimilationist 
nor adhered to the cultural maintenance model. The course was designed for Spanish 
speaking and white non-Hispanic students. Its end goal was for students to be able to 
interact fluently in both American and Mexican cultures. The program’s focus on 
developing students’ knowledge and understanding of Mexican culture made the course 
progressive for this period. It was one of the most generously funded bilingual-bicultural 
Title VII programs in the country in 1969 ($442,216 Title VII funds in its first year) 






The Passage of SB 53 
 According to Petrzela (2010), the political imminence of the federal Bilingual 
Education Act spurred Californian political officials of both parties to address the issue of 
bilingual education as Mexican Americans were a growing constituency in the Californian 
electorate (407). Subsequently, BEA encouraged the elite consensus which spawned 
Senate Bill 53 (SB 53).  
 The 1967 legislation overturned the 1872 and 1959 ordinances that mandated 
English Only instruction (Petrzela, 2010 415; Farr et al, 2005 17). It permitted the use of 
bilingual education in those situations when students benefitted from its use without 
interfering with the regular (English) instruction for the majority student population. SB 
53 provided a transitional program that valued bilingualism as an “asset” as it pursued 
English fluency for Mexican American students (Petrzela, 2010 415). Its long term goals 
(according to Gonzalez (1968)) were bilingualism for all students, a progressive 
development from pre-existing ESL programs in California whose end goal was mostly 
English proficiency (as cited by Petrzela, 2010 415). Thus, SB 53 did not adhere to the 
language as deficient paradigm of the federal Bilingual Education Act (as is discussed later 
in the chapter and more thoroughly in the Politics of Bilingual Education, Chapter 4) 
through its treatment of Spanish proficiency as an asset (Petrzela, 2010 415). 
 SB 53 was also passed with the federal bilingual bill in mind (Navarro, 1985 303). 
By removing English Only statutes, California would be eligible to receive federal funds 
provided by the federal act that would be passed a year later. California along with Texas 




 Signed into law by Republican Governor Ronald Reagan, it formally acknowledged 
the significance of the Spanish language and culture via bilingual pedagogy (Petrzela, 2010 
407). It recognized the link between Spanish fluency and Spanish culture — an aspect that 
the Bilingual Education Act would abandon in its evolution from bill to law (Petrzela, 
2010). However, its main goal, according to Petrzela (2010), was to use bilingual education 
to more effectively integrate the growing Mexican population. Hence, SB 53 was both 
conservative and liberal in nature — focusing on cultural maintenance and assimilation 
(Petrzela, 2010 413). Petrzela (2010) proffers that this resulted from the wide range of 
political responses to LEP students at the time from local and state officials and the 
attempts of SB 53’s architects to make Californian legislation more precise in its 
pedagogical intent than the federal Bilingual Education Act. By 1967, localities had already 
begun enacting programs to address the special needs of their LEP populations. These 
ranged from bicultural- bilingual programs for LEP students to those localities that 
continued to classify LEP students for remedial (Educable Mentally Retarded- EMR) 
tracks (a practice dating back to the 19th century).  Petrzela (2010) argues that such varied 
responses potentially made BEA both a catalyst for legislation but also possibly an 
impediment to local policy responses because of its lack of pedagogical specificity (see 
Chapter 4 - Politics of Bilingual Education). Concerning the latter, as some local 
experimentation was more progressive than BEA, BEA’s lack of specificity did not provide 
the political support these progressive policies needed during their infancy. Nevertheless, 
SB 53 sanctioned local district experimentation and served as a guide in developing 




Issue Expansion in bilingual education leads to federal mandates which 
ultimately result in more substantial bilingual education legislation at the state 
level 
 In the 1970s, linguistic politics in education was driven by a civil rights 
problematization of the issue (King and Smith, 2005; Olsen, 2009 822). The problem  of 
educating Spanish speaking Latinos was viewed through the paradigm of providing Latinos 
(and other second language students) with equal education opportunity to education 
achievement (Olsen, 2009 822). Advocacy from Latino interests as well as elite agreement 
concerning bilingual education were oriented by this problematization.  
 Federal mandates, aiming to provide second language students with equal 
education opportunity, drove the next phase in state bilingual education policy. These 
mandates came in the form of federal legislation, directives from the executive branch, and 
judicial rulings that interpreted the constitutional rights of LEP students and district 
responsibilities with respect to these rights.   
 The period of the late 1960s through the mid-1970s exhibited successful venue 
shifting from state interests. They had hoped to elicit federal intervention to coerce/ 
underwrite state responses to its growing LEP student population. These efforts consisted 
of Chicano and Latino advocacy at the state and federal level as well as advocacy from 
state officials. Federal advocacy and directives in turn legitimated and empowered local 
interests in support of reforms. In sum, the resulting interaction of policy venues led to 
issue expansion in bilingual education. Issue expansion across these three federal policy 
venues (this includes the courts) resulted in a deepening of California’s legal commitment 
to bilingual education. This bequeathed statutory changes in state law to institutionalize 
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these commitments — the latter coming in the form of the Chacon-Moscone Act, 1976.  
Lastly, this was a bipartisan phenomenon as officials from both parties played prominent 
roles in the actions emerging from these policy venues. 
 
Bipartisanship involved in the emerging support for bilingual education in California 
 Bipartisan efforts during this period depict elite agreement at the federal and state 
level in support of bilingual education. Support for both the federal Bilingual Education 
Act of 1968 and SB 53 stemmed from conservative as well as progressive officials 
(Petrzela, 2010 415; Davies, 2002). Concerning federal legislation, California state 
officials from both parties were involved in the push for the federal Bilingual Education 
Act (BEA) and the federal directives to ensure state compliance that followed in the wake 
of BEA, 1968 (Petrzela, 2010; Davies, 2002). 
 Thomas Kuchel, an Orange County Republican, was an early proponent of the 1967 
Bilingual Education bill. He served as one of the original seven members of the Senate 
Subcommittee that recommended the federal Bilingual Education Act and mentored Leon 
Panetta, who (as mentioned in the previous chapter) would later play an important role in 
OCR endeavors to enforce federal and court mandates. Republican senator George Murphy 
was an early proponent of bilingual education, arguing that something needed to be done 
to reverse the high Latino dropout rate.34 Republican school superintendent Max Raferty 
(as detailed in the previous section) organized and sponsored a conference to discuss the 
pending federal bilingual bill in 1967 (Petrzela, 2010 415).    
 SB 53 was supported and signed into law by Governor Ronald Reagan, an arch 
                                                 
34 Studies from the 1960s found that 50 percent of Latino students dropped out of school by 8th grade. 
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conservative. He did so in an attempt to capture the Mexican constituency which he felt 
Democrats had taken for granted (Petrzela, 2010 416; Davies, 2002). Later, Republican 
President Richard Nixon (also a Californian) supported the federal act and used his support 
for BEA to court Latinos as the Nixon administration had also come to believe Latinos had 
latent Republican sensibilities and could be successfully courted (Petrzela, 2010 416; 
Davies, 2002).   
 Republican support was politically motivated, 35  but was also driven by true 
adopters who believed that the increased second language population required 
experimentation in pedagogy (Petrzela, 2010 416). The latter is most evident in Kuchel’s 
statement concerning his support for bilingual education: 
We must treat the ability to speak Spanish and other languages as an asset. The US 
can no longer pretend that it can communicate with other people with but one 
tongue—no matter how widely the English language is spread over the Earth 
(Sanchez, 1973 quoted in Petrzela, 2010 415). 
 
 On the Democratic side, in addition to the support of state Democratic legislators 
for SB 53, California’s Congressional representatives played a major role in the 
development of the federal act. Democratic congressional representatives Edward Roybal 
and George Brown of California expanded the scope of Senator Yarbourough's (R-Texas) 
Bilingual Education Act of 1967 and pushed a House bill that addressed language 
minorities other than Mexican-Americans (Petrzela, 2010 415). Leon Panetta and J. 
Stanley Pottinger, liberal lawyers from California, served in the federal Department of 
                                                 
35 Petrzela (2010) cites Sanchez (1973), who argues that Raferty’s conference initiative was driven by the 
politics of his 1968 Senate campaign.  
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Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), and would later play prominent roles in OCR 
enforcement of the Title VII act (Petrzela, 2010 414). Panetta crafted and Pottinger 
implemented OCR directives mandating California state compliance with federal Title VII 
mandates. HEW was also headed by California liberal Robert Finch (Davies, 2002). Finch 
authorized the OCR directives developed by Panetta.   
 The question of how to best educate Latinos had also been on the political agenda 
of progressives and Latino advocates before the passage of the Bilingual Education Act of 
1968 (Petrzela, 2010 416). Campaigns by parents, activists and advocates of Latino and 
Asian students lobbied for bilingual education programs in California’s localities and for 
legislation at the state level to support and coerce such programs. They argued that Latino 
and Asian students had been left behind by an educational system that had historically 
discriminated through mandating English-only instruction36 (HoSang, 2010 232).  
 
The Passage of the Bilingual Act of 1968 
 Concerning federal mandates, the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 (BEA, 1968) 
was the first shot fired. The Act mandated districts to address the educational needs of their 
LEP student population but provided minimal federal assistance. BEA, 1968 also did not 
                                                 
36 Petrzela (2010) found that the number of Latinos in the teaching profession had become associated with 
the poor performance of Latino students. Teaching had emerged as a profession in which Latinos could gain 
access to professional employment. The Association for Mexican Americans Educators quoted an influential 
study that found that only 2.3 percent of teachers employed statewide had Spanish surnames despite making 
up 8 percent of the civilian labor force. A circular argument emerged connecting the disproportionately small 
number of Latinos in the teaching force to the lack of qualified Latino teachers; this led to ineffective bilingual 
programs which resulted in poor Latino performance in school, leaving Latinos ill prepared for professional 
work. Thus, improved performance of Latino students was connected with the employment of Latino 
teachers. Subsequently, the hiring of Latino teachers became a polarizing political issue connected with 
bilingual education. Teachers Unions stigmatized bilingual education instruction hires, complaining that the 
politics of bilingual education led to the hiring of unqualified Latino teachers.  
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legislate a particular pedagogical approach (Petrzela, 2010 414). This tasked states and 
ultimately localities with creating and funding the programs to satisfy the federal directive. 
Petrzela (2010) argues that such mandates led to resentment among fiscally strapped 
localities. This was especially the case in the 1970s as federal bilingual education directives 
became more demanding and its expanding federal bureaucratic reach provided more 
efficacy to enforce federal mandates. Petrzela (2010) concludes that district resentment of 
federal mandates played out in the districts’ view of bilingual education in the late 1970s 
as elite agreement began to dissolve (415). Nevertheless, its passage legitimated 
experimental efforts already underway  in California and forced other localities to reassess 
their treatment of LEP students. 
 
The OCR Memorandum and the Role of California Officials and Interest in its Genesis 
 Along with Chicano advocacy in Texas, lobbying from Latino advocates in 
California as well as the bureaucratic initiatives of California liberals in HEW led to the 
OCR Memorandum of 1970. As cited in the previous section, the OCR Memorandum 
resulted from the efforts of California liberals, successive OCR heads Panetta and 
Pottinger, and HEW Secretary Finch (Davies, 2002 1418). Panetta had been made aware 
of the linguistic problems faced by Latinos in the California school system in a 1969 
meeting he had with Latino leaders in San Francisco (Davies, 2002 1414). As Panetta was 
looking to regain the favor of President Nixon and reorient OCR in a more Nixon-friendly 
direction, Latino advocacy — venue shifting to the executive branch — found a favorable 
ear in Panetta (Davies, 2002 1410-1415). This combination of Latino advocacy, the 
previously discussed OCR bureaucratic autonomy, and Republican courtship of the Latino 
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vote led to the drafting of the 1970 Memorandum (Davies, 2002 1410-1417). 
 
OCR’s Memorandum to California 
 The 1970 OCR Memorandum led the OCR to issue an additional memorandum 
specifically to California school districts to mandate “meaningful compliance” with the 
Bilingual Education Act (Petrzela, 2010 414). Petrzela (2010 414) proffers that since the 
language of the Bilingual Education Act did not mandate a particular pedagogical method 
for addressing the needs of LEP students and because of its minimal fiscal support, this 
encouraged states such as California to drag their feet in implementing policies to address 
LEP student needs. SB 53 also did not mandate bilingual education but permitted the use 
of native language in the instruction of LEP students whenever beneficial and not obtrusive 
to mainstream students. Subsequently, without a federal or state mandate, Californian 
districts (outside of the experimental efforts mentioned) were often slow to address the 
needs of LEP students. Such feet dragging had been the target of Latino advocacy 
(specifically Chicano37 advocacy) in the 1960s. In lieu of the 1970 OCR Memorandum, 
this prompted additional OCR action — the second memorandum mandating that school 




                                                 
37 The Chicano advocacy movement was a Mexican-American student movement birthed in Texas in the 
mid-1960s. The movement was inspired by the farmworkers protest of 1966 in which protest associated with 
a farmworker strike in the summer of 1966 culminated with a dramatic march from south Texas to Austin 
that garnered national media coverage. The movement was also inspired by the Black Panthers and Anglo 
student protests of the era (Limon, 2010). 
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Influential Court Rulings of the early 1970s 
 Political momentum for addressing the needs of Latinos in the state also gained 
traction with the favorable legal ruling in Diana v. California State Board of Education 
(Davies, 2002 1417). In this case, venue shifting from California activists for Latino 
second-language students helped bring the linguistic issue of Mexican-American second-
language speakers to the national education agenda (Davies, 2002 1417). In the 1970 class 
action suit, the plaintiffs — nine Spanish speaking Mexican-American students from 
Monterey County, California — contested their placement in a remedial class per the result 
of assessment examinations given in English (McClean, 1995 8). The plaintiffs 
successfully argued that the rights of the Mexican-American students (ages 8-13) protected 
by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment had been violated by the state’s 
tracking system (Serpa, 2005). The ruling ordered the state’s school districts to re-evaluate 
Latino students who had been assigned to remedial education via assessments in their 
native language (Davies, 2002 1417; Serpa, 2005).   
 Additionally as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Supreme Court played a 
decisive role in increasing federal mandates on states. The most important of these rulings 
was the Lau rulings. As the Lau ruling provided legal backing to the 1970 OCR 
memorandum, OCR then proceeded to establish field offices to assist districts in complying 
with the federal mandates (Lucas, Henze, Donato, 1990 316). Their recommendations (the 
Lau remedies) strongly encouraged districts to establish bilingual education programs as 
OCR viewed them as the best pedagogical response to ensure district compliance. Policy 
makers at the state level, subsequently, were coerced to formulate policy to address the 
needs of its LEP student population (Lucas, Henze, Donato 1990 316). The Lau ruling 
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would factor prominently in California’s statutory development in bilingual education in 
the mid-1970s. 
 
Congressional Action Concerning Bilingual Education 
 In the same year, Congress passed the Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1974 as 
well as reauthorized BEA, 1968 (the Bilingual Education Act of 1974). The two acts put 
additional pressure on California to develop more substantial responses to the problem of 
LEP student education. The former elevated the legal standing of the issue, encouraging 
legal suits to coerce district compliance with federal law. This further encouraged all 
schools — not just those receiving federal grants — to develop approaches to comply with 
the OCR memorandum and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (TEA, 2006). 
 Moreover in 1974, the US Commission on Civil Rights (a bipartisan agency 
established by Congress in 1957) issued a report that was critical of several bilingual 
programs in southwestern states including California. The Commission had engaged in a 
study between 1971 and 1974 of segregationist and exclusionary practices used by the state 
of California to segregate and exclude Mexican-American students from its Anglo student 
population (Rodriguez, 2010). The Commission found that traditional monolingual schools 
had fostered poor academic performance, demeaning influences, and alienation among the 
Mexican-American population (Rodriguez, 2010). The Commission also found that 
bilingual programs were severely underfunded, only reached a small percentage of the LEP 





The Culmination of 1970s Venue Shifting, Federal Directives, and Issue advocacy— 
The Passage of the Chacon-Moscone Bilingual-Bicultural Education Act 
 Sparked by the passage of the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 and the 
incorporation of the problem of second language instruction into the civil rights debate, a 
Latino advocacy coalition emerged in California. It consisted of civil rights lawyers, the 
California Association of Bilingual Educators, sympathetic education scholars, state 
political officials, Latino rights advocates, teachers and education administrators, bilingual 
parent committees, bilingual education administrators in the field, activist staff from 
agencies responsible for the implementation of LEP programs, Latino and farmworker 
communities, and teacher’s unions. Although this coalition faced strong opposition, taking 
advantage of the resonance of the equal education opportunity problematization, they were 
increasingly successful in lobbying efforts to push through bilingual education legislation 
in the early to mid-1970s (Olsen, 2009 822 - 826).   
 The gradual incorporation of this advocacy was important to Latino interest as 
Latino political representation in the state legislature was sporadic through the early 1970s. 
By 1970, California had only two Latino legislators in the state assembly (Schmal, 2011). 
The dearth of Latino political representation was the product of gerrymandering which had 
diluted the political efficacy of the Latino vote (Schmal, 2011). Subsequently, Latino 
collective action and advocacy were the main methods of political influence for Latinos in 
the early to mid-1970s. 
 In 1972, California passed its first bilingual education bill, Chacon-Moscone (AB 
2284) (Standards of Quality and Effectiveness for Programs Leading to Bilingual 
Authorization, 2009 5). Signed by Governor Reagan, the purpose of the bill was to 
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“develop competencies in two languages” (bill quoted in Navarro, 1985 304). Other goals 
included developing cultural enrichment, multiculturalism and cross-cultural 
understanding (Navarro, 1985 304). The bill encouraged native language instruction for 
LEP students, established a census and home language survey to identify potential LEP 
students for native language instruction, and appropriated state funds for a new state 
program in bilingual education (Olsen, 2009 824). There were no state mandates as AB 
2284 was a voluntary program. Ultimately these programs were implemented at the 
discretion of local authorities (Navarro, 1985 304).  
 According to Navarro (1985 304), the bill legitimized bilingual education interests 
and the expectation that the state’s linguistic minorities were entitled to equal education 
opportunity. Specifically, the passage of bilingual legislation helped legitimize among 
policymakers and practitioners that accommodations would need to be made to provide 
equal education opportunity for their LEP student populations. This was important as many 
in the minority community complained of discriminatory treatment of LEP students 
(Navarro, 1985 304). 
 Although the bill had the votes to pass, there was substantial opposition.  Opponents  
were critical of the program’s goals, arguing that neither state institutions nor state 
provisions should be allocated towards instruction in a language other than English.  
Additionally, they opposed the legislation’s prescriptive program designs on districts  
(Olsen, 2009 824). Teachers unions also opposed the bills requirement that teachers acquire 
extra training to better prepare them to instruct LEP students (Olsen, 2009 824).   
 Due to the voluntary nature of the bill, programs varied locally. Additionally, the 
State Board of Education was lax in its enforcement of those districts receiving state 
 
239 
provisions. This was the main finding of investigations of California’s school system 
conducted by the US Commission on Civil Rights. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
US Commission on Civil Rights produced a series of studies on disenfranchised groups 
nationwide (Navarro, 1985 305). The plight of linguistic minorities in the southwest was a 
focus of several of these studies. Additionally, the California Advisory Committee to the 
Committee produced reports on the experiences of linguistic minorities in various districts 
throughout the state. Mostly, the Commission and the Advisory Committee studies found 
that the State Board of Education failed to properly implement and monitor programs 
receiving state provisions; that LEP students suffered from chronic civil rights violations; 
that the SBOE did little to oversee the identification and assessment of LEP students; 
provided districts with inadequate instruments to identify LEP students; and provided 
inadequate programs to meet the needs of LEP students. The studies ultimately 
recommended more federal and state involvement in monitoring the practices of localities. 
In light of these findings,38 Latino advocates pressed for a new bilingual education bill 
(Navarro, 1985 305-306). 
 In 1976, California passed the Chacon-Moscone Bilingual-Bicultural Act (AB 
1329), which mandated bilingual education in its schools (Lucas, Henze, Donato, 1990 
316; de Cos, 1999 16). It was the state’s first major legislation mandating districts to 
provide equal education opportunities for their LEP student population as AB 2284 merely 
encouraged localities to implement native language programs (Bilingual Education: A 
Sunset Review, 1986 10; Olsen, 2009 824). The state Act was in response to the Lau ruling 
and the lobbying efforts of state advocates in light of the problems suffered by LEP 
                                                 
38 The US Commissions on Civil Rights reports were highly influential in legislative forums both nationally 
and at the state level during these years (Schneider, 1976 cited in Navarro, 1985 305) 
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students, highlighted in the previous paragraph (Bilingual Education: A Sunset Review, 
1986 10; Navarro, 1985 305-306). The bill was signed in to law by Governor Jerry Brown 
who had close ties to the Latino community via his involvement with Latino farm workers. 
The Act also enjoyed favorable public opinion and support from mainstream educational 
organizations (Navarro, 1985 307). It was the culmination of issue expansion in bilingual 
education (mentioned in the previous section) from the late 1960s through the mid-1970s. 
 The 1976 law mandated primary and secondary district schools to offer bilingual 
education programs to its LEP student population and supplemental state provisions to help 
fund these programs (California Education Code, n.d.). The bill, however, struck a 
compromise with opponents who felt the previous bilingual education legislation was too 
prescriptive and those who opposed AB 2284’s primary goal of bilingualism (Olsen, 2009 
824). AB 1329 provided several program options for districts and stated English acquisition 
along with bilingualism among others as the program’s goal. The Act established 
transitional bilingual education programs, bi-cultural-bilingual programs 39  and a 
classification system for second language speaking students (Farr et al, 2005 17; Bilingual 
Education: A Sunset Review, 1986 10). The latter mandated identifying students whose 
home language was not English and classifying them (they were classified as either non-
English, limited or fluent English speaking or NES, LES, FES, respectively) (Bilingual 
Education: A Sunset Review, 1986 10). Districts were then required to offer these students 
a program that utilizes the native language in a manner benefitting effective instruction 
(Bilingual Education: A Sunset Review, 1986). The program’s requirements complied with 
                                                 
39 These are courses where native English speakers and LEP students share a class and are taught both in 




federal mandates concerning identifying LEP students, program placement and 
reclassification (Farr et al, 2005 17). The Act also stressed the importance of developing 
positive self-image, cultural enrichment, cross-cultural understanding, bilingualism, 
multiculturalism and providing equal education opportunity along with English proficiency 
(Farr et al, 2005 17; Gandara and Rumberg, 2009 763; California Education Code, n.d.). 
 The passage of AB 1329 also marked the end of the period of bipartisanship in 
support of bilingual education.  AB 1329 was the most extensive bilingual education bill 
in the nation as it guaranteed district accommodation to the needs of every LEP student 
from grades K-12 (Navarro, 1985 306). Even during this period of bipartisanship, there 
continued to exist a vocal opposition to bilingual education legislation (Olsen, 2009 822- 
825). As AB 1329 was a statutory response to increased federal mandates on California, 
the implementation of AB 1329 was less than ideal for advocates of bilingual education.  
Specifically, teacher training, teacher shortages and effective program designs negatively 
affected the practical effect of bilingual education programs once established (Olsen, 2009 
825). Subsequently, programs had substantial variation in quality across localities (Olsen, 
2009 825). According to Olsen (2009 825), this set the stage for the political fallout that 
would emerge in the late 1970s. 
 
The Legacy of AB 2284 and AB 1329 
 In addition to providing legislation, mandating district responses to the needs of 
their LEP student populations, AB 2284 and AB 1329 (as mentioned) legitimized bilingual 
education. This sparked the development of an advocacy network that would help develop 
and lobby for policy as well as defend policy arrangements from the late 1970s forward. 
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The California Association of Bilingual Education formed in 1975 and has become the 
preeminent interest group in bilingual education. In addition the following organizations 
also became active participants in bilingual education policy affairs during this period: the 
Association of Mexican American Educators, the California Association of Teachers 
English to Speakers of Other Languages (an association for ESL teachers), and advocates 
within the two major teacher’s unions, the California Teachers Association and California 
Federation of Teachers (Navarro, 1985 306). 
 
The Dissolution of Elite Agreement Concerning Bilingual Education 
 By the late 1970s, however, Bilingual education began to be identified as 
affirmative action for bilingual education administrators and teachers (Navarro, 1985 310). 
It was subsumed within the emerging national debate over the federal government’s role 
in addressing inequalities (King and Smith, 2005 83). Beginning in the late 1970s, a 
conservative movement began to emerge at the federal level (in Congress and the courts) 
set on stymying and/or reversing the gains made by liberal interventionism in the late 1960s 
and early to mid-1970s (King and Smith, 2005 83). This would change the effects venue 
shifting to the federal level would have on state policy in the decades to follow. Its politics 
would eventually trickle down to the state level in the 1980s in the form of English Only 
and school accountability movements. California was one of the first states to show the 
effects of this conservative movement (Olsen, 2009; Joppke, 1999; HoSang, 2010). 
 An example of the influence of this conservative movement on state politics is the 
passage of Proposition 13. Navarro (1985) argues that the passage of Proposition 13 greatly 
affected the politics of bilingual education. Proposition 13 was passed in June of 1978 and 
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reflected the conservative fiscal politics of the late 1970s. Proposition 13 outlawed property 
tax and with it eliminated a major source of local revenue. The voter initiative resulted in 
an increased local reliance on state assistance for school funding.  After Proposition 13, the 
state coffers assumed 80 percent of local school costs, an increase from 30 percent before 
the passage of Proposition 13 (Navarro, 1985 309).  Districts handled the increased 
pressure on their budgets by cutting back. The mandates of AB 1329, however, 
contradicted this culture of austerity — with its demands for hiring and training qualified 
teachers and providing special programs for LEP students. Subsequently, efforts to comply 
with AB 1329 elicited frustration from districts. 
 Lastly with respect to the central argument of this study, Proposition 13 is also an 
example of how California’s more open political system permitted conservative populism 
to affect linguistic politics. Fiscal concerns also became an issue in  bilingual education 
politics in Texas in the late 1970s. However, lacking a voter initiative policymaking option, 
austerity proponents were left to fight their battle within the legislative institution.  This 
advantaged the status quo (as will be discussed in Chapter 6). At this juncture, however, as 
Proposition 13 was only tangentially related to bilingual education, the Latino advocacy 
coalition was still able to prevail in the succeeding legislative battle to reauthorize bilingual 
education law (to be discussed in the next section). However, the Proposition 13 example 
does depict how opponents of civil rights liberalism were afforded more venues in the 
California system to affect policy outcomes and specifically  issue areas bequeathed from 





The 1980s and the Increased Salience of Policy Rollback in Bilingual Education 
 By the 1980s, demand for programs to address the needs of its LEP population 
increased (HoSang, 2010 233). Between 1982 and 1997, the number of LEP students 
increased by 220 percent in California (HoSang, 2010 233). However, the political climate 
had changed. Bilingual education had come under criticism and a culture of fiscal austerity 
had developed which put fiscally demanding programs such as AB 1329 on the defensive 
politically (Navarro, 1985 310). 
 Navarro (1985) details the political bargaining that took place between opponents 
of AB 1329 and bilingual education advocates and sympathetic government officials. In 
the wake of Proposition 13, several public hearings and legislative committee meetings 
took place to assess the state of AB 1329.  As mentioned, Proposition 13 had helped focus 
attention on the issues of implementing AB 1329. In addition to district complaints, 
advocates of bilingual education discovered that implementation had been problematic.  
Program quality varied locally, teacher shortages were endemic throughout the state, and 
segregation and remedial tracking were still commonplace (Olsen, 2009 825).   
 According to Navarro (1985), the debate was preoccupied with comparing the 
effectiveness of English oriented approaches versus the use of the primary language  of 
instruction. Equity, although considered because of the governing federal civil rights 
mandates, was a secondary concern (Navarro, 1985 311). The public hearings and 
committee meetings led to recommendation of AB 690 sponsored by Richard Alatorre.  
The bill called for the repeal of AB 1329. AB 690 would replace bilingual instruction with 
a program focused on intensive English instruction. During the public hearings, the State 
Department of Education hired two consultants, Heide Dulay and Marina Burt to develop 
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policy alternatives for bilingual education. In assessing the state’s LEP population, they 
found that the majority (65-85 percent) showed limited English proficiency but with worse 
command of their mother tongue. Dulay and Burt concluded that since the primary goal of 
AB 1329 was to use the primary language to build English proficiency, such a goal was 
rendered moot with students whose command of their primary language was worse than 
their command of English. Thus, they recommended English immersion methods as the 
best means to attain the primary goal of AB 1329— English proficiency. The State 
Department of Education backed the Dulay-Burt proposal and packaged it as AB 690 
(Navarro, 1985 311-313). Backed by the State Board of Education, AB 690 also had the 
support of a majority of mainstream education organizations such as California Federation 
of Teachers, the California School Boards Association, and school administrators. 
 Reaction to AB 690 from proponents of bilingual education was intense. The 
conflict over AB 690 split the Department of Education into factions. Navarro (1985), 
however, argues that it was the catalyst for uniting the bilingual education advocacy for 
the first time. Advocates put aside their difference and united in opposition to AB 690, 
offering moderations to AB 1329 as a compromise. Bilingual education — and maintaining 
statutory legislation — became a symbol of Latino political incorporation for this group 
(Navarro, 1985 313).   
 Resolving the impasse between supporters and opponents of AB 690 would take 
two years to resolve. The official backing of AB 690 by the State Board of Education also 
highlighted the opposition that bilingual education faced in the state and the importance 
that advocates for bilingual education unite and take a participatory role in the policy 
making process. This encouraged twenty advocate organizations to form the Bilingual 
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Community Coalition to lobby for changes to AB 690. The group was led by the California 
Association for Bilingual Educators and the Association of Mexican American Educators. 
Their efforts spawned an alternative bill, AB 507, sponsored by AB 2284 and 1329 
sponsor, Peter Chacon, late in 1979 (Navarro, 1985 313-314).   
 After a contentious year in which both sides were polarized over pending 
legislation, in 1980, advocates for bilingual education gained the support of key political 
allies. In the previous year of polarizing debate, the bilingual education coalition had built 
support for bilingual education in the community. Sympathetic government official took 
note of the importance of this issue to the growing Latino population. Governor Brown, 
who (as mentioned) had ties to the Latino community, hired a special aid to assist the 
emerging bilingual coalition with lobbying efforts. In publicly supporting AB 507, he cited 
the growing Latino population as a reason for incorporating their policy preferences. 
Throughout 1980, the bilingual advocacy coalition gained support for AB 507 as legislators 
and interests recognized that this mobilized interest had to be a part of the solution 
(Navarro, 1985 316).   
 Despite their increased influence, the bilingual advocacy coalition realized they 
operated from a position of weakness, however.  They did not have enough representation 
in the State Board of Education or in the legislature to determine policy. Subsequently, AB 
507 was a compromise bill in which the bilingual advocacy attempted to strike a middle 
ground between AB 607 and AB 1329 (the governing bilingual legislation at the time) 
(Navarro, 1985 317).   
 In 1980, the Chacon-Moscone Bilingual Bicultural Act was reauthorized as the 
Bilingual Education Improvement and Reform Act (AB 507). AB 507 intended to improve 
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and update the requirements of AB 1329 by further detailing district responsibilities to their 
LEP student populations (Bilingual Education: A Sunset Review, 1986 11). However, as 
stated in the previous paragraph, it offered concessions to opponents of bilingual education. 
State bilingual education programs had to employ seven strategies (three primary and four 
secondary strategies) in pursuit of a primary goal in order to comply with two federal 
mandates. The following are the two federal mandates:  
a. Equal educational opportunity in access to core curriculum irrespective of English 
language proficiency; 
b. Equal education participation within public schools irrespective of English language 
proficiency (Bilingual Education: A Sunset Review, 1986 13).    
The primary goal of the Bilingual Education Improvement and Reform Act (AB 507) 
remained the same as AB 1329: The overall goal was to develop English fluency in LEP 
students as quickly and effectively as possible; Additionally, the program aimed to 
encourage bilingualism, multiculturalism, cross-cultural understanding, cultural 
empowerment and equal opportunity for educational achievement (Bilingual Education: A 
Sunset Review, 1986 13). These in essence were transitionary bilingual education 
programs which also focused on multiculturalism, bilingualism and cultural enrichment.   
 To provide LEP students with the aforementioned, the act included provisions for 
identification and assessment of LEP students’ needs that met the federal demands 
established by the Lau ruling and the OCR memorandum concerning these matters. This 
involved a multi-method assessment that used Home Language Surveys, state English 
language proficiency examinations, and primary language diagnostic assessments 
performed by the district (Bilingual Education: A Sunset Review, 1986 13). Additionally, 
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bilingual education programs were to include at a minimum, a daily English language 
development, and a primary language instruction in various subjects until the transition to 
English instruction could be made, and program evaluation that included an evaluation of 
the student’s English language proficiency and an assessment of their academic progress 
(Bilingual Education: A Sunset Review, 1986 14). 
 The four secondary strategies included staff development for personnel working 
with LEP students, parental involvement, development of written plans by the school and 
the district, and appropriate use of available funding sources to deliver effective instruction 
for LEP students (Bilingual Education: A Sunset Review, 1986 14). 
 Those elementary (grades K-6) students identified as LEP students were required 
to be placed in one of the following bilingual education programs. Districts were required 
to offer one of the following programs if they had 10 or more LEP students with the same 
primary language in the same grade:  
a. basic bilingual education program: in this program, the primary language is used for 
purposes of instruction as necessary until the student has acquired the requisite English 
proficiency to receive all-English instruction. In most cases, the primary language is 
used for instruction in core subjects such as mathematics, reading, and language arts.  
Other subjects are taught in English. Daily English development lessons are also part of 
the curriculum (Bilingual Education: A Sunset Review, 1986 16); 
b. bilingual-bicultural program: in this program, students receive instruction in English 
and their primary language. The aim is to achieve proficiency in both languages 
(Bilingual Education: A Sunset Review, 1986 16). Additionally instructional goals 
include acquiring knowledge of the culture and history of the United States as well as 
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that of the primary language (Bilingual Education: A Sunset Review, 1986 17); 
c. innovative bilingual programs: these programs are variations of basic bilingual 
education programs or bilingual-bicultural programs in which the goal is to improve 
upon these programs to increase the learning opportunities for LEP students (Bilingual 
Education: A Sunset Review, 1986 17); 
d. planned variation programs: with the approval from the State Department of Education, 
districts were permitted to provide alternative programs such as English immersion, 
sheltered English and intensive English as a Second Language programs.  These 
programs were to use English as the primary language of instruction.  Schools that 
offered planned variation programs were required to also offer one of the other three 
program options. Additionally, districts were required to conduct locally designed 
assessments of the planned variation programs. The general goal was to use these 
variation programs for comparative purposes to assess their effectiveness when 
compared with the previously described programs (Bilingual Education: A Sunset 
Review, 1986 17). 
e. Impacted Language programs: these programs were used for students from language 
groups where insufficient staff/ resources were available, precluding the possibility of 
offering the standard bilingual education programs described above. Typically, under 
this program sheltered English, ESL, or compensatory remedial approaches would be 
used (Bilingual Education: A Sunset Review, 1986 18).   
f. Individual Language Program: any LEP student not enrolled in any of the previous 
programs, except those exempted by parental choice, must be enrolled in an individual 
language program. Students are generally “pulled out” of general instruction to receive 
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individual instruction.  Generally, students receive a daily lesson in ESL plus an equal 
amount of remedial or compensatory tutoring (Bilingual Education: A Sunset Review, 
1986 18).   
At the secondary (grades 7-12) level, schools have the discretion to establish one of three 
types of bilingual education, and unlike at the elementary level, there is not a threshold 
concentration of LEP students that triggers the requirement. The required programs offered 
are as follows:  
a. language development program: students receive at least one period per day of English 
language development. In non-elective subjects required for graduation, the primary 
language is used for instruction to the extent needed for academic achievement 
(Bilingual Education: A Sunset Review, 1986 19).   
b. impacted language program: the program is similar to the one provided for elementary 
students. 
c. Individual learning program: participating students receive one or two periods of 
English language development. In all non-elective subjects required for graduation, 
bilingual instructional assistants provide bilingual tutoring when necessary (Bilingual 
Education: A Sunset Review, 1986 19).          
 
Analysis of the Bilingual-Bicultural Improvement Act— Can This Really Be Called an 
Improvement for Bilingual Forces 
 This act in many ways reflects the politics or the state of elite views concerning 
bilingual education in the early 1980s in the US. Elite disagreement concerning bilingual 
education had emerged in the late 1970s. Due to the conservative backlash against civil 
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rights liberalism nationally and fiscal austerity locally (because of Proposition 13), there 
was a push to repeal the use of bilingual education in California.  
Additionally, in the late 1970s a number of high profile reports had been published 
which cast doubt on the efficacy of bilingual education to improve educational outcomes 
(improve English proficiency) for LEP students and advocated pedagogies that 
predominantly focused on English acquisition. The reports led congress, in its 1978 
reauthorization of BEA, to restrict federal funding to only transitional bilingual education 
(TBE) programs — programs with the goal of mainstreaming students (Crawford, 1998 
56). In 1978, developmental bilingual education40 was removed from a list of federally 
supported programs (Czegledy, 2005 13-14). By 1980, President Reagan began permitting 
BEA funding for monolingual programs such as Sheltered English Immersion (Czegledy, 
2005 15). The Reagan administration had also put an end to the executive (OCR) 
enforcement of the Lau remedies. Thus, the support that bilingual education had enjoyed 
in the federal legislative and executive branches — the same support that had been a major 
factor in the enactment of AB 1329 — began to dissipate as elite agreement concerning the 
pedagogy began to splinter. Finally, the federal courts also abandoned the stance that 
bilingual education was the best method to ensure equal educational opportunities for LEP 
students. In 1981, the Castaneda ruling established a standard to assess pedagogies and 
their appropriateness for ensuring equal educational opportunity for LEP students. The 
ruling signaled that bilingual education was not the only pedagogy that could achieve this 
goal. 
                                                 
40 This is also called two-way bilingual education where classes are 50-50 LEP students and native English 




 These state and national factors legitimized the critics of bilingual education in the 
1980 policy debate. Because of the resonance of these claims, opponents of bilingual 
education originally held the upper hand, proposing a new bill to end bilingual education 
that had the early support of the State Board of Education and the state’s mainstream 
educational organizations. The lobbying efforts of the increasingly entrenched bilingual 
education advocacy network were able to convince lawmakers to abandon their support for 
AB 690. However, the 1980 debate — and the new resonance of policy rollback in bilingual 
education — was able to net opponents concessions in the new bilingual bill. The inclusion 
of English immersion pedagogies in the Act is indicative of these trends as these 
pedagogies were absent in the Chacon-Moscone bill in 1976 — the political zenith of elite 
support for bilingual education.  
 Yet the pro-bilingual forces were still able to pass a bill that included program 
options stressing cultural maintenance, multiculturalism and bilingualism. Although the 
period of expansion had ended, bilingual forces were now more entrenched in the 
California education policymaking system and thus were able to salvage some of their main 
objectives (Olsen, 2009 824-825; Navarro, 1985 315-316). Both the federal act and state 
legislation had empowered, legitimated, and encouraged the mobilization of a loose 
coalition of pro-bilingual advocates that were increasingly becoming influential in 
bilingual education policymaking in California (Olsen, 2009 824-826). This advocacy 
coalition consisted of education scholars, teachers and administrators, bilingual education 
administrators in the field, activist parent advisory committees (these were very influential 
at the local level), activist administrators staffed in agencies responsible for the 
implementation of programs for LEP students, immigrant rights advocates, civil rights 
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lawyers, and Latino and farmworker communities (Olsen, 2009 826).  
 
The Castaneda Ruling 
 As mentioned in the analysis of the Bilingual-Bicultural Reform and Improvement 
Act, the political effect of the Castaneda ruling can be seen in the inclusion of English 
immersion programs as part of the Planned Variation option pending approval from the 
State Board of Education. By the time of the Castaneda ruling, English immersion 
pedagogical approaches enjoyed support from some pedagogic experts, thus legitimizing 
it as an alternative pedagogy to bilingual education. Implementation of the Planned 
Variation option also required that districts that implemented this plan also offer some form 
of bilingual education. The stated purpose was to allow districts to compare the 
effectiveness of the methods — as districts that opted for the Planned Variation program 
were also required to implement local assessment programs to evaluate the efficacy of the 
programs. This thus went towards satisfying Castaneda’s third requirement — that 
programs had to produce adequate results to comply with the ruling.   
 This is indicative of a trend that became prevalent with elite disagreement 
concerning bilingual education: policy debate preoccupied with assessing whether English 
immersion or bilingual education was the better pedagogical approach for the problem of 
low educational attainment among Latinos. Education scholars believed that this focus was 
misplaced and precluded developing programs that could truly improve Latino educational 
outcomes (Crawford, 1999). However, as elites were split between the two pedagogical 
approaches — mostly for political and symbolic reasons — and as efficacy and 





The Sunset of the Chacon-Moscone Bilingual-Bicultural/ Bilingual Education 
Improvement and Reform Act and the Years Without a Clear Mandate on Bilingual 
Education  
 The Chacon-Moscone Bilingual-Bicultural Act/ Bilingual Education Improvement 
and Reform Act had a sunset clause, which was set to take effect on June 30, 1987 (de Cos, 
1999 16). During this time, the political tide in California continued to trend conservative, 
and as the immigrant population continued to increase, anti-immigrant sentiment also 
began to emerge (Czegledy 2004 14; Olsen, 2009 826). In 1984, amid growing anti-
immigrant sentiment, the California electorate passed Proposition 38 (Olsen, 2009 826).  
Proposition 38, sponsored by US English, put California on record as opposing bilingual 
ballots sanctioned by the Voting Rights Act (Olsen, 2009 826). In 1986, the California 
electorate overwhelmingly passed Proposition 63, making English the official language of 
the state (Czegledy, 2004 14). Both laws were mostly symbolic in effect (Crawford, 1999 
70). However, according to Czegledy (2004), Crawford (1999) and Olsen (2009), the voter 
initiatives — especially Proposition 63 — legitimized voting against bilingual education 
(Czegledy, 2004 14; Crawford, 1999 62; Olsen, 2009 826).  US English (an organization 
promoting English Only policies and sponsor of Proposition 63) had purposely timed the 
amendment proposal with the sunsetting of Chacon-Moscone (Crawford, 1999 62).   
 During this period, the legislature passed AB 2813 to extend Chacon-Moscone.   
AB 2813 as well as the Chacon-Moscone Act enjoyed substantial support in the legislature 
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and with parents and most educators. 41  In 1986, most school boards and education 
associations endorsed AB 2813 (Crawford, 1999 63). Nevertheless, in 1986 Republican 
Governor Deukmeijan vetoed the legislation, citing budgetary constraints (Crawford, 1999 
63). Most observers at the time, according to Crawford (1999 63), cited the political climate 
created by Amendment 63 as enabling Deukmeijan's veto. Olsen (2009 827) offers that the 
Deukmeijan veto was in response to the lobbying of the English Only movement. In 1987, 
Willie Brown, the Assembly Speaker and sponsor of AB 2813, submitted another 
reauthorization bill with significant concessions to state Assembly representative Frank 
Hill, a leader in the Amendment 63 campaign and critic of bilingual education law 
(Crawford, 1999 63). Governor Deukmeijan again vetoed the legislation (Farr et al, 2005 
17).  
 This episode differs with comparable legislative scenarios in Texas concerning 
English Only legislation. In Texas, which lacks a voter initiative policymaking mechanism, 
proponents of official English were unable to put an official English constitutional 
amendment on the ballot (Tatalovich, 1995 160-168). The various proposals all died in 
legislative committee due to the reluctance of a majority of legislators (most significantly 
a significant percentage of Republican legislators including the Governor) to take on a 
mobilized Latino community, which opposed official English, despite polling that 
indicated a majority of Texans supported the amendment (Tatalovich, 1995 160-168). 
English Only challenges to bilingual education policy regimes died similar deaths in 
legislative committees due to the reluctance of legislators to take on mobilized Latino 
                                                 
41
 AB 2813 was, however also criticized by some educators as it required teachers to learn a second language 
— a longstanding complaint of educators concerning teacher responsibilities to serving the growing LEP 
population (Crawford, 1999 63). 
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interests and push through English Only reforms (see Tatalovich, 1995; San Miguel, 2011). 
However, in California, this was not the case with Official English —making English the 
official state language — nor would it be the case with anti-bilingual education measures 
that followed in the 1990s. The voter initiative would make it possible to pass English Only 
legislation without the need of a legislative majority. 
 For the next eleven years, the California legislature was unable to pass legislation 
extending/ reauthorizing the bilingual education law (de Cos, 1999 16; Olsen, 2009 826).  
However, the Legislature sanctioned the state to continue funding bilingual programs 
effectuated by the expired Act (de Cos, 1999). Subsequently, districts continued to enforce 
the provisions of the Chacon-Moscone Act without a clear mandate (Farr et al, 2005 17). 
However, Superintendent of Public Instruction Bill Honig did issue a program advisory 
that stated that if districts wanted to continue to receive funding under the “sunset statutes,” 
they were required to provide services that were consistent with those established under 
the Bilingual Education Improvement and Reform Act (Johnson, 1999). Such moves by 
the the State Board of Education and the Superintendent of Public Instruction would 
become more numerous during these eleven years as they repeatedly filled the policy 
vacuum created by the political impasse between the legislature and the Governor in the 
post sunset years. 
 Additionally, a federal court decision clarified state responsibilities to its LEP 
students. The ruling in Gomez v. Illinois State Board of Education (1987) reaffirmed 
particular compliance criteria required of state and local education agencies in order meet 
the needs of its LEP student population (de Cos, 1999 16). This required the state to set 
minimum standards for language remediation programs and criteria for reclassifying LEP 
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(or LES- limited English speaking) students to FES (Fluent English speaking- mainstream 
all-English instruction) (Mora Modules, 2012). Thus, through the 1980s, although the 
courts had taken a more restrictionist stance towards bilingual education, federal courts 
consistently maintained that states still had a responsibility to LEP students. That 
responsibility, however, no longer required bilingual education. 
 
The 1990s - Criticism Increases Concerning California’s Bilingual Education Approach 
 As the 1990s proceeded, policy events signaled an increasing opposition towards 
bilingual education from elites in the institutions designed to maintain it. California had 
been mostly out of compliance with federal and state laws by the mid 1990s (Czegledy, 
2004 14). The K-12 LEP population had almost tripled between 1987 and 1997 (growing 
from 233,000 to 613,000). Yet shortages in trained personnel prevented districts from 
appropriately meeting the educational needs of this growing student population (Czegledy, 
2004 14). By 1994, the population had grown to 1,262,982 (24 percent of the state’s total 
enrollment). Concurrently, teacher shortages had increased from 12,021 in 1986 (when 
Chacon- Moscone sunset) to 20,692 (Crawford, 1997 30). In 1993, the Little Hoover 
Commission issued a report, “A Chance to Succeed: Providing English Learners with 
Supportive Education” (Czegledy, 2004 14). The Commission (formally known as the 
Milton Marks “Little Hoover” Commission) is an independent, bipartisan state-oversight 
agency (Little Hoover Commission). In its report, it criticized the California State 
Department of Education for its “single-minded” pursuit of a policy that was ineffective, 
divisive, and wasteful (Czegledy, 2004 14). Almost a quarter of LEP students were not 
receiving any special assistance, which violated both California and federal law (Czegledy, 
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2004 14). Reclassification rates from LES to FES were deemed to be inadequately slow 
(Czegledy, 2004 14). The Commission recommended financial incentives for schools to 
achieve quicker English proficiency for its students, increasing local control to better 
provide programs for their particular populations of LEP students, establishing program 
assessment measures that evaluate results as opposed to methods, and emboldening teacher 
training (Czegledy, 2004 15).  
 The Commission’s recommendations are indicative of the changed politics of the 
era.  Similar to the reports published by US Commission on Civil Rights on California’s 
treatment of its LEP student population, the Hoover Commission censured California’s 
approach. Unlike the US Commission on Civil Rights recommendations in 1970 which 
called for increased federal and state monitoring of local practices, the Hoover 
Commission’s recommendations stressed increased local discretion and emboldening local 
incentives to improve their responses. Additionally, criticism of the inefficacy in 
encouraging English proficiency and the need to stress results over methods were 
buzzwords of the school accountability movement, which had been critical of bilingual 
education. This was a direct criticism of the state's bilingual education programs as opposed 
to the 1960s and 1970s when the US Commission on Civil Rights denounced the state's 
reliance on English immersion "sink or swim" methods. In addition to using the lexicon of 
the school accountability movement, the Hoover Commissions recommendations were in 
line with the politics of the post Reagan era which stressed local discretion, incentive based 
reforms and more focus on English proficiency. These recommendations were explicitly 




The Influence of the mid-1990s Referendum Campaigns, the role of the California State 
Board of Education, and Venue Shifting to the Federal Courts and the Direct-Initiative 
Venues After the Sunset of Bilingual Education Legislations 
 This period provides further evidence of how the open policy structure and 
especially the presence of the direct initiative facilitated the manner in which elite 
disagreement concerning bilingual education played out in bilingual education policy 
outcomes. Instead of merely legitimizing policy rollback in bilingual education as was the 
case in the 1980s, voter initiatives would legitimate and enable statutory elimination of 
bilingual education by the end of the 1990s. 
 From 1983 through 1999, California had two Republican governors who both 
served two terms: Governor George Deukmejian and Governor Pete Wilson. Both opposed 
bilingual education.  And during their two terms, both vetoed legislation that would have 
reauthorized the Chacon-Moscone Bilingual Education Act. During this period, the 
legislature was predominantly in Democratic hands except for the 1995-96 session where 
Republicans had a two seat majority in the Assembly. Thus, Democrats in the legislature 
could either push their agenda or easily veto a Republican agenda. The combination of 
Republican governors opposed to bilingual eduction and a Democratic legislature favoring 
it created a political impasse concerning bilingual education policy.  The legislature made 
several attempts to pass bilingual education legislation/ initiatives to reform bilingual 
education that either died in committee — reform efforts were killed by the lobbying of 
the Latino advocacy network led by CABE (California Association for Bilingual 
Education) — or [initiatives to reauthorize Chacon-Moscone] were vetoed by the 
Governor. This created a policy vacuum that was initially filled by the State Board of 
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Education and the Superintendent of Public Instruction — using their power of 
implementation to reorient program goals and district responsibilities. Later, the federal 
courts filled this void via rulings which spurred further actions from the State Board of 
Education and the Superintendent of Public Instruction to use their aforementioned 
implementation power for policy reform. Contrary to the 1970s, however, venue shifting 
to the courts meant appealing to venues which no longer favored policy expansion but more 
often policy rollback. Elite agreement had dissolved and increasingly, policy rollback was 
favored in bilingual education in the venues that had formerly supported policy expansion. 
 Nevertheless, it would be the initiative movements in the mid-1990s that would 
have the more profound and lasting effect on the politics of bilingual education (see 
HoSang, 2010). Dating back to the 1986 Official English referendum that California voters 
passed and even further back to California's Proposition 14 (No on Fair Housing Act), the 
California electorate had a history of opposition towards bilingualism and Civil Rights 
liberalism, respectively.42 During the 1983-1999 period of Republican gubernatorial rule, 
California passed four direct-initiatives that had great influence on bilingual education 
policy. The Official English initiative has already been discussed.  The three initiatives 
passed in the mid 1990s (Proposition 187, Proposition 209 and Propositions 227) sought 
to restrict Civil Rights liberalism and the access illegal and legal immigrants had to public 
benefits (HoSang, 2010). Proposition 187, being the first (followed by Proposition 209, 
which ended affirmative action in public institutions, and Proposition 227, which ended 
bilingual education in elementary and secondary public schools), built on a political 
                                                 
42 Kruse (2005) uses this term to describe proactive government policies of intervention in public and private 




momentum within the electorate that had been brewing in California dating back to the 
1960s. This made the political climate more favorable for the politics of policy rollback, 
restrictionism and retrenchment (HoSang, 2010). The passage of Proposition 209 would 
build on this momentum, providing a campaign template for 227 sponsor, Ron Unz 
(HoSang, 2010).   
 As public legislation in California could be enacted through direct initiative, this 
provided a policy forum less encumbered by entrenched institutional gatekeepers who 
could frustrate reform efforts, and mitigated the institutional dynamics of concentrated 
costs and diffuse benefits that drives retrenchment and restrictionist politics in the 
traditional policymaking forum of the state legislature (Sheingate, 2000, Pierson, 1994; 
Ellermann, 2009). Concerning the former, the direct initiative, thus, provided a more equal 
playing field for challengers to reframe issues (HoSang, 2010): Challengers were afforded 
a venue where their initiatives to reframe issues could be judged on their political merits 
as opposed to being subjected to the institutional mechanisms that entrenched interest can 
impose to mute reframing efforts (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).  With respect to the 
latter, the institutional dynamics of concentrated costs and diffuse benefits privileges 
organized interests as legislators are fearful of enacting reform for which they may have to 
face future electoral retribution from mobilized interests. This had proved decisive in the 
enactment of AB 507 when bilingual advocates were initially faced with a bill, AB 607, 
which would have repealed bilingual education legislation.  However, the bilingual 
education advocacy coalition organized and coordinated a lobbying effort that salvaged the 
majority of their bilingual education preferences (or at least retained important aspects of 
the 1976 Act). The openness of the direct-initiative forum, on the other hand, allowed 
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initiative sponsors, who were not legislators in California’s case, to propose and campaign 
for reform proposals. This institutional mechanism not only opened the policymaking 
process to outside interests but also relieved sympathetic legislators from assuming the 
political responsibility for proposals to rollback policy arrangements (a necessary 
ingredient in retrenchment politics - see Pierson, 1994).  
 These examples of venue shifting (to the federal courts; to the direct initiative) 
resulted in the restrictionist turn that bilingual education policy took in California as these 
venues were more receptive to proposals for policy rollback in bilingual education policy 
than was the Californian legislature. 
 This section will first detail the actions by the State Board of the Education and the 
federal courts that resulted in the initial turn towards restrictionism in bilingual education 
policy. Then a detailed analysis of the Proposition 227 campaign and passage will show 
how the bilingual education policy regime was replaced by the policy regime created by 
Proposition 227. The last section will examine the policy arrangements that emerged in the 
wake of 227. 
 
The Role Played by the State Board of Education and Venue Shifting to the Federal 
Courts After The Sunset of Chacon-Moscone 
 During the period after Chacon-Moscone had sunset when the legislature was 
unable to pass Chacon-Moscone reauthorization legislation into law — legislation that 
could secure a Republican Governor’s signature — the California State Board of Education 
and the federal courts filled the policymaking vacuum created by the political impasse 
between the Governor’s office and the legislature. Regarding the Board, the California 
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State Board took several actions — under its power of implementation — in the 1990s to 
relax district requirements concerning the use of bilingual education and the goals of 
programs designed for LEP students. These actions suggest that as the Board members 
were appointees of the Governor, politically, they concurred with the politics of the 
Governor concerning bilingual education (see Haberman, 1999). In the 1990s, 
Republicans, both nationally and at the state level (especially California Republicans) 
began to take more public stances against immigration and multiculturalism (Tatalovich, 
1995). The education governance structure in California provided the availability of 
multiple, overlapping policy forums (Habermann, 1999; Brewer and Smith, 2007). This 
facilitated the partisan nature of bilingual education policy outcomes to play out according 
to the dynamics of the governing structure and partisan leanings of particular policy venues 
within the system. Subsequently, policy actions by the California State Board of Education 
engendered incremental policy rollback for bilingual education policy arrangements as the 
members of the State Board — appointed by the Governor for 4 year terms — were 
beholden to the Governor (Haberman, 1999).   
 With respect to the courts, the federal circuit court’s ruling in Sacramento likewise 
shows how the changing politics of bilingual education was also reflected in the courts as 
justices ruled in a more restrictive manner concerning the state’s responsibility to its LEP 
student population.   
 
The Roles of the California State Board of Education 
 The next section will discuss how three voter initiatives (Propositions 187, 209, and 
227) of the mid-1990s that addressed immigration and civil rights liberalism legitimated 
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the politics/ enacted policy outcomes in immigration restrictionism and social policy 
retrenchment. This section will detail how these political trends were evident in the actions 
of the California State Board of Education.   
 The immigration restrictionism legitimated by Proposition 187 (to be discussed 
below) also affected the politics of the State Board of Education (following the Governor’s 
lead as Governor Wilson had supported Proposition 187). By the mid-1990s, directives 
from the California State Board of Education also began trending towards the policy 
rollback in bilingual education. In July of 1995, the California State Board of Education 
revised its policy statement, indicating a minor break from the goals enumerated in the 
Bilingual Education Improvement and Reform Act (the 1980 reauthorization of the 
Chacon-Moscone Bilingual-Bicultural Act). The revised policy statement instructed the 
California Department of Education to administer funds for eight general purposes from 
the expired Chacon-Moscone Bilingual-Bicultural Act and for the continuation of parental 
advisory committees. The revised policy statement offered two goals for all districts 
providing educational programs for LEP students: rapid development of English language 
proficiency in reading, writing, and speaking; and the opportunity to learn which involved 
access to “challenging” core curriculum and primary language development (de Cos, 1999 
16-17).   
 This is a clear break from Chacon-Moscone which focused not only on developing 
English proficiency and primary language development, but also on cultural maintenance 
and multiculturalism (both enumerated in the Chacon-Moscone and its 1980 
reauthorization). This also depicts how the California State Board of Education used its 
policymaking power to change the policy goals of bilingual education— a form of 
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restrictionist fine tuning where the State Board of Education filled the policy vacuum 
created by the aforementioned political impasse of the legislature and the Governor’s 
office, reorienting the programmatic goals of bilingual education policy to be more in line 
with the Governor’s policy stance.   
 In 1996, the California State Board of Education granted four Californian school 
districts waivers from following the provisions of existing bilingual law. The waivers 
permitted these districts to replace bilingual education programs with sheltered English 
immersion programs (Farr et al, 2005 17). 
 In March of 1997, The California State Board of Education issued a Program 
Advisory for English Learners. The Advisory enumerated the legal responsibilities districts 
had in the provision of services to LEP students and their legal obligations when applying 
for and implementing bilingual education waivers (de Cos, 1999 17).   
 Later in 1997, the Orange Unified School District was sued in Quiroz et al v. State 
Board of Education. Plaintiffs charged that LEP students' rights had been violated by 
school district waivers for English Only instruction (Farr et al, 2005 17). 
 In February of 1998, in the Sacramento Circuit Court ruling, Judge Robie ended 
the legal requirement that districts use bilingual education as mandated in the Chacon-
Moscone Act and its 1980 reauthorization. In the political impasse left after the sunset of 
the Chacon-Moscone Act, the Robie ruling is another example of the court’s changing 
stance that resulted in the rollback of bilingual education policy arrangements. In this 
ruling, the Sacramento Circuit Court decided that the sunset of the Chacon-Moscone 
Bilingual-Bicultural Act repealed the substantive portion of the law. The Justice Robie 
ruling stated that funding supporting the general purposes of the bill could continue, but 
 
266 
the legal mandate to provide bilingual education for LEP students ended with the 
provision’s sunset as instruction in a student’s primary language was no longer considered 
under the general purposes of the sunset law. The ruling did not prohibit bilingual 
education, but it also did not mandate it in districts with LEP populations. The implication 
of the ruling was that using instruction in the student’s primary language should only be 
employed “when deemed necessary” (de Cos, 1999 17).      
 Justice Robie also ruled that the State Board of Education was not authorized to 
provide waivers. Waivers involved funding and this was beyond the authority of the State 
Board (de Cos, 1999 65). Concurrently, Justice Robie ruled that Orange Unified School 
District did not have to comply with California bilingual education law as the governing 
law had sunset (Farr et al, 2005 17). It was only required to comply with federal mandates 
concerning its dealings with LEP students (Farr et al, 2005 17; de Cos, 1999 17).   
 In response to this ruling, in March of 1998, the State Board of Education rescinded 
its policies and program advisories concerning bilingual education. In April 1998, the State 
Board of Education issued a new policy statement which aimed to communicate the 
Board’s intent to grant more discretion to districts to develop and implement programs to 
best encourage English proficiency and academic achievement for LEP students. The new 
policy statement called for districts to encourage and monitor the language proficiency and 
academic achievement of English language learners. Districts were no longer required to 
offer native language instruction to LEP students. This granted districts greater flexibility 
in addressing the needs of its LEP population (de Cos, 1999 17). 
 These last two moves by the Sacramento Circuit Court and the State Board of 
Education further rescinded district obligations to offer bilingual education— another clear 
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break from the sunset of the Chacon-Moscone Act. The former is an example of failed 
venue shifting by the plaintiffs of Quiroz et al. Contrary to the 1970s, the federal courts 
were less sympathetic to bilingual education, instead resulting in state action that formally 
relieved districts of their obligation to provide native language instruction to LEP students.   
 These were clear signs of the incremental policy rollback occurring in California 
bilingual education policy arrangements. However, because of the political impasse 
between the legislature and the Governor's office, these were the only options available at 
the time to opponents of bilingual education for policy rollback. 
 
Mass Immigration, Economic Contraction and California’s Backlash Against Illegal 
Immigration 
 The initial shot of the 1990s anti-immigration movement was fired with the passage 
of Proposition 187. As this bill dealt with immigration law, it was legally controversial as 
immigration law is normally the province of the national government.  However, the 
initiative, which the voters enacted by a substantial majority revealed the continued 
resonance anti-immigrant politics had with the California electorate in the mid-1990s. As 
the state was feeling the acute effects of economic contraction and mass immigration 
simultaneously, restricting illegal immigration and immigrants’ rights to public benefits 
struck a chord with the electorate (HoSang, 2010; Olsen, 2009 827). 
 
Proposition 187 
 Proposition 187 aimed to outlaw public provisions in education and health care to 
illegal immigrants, and required all federal employees to report any individuals suspected 
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of being illegal immigrants. It passed in 1994 by a margin of 59 percent to 41 percent 
(HoSang, 2010 161). Most of its implementation was ruled unconstitutional by the courts 
in the same year (HoSang, 2010 161; Olsen, 2009 827). However, its passage reordered 
the political landscape in California and nationwide. Eventually its contents were 
incorporated into federal immigration and welfare reform over the following two years 
(HoSang, 2010 161).   
 The Proposition framed the state as under siege by illegal immigrants who cost the 
state billions of dollars, paid by innocent, hardworking taxpayers (HoSang, 2010 167; 
Olsen, 2009 826-827). HoSang (2010 167) argues that the innocent and guilty were 
racialized — the white innocent taxpayer victimized by the non-white illegal immigrant. 
This narrative was part of a long history of the subjugation of Mexican immigrants that 
began with the US war against Mexico and continued with immigration law that 
perennially contained the dual goals of importation and deportation (the balance 
determined by the economic business cycle) to satisfy political and business (labor) needs, 
respectively (HoSang, 2010 167). It was also within the tradition of immigrant exclusion 
originating with the Asian exclusion laws of the late 19th and early 20th century and the 
racialization of Mexicans that began with the creation Boarder Control in 193043 (Ngai, 
1999).  
 Proposition 187 was also passed during a period of concurrent macroeconomic 
change and mass immigration (HoSang, 2010; Olsen, 2009 826-828). Jobs and the tax base 
had dramatically contracted (HoSang, 2010; Calavita, 1997). Poverty rates and wealth 
inequality had increased substantially while housing values and job security had decreased 
                                                 
43 According to Ngai (1999), it concluded with the establishment of the Mexican demographic by US Census 
in 1930 for the purpose of accounting for this foreign presence (Ngai, 1999).  
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(HoSang, 2010 162; Calavita, 1997). Immigration (legal and illegal) had increased sharply 
in the 1980s and 1990s — an estimated 42 percent increase in illegal immigration alone 
occurred between 1988 and 1992 (HoSang, 2010 165). However, despite these changes, in 
six polls conducted between May 1991 and August 1993, immigration ranked low on the 
most pressing problems in polling done during those two years (HoSang, 2010 163). The 
problems associated with the changes mentioned (such as crime, education, and the 
economy) ranked higher (HoSang, 2010 165). HoSang (2010) argues that when immigrants 
fit comfortably within the established racial hierarchy of the electorate — serving as low 
wage manufactures, landscapers, and domestic help — suburban Californians welcomed 
immigrants, legal and illegal. When focus was placed on immigrants demanding public 
goods, political power, or cultural equality, immigrants garnered restrictionist responses 
(HoSang, 2010 168).   
Also in early 1992, immigration restrictionism in California received little support 
from the Republican Party (HoSang, 2010 169). Only Pat Buchanan championed 
increasing border control. An assorted group of immigration restrictionists came together 
in the fall of 1993, some of whom were connected to the state and county GOP (HoSang, 
2010 163). A subset of the restrictionists were interested in eliminating welfare benefits to 
illegal immigrants; another faction in restricting access to public education for 
undocumented immigrants; and others pushed for criminal penalties for fraudulent use of 
government documents. Ultimately they decided that a ballot initiative would be the best 
way to incorporate their broad agenda and escape the legislative coalitions that had 
frustrated previous efforts at immigration restriction (HoSang, 2010 163). Its eventual 
passage — venue shifting to the voter initiative forum— would confirm their beliefs. 
 
270 
 Although the ‘state under siege-’ framing of immigration resonated with the white 
non-Hispanic electorate, Proposition 187 was viewed as anti-Latino in the Latino 
community (Pantoja, Ramirez, Segura, 2001 729-731). In turn, Proposition 187 had the 
effect of mobilizing the California's Latino community (Pantoja, Ramirez, Segura, 2001).  
Despite the growing Latino population in California, Latino political incorporation was an 
elite affair as naturalization rates and political participation lagged behind their growing 
numbers. Proposition 187 began to change this, however. In the aftermath of Proposition 
187, Latinos in California naturalized and began to mobilize politically in larger numbers. 
Concerning voter turnout numbers, in 1990, Latinos consisted of 26 percent of the 
population but only 8 percent of the electorate in 1988 (Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura, 2001 
730). After Proposition 187, voter turnout increased Latino's share of the electorate to 12 
percent in 1996 and 13 percent in 1998 (Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura, 2001 731). Pantoja, 
Ramirez and Segura (2001 731) cite studies that show that voter turnout rate in Los Angeles 
County in 1998 was 46 percent which exceeded all other demographic groups. 
Naturalization rates were also affected positively by Proposition 187. Pantoja, Ramirez and 
Segura (2001) also present figures from the Immigration and Naturalization Services 
records which showed an 80 percent increase in naturalization applications between 
October 1994 and January 1995. Additionally, they cite claims from Senator Richard 
Polcanco of Los Angeles (chairman of the Democratic caucus) and Hadly (1995) that Los 
Angeles County was receiving naturalization applications at rates of between 1,500 and 
2,500 per day during this period — increases of over 650 percent over previous rates 
(Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura, 2001 731). The California Field Poll reported that 87 
percent of California's 1.15 million new voters were Latino (as cited in Pantoja, Ramirez 
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and Segura, 2001 731). These numbers would eventually turn the political tide in 
California, making it a solidly Democratic state. Nevertheless, in the late 1990s non-




 By 1997, 2 in 5 children were Latino (Olsen, 2009 827). According to Olsen, as 
demographic projections made clear that Latinos would soon be the state’s majority, 
bilingual education became a symbol of the public services and tax dollars that were 
increasingly being ‘wasted’ on a population which was reluctant to assimilate. Such 
sentiments were exacerbated by a worsening economy which had led to fiscal austerity in 
school budgets. This emboldened opposition claims that bilingual education was a wasteful 
endeavor (Olsen,  2009 827). 
 Additionally, research conducted on the effectiveness of bilingual education since 
the 1970s had produced mixed results. According to Olsen (2009 827), one of the more 
referenced national studies was conducted by Ramirez et al in 1991. The study tracked and 
compared students in English immersion programs with those in early exit transitional 
bilingual education programs. The findings indicated no difference in English proficiency 
between the two groups. Another often cited investigation, a longitudinal study in Texas, 
that compared students in transitional bilingual education programs with those in bilingual 
immersion programs, also found little difference in English proficiency between the two 
groups.   
 Proponents of bilingual education had long argued that the studies conducted since 
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the 1970s were methodologically flawed. Two meta-analyses of the body of research 
available attempted to clarify the studies that had been made to that point. They, however, 
also produced mixed results. Rossell and Baker's 1996 review concluded that structured 
English immersion was the more effective pedagogical approach. Greene (1998) reviewed 
the same material as Rossell and Baker and came to the conclusion that approaches that 
used native language instruction were moderately more effective.  Additionally, there had 
not been any research done on the most frequently used structured English immersion 
model, Specifically Designed Academic Instruction In English (SADIE). However, what 
resonated with the public was that bilingual education did not provide any added benefit. 
And as its use was counter intuitive to the classic American assimilation model of English 
acquisition, bilingual education proponents were left on the defensive (Olsen, 2009 827-
828). 
 
Proposition 227 - Its Substance 
 Proposition 227 was sponsored by Ron Unz, a multimillionaire software developer 
and former gubernatorial candidate, and called for the mandatory replacement of bilingual 
education programs with “sheltered English immersion” programs. These were not to 
exceed one year at which time students were mainstreamed to all English instruction (It 
should be noted that this one year mainstreaming pedagogy had no academic support at the 
time (Olsen, 2009 828)). Parents could still request waivers for bilingual education. 
However, for students under the age of 10, bilingual education would only be permitted for 
those students with “special physical, emotional, psychological, or educational needs” (as 
stated in Proposition 227). Educators who “willfully and repeatedly” violated the law of 
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mandatory English instruction could be sued and held personally liable for financial 
damages (as stated in Proposition 227). These provisions could only be repealed by two-
thirds vote of the legislature and the governor’s signature, or through a new ballot initiative 
(Crawford, 1997 8).  
 
Proposition 227- The Different Political Dynamics of the Voter Initiative 
 Proposition 227 was the last of the three referenda in the mid-1990s to address civil 
rights liberalism and anti-immigration. The political divide among elites concerning these 
two issues was a factor involved in how Unz pursued attacking bilingual education. Unz 
revealed in interviews during the Proposition 227 campaign that he venue shopped for 
states with a referendum policymaking option that had California’s immigration 
demographic changes and political stalemate on the issue (HoSang, 2010 236).   
 Proponents of bilingual education understood the imminence of an anti-bilingual 
education referendum campaign in light of the successes of Propositions 187 and 209 
(HoSang, 2010 236). Yet, bilingual education proponents were ill-prepared to contest 
Proposition 227 in the more open forum of the direct initiative (Olsen, 2009 833). Olsen 
(2009) argued that the entrenched Latino advocacy coalition was adept at influencing the 
legislature to attain their policy goals or frustrate reform efforts, however they were less 
prepared for the open politics of the voter initiative.  
 The campaign and passage of Proposition 227 depicted the different political and 
institutional dynamics at play in the direct initiative campaign as opposed to policy rollback 
efforts within the traditional legislative process. The presence of mobilized interests could 
not strike political fear in initiative sponsors since initiative sponsors did not have to take 
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into account future electoral prospects. Initiative sponsors only had to worry about the 227 
campaign— how to successfully frame their problematization of educating LEP students. 
 The passage of Proposition 227, thus, shows how elite disagreement concerning 
bilingual education and the openness of the California system contributed to policy 
rollback in bilingual education policy arrangements. The political impasse created by elite 
divisions in a political context where the electorate — in the wake of the Propositions 187 
and 209 — seemed primed to move in a restrictionist direction if empowered to make that 
decision made California an ideal setting to (re)frame the debate on immigration in a more 
restrictionist light. Unz recognized this, seeing the policy potential the referendum option 
provided for his policy goals in bilingual education in the mid-1990s. 
 
Proposition 227 and the influence of Propositions 187 and Proposition 209 
 After the passage of Proposition 187, advocates for bilingual education recognized 
that an assault on bilingual education was imminent (HoSang, 2010 236).  California had 
experienced a dramatic rise in its immigrant population as outlined above. Towards the end 
of the 1990s, the white non-Hispanic population approached the 50 percent mark, drawing 
it closer to falling out of the majority for the first time since the Gold Rush (Crawford, 
1997 2). With respect to the student population, LEP students increased by 220 percent 
from 1982 through 1997 (HoSang, 2010 233). Not coincidentally, this was also a period of 
anti-immigrant politics (Ngai, 1999; Olsen, 2009 826-827). Since the 1965 Immigration 
Reform Act, California had replaced New York as the main destination for immigrants. 
This new generation of immigrants, however, originated from Latin America and Asia as 
opposed to the immigrants from the turn of the 20th century who were of European origins 
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(Citrin et al, 2003 7; Campbell et al, 2006 132). By 2000, 32.4 percent of the population 
were of Hispanic origin and an additional 10.9 percent were Asian (Citrin et al, 2003 7). 
Moreover, 39.5 percent of the population over 5 years of age lived in homes where a 
language other than English was spoken (Citrin et al, 2003 7). Latinos made up 42.2 percent 
of the K-12 population in California schools, and 25.4 percent of California’s students were 
classified as LEP students, which was the nation’s largest LEP population (Citrin et al, 
2003 7; Campbell et al, 2006 131). This helped spark the anti-immigrant political 
movement that passed Proposition 187 in 1994 (Crawford, 1998 61).   
 This sentiment clearly affected the politics of bilingual education. Since the 1980s 
and the passage of Official English in 1986, bilingual education had come under perennial 
attacks from opponents questioning its pedagogical efficacy and its long-run benefit for 
Latino children and society as a whole as discussed above. Studies since the passage of the 
Bilingual Education Act had produced mixed results concerning the efficacy of bilingual 
education (Olsen, 2009 827-828). This put increasing pressure on bilingual education 
advocates to defend the continuation of policy arrangements (Olsen, 2009 828).   
 Despite all the political controversy surrounding bilingual education, however, 
prior to the passage of Proposition 227, California never had more than 30 percent of its 
LEP students enrolled in bilingual education programs (Gandara and Rumberger, 2009 
770; Olsen, 2009 828). Legislation mandated that districts and schools offer bilingual 
education programs, but parents could opt out of enrolling their students (Gandara and 
Rumberger, 2009 770). Programs also suffered from varied quality, problematic 
implementation, and chronic teacher shortages (Olsen, 2009 825). These all contributed to 
the low identification and enrollment of LEP students in bilingual education programs.  
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And this depicts the symbolic nature of the bilingual education debate—as it was a debate 
detached from reality. 
 Nevertheless, public opposition to immigration and civil rights liberalism continued 
with the passage of Proposition 209, which ended all affirmative action programs in 
publicly funded institutions. According to HoSang (2010 233), it was Proposition 209 
which may have most influenced Proposition 227 sponsor Ron Unz. Proposition 227 
followed in its political wake and involved many of the same political interests. The Unz-
led campaign, English for the Children, passed with 61 percent of the electorate voting to 
end bilingual education in California (Crawford, 1997 1). The Unz campaign tried to create 
a more broad based coalition that did not just court nativist and anti-immigrant groups as 
had Proposition 187 (Crawford, 1997 3). Unz rejected support from Governor Pete 
Wilson— one of the prime sponsors of Proposition 187 — Pat Buchanan and English Only 
groups (HoSang, 2010 233; Crawford, 1999 12). He believed the future of the Republican 
Party involved courting — not alienating — Latinos and Asians as demographic changes 
demanded it. Subsequently, he placed minorities in leadership positions to neutralize 
claims by his opponents that his proposition was anti-Latino (HoSang, 2010 233; 
Crawford, 1997 3). This was similar to the approach used by the Proposition 209 campaign 
(Ho Sang, 2010 233). The Proposition 209 campaign appointed Ward Connerly’s (“black, 
self-made businessman”) to chair the Proposition 209 committee, helping to neutralize 
claims that the proposition was anti-civil rights. In similar fashion, Unz brought on Gloria 
Matta Tuchman to co-chair the campaign (HoSang, 2010 234). Tuchman was an 
elementary school teacher and a long-time critic of the efficacy of bilingual educational 
programs. He enlisted Alice Callaghan, an Episcopal priest and community leader who led 
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a much-talked-about Latino protest against bilingual education at Ninth Street Elementary 
School in 1996. Jaime Escalante, a well-reputed math teacher from East Los Angeles, 
agreed to be the campaign’s honorary chair. Henry Gradillas, a former principal at Garfield 
High School in East Los Angeles signed on as a campaign spokesperson (HoSang, 2010 
233-234). Unz also campaigned in Latino communities arguing that bilingual education 
distracted their children from learning English— the skill most needed for social and 
economic advancement (Unz,1997 3). Sixty-three percent of Latinos still voted against the 
bill, but his efforts were rewarded by the media which focused more on his Latino converts 
than the actual number of Latino supporters that Proposition 227 had (Unz, 1997 5). The 
campaign was also helped by media polls in the months leading up to the election that 
showed overwhelming majorities of Latino support for Proposition 227 (Unz, 1997 4; 
Rossel, 2002 10; Olsen, 2009 830-835).  
 
English for the Children- Reframing Opposition to Bilingual Education 
 Ideationally, English for the Children attempted to change the rationale for rejecting 
bilingual education. Instead of stressing the cultural importance of English to the American 
polity, Unz's organization focused on learning English as a right reserved to all immigrant 
children including Latino children (Crawford, 1997 3). Embracing and flipping on its head 
the rights-based politics of the post-civil rights era, Unz stressed Latino children’s right to 
learn English, a right he claimed was denied by bilingual education programs. Pro-
Proposition 227 forces incorporated the language of the civil rights movement — whose 
legacy had been re-imagined as championing color-blind individual liberty as opposed to 
a campaign to end systemic racism (HoSang, 2010 241).  They argued that bilingual 
 
278 
education prevented children from learning English which best prepared them to compete 
in American society. By incorporating pro-immigrant, civil rights rhetoric, they left the 
opposition to campaign against the civil rights-based narrative — a narrative they had used 
to sustain bilingual education (HoSang, 2010 241).  This argument was ensconced within 
the paradigm that systemic racial prejudice had been effectively eliminated except for some 
extremist individuals and thus claims of historic racial injustice were unfounded (HoSang, 
2010 242).   
 The embodiment of this rhetoric was captured in the Latino boycott of the Ninth 
Street Elementary School, led by Callaghan (Crawford, 1997 3). According to Crawford 
(1999), accounts vary concerning the authenticity of the Callahan/Unz narrative that this 
was a Latino parent protest against bilingual education44. Nevertheless, the Unz narrative, 
which the media reported, framed Latino parents as boycotting a bilingual program that 
was denying their children the right to learn English (Crawford, 1997 3).    
 In addition, according to Crawford (1997 6), Unz exploited the iron triangle 
relationships that characterized the policy making process (a theme that resonated in 1990s 
party politics) to his advantage. He painted bilingual education as a well-intentioned but 
failing program — failing to incorporate immigrants — that was entrenched to benefit 
profiteering special interests—the same advocacy coalition that had successfully lobbied 
for and defended bilingual education policy arrangements (Crawford, 1997 6; Olsen, 2009 
830-831). Media accounts (such as the Wall Street Journal) likewise described bilingual 
education as a well-meaning program but one that had become a costly, inefficient 
bureaucratic burden on the state (HoSang, 2010 235). With respect to the efficacy of 
                                                 
44 Details suggest Callaghan manipulated the relationship between the daycare center and the parents’ 
dependence on its services to stage a protest to garner media attention (Crawford, 1997). 
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bilingual education, Unz used the simple argument that bilingual education had a “95% 
failure rate”45 (HoSang, 2010 234; Olsen, 2009 836-837). Although the veracity of the 
claim had been widely criticized by education scholars, the claim was never challenged by 
opponents of Proposition 227 (HoSang, 2010 234; Olsen, 2009 837).   
 Bilingual education was originally championed as a mechanism to provide a quality 
education to linguistic minorities who had been historically denied such education because 
of English Only instruction. Proponents of Proposition 227 flipped this claim, arguing that 
bilingual education denied quality education to linguistic minorities by not focusing on the 
acquisition of English (HoSang, 2010 234; Olsen, 2009 837-838). Unz's message was that 
bilingual education was another example of an ineffective captured bureaucracy that 
provided benefits for a few bureaucrats at the expense of public schools through coddling 
those it should be encouraging to work harder (HoSang, 2010 234; Olsen, 2009 831). In 
this narrative Latino students (and taxpayers) were the victims of this ineffective program 
— neutralizing claims that anti-bilingual education was anti-immigrant (HoSang, 2010 
235).  
 Unz ultimately aimed to remake the Republican Party by fostering a multi-ethnic 
coalition of Latinos, Asians and White conservatives opposed to a welfare state seen as 
primarily serving African Americans — the embodiment of “social pathology and state 
failure” (HoSang, 2010 235; Crawford, 1999). He believed the Republican Party’s 
courtship of nativist only served short term goals, but endangered long term prospects 
because of the demographic changes occurring in California (Crawford, 1999 12). 
Likewise, Unz felt that Asians and Latinos shared many Republican values and could be 
                                                 




sold on the party platform of free markets and limited government in service of the ideals 
of personal responsibility, individual liberty, and community spirit (Crawford, 1999 12).  
Unz, thus, framed the bilingual debate and chose minority spokespersons to present 
bilingual education as antithetical to minority interests (Crawford, 1999). This was an 
effective argument in the 1990s as the political winds shifted to the smaller government 
approach in response to the iron triangle Big Government that had developed in the post-
1960s era.  
 Moreover, the Unz campaign benefited from media coverage that focused more on 
the personalities involved than in distinguishing the academic findings from the political 
discourse (Crawford, 1997 7). Academic findings were given the same merit and 
legitimacy as political soundbites (Crawford, 1997 7). In addition, since the academic 
failings of Latino students had been widely reported, the task of proving bilingual 
education’s efficacy was counterintuitive to the widely accepted narrative that Latino 
students’ lack of academic success was because of the limited English proficiency among 
the students. According to Crawford (1997 7), Unz's campaign effectively framed the 
debate concerning bilingual education solely on the language of instruction issue, ignoring 
all other factors (availability of qualified bilingual teachers, poverty, etc.) that might also 
affect Latino performance in school. Additionally, the campaign focused mainly on 
pedagogical issues, eschewing anti-immigrant rhetoric (Crawford, 1997 7). As the 
bilingual education proponents had limited research to explain Latino academic outcomes 
and failed to challenge the assertions on pedagogy, the issue was painted as a pedagogical 
reform proposal (Crawford, 1997 7). This made it acceptable even for those sympathetic 
to bilingual education. 
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Transforming the problematization of bilingual education— An opportunity Provided 
by the 227 Campaign 
 Transforming the framing of an issue / changing its issue definition— how the issue 
is problematized — and finding a favorable venue where such a problematization can help 
bring about or result in policy change is the process of policy change theorized by 
Baumgartner and Jones (1991; 1993). And this is how Unz pursued reforming bilingual 
education in California. Unz sought out California for his English for the Children 
campaign because it had an initiative process and a growing immigrant population. He 
recognized the direct initiative provided a policy venue where his reframing of the bilingual 
education issue could be sold directly to the public without the institutional impediments 
of the legislature — the retrenchment institutional dynamics of concentrated costs and 
diffuse benefits that benefitted the status quo — that precluded policy rollback efforts. The 
policy venue afforded by the ballot initiative was relatively free of the institutional 
gatekeepers that would typically preclude such attempts at transforming the issue definition 
within the traditional legislative policymaking process. Absent issue salience (as bilingual 
education and immigration, for that matter, were low on the issue agenda in the early 
1990s), issue definition changes to issues governed by entrenched policy regimes are 
difficult to achieve for challengers because of the institutional advantages afforded to the 
policy regime (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Pierson, 1994). However, the policy venue 
afforded by the ballot initiative presented a relatively open venue where Unz's reframing 
of the issue could be more favorably received— and the pro-Proposition 227 forces did 
just that. It also provided a forum for policy rollback in which sympathetic legislators were 
spared accountability for the rollback of policy arrangements. 
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 The opposition gave English for the Children a four-month head start before 
commencing an opposition to the Proposition 227 campaign (HoSang, 2010 236). This 
allowed Unz to frame the debate uncontested, as mentioned above.  During this time, the 
campaign built a 4 to 1 lead in the polls (HoSang, 2010 236). This neglect was typical of 
bilingual proponents who failed to articulate a positive image of bilingual education. 
Negative narratives concerning the program’s efficacy went unchallenged for years prior 
to the Proposition 227 campaign (Crawford, 1999 14). The California Association for 
Bilingual Education (CABE) was the chief and most entrenched advocate and defender of 
bilingual education regimes. It had used its close relations with Latino lawmakers to 
orchestrate agreements that blunted perennial reform efforts by critics of bilingual 
education (Crawford, 1997 4). However, these successes were exploited by Unz and 
English for the Children, which successfully painted the bilingual education regime as 
captured by special interests and, thus, resistant to reform efforts favored by the public. 
Unz, subsequently, painted the aforementioned political stalemate — between the 
Governor and the legislature — created by elite divisions and the institutional inertia 
created in the (more) closed aspect of the policymaking system by entrenched Latino 
advocates as the reason why the voters (including the affected minorities) needed to act. 
By refocusing attention on the issue dimension of bilingual education’s [questionable] 
efficacy, he turned retrenchment politics (as theorized by Pierson, 1994) on its head by 
blaming the entrenched for frustrating “sound” retrenchment policy ideas. 
 Initial polling showed overwhelming support within minority communities for 
Proposition 227 (Crawford, 1999). These polls galvanized the opposition.  Four-months 
after the 227 campaign began, a summit was held to organize the opposition, called 
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California Tomorrow (Olsen, 2009 833). Summit attendees included educators, immigrant 
rights advocates, civil rights lawyers, representatives of community organizations, unions, 
and professional associations in education (Olsen, 2009 833). This led to the formation of 
the official No on Proposition 227 organization, Citizens for an Educated America (CEA) 
(Olsen, 2009 833; Crawford, 1999 14). CEA consisted of the California Association of 
Bilingual Educators (CABE), the California Teachers Association, the two state teachers 
unions (California Teachers Association and California Federation of Teachers), California 
Tomorrow, Californians for Justice (a state-wide youth mobilization organization), the 
Latino Civil Rights Network, and other sympathizers (civil rights activists, immigrant 
advocacy groups and California education representatives) who opposed English for the 
Children (HoSang, 2010 236; Crawford, 1999 14; Olsen, 2009 833). They hired veteran 
Democratic consultant, Richie Ross, who advised them not to attempt to defend bilingual 
education because of the negative views his preliminary focus group polling had found the 
issue had with voters (HoSang, 2010 236; Crawford, 1999 15). Additionally, Ross believed 
the anti-Proposition 227 campaign had the time necessary to change voters minds (which 
they did not have because of their late start) (HoSang, 2010 236; Crawford, 1999 15). They 
pursued this strategy by having the campaign focus on Proposition 227 as an extremist 
policy that would cause more problems in implementation than its promised benefits would 
deliver (HoSang, 2010). They avoided mentioning bilingual education in campaign 
rhetoric, featuring Latino student success stories, and highlighting programs that were 
effective. Additionally Crawford (1999 17) cites that No on 227 failed to focus on the 
restrictions of parental choice and local discretion which may have been effective in 
winning over the favor of the public concerning the consequences of 227. Late in the 
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campaign, California for Justice (CFJ) embarked on a modest voter mobilization campaign 
and youth volunteer training in 350 precincts in Northern and Southern California to 
marshall opposition to Proposition 227. This seemed to narrow the gap as Election Day 
drew closer (HoSang, 2010 238). 
 Less than 6 months before the election, English for the Children had been outspent 
5 to 1 and had not received public support from Republican state or national party leaders. 
It did receive support from well-funded donors who had also helped to fund other 
conservative and right-wing initiatives (HoSang, 2010 239).   
 Other Latino advocates did not agree with the official No on 227 strategy. They 
saw that the anti-bilingual campaign could not be divorced from a long history of official 
Californian opposition to the Latino immigrant student population (which included forced 
residential and school segregation of Mexican immigrants, literacy tests for immigrant 
entry, and Spanish prohibitions in schools through the 1960s) — or its fight for equal 
educational opportunity (the former governing policy dimension of bilingual education’s 
heydays in the 1960s and 1970s) (HoSang, 2010 236). Additionally, they felt that bilingual 
education should be defended because of its efficacy in academics and personal growth for 
Latino students (HoSang, 2010 236).  
 Among political elites, gubernatorial candidates in the 1998 primaries all opposed 
Proposition 227 (Citrin et al, 2003 9). State and national Democratic leaders, although they 
did not support Proposition 227, did not offer support for the opposition until very late in 
the Proposition 227 campaign. Incumbent governor Pete Wilson did express support for 
the initiative, but did so late in his campaign (Citrin et al, 2003 9). This drew immediate 
public repudiation from English for the Children as they tried to formally distance the 
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campaign from Governor Wilson who was unpopular in the Latino community because of 
his support of Proposition 187 (Citrin et al, 2003 9). Media elites were also opposed to 
Proposition 227 expressing their opposition in op-ed pieces (most notably, The Los 
Angeles Times editorialized their opposition to Proposition 227) (Rossel, 2002 11).  
 As can be seen, elites were hesitant to embrace or involve themselves in the politics 
of Proposition 227. Democrats feared that in expressing public opposition to Proposition 
227 they would be attaching themselves to the sinking ship of civil rights/ pro immigrant 
liberalism (HoSang, 2010). Republicans, on the other hand, feared that in expressing 
support for 227, they may elicit political retribution from aggrieved Latinos — as 
supporting the proposition could be interpreted as anti-immigrant (Citrin et al, 2003 9).  
 Elite aversion to the proposition suited Unz's political goals as it helped his framing 
of the issue — an issue where the elites were out of touch, thus requiring the electorate's 
direct vote. Their aversions allowed him to feature pro-Proposition 227 immigrants. This 
furthered his framing that Proposition 227 was pro-immigrant as it pursued English 
acquisition (Citrin et al, 2003 9).  
 And, according to Unz's plan, despite elite ambivalence, from early in 1998, 
Proposition 227 enjoyed substantial support from a majority of the electorate according to 
polls (Citrin et al, 2003 12). A Field Institute survey in March 1998 found that 79 percent 
of likely voters supported the initiative. Support was bipartisan (69 percent of Democrats; 
92 percent of Republicans) and across all ethnic groups (87 percent of whites, 87 percent 
of Asians, 69 percent of blacks, and 66 percent of Hispanics). Support slipped to 66 percent 
in May according to a May poll conducted by the Field Institute and the issue would 
become more partisan as the June election date approached (partisan differences grew from 
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22 percent in March to 47.2 percent in the May poll) (Citrin et al, 2003 12).    
  
Legislative Attempts to Reform Bilingual Education in Response to Proposition 227 
 In response to the Proposition 227 campaign, the California state legislature 
proposed a less harsh bill, Senate Bill 6, aimed at reforming, not ending, bilingual 
education (Citrin et al, 2003 9). The 1998 Legislature, in fact passed two bills that were 
ultimately vetoed by Governor Wilson, the aforementioned Senate Bill 6 chaired by 
Senator Alpert and Assembly Bill 2620 spearheaded by representative Davis (de Cos, 1999 
23). The Democratic Party establishment, after the successive losses in the Proposition 187 
and 209 campaigns, judged the electorate to be unalterably hostile to the merits of bilingual 
education (HoSang, 2010). They, thus, thought it best to concede the problems with 
bilingual education and offer a reform proposal that better addressed the “problem” 
(HoSang, 2010). This proposal offered to decrease the number of years that LEP students 
spent in the transitional bilingual program (HoSang, 2010). SB 6 would have afforded 
districts full discretion in developing responses to address the needs of LEP students within 
a three-year period in exchange for a promise to regularly evaluate student progress (de 
Cos, 1999 23). The bill had been working its way through the legislature for more than two 
years when it passed just weeks before Proposition 227 was ratified by the voters. Governor 
Wilson received the bill after the passage of 227.  Wilson, subsequently, vetoed the bill, 
claiming that the will of the electorate expressed in Proposition 227 trumped the will of the 
legislature, and that the bill also had substantial flaws (de Cos, 1999 23).  
 The Legislature also passed AB 2620 after the voters had ratified Proposition 227.  
AB 2620 would have authorized the State Department of Education to survey state 
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preschool and child care programs and recommend the best method of instruction to 
prepare its ELL students to master the English language (de Cos, 1999 23). The State Board 
of Education proposed providing local school districts with more autonomy in developing 
bilingual programs as another attempt to assuage the anti-bilingual forces (Citrin et al, 2003 
9). However, Governor Wilson vetoed the legislation (Citrin et al, 2003 9; de Cos, 1999 
23).  
 
The Passage of Proposition 227 
 Proposition 227 passed winning by a margin of 62 to 39 percent (HoSang, 2010).   
Whites and Asians voted in favor of the bill by 67 and 57 percent, respectively (Rossell, 
2010 10); Latinos and African Americans opposed the proposition by 63 and 48 percent, 
respectively (Rossell, 2010 10). As Whites made up 69 percent of the electorate, their 
overwhelming support secured the bill’s passage (HoSang, 2010 240). Unz's claims of 
bilingual education’s ineffectiveness and its portrayal as a product of a captured 
bureaucracy were widely accepted, showing the transformational powers of the plebiscitary 
venue as forces in support of reform found a venue favorable to their issue framing 
(HoSang, 2010 240). The plebiscitary venue provided the pro-Proposition 227 forces with 
a venue where they could take their issue directly to the voters (overwhelmingly White, a 
majority of whom were in support of ending bilingual education) without political 
intermediaries — legislators — who would have feared political retribution from a 
mobilized minority in backing this effort at policy rollback. These factors allowed the Unz 
initiative to eliminate a politically entrenched program with modest financial support and 
tepid elite support (HoSang, 2010 240).   
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 Despite not garnering support from political and media elites, it should not be 
assumed that Proposition 227 lacked elite support. It did in fact enjoy wide support among 
conservative advocacy groups and conservative big donors (HoSang, 2010). The 
plebiscitary venue just allowed these forces a forum where the stalemate among the 
political establishment was rendered moot.   
 The opposition (as it had in the Propositions 209 campaign), conceded that the 
racial attitudes of the electorate made bilingual education indefensible (HoSang, 2010 240). 
Unz interpreted the No on Proposition 227’s strategy not to defend bilingual education as 
a concession that the program was indeed failing (Crawford, 1999 17).  Subsequently, the 
narrative that bilingual education was ineffective in educating Latino students was accepted 
without challenge despite empirical evidence to the contrary. In the aftermath, the No on 
Proposition 227 approach has been criticized (see Crawford, 1997) for allowing English 
for the Children to frame bilingual education as an ineffective, wasteful approach (HoSang, 
2010 240). This stripped the pro-bilingual forces of the argument that it was bilingual 
education that was best for LEP students, a claim they had won after decades of 
campaigning, culminating in the 1960s and 70s (HoSang, 2010). This combined with 
silence from much of the Democratic establishment, both nationally and within the state, 
in opposing Proposition 227 meant that the No on Proposition 227 advocates fought an 
uphill battle from the time they entered the campaign (HoSang, 2010; Crawford, 1999). 
The elite divisions concerning bilingual education that led to political stalemate and the 
legitimation of retrenchment politics via referendum voting in California, culminated with 
the Proposition 227 passage which legally ended bilingual education throughout the state. 
By 1998, California had come full circle from the English Only instruction ordinance of 
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1959. The elite consensus in the 1960s and early 1970s that had led to expansionary politics 
at the state level had dissipated by the 1990s. And, thus, the restrictionism of the pre-1960s 
in bilingual education had returned via the institutional effects of the voter initiative on 
retrenchment politics concerning civil rights liberalism.  
 
Post-Proposition 227 
 For the next several years, pro-bilingual forces attempted to delay the 
implementation or overturn Proposition 227 through the courts. Venue shifting to the courts 
was their last remaining option as the voters and legislature (at the state and federal level— 
the Newt Gingrich-led US Congress was anti-immigrant and the Democrats were generally 
silent on such matters) had become unfavorable venues for policy expansion in bilingual 
education. Proposition 227, however, withstood judicial suits within its first ten years 
(HoSang, 2010 241). A majority of elites in the judiciary supported policy rollback in 
bilingual education. 
 
Analysis of Early Post-Proposition 227 Period 
 The early phase in the post-Proposition 227 era show the problems created by the 
lack of guidance provided for the implementation of Proposition 227. The referendum 
mostly ended bilingual education and called for a one-year transition period before 
mainstreaming LEP students. It also established a waiver process that only parents could 
use. However, this left more questions unanswered than answered concerning its 
implementation. The state assessment testing was the first issue that had to be reconciled 
with the new 227 mandate. The courts mostly deferred to districts that claimed it would be 
 
290 
legally tenuous to test LEP students in English. Thus, although the courts no longer viewed 
bilingual education as the go-to pedagogy for LEP students, the courts still upheld the 
notion that language deficiencies had to be reconciled with LEP students' right to equal 
education opportunity — a juridical legacy of the heyday of bilingual education. 
 Additionally, concerning the State Board of Education, they proceeded to issue new 
guidelines that generally adhered to the 227 mandates despite the questionable legality of 
these ordinances concerning their compliance with state and federal mandates for district 
responsibilities to its LEP population. This shows that the State Board of Education, 
different than the courts, answered to the governor as governor appointees. They, thus, 
used their power to implement Proposition 227 according to the politics of the Governor, 
who was pro-Proposition 227. 
 And so here again, elite divisions are permitted to manifest in policy outcomes 
which had different effects depending on the politics of the elites controlling the policy 
venue where certain aspects of the 227 mandate were implemented. 
 
The Implementation of Proposition 227 
 In the years after the passage of Proposition 227, the number of K-12 students 
receiving bilingual education dropped from 30 percent in 1998 to 6 percent in 1998 
(Standards of Quality and Effectiveness Leading Bilingual Authorization, 2009). 
Nevertheless, the passage of Proposition 227 did not completely end the usage of bilingual 
education in California (Rossell, 2002 10). From the implementation of bilingual education 
in the 1960s, districts had relied on loose interpretations of bilingual education pedagogy 
in categorizing which programs were bilingual education. Those programs using structured 
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English immersion, ESL, and bilingual education (use of the primary language to first 
establish literacy in the primary language before moving to establish literacy in the second 
language) were categorized under bilingual education (Rossell, 2002 5). This is contrary 
to other states, such as Texas, which treated ESL as an alternative to bilingual education 
(TEA, 2006). Additionally, Proposition 227 called for the replacement of bilingual 
education with a transition period (not to exceed one year) of English immersion or 
Structured English Immersion. However English Immersion/ Structured English 
Immersion was a new pedagogical label created by the Act’s authors (de Cos, 1999 3). And 
although the Act provided a definition for English Immersion/ Structured English 
Immersion, it did not provide a direction concerning how to actualize this new pedagogical 
program (de Cos, 1999 3). This encouraged local discretion in the implementation of 227 
(de Cos, 1999 3). As such, districts have interpreted 227 as only requiring that English is 
the main language of instruction. Bilingual education, ESL, structured immersion have 
continued to be used by districts as long as English is the primary language of instruction 
for most of the school day (Rossell, 2002 15-21).  
 What this shows is that the 227 regime replaced the bilingual education regime in 
statute, but in practice there had never been a clear distinction between bilingual education 
and pedagogical approaches that stressed English instruction and 227 did not rectify this 








          In some sense then the Proposition 227-era was anti-climatic. However, the politics 
of Proposition 227 was quite dramatic. Elite views concerning bilingual education and the 
open policy system resulted in a policy trajectory that went from expansive in the 1960s 
and 1970s to policy rollback in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. This dynamic policy trajectory 
depicts both the strength and impotency of Latino entrenchment in the California education 
policymaking system. In the 1960s and 1970s, Mexican (Chicano) political entrenchment 
allowed Mexican advocacy groups to play a substantial role in the content and direction of 
bilingual education policy. Elite agreement in support of bilingual education in the multiple 
policy venues involved (at the federal, state, local and judiciary) catalyzed and legitimated 
a Latino advocacy coalition. Together, their efforts in support of bilingual education led to 
issue expansion across federal, state, local, and judiciary venues from the late 1960s 
through the mid 1970s. Mexican advocacy (as well as Asian advocacy) were the lead 
players in all policy venues involved during this period of issue expansion. However, once 
elite agreement dissipated and elite disagreement intensified over bilingual education, their 
entrenched position worked against Latino advocacy as it increasingly came to be seen as 
a self-serving special interest detached from the reality of problems in Latino school 
performance. Although the favored position of Latino advocacy mitigated the policy 
effects of the growing English Only movement, it only lessened and delayed restrictionist 
policy trajectories. Once Proposition 63 was successfully passed, making English the 
Official language of the state in 1986, bilingual education’s days were numbered. However, 
this was not the case in the Texas policymaking system, which lacks a plebiscitary policy 
venue. The presence of the plebiscitary mechanism diluted the advantages that Latino 
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entrenchment afforded Latino advocacy in legislative politics. As the Texas example 
makes clear, restrictionism may have been inevitable, but it was the plebiscitary 
mechanism that made statutory elimination of bilingual education possible amid the 
























THE EFFECTS OF MEXICAN POLITICAL ENTRENCHMENT ON POLICY 
TRAJECTORIES IN BILINGUAL EDUCATION IN TEXAS 
 
Introduction  
 As mentioned in the California chapter, the policy trajectories of Texas and 
California were similar through the mid-1980s. Thereafter, California’s voter initiative 
legitimated the politics of retrenchment in bilingual education, affording English Only 
forces a policy venue favorable to their reframing of the bilingual education issue. This 
chapter will outline how after a period (similar to California) of elite agreement in the 
1960s and 1970s followed by elite disagreement brought about by the conservative 
backlash to civil rights liberalism, the open policymaking system of Texas facilitated both 
rapid policy expansion in the 1970s through the early 1980s and incremental policy 
rollback from the mid-1980s forward. It is the latter period where the differences in the 
Texas policymaking system with California becomes apparent. Lacking the voter initiative 
policy option of California, from the mid-1980s forward, English Only forces could only 
yield incremental policy rollback reforms to bilingual education policy regimes. Having 
only the legislative and judicial forums to pitch the English Only reframing of the bilingual 
issue, pro-bilingual forces were able to defend their policy regimes despite the growing 
political resonance of English Only policy framings.   
 As in California, two factors have influenced policy evolution in bilingual 
education in Texas: the comparative closeness (due to the lack of a direct democracy 
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policymaking mechanism) of the policymaking system and the evolution of elite agreement 
over bilingual education in the 1960s and 1970s to elite disagreement from the late 1970s 
forward. Compared to the German cases, the Texas policymaking system can be 
characterized as an open policymaking system. This openness of the system resulted in 
policy change via venue shifting, coercion of state and local policymakers via federal 
intervention, and the emergence of actors and interests catalyzed by the interaction of 
policy venues at the local, state, and national level. These interactions resulted in issue 
expansion across these venues; one of the results being the passage of increasingly 
expansionary bilingual education law at the state level through the mid-1970s. The lack of 
a direct democracy policymaking option in Texas, however, makes it a comparatively 
closed policymaking system when compared to California. The absence of the voter 
initiative option muted the influence of the electorate on the policymaking process and 
strengthened the position of entrenched Latino advocacy groups. The lack of a direct 
democracy policymaking mechanism is a characteristic of Texas’ open policymaking 
system. But this difference from the California system specifically led to the varying policy 
trajectories of Texas and California in the 1980s and 1990s. This feature of Texas’ open 
policymaking system was crucial in its less restrictionist policy trajectory after the mid-
1980s as most polls found majority support among the electorate for English Only policies 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Instead the dynamics of concentrated costs and diffuse benefits — 
typically associated with the politics of retrenchment (Sheingate, 2000; Pierson, 1994) — 
has advantaged the political influence of entrenched Latino (mostly Mexican) interests (the 
target of bilingual education/ English Only policies), allowing them to use their entrenched 
positions to veto or at least mitigate restrictive bilingual education policy reforms.    
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 The remainder of the chapter will be devoted to detailing how the comparative 
closeness of the policymaking process and the dissolution of elite agreement concerning 
bilingual education have manifested in the evolution of bilingual education policy in Texas. 
The next section will provide a summary of policy developments. The rest of the chapter 
will provide a detailed analysis of policy Texas’s bilingual education policy trajectory. 
 
A Summary of Policy Developments in Bilingual Education  
 In the late 1960s local bilingual education policy initiatives contributed to the 
national conversation concerning bilingual education. During this time a consensus 
emerged between liberal and conservative elites as well as Chicano advocates that bilingual 
education was the proper policy response to address the segregation, inequality in 
educational opportunity and cultural impoverishment that Mexican-Americans had 
experienced in Texas through the late 1960s. The local initiatives resulted in HB 103, 
which allowed for the use of native language instruction that benefited the education of 
LEP students. The bill repealed the 1918 English Only instruction statute, allowing districts 
to experiment with programs that used the native language of students in instruction, a 
trend that had spread to nearly 30 districts by the end of the 1960s. At the national level, 
this elite agreement lead to the bilingual Education Act of 1968 which provided minimal 
federal funding for district programs designed to address the needs of LEP students. During 
this period of policy evolution in the late 1960s, venue shifting and the legitimation of pro-
bilingual education advocates from the local to state to national policy venues resulted in 
issue expansion in bilingual education policy as major pieces of legislation were passed at 
the state and federal level.  
 
297 
 Through the mid-1970s, elite agreement in Texas and at the national level 
concerning bilingual education manifested in majorities in the state and federal legislatures 
which supported bilingual education. Elite agreement also resulted in sympathizers of 
bilingual education in key political and judicial offices at the state and federal level as well. 
This allowed for an expansion of bilingual education through issue expansion across the 
federal, state and local levels via venue shifting and the legitimation of pro-bilingual 
interests and policy framings. Issue expansion during this period led to an increased 
commitment towards bilingual education in Texas as policy venues (federal and judicial 
venues) enacted mandates to deepen Texas’ commitment to bilingual   education. The 
primary goals of bilingual education during these years were cultural maintenance, 
biculturalism as well as its use as a pedagogical tool to assist in English acquisition and 
transitioning LEP students to mainstream all-English instruction. However after the mid-
1970s, elite agreement waned resulting in opponents of this multicultural paradigm 
increasingly gaining influence and eventual majorities in the same policy venues which 
had spawned expansionist policies. These opponents of expansionist bilingual education 
policy used their positions to thwart and sometimes reverse legislative and judicial gains 
in bilingual education. These changes also occurred within the electorate as support 
declined for liberal interventionist policies in pursuit of social equity issues in general 
during the 1980s and 1990s. However, because Texas lacks a plebiscitary policymaking 
mechanism, entrenched Latino interests have been able to mitigate English Only 
pedagogical political trends during the decades following the 1970s when such trends 
peaked in political influence as elite divisions deepened concerning bilingual education. 
Since the 1960s in Texas, this has played out in the resilience of bilingual education policy 
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arrangements even as English Only pedagogy gained political legitimacy in the 1990s and 
2000s. This was first evident in the defeat of a movement to put an official English 
constitutional amendment proposal on the ballot in the mid-1980s — an act that a majority 
of the electorate supported according to polls conducted at the time — and again in the 
1990s when English Only movements attempted to reform bilingual education policy 
arrangements. Reform efforts to bilingual education (because of the aforementioned 
political trends) did succeed in eliminating bilingual education as a pedagogical tool that 
encouraged cultural maintenance and bilingualism (although dual-language programs do 
exist at the local level). Bilingual education became primarily a pedagogical tool used to 
transition LEP students to mainstream all-English instruction. However, contrary to 
California, bilingual education policy regimes have been able to fend off challenges from 
advocates of English Only pedagogy. Although the aforementioned restrictionists 
moderations were made to bilingual education policy arrangements, elimination of 
bilingual education (as was the case in California) was avoided in Texas. Thus, the lack of 
a plebiscitary policymaking mechanism was pivotal, allowing bilingual education policy 
regimes to take advantage of the political dynamics of retrenchment politics — fear of 
encouraging political retribution from the aggrieved targets of policy rollback. This 
allowed advocates to fend off English Only challenges (Gandara and Rumberger, 2009). 
Policymaking in Texas, thus, has been less susceptible to the radical shifts experienced in 
California (Gandara and Rumberger, 2009).       
 The rest of the chapter will offer in further detail the history of bilingual education 
policy evolution and how the three factors — the open policymaking system, elite 
divisions, and the lack of a plebiscitary policymaking option — contributed to shaping the 
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policy evolution of bilingual education from 1965-2010.  
 
Policy Evolution in Texas Bilingual Education Policy - Introduction 
 During the late 1960s, elite agreement and the open policymaking structure led to 
issue expansion across local, state and federal policy venues. This then resulted in policy 
expansion in bilingual education in Texas and the drafting of federal bilingual education 
legislation, the Bilingual Education Act of 1968. The federal Act was authored by Texas 
Senator Ralf Yarborough in 1967 and was partially the result of Texas’ lead role in local 
experimental efforts to address the needs of its rapidly growing LEP student population.  
The Bilingual Education Act of 1968 spurred an increase in local initiatives. These would 
eventually spawn Texas’ first bilingual education bill, HB 103. The issue expansion during 
this period resulted from elite agreement among political officials of both parties and 
Chicano advocacy which embraced bilingual education as a policy pursuit, merging their 
politics of cultural recognition with the support among bilingual education enjoyed at the 
time. Before discussing the legislation of the 1960s, the following section will provide a 
brief historical summation of the development Mexican advocacy in Texas and how 
bilingual education fit within their demands. 
 
Historical Background of Mexican-American Education Politics  
 Texas has a history of experimenting with bilingual education at the local level that 
dates back to the initial years of Anglo settlement in the region (Blanton, 2004; Perez, 2007 
44-47). Locally, bilingual education arrangements existed as a method for centralizing 
public education in areas controlled by German or Mexican political establishments 
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(Blanton, 2004). Such local arrangements continued from the 19th century through the first 
two decades of the 20th century (Perez, 2007 44-47). With the goals of the Americanization 
and progressive education movements dovetailing — suspicion of local control and 
instruction in languages other than English — state officials disbanded local bilingual 
education arrangements (Blanton, 2004). The legislature passed an English Only 
instruction law in 1918 which officially ended the 19th century bilingual education 
arrangements at the local level (Perez, 2007 51). Bilingual education (for the most part) 
ceased to be practiced in localities and remained in disrepute until the late 1950s when 
Cold War politics, academic findings concerning best practices for the instruction of LEP 
students, and Civil Rights era politics began to move linguistic politics in a more 
multicultural direction (Blanton, 2004). These separate elite movements collectively 
created a political environment that favored bilingual education as an appropriate 
mechanism for integrating and best educating LEP students while also remedying the Civil 
Rights abuses suffered historically by Mexican-Americans (Blanton, 2004).   
 
The Development of Mexican-American Advocacy Coalition  
 Mexican advocacy emerged and matured during this period when English Only 
politics reigned. Mexican American political organization in Texas dates back to the 19th 
century. Tejano communities established mutual-aid societies (sociedades mutualistas) to 
aid Mexican immigrants in the transition to life in the US (Pycior, 2010). In the early 20th 
century, advocacy was catalyzed by the Americanization movement. Specifically, the 
English Only law of 1918 sparked advocacy in education (Blanton, 2004). Anglo 
leadership, backed by elite agreement — implemented English-only instructional mandates 
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in areas of Mexican concentration that had formerly established bilingual policy 
arrangements (Blanton, 2004; Perez, 2009 50). The pedagogical establishment favored 
English-only instruction; politically, the backlash from the turn of the century immigration 
boom was peaking during this period. English acquisition was a central aspect of the 
assimilation process that an increasing number of political elites felt needed to be required 
of immigrants (Blanton, 2004; Ngai, 1999). Among the Mexican- American community, 
however, the statute was seen as an attempt to repress Mexicans and their culture. This 
notion was solidified by the use of English proficiency by school administrators as a means 
for segregating Mexican students in remedial education programs (as many were 
categorized as learning impaired due to their language deficiencies) (Blanton, 2004; Perez, 
2009 50). This inspired Mexican elites and organization create Spanish newspapers to 
encourage literacy in Spanish and private schools (escuelitas) which taught using bilingual/ 
bicultural curriculum (Perez, 2009 49).   
 In 1929, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) formed. It has 
continued to be one of the main Latino advocates for education, business, and law (Perez, 
2009 51). Most relevant to this study, LULAC has been a long time vocal opponent of 
English-only laws and the segregation of Mexican-American students (Perez, 2009 51).  In 
1930, LULAC filed the first class-action suit against Mexican-American student 
segregation, Salvatierra v. Del Rio Independent School District (Perez, 2009 51). It has 
been one of the lead organization in legal initiatives to address Latino rights.  
 The La Liga Denfensa Escolar (The School Improvement League) or La Liga was 
founded in San Antonio in 1934 and became a staunch defender of Mexican-American 
students in San Antonio (Founding of La Liga Defensa Escolar; Orozco, 2010). La Liga 
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was successful in documenting the unequal conditions suffered by Mexican-American 
students and securing redress from the San Antonio school board.  For example, in 1934, 
La Liga initiated a bill to reduce board member terms from 6 to 2 years. They hoped to 
attract the attention of the board to address issues of inequity. In Senate hearings, La Liga 
presented evidence of the poor situation for Mexican students. The School board conceded 
and agreed to the construction of two new schools (Founding of La Liga Defense Escolar). 
La Liga disbanded in 1935 but re-emerged in 1947, but in this iteration it went by its 
English name, The School Improvement League (Orozco, 2010). Its mission, however, 
remained the same. 
 According to Perez (2009), in the post war years, these separate groups began to 
form a Latino advocacy coalition. Earlier in the century, the various Mexican organizations 
in Texas competed over jurisdiction and for members. However as Mexicans continued to 
suffer from unequal treatment in residence, education and employment, the groups slowly 
came to the conclusion that they needed to act in concert to affect change. Segregation in 
residence and schools and poor conditions for students and labor had continued through 
the war years. In the post-war years, a coalition of organizations began to lobby the Texas 
legislature to take an active role in addressing these issues. The coalition consisting of 
LULAC, social, civic, religious, mutual aid societies (mulistias) and labor groups were 
successful in convincing Governor James Ferguson to establish the Office of Inter-
American Affairs. This led to the creation of the Good Neighbor Commission and the Good 
Neighbor Policy Committee. Mexican political inclusion dovetailed with Cold War policy 
goals to secure Mexico as an American ally (Blanton, 2004). Among other issues pertaining 
to Mexican-Americans, these committees held conferences to discuss education issues and 
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led teaching training seminars. Prominent Mexican education professions participated or 
gained their start in these commissions (Perez, 2009 53). 
 In 1948, George I. Sanchez and Virgil E. Strickland published “The Study of the 
Educational Opportunities Provided Spanish Name Children in Texas School Systems.” 
The study revealed the stark inequities Mexican-American students in the state faced when 
compared to the Anglo counterparts. The attention garnered in the Mexican advocacy 
community as well as the recent desegregation ruling in California, Westminster v. Mendez 
(1947), encouraged LULAC to file suit in the Delgado v. Bastrop Independent School 
District. In addition to declaring the segregation of Mexican-American children 
unconstitutional, the ruling prompted assessment of the English assessment testing used to 
evaluate Mexican-American students (Perez, 2009 54).   
 The American GI Forum formed during this period. Originally, forming to protest 
the unequal treatment of Mexican soldiers in the war, the American GI Forum would 
become a major advocate for Latino rights in general (Pycior, 2010). They became active 
in investigations of federal violations committed by school officials in the treatment of 
Mexican students. They teamed with LULAC to bring successful desegregation suits in 
1948 and 1957, Delgado v. Bastrop Independent School District (1948) and Hernández v. 
Driscoll Consolidated School District, respectively (Pycior, 2010; Perez, 2009 54-55).   
 In 1950, Governor Allen Shivers commissioned the Texas Council for the Study of 
Human Relations. The organization was an advisory group designed to improve relations 
between Anglos and Mexicans-Americans in Texas (Orozco, 2010).It was a gesture to the 
Mexican-American advocacy community which had complained that the Good Neighbor 
Commission did not focus sufficiently on domestic issues (Orozco, 2010). This facilitated 
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discussions between Mexican-American organizations and the Texas Education Agency 
(TEA) and the State Board of Education (SBOE) (Perez, 2009 55). A paper produced from 
these discussions, the “Statement of Policy Pertaining to Segregation of Latin American 
Children,” precipitated the hearing of nine cases before the Commission of Education for 
alleged discrimination and segregation of Mexican-American students (Perez, 2009 55).  
 In 1959, two LULAC members, Felix Tijerina and Isabel Verver, founded the Little 
Schools of 400. It was a preschool program that aimed to teach pre-kindergarten-aged 
Spanish speaking students 400 English words so that they could effectively participate in 
school from first grade (Kreneck, 2010). The success of the school and its curriculum led 
to HB 51, which initiated the first Head Start program in Texas (nine years before President 
Johnson Head Start program) (Perez, 2009 55).   
 In the 1960s, the influence of Mexican-Americans in Texas expanded to the 
national level. Texas was responsible for President John F. Kennedy’s narrow victory in 
the 1960 election. The Viva Kennedy/Viva Johnson Clubs were instrumental in mobilizing 
Mexican support (Pycior, 2010). Club leaders eager to take advantage of their new access 
formed the Political Association of Spanish Speaking Organizations to lobby for federal 
attention to issues faced by Texas’ Mexican Americans (Pycior, 2010).  PASSO played a 
role in Kennedy’s appointment of Reynaldo de la Garza, the first Mexican federal judge 
(Perez, 2009 56).   
 Recognizing the need for research in education in order to champion instructional 
approaches appropriate for Mexican-American students, Americo Paredes founded the 
Center for Mexican American Studies (CMAS) at the University of Texas at Austin. 
Theiscreated a space for the development of progressive curricula to address the needs of 
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LEP student populations (Perez, 2009 56).   
 By the mid-1960s, farmworker protests and youth militancy began to emerge amid 
frustration among Mexican advocates that the resources of the Great Society were not 
reaching them (Pycior, 2010). The Southwest Council of La Raza and Chicano 
identification emerged during this period. The former promoted cultural pride and 
bilingualism while the latter served as the embodiment of this new ethnic pride and identity 
(Pycior, 2010). 
 By the late 1960s, Mexican advocacy in Texas had increasingly gaining influence 
at the state and national levels and was galvanized by the identity politics and protest of 
the era. Bilingual education became a policy area that was mutually beneficial for the 
Mexican advocacy coalition and political elites from the late 1960s through mid-1970s.   
Both the Elementary, Secondary Education Act of 1965 and the Bilingual Education Act 
of 1968 set aside federal funds for programs aimed at disadvantaged, Mexican American 
students. Mexican-American advocacy finally had an issue that garnered federal attention. 
And as the next section depicts, support for bilingual education also emerged with the state 
political and education elites. 
 
Policy Evolution Through the Early 1970s 
 Through the early 1970s, bilingual education policy evolved from a combination of 
local initiatives, Texas Education Agency (TEA) initiatives, state legislation and federal 
funding available through the passage of the two previously mentioned, landmark federal 
Civil Rights Acts, the Elementary Secondary Education Act of 1965 and the Bilingual 
Education Act of 1968. 
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 Bilingual education arrangements in this renaissance period initially started with 
local bilingual education arrangements in Laredo United school district in 1964 
(Rodriguez, 2010). The arrangement was the brainchild of Superintendent Harold Bentley 
who based the Laredo United bilingual education program on the one started at the Coral 
Way school in Dade County Florida in 1959 (Rodriguez, 2010). Bentley’s idea then spread 
to other Texan counties. District funds initially financed these programs, which were later 
replaced with federal funds made available through Title I and Title III of the Elementary 
Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 (Rodriguez, 2010). ESEA allocated federal aid 
to localities with underprivileged, minority student populations.  ESEA funding led to a 
flurry of activity to address the needs of disadvantaged students (Rodriguez, 2010). These 
programs incorporated those students lacking in English proficiency (Rodriguez, 2010). 
By 1969, this encouraged the development of bilingual education arrangements in 16 
school districts (Rodriguez, 2010). These arrangements, however, created a conflict for the 
Texas Education Agency (TEA) which was charged with ensuring district compliance with 
the English Only law of 1918, which was still on the books (Rodriguez, 2010). In 1967, 
TEA developed an accreditation criteria allowing for districts to offer non-English 
speaking students a voluntary instructional program using two languages of instruction 
(Rodriguez, 2010). In 1969, state senators Carlos Truan and Joe Bernal spearheaded and 
helped pass legislation in the 61st legislature that allowed for the aforementioned TEA 
standard and for bilingual instruction when it was “beneficial to the students” (Rodriguez, 
2010; Perez, 2010 58).   
 During the same period Chicano advocacy contributed to the political pressure to 
address the needs of Mexican students in Texas (Trujillo, 1998). In Texas, Chicano 
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advocacy had been a major political force in galvanizing grassroots pressure for addressing 
the educational needs of the Mexican community in Texas and the Southwest as a whole 
(Trujillo, 1998). Specifically, MAYO (Mexican American Youth Organization) was 
organized in 1967 as a civil rights political advocate organization for Mexican concerns in 
education, discrimination, police brutality, labor organization, and Chicano cultural 
empowerment in South Texas (Trujillo, 1998 29-30). Educational concerns became their 
main focus supporting several school-walkouts in South Texas between 1967 and 1970 
(Trujillo, 1998 29-30). Rhetorically, Chicano advocacy aimed at cultural and territorial 
empowerment for the Chicano community (Trujillo, 1998). With respect to education, this 
manifested in demands for improving educational outcomes of Chicano students (Trujillo, 
1998 29). 
 The emergence of Chicano advocacy as a real political force in the region coincided 
with the political emergence of bilingual education as the bipartisan policy response of 
choice for addressing the educational needs of Mexican-American students (Trujillo, 1998 
32). Chicano advocacy played a major role in influencing the content of the Bilingual 
Education Act of 1967, authored by Texas-Democrat Senator Ralph Yarborough (Trujillo, 
1998 32). The 1967 Act was the original bilingual education bill proposed to the Johnson 
administration in 1968. This, thus, was a form of venue shifting on the part of Chicanos — 
taking advantage of the favorable national policymaking forum to obtain policy 
concessions in line with their framing of the educational needs of Chicano students in 
Texas and other Southwestern states (Trujillo, 1998 29-33). The original BEA of 1967, 
sponsored by Senator Yarborough, aimed at addressing the educational and cultural 
demands of Chicano advocates for Chicano students (Trujillo, 1998 32). It would 
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eventually expand in scope to address the language needs of language minorities in general 
as the bill made its way through the federal legislative process (Trujillo, 1998 32; 
Crawford, 1999).   
 The passage of the Bilingual Education Act in 1968 (Title VII of ESEA) aided the 
cause of pro-bilingual forces and was precipitated by the venue shifting by Chicano 
activists (Rodriguez, 2010; Trujillo, 1998 32). It made available competitive grants for 
school districts and obligated districts to fund their bilingual programs within five years 
(Rodriguez, 2010). By 1970, Title VII funds supported 27 bilingual education programs in 
Texas school districts, totaling almost $2 million (Policy Research Report, 1998). By the 
spring of 1973, 19 districts required state fiscal support for their bilingual education 
programs as state funds were not appropriated for these policy endeavors of the late 1960s 
(Rodriguez, 2010). Title VII funding had helped to fund these programs after 1969, but the 
funding was insufficient to accommodate the 243,185 LEP students in need of program 
support (Rodriguez, 2010). Nevertheless, federal funding during the late 1960s and early 
1970s provided the fiscal and political means for allowing these local initiatives to spread 
to almost 30 districts in Texas prior to the enactment of state bilingual education legislation 
(Policy Research Report, 1998). An example of how the BEA, 1968 sparked local bilingual 
programs occurred in Crystal City, Texas. La Raza Unida, a militant Chicano organization, 
organized protests against schools in Crystal City, Texas to draw attention to the 
discriminatory treatment of their Spanish-speaking student body (Crawford, 1999 42). 
Among their demands for more fair treatment of Spanish-speaking students was a call for 
establishing bilingual education programs (Crawford, 1999 42). Spawned by Chicano 
activism and venue shifting of the time, Chicano mobilization gained control of the schools 
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and city government (Crawford, 1999 42; Trujillo, 1998 37). Once in control, they used 
BEA funding to establish a K-12 bilingual-bicultural education program that stressed 
cultural maintenance (Crawford, 1999 42; Trujillo, 1998 37). This depicts the interactive 
effects of the local, state, and federal policy venues through issue expansion, venue shifting 
and the legitimation effects passage of bilingual policy initiatives had in other policy 
venues. 
 HB 103 was Texas’ first bilingual education bill (Policy Research Report, 1998).  
Its author, House Representative Carlos Truan (a Democrat from Corpus Christ and who 
has been Texas’ most staunch proponent of bilingual education in the Texas legislature) 
and co-author Senator Joe Bernal (D-San Antonio) were two of the main political actors 
legitimated and empowered by the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 (Policy Research 
Report, 1998). HB 103 passed in Truan’s first year in office (Policy Research Report, 1998; 
Perez, 2007 58). The bill granted that English was the primary language of instruction but 
permitted the use of “instruction in the earlier years which includes the use of language 
that the child understands to make learning easier” (Policy Research Report, 1998; 
Bilingual and Dual Language Education). The 1968 bill allowed for (when “advantageous” 
to the student) the use of the native language instruction but did not mandate bilingual 
education as an approach to address the needs of LEP students (Policy Research Report, 
1998; Truan and Murray, 1969 sec. 2). Bilingual education was not offered or provided 
beyond grade 6 without the expressed consent of the Texas Education Agency (Truan and 
Murray, 1969 sec. 2). It also did not appropriate state funds for the bill’s provision (Policy 
Research Report, 1998). Subsequently, its implementation was severely hampered (Perez, 
2007 19). Nevertheless, the bill repealed the Texas English Only instruction law of 1918 
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and encouraged and legitimated local initiatives (Truan and Murray, 1969 sec. 4; Perez, 
2007). By 1970, 27 programs initiated under the auspices of this bill qualified for federal 
funding totaling $2 million (Policy Research Report, 1998).  
 In 1968, Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District became the first 
post-Brown desegregation ruling (Allsup, 2010). The suit was filed by Texas civil rights 
attorney James DeAnda on behalf of twenty-five Mexican-American parents (Perez, 2009 
59). The ruling declared Mexican-Americans were a minority group that faced 
unconstitutional segregation. The legal recognition of Mexican-Americans as a racial 
group replaced the “other white” — constitutional rights-based on class — that previous 
Mexican desegregation rulings had relied upon (Perez, 2009 59). It also reoriented Mexican 
advocacy officially to lobby for their share of the redistributive redress that Civil Rights 
legislation afforded African Americans. Mexican advocacy and political elites debated 
bilingual education pursued within this paradigm from the 1960s forward.  
 The venue shifting of Mexican advocacy and sympathetic state officials as well as 
issue expansion had bequeathed state policy expansion in the form of HB 103 and further 
policy developments in bilingual education at the local levels. This pattern would continue 
into the early 1970s. 
 
Policy Evolution in the 1970s 
 In the 1970s, continued venue shifting and issue expansion across state and federal 
venues brought about further policy expansion in Texas bilingual education policy. During 
this period the courts and federal executive in addition to the US Congress were catalysts 
for policy expansion at the state level. As elite agreement favoring the expansion of 
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bilingual education was in its peak period of political influence, venue shifting and issue 
expansion across these policymaking venues engendered expansionary bilingual education 
policy trends in Texas through the late 1970s. Advocates for bilingual education recognized 
this and lobbied the multiple alternative policymaking venues at the federal level when 
state policymaking venues were slow to enact their policymaking goals.   
 
Venue Shifting from Chicano Advocacy  
 Chicano advocacy — originating mostly from Texas and California — was also 
directed at the executive branch. They campaigned for federal intervention to address 
issues of high dropout rates and poor educational outcomes for Mexican-American students 
(Crawford, 1999 42). Their efforts contributed to the enactment of the 1970 OCR 
memorandum (explained in detail in the Politics of Bilingual Education chapter). The OCR 
memorandum prepped the legal context for judicial developments that would transform 
bilingual education in the states (including Texas). Furthermore, it is an example of 
advocacy — venue shifting — leading to executive actions that transformed the legal 
context, ultimately, coercing state action (Policy Research Report, 1998).   
 
Actions by the State Board of Education to Strengthen Existing Bilingual Education 
Arrangements 
 During this period of executive action at the federal level, the State Board of 
Education fortified the implementation of current bilingual education initiatives at the state 
level (Policy Research Report, 1998). Legislative proposals to strengthen existing bilingual 
education, despite dying in the legislative process, encouraged action from the State Board 
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of Education. These actions solidified the implementation of existing bilingual education 
policy arrangements (Policy Research Report, 1998). This involved ensuring that the 
pedagogical goals of bilingual education programs would include the use of the student’s 
native language in instruction to acclimate the student to the school environment and 
encourage the development of bilingual academic skills (Policy Research Report, 1998). 
 In 1971, Texas Representative Carlos Truan introduced two bills (HB 495 and HB 
1024) to strengthen and expand bilingual education (Policy Research Report, 1998 4).  
Neither bill would pass. HB 495 was proposed but held up and died in committee, and HB 
1024 was passed but did not become law (Latino Education Policy in Texas: Bilingual and 
Dual Language Education). However, these initiatives did encourage the State Board of 
Education to develop a more extensive policy statement on the state’s existing bilingual 
education laws (Policy Research Report, 1998 4; Perez, 2009 59). The 1971 Bilingual 
Education State-wide Plan mandated bilingual education programs to 1) introduce LEP 
students to the school environment through use of the student’s first language; 2) develop 
the student’s language skills in their first and second languages; 3) instruct in both 
languages; and 4) assist the student in developing a positive self-image and appreciation 
for their cultural heritage through the use of instruction in the child’s native language 
(Policy Research Report, 1998 4). TEA then published and distributed a guide to districts 
to assist in the implementation of this new mission statement. The guide indicated that the 
initial language was of value and a pedagogical end unto itself. The use of native languages 
was not to simply transition the LEP student to mainstream/ all-English instruction, 
resulting in the discard of the native tongue. The goal of bilingual education should be the 
development of students that can function bilingually (Policy Research Report, 1998 4). 
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This new policy mission, thus, established cultural maintenance, biculturalism and 
bilingualism as the main goals of bilingual education policy. This would be extremely 
progressive by modern standards and certainly was in the early 1970s. 
 
Policy Developments in the Judicial Branch 
 In Texas, according to Fenner (2012), bilingual education policy has been 
influenced not only by legislation at the national and state level, but also by judicial actions 
at the various judicial levels of the American federalist system. Beginning from the early 
20th century, Mexican-American advocacy pursued a three-prong legal strategy to 
influence the educational outcomes of Mexican-American students. These three legal 
strategies were desegregation, educational funding, and equal opportunity in education 
(Fenner, 2012 91). Through the mid-1970s this was a promising approach as the federal 
and state judiciary were sympathetic to equity and desegregation claims by minority 
litigants (Fenner, 2012 91). However, by the late 1970s, the court became less so, 
establishing judicial precedents later in the decade which precluded this as a viable strategy 
in the decades to follow for those Latino interests favoring the expansion of bilingual 
education (Fenner, 2012).  
 During the early 1970s, advocates for Latino education reform and bilingual 
education pursued desegregation and equal opportunity legal strategies. The US Eastern 
District court considered issues of desegregation and equal opportunity in two Texas school 
districts, San Felipe and Del Rio (Policy Research Report, 1998 5; Perez, 2009 61). The 
court's ruling would greatly affect state legislation concerning bilingual education in Texas. 
And it is an example of venue shifting to the federal courts leading to policy expansion.   
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 An issue of contention in the judicial suit was whether the two districts were 
providing equal educational opportunities to Mexican students (Policy Research Report, 
1998 5; Perez, 2009 61). In United States v. State of Texas (1971/1972), Judge William 
Wayne Justice ordered the consolidation of the two districts (Policy Research Report, 1998 
5; Perez, 2009 61). Four months later, Justice ordered the implementation of a 
comprehensive bilingual/bicultural education program. This program concurred with the 
guidelines laid out by the OCR in 1970 concerning the educational responsibilities of states 
and districts to their LEP student population. The program sought to reinforce the OCR 
goal of the “cultural and linguistic pluralism of the student body” (OCR quoted in Policy 
Research Report, 1998 5). Thus, in this example the court ruling (via judicial activism) 
provided legal foundation for the legal context created by the OCR memorandum.  
 Venue shifting to federal courts in this case was favorable for advocates of bilingual 
education. As this was the period when the federal courts embraced bilingual education as 
the best pedagogical approach to address the needs of LEP student, Justice’s ruling was in 
line with the political trends of the federal judiciary during the early 1970s.  His ruling 
practically mandated policy expansion in bilingual education for Texas. 
 
SB 121- The Passage of the Bilingual Education and Training Act 
 Bilingual education has been the law the of the state since 1973 when Governor 
Dolph Briscoe and the state legislature signed the Bilingual Education and Training Act 
(S.B. 121) into law (Blakeslee, 2009 146; Rodriguez, 2010). The law was passed right after 
Judge Justice’s ruling in the United States v. State of Texas (1971/1972) and with the 
support of the Texas Association of continuing Adult Education and the League of United 
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Latin American Citizens (LULAC) (Policy Research Report, 1998 5; Perez, 2009 60). It 
was the legislative outcome of venue shifting to the federal courts, in which Judge Justice 
virtually legislated policy expansion for bilingual education in Texas.   
 The law, sponsored by House Representative Truan, mandated that districts with at 
least 20 English language learners in the same [elementary school] grade which shared the 
same language classification the previous year offer bilingual education classes (Blakeslee, 
2009 146; Policy Research Report, 1998 5; Perez, 2009 60). It ended the ‘no-Spanish 
rules,’ which had forbade the speaking of Spanish by Spanish-speaking students on school 
grounds (Rodriguez, 2010). SB 121 required that districts use native-tongue instruction to 
facilitate the learning and the eventual transfer of the LEP students to mainstream English-
only instruction. English literacy was to be developed through ESL training. The program 
was to be a full-time program employed in all subject areas and students were not to be 
segregated from English-speaking students (Policy Research Report, 1998 5). The initial 
program applied to only grade 1 but the law required that an additional grade would be 
added each year through grade 6 (Policy Research Report, 1998 5; Perez, 2009 60). The 
law did not require bilingual education for grades 7-12 (Policy Research Report, 1998 5; 
Perez, 2009 60). For the two year budget, the state appropriated $2.7 million (Policy 
Research Report, 1998 5; Perez, 2009 60). The state allocated $15 per student for 
instructional resources (Policy Research Report, 1998 5; Perez, 2009 60). The law also 
authorized the use of bilingual textbooks (Policy Research Report, 1998 5; Perez, 2009 
61). The SBOE began the process of developing rules concerning certification for bilingual 
education instructors (Policy Research Report, 1998 5). And TEA initiated the 
establishment of bilingual education training institutes to train public school instructors 
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(Policy Research Report, 1998 5; Perez, 2009 60). Bilingual education programs under the 
act went into effect with the 1974-75 academic year (Policy Research Report, 1998 5).   
 Thus, the Justice ruling encouraged the passage of SB 121. Although the Act 
required the provision of bilingual education in districts with at least 20 LEP students of 
the same language and in the same grade level, the bilingual education programs offered 
were transitional bilingual education. No mention was made of cultural maintenance nor 
bilingualism. SBOE rules, however, had already stated these as the program's end goals for 
existing bilingual education programs. Additionally, SB 121 did mandate that districts with 
sizable LEP student populations at least offer bilingual education through 6th grade.  This 
made SB 121 expansionary when compared with HB 53 which only permitted (and did not 
require) the use bilingual education. Lastly, as SB 121 was passed before the Lau ruling, it 
was quite progressive for it its day.   
 
Issue Expansion in the Mid- and Late 1970s     
 In the mid-1970s, equal education opportunity was the issue paradigm that 
governed the responses of the federal courts, the US Congress, and agencies of the 
legislative and executive branches to address the issues of LEP students (Policy Research 
Report, 1998 5).  As a collective, these moves by the US Congress and the courts coerced 
districts to reevaluate their policies and obligations towards its LEP student population 
(Policy Research Report, 1998 5). As will be detailed below, these serve as further 
examples of issue expansion creating legal impetuses for state policy change. 
 In 1974, directives from the Supreme Court and Congress put additional pressure 
on states to meet the legal needs of LEP students protected by the Civil Rights Act and the 
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OCR memorandum of 1970. The Lau ruling by the Supreme Court made it the law that the 
failure to provide language assistance to LEP students amounted to denying them 
meaningful access to education— a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (Policy 
Research Report, 1998 5). Although the Supreme Court and OCR censured districts for not 
addressing the language needs of its LEP populations, their directives did not mandate 
bilingual education (Policy Research Report, 1998 5). Bilingual education, thus, remained 
an option among others to ensure district compliance with federal civil rights law (Policy 
Research Report, 1998). Nevertheless, pro-bilingual education forces in Texas and other 
localities were emboldened by the ruling. 
 In the same year Congress passed the Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1974.  
This act permitted citizens to bring civil action when they were denied equal educational 
opportunity. Additional lawsuits by Latino parents ensued (Crawford, 2007 150). This, 
further encouraged all schools — not just those receiving federal grants — to comply with 
the OCR memorandum and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (Policy Research Report, 1998 
5).   
 Lastly, the 1974 reauthorization of the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 led to the 
expansion of bilingual education. It provided increased funding for districts with LEP 
populations and offered the first federal definition of a bilingual education program. This 
helped further legitimize bilingual practitioners locally (Navarro, 1990 304). 
 Moreover in 1974, TEA received a report from US Commission on Civil Rights (a 
bipartisan agency established by Congress in 1957) that was critical of several bilingual 
programs in southwestern states including Texas. The Commission had engaged in a study 
between 1971 and 1974 of segregationist and exclusionary practices used by the state of 
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Texas to segregate and exclude Mexican-American students from its Anglo student 
population (Rodriguez, 2010). The Commission found that traditional monolingual schools 
had fostered poor academic performance, demeaning influences, and alienation among the 
Mexican-American population (Rodriguez, 2010). The Commission also found that 
bilingual programs were severely underfunded, only reached a small percentage of the LEP 
student population and did not do enough to address Mexican culture and history (Policy 
Research Report, 1998 5-6).   
 The SBOE, before submitting its legislative recommendations for addressing LEP 
student needs, requested that TEA conduct a study to research the accusations made by the 
US Commission on Civil Rights. In a TEA report, delivered by the SBOE to the 64th 
Legislature, the study concurred with the US Commission on Civil Rights and 
recommended that the lawmakers reform bilingual educational law by giving it “increased 
and continued financial support” and expanding it to include kindergarten (Policy Research 
Report, 1998 7).   
 In August of 1975, U.S. Education Commissioner Terell Bell announced guidelines 
for identifying and evaluating LEP students and for planning bilingual education and ESL 
programs to address their needs (Rodriguez, 2010).   
 In 1975, several bills were introduced to amend bilingual education laws in Texas. 
House Bill 1126 — public school finance bill — passed in 1975 (Policy Report, 1998 7). 
It included an amendment to bilingual education laws (Policy Report, 1998 7; Perez, 2009 
61). The amendment added kindergarten to the mandatory program but opponents of 
bilingual education successfully won the removal of grades 4-6 as mandatory (Perez, 2009 
61; Policy Research Report, 1998 7; TEA et al, 2006 14). State funds were provided for 
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bilingual education in grades 4 and 5, however, those programs were optional (Policy 
Report, 1998 7; Perez, 2009 61). Districts could choose to offer bilingual education beyond 
the 5th but they would have to assume fiscal responsibility for its provision Perez, 2009 
61; Policy Research Report, 1998 7).    
 In 1975, LULAC, the American GI forum, and the Mexican American Legal 
Defense and Education Fund brought a suit against the state of Texas, alleging that the state 
of Texas failed to provide equal educational opportunities for English language learners 
(ELL) despite the 1973 law (Blakeslee, 2009 147). This was in response to the exclusion 
of mandatory bilingual education in grades 4 and 5 and the state funding support 
implemented with the aforementioned 1975 amendments (Policy Report, 1998 7; Perez, 
2009 61). Their efforts were aimed at reactivating the United States v. The State of Texas 
desegregation case of 1970 in which Judge William Justice had issued an extensive 
desegregation order to Texas public school districts that resulted in the expansion of 
bilingual education Policy Report, 1998 7; Kemerer, 2010). This was another example of 
Mexican-American advocacy groups venue shifting to the favorable venue headed by 
Judge Justice as policy outcomes via the legislature had been unsatisfactory. 
 The plaintiffs alleged that Texas had engaged in discriminatory practices against 
Mexican Americans — denying them equal education opportunity (Perez, 2009 62). They 
asked that the court mandate TEA to implement a bilingual education program for all LEP 
students in the state (Policy Report, 1998 7; Kemerer, 2010; Perez, 2009 62). It would be 
six years before a ruling was issued (Policy Research Report, 1998 7; Perez, 2009 62).   
 During the period while the case was pending, federal requirements became stricter 
(Policy Research Report, 1998 7). Following the Lau Rulings, the OCR developed 
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guidelines (the Lau Remedies) for districts to adhere to the Court’s Lau ruling (Policy 
Research Report, 1998 7). Each school found in violation of the ruling had to submit a plan 
to the OCR detailing how it would eliminate inequities towards its LEP student population 
or risk losing federal funding under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) 
(Policy Research Report, 1998 7). 
 Texas school districts experienced increased federal scrutiny between 1976 and 
1978 (Policy Research Report, 1998 7). State officials met periodically with OCR officials 
concerning how to ensure district compliance with OCR regulations. Despite these efforts, 
by 1978, 40 Texas schools were found to be in violation of Title VI. The OCR subsequently 
moved to withhold $14 million in federal funds made available under the Emergency 
Education Act of 1972 — legislation aimed at assisting districts with high minority student 
populations and those undergoing desegregation. TEA also used its implementation power 
to expand the reach of bilingual education in response to the resulting OCR induced federal 
scrutiny (Policy Research Report, 1998 7).  
 As the TEA and state officials contested federal moves to withhold federal funding, 
the SBOE moved to develop administrative rules to implement its Texas State Plan for 
Bilingual Education (Policy Research Report, 1998 7). The SBOE implemented the rules 
in June of 1978 on an emergency basis, voting to expand the mandatory bilingual education 
plan to grade 4 and 5 and mandating English language development services for grades 6-
12 (Policy Research Report, 1998 7). These rules applied to any district where LEP 
students were present and was not restricted to the bilingual education statutory 
requirement, which only applied to those districts with 20 or more LEP students of the 
same language classification in any one grade (Policy Research Report, 1998 7).  TEA et 
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al (2006 14) states that these measures were taken in response to the increased federal 
scrutiny and mandates issued by HEW and OCR. Thus, TEA used its implementation 
power to expand policy (the reach of SB 121) in response to the criteria set by OCR. This 
shows the influence of venue shifting to the executive and judicial branch (since the Lau 
ruling gave the OCR memorandum the effect of law) and the effects of issues expansion in 
general. Venue shifting to the executive (OCR) and the courts and issue expansion of the 
period not only precipitated policy response from the legislature but also policy action from 
state agencies. 
 
The Conflict Over the Number of Years for Mandatory Bilingual Education and 
Reclassification Score Thresholds 
 The issue expansion that resulted in favorable legislation, executive directives and 
judicial rulings at the federal level was facilitated by elite agreement concerning bilingual 
education in the early 1970s. Elites for various political and pedagogical reasons concurred 
that bilingual education best addressed issues of equal education opportunity. By the late 
1970s, however, elite disagreement concerning further expansion of bilingual education 
began to emerge both at the state level and at the federal level (in congressional legislation 
and judicial rulings). With respect to elite division in Texas, this played out over the grade 
levels for which bilingual education would be mandatory and also concerning threshold 
scores which students needed to reach on standardized tests to merit reclassification from 
LEP to mainstream instruction. 
 By November when SBOE adopted the rules on a permanent basis, the Plan had 
been significantly weakened amid concerns over program costs and lack of qualified 
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teachers — a reorientation of issue problematization from that of equal educational 
opportunity (Policy Research Report, 1998 7). Mandatory bilingual education was again 
restricted to grades K-3 with grades 4 and 5 being optional. The plan was also restricted to 
those districts with 20 or more LEP students of the same language classification in any one 
grade — a change from the emergency plan which made bilingual education mandatory in 
districts simply where LEP students were present (Policy Report, 1998 7). Although 
English language development services were made mandatory for grades K-12, state funds 
were not provided for this program. Additionally, the plan allowed for the reclassification 
of LEP students to non-LEP when the student scored at least at the 23rd percentile on the 
reading and language arts section of the TEA-approved achievement tests. The provision 
was controversial as it lowered the threshold from the 40th percentile, a bar TEA had 
mandated to all school districts arguing that students should be reclassified out of LEP 
assistance when their integration and participation in the mainstream classroom setting was 
not jeopardized by their proficiency in English (Policy Research Report, 1998 7).   
 It was clear there were divisions within the SBOE concerning the extent of bilingual 
education. Although there had been support for expanding bilingual education according 
to the emergency plan issued by the TEA, the introduction of the fiscal impact dimension, 
altered the consensus, bringing a majority back to a more restrained level of mandatory 
bilingual education provisions. As the SBOE board members represented different regions, 
which had varying support for bilingual education (with the border regions having a 
stronger affection for bilingual education arrangements) and the emerging issue dimension 




United States v. the State of Texas Part 2 
 Hearings began for the suit brought by the Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Education Fund (MALDEF) and other Mexican advocacy groups (United States v. Texas) 
in December of 1979 (Policy Research Report, 1998 8). Testimony surrounded the 
historical treatment of Mexican students and whether the state had done enough to provide 
equal educational opportunity (Policy Research Report, 1998 8). In 1981, federal district 
judge William Wayne Justice ordered the state to reform the bilingual education program 
to satisfy the 1975 suit (Blakeslee, 2009 147). Justice ruled that the state had engaged in 
historic discrimination against Mexican American students, which violated the equal 
protection clause of the 14th amendment, and that the state response to the needs of LEP 
students was severely inadequate, constituting a violation of the Equal Educational 
Opportunity Act of 1974 (Policy Research Report, 1998 8; TEA et al, 2006 14). The Justice 
ruling designated Mexican Americans as a protected class (TEA et al, 2006 14). Justice 
cited various inadequacies including failure of program coverage (half of the students 
identified as LEP students were not in bilingual education programs), inadequate 
procedures for identifying LEP students, inadequate establishment of entrance and exit 
requirements, inadequate training of administrators and instructors, problematic 
monitoring and enforcements procedures, and failure to utilize all available certified 
teachers with bilingual education certification (Policy Research Report, 1998 8; TEA et al, 
2006 14). Judge Justice mandated a comprehensive plan of relief to eliminate the effects 
of past discrimination and to ensure future compliance with “the laws of the land” (Policy 
Research Report, 1998 8). This plan had to be made available to all LEP students in the 
state for as long as was necessary for them to “fulfill their educational potential” (Policy 
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Research Report, 1998 8). Specifically, Justice ordered bilingual education for K-5 to begin 
with the 1981-82 school year and for it to be extended through grade 12 by the 1985-86 
academic year (TEA et al, 2006 14). To address staffing needs, TEA was mandated to 
implement an aggressive recruiting and training plan (Policy Research Report, 1998 8). 
English proficiency would be determined through a combination of teacher observations 
and standardized testing, and a home language assessment survey would be distributed to 
all students (not just those with Spanish surnames). To evaluate their progress, students 
enrolled in bilingual education programs were to be evaluated at the end of each academic 
year. Reforms were made to the exit criteria to include mixed assessments (teacher 
evaluations, standardized test scores, oral proficiency assessments, parental opinions, and 
mastery of specific English language skills). TEA was required to visit each school at least 
once every three years to ensure compliance. Those schools found in violation would face 
severe penalties (Policy Research Report, 1998 8). The parties to the suit were required to 
issue a joint plan to address the requirements in Justice’s ruling within 60 days of the 
January 9, 1981 ruling (or by March 9, 1981) (TEA et al, 2006 14). If they could not agree 
on a joint plan, they were to submit separate plans (Policy Research Report, 1998 8).  
 After the two parties could not agree on a joint plan, separate plans were submitted 
to Judge Justice. After reviewing the separate plans, Justice ruled that the Texas plan was 
nothing more than an advocation for the status quo (Policy Research Report, 1998 8). He 
issued a remedial order similar to the plan issued in his opinion, but added several new 
requirements: School districts were to establish language proficiency assessment 
committees to assess LEP student placement; parental advisory committees to monitor 
district compliance with the court order; and TEA was to request that districts offer six-
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week summer school sessions for LEP students (Policy Research Report, 1998 8). The state 
program has since been under Judge Justice’s jurisdiction (Blakeslee, 2009).   
 Concurrently, the Texas legislature received a report from the Task Force on 
Bilingual Education, 1981. The report, the culmination of a month-long study by a 15-
member panel, cited inadequacies with the current bilingual education legislation and 
agreed on a number of recommended changes to the law. The panel disagreed, however, 
on the best way to teach LEP students at the secondary level.  Seven of the members felt 
bilingual education should be taught in grades K-12; seven of the members believed it 
should only be mandatory through grade 6. The chair of the department broke the tie and 
the Task Force publicly recommended bilingual education for grades K-6 (Policy Research 
Report, 1998 8).   
 When the Texas legislature convened in January of 1981, proponents of bilingual 
education were skeptical that they could garner enough support to expand the current law 
(Policy Research Report, 1998 8). Two previous bills to expand the program (in 1977 and 
1979 sessions) had both been rejected (Policy Research Report, 1998 8). Moreover, several 
recently published national reports including an assessment of Title VII projects by the US 
Office of Education had raised doubts about the efficacy of bilingual education to raise 
student achievement (Policy Research Report, 1998 8; for other reports see the Politics of 
Bilingual Education Chapter). However, the Justice ruling greatly changed the politics of 
bilingual education in 1981 by reorienting the policy definition to equal education 
opportunity (as issue definitions of program efficacy and fiscal impacts were gaining 
political salience) (Policy Research Report, 1998 8). Encouraged by the aforementioned, 
Senator Carlos Truan introduced SB 477 in February of 1981, which closely followed the 
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guidelines set out in the Justice ruling (Policy Research Report, 1998 8; Perez, 2009 62). 
Truan introduced the bill in the period between Justice’s 1981 ruling and an appeal of that 
ruling made by the Attorney General on behalf of the state to the 5th US Circuit court in 
July (TEA et al, 2006 14).  At hearings held by the Senate Education Committee, committee 
members contested the bill, objecting to its scope and the associated costs of its provision 
(Policy Research Report, 1998 8). Senators voted to send SB 477 to subcommittee for 
further review. The subcommittee task force issued its report a month later. Senator Truan 
modified SB 477 to include some of the task force recommendations including limitations 
on mandatory bilingual instruction. Despite continued opposition that forced last minute 
changes, SB 477 was passed June 1, 1981 (Policy Research Report, 1998 8). The text of 
the bill maintained that English was the main language of instruction. However, it 
acknowledged that for students whose native language was not English, English-only 
instruction was not an effective pedagogical approach (Hobby, Clayton, Snelson, 1981 38). 
It viewed bilingual education as an effective tool in integrating students into the 
mainstream by providing assistance in mastering core concepts in early grades (Hobby, 
Clayton, Snelson, 1981 38). Its use was restricted to this transitional paradigm, facilitating 
the eventual mainstreaming of LEP students into all-English instruction (and not for 
cultural maintenance) (Hobby, Clayton, Snelson, 1981 38). It was to be a dual-language 
instructional program in which the student’s native tongue was used to facilitate the 
acquisition of core educational concepts and English proficiency (Hobby, Clayton, 
Snelson, 1981 42). The bill required schools to offer bilingual education for grades K-5 
(and grade 6 if deemed as an elementary grade in the district), but retained the provision 
from the earlier law that it only pertained to districts with at least 20 LEP students of the 
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same language classification in the same grade (Policy Research Report, 1998 8; Hobby, 
Clayton, Snelson, 1981 41). The bill also modified requirements laid out in Justice’s ruling 
pertaining to the post-elementary grades, only requiring that schools had to offer bilingual 
education, ESL, or other transitional language instruction approved by TEA in grades 7 
and 8 (Policy Research Report, 1998 8; Hobby, Clayton, Snelson, 1981 39). Students in 
grades 9-12 were to be offered ESL services. School districts were also encouraged to offer 
pre-school, summer school, extended day or week programs for LEP students (Policy 
Research Report, 1998 8). School districts that did were not mandated to offer bilingual 
education. However those with LEP student populations, had to offer ESL programs for 
grades K-12 (Hobby, Clayton, Snelson, 1981 41). Instruction in all special language classes 
was to consider the students’ cultural background and learning experiences (Policy 
Research Report, 1998 8) and thus did acknowledge the importance of developing a 
positive cultural identity along with language proficiency (Gandara and Rumberg, 2009 
763). The commissioner of education was also authorized to mandate that districts provide 
bilingual education programs even if they were not mandated by their LEP student 
population (Hobby, Clayton, Snelson, 1981 41). This bill also authorized the 
Commissioner of Education to grant exceptions to the mandatory bilingual education 
programs in those situations where there was a lack of trained bilingual education staff 
(Policy Research Report, 1998 8).  Exemptions could be approved in one-year increments. 
Districts requesting such an exemption had to provide evidence of the teacher shortage and 
present a plan to increase the recruiting of trained staff. During the exemption period, 
districts were permitted to employ approved alternative methods for addressing LEP 
student needs. The SBOE was concurrently required to draft a plan to meet the teacher 
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supply needs and submit it to the legislature by January of 1983. Borrowing from the 
Justice ruling, this bill also required the establishment of language proficiency assessment 
committees (LPAC) to implement SBOE-established standards for identifying LEP 
students (Policy Research Report, 1998 9; Perez, 2009 62). The bill also included exit 
criteria similar to that included in Judge Justice’s order— relying on multiple assessment 
measures and that LEP students score at least in the 40th percentile before being 
reclassified as non-LEP (Policy Research Report, 1998 9; TEA et al, 2006 14). TEA was 
also required to monitor compliance by visiting each school at least once every three years 
(Policy Research Report, 1998 9; Perez, 2009 63). This requirement has since been lifted 
via the passage of an amendment (TEA, 2006 14).   
 Bilingual education was appropriated $18 million from the legislature for the two-
year budget (Policy Research Report, 1998 9; Perez, 2009 63). Bilingual education pupils 
were allocated $50 per pupil and $12.50 was allocated for ESL or special language classes 
(Policy Research Report, 1998 9; Hobby, Clayton, Snelson, 1981; Perez, 2009 63). These 
provisions could be spent on student evaluation, instruction materials, staff development, 
or supplemental staff expenses (Policy Research Report, 1998 9). 
 As the SBOE prepared to change its rules to implement SB 477, legal activities 
continued concerning the Eastern U.S. District Court (Policy Research Report, 1998 9).  
Judge Justice, unsatisfied with the contents of of SB 477 (specifically, that it only mandated 
bilingual education through grade 5), ordered that the state ignore SB 477 and comply with 
his ruling (TEA et al, 2006 14).  
 Judge Justice’s order, mandating TEA to implement bilingual education in grades 
K-12, was still in effect and set to begin with the 1981-82 school year when the state 
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appealed the decision to the Fifth US Circuit Court of Appeals (Policy Research Report, 
1998 9; TEA et al, 2006 14). The three-judge panel ruled in favor of the state, staying Judge 
Justice’s ruling on July 12, 1982 and returning the ruling to Justice for him to take it under 
review (TEA et al, 2006 14). The three-judge panel cited that he relied on flawed evidence 
to render such a sweeping order on the state (Policy Research Report, 1998 9).   With this 
ruling, the state, thus, was not under legal obligation to carry out the exact provisions of 
Justice’s ruling (TEA et al, 2006 14).  And beginning with the 1981-82 academic year, the 
provisions of SB 477 became the law of the state governing bilingual education (TEA, 
2006 14).    
 
Analysis of Events Surrounding the Passage of SB 477 
 This period ending with the implementation of SB 477 was indicative of elite divide 
and how it played out in the multiple venues involved in policy outcomes in bilingual 
education for the state of Texas. At the federal level, bilingual education was losing its 
support in congress, the executive and the judiciary. In the late 1970s (in addition to the 
mentioned report by the US Office of Education), a number of high profile reports had 
been published which questioned the efficacy of bilingual education to improve 
educational opportunities for LEP students. Thus, the issue definition of bilingual 
education transitioned from equal opportunity to program efficacy (or accountability— 
how to make programs more accountable for student outcomes). These reports championed 
pedagogies that predominantly focused on improving English proficiency. In Congress, the 
1978 reauthorization of the Bilingual Education Act restricted federal funding to 
transitional bilingual education (TBE) programs— programs with the goal of 
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mainstreaming students (Crawford, 1998 56). In 1978, developmental bilingual education 
was removed from a list of federally supported supported programs (Czegledy, 2005 13-
14). By 1980, President Reagan began permitting BEA funding for monolingual programs 
such as Sheltered English Immersion (Czegledy, 2005 15). The Reagan administration also 
terminated the executive (OCR) enforcement of the Lau remedies. Thus, the support that 
bilingual education had enjoyed in the federal legislative and executive branches in the 
early 1970s— and which had resulted in policy expansion at the state level— had begun 
to dissolve as elite agreement concerning the bilingual education began to splinter. The 
consensus that backed bilingual eduction for education equity issues had been dissolved by 
the change in issue dimension to education efficacy and accountability (Crawford, 1999 
56) 
 At the state level, there was conflict concerning the expanse of mandatory bilingual 
education because of the funding implication and lack of trained professionals.  The fiscal 
dimension of the issue splintered the consensus that had backed the education equity 
dimension of bilingual education. This played out in the legislature in the passage of SB 
477 and in the SBOE and TEA implementation of curriculum standards for bilingual 
education.   
 And in the judicial branch, Judge Justice continued to be an avid supporter of 
expansive bilingual education. His ruling continued to focus on the education equity 
dimension of the issue. However, the Fifth US Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that his 1981 
ruling rested on faulty argumentation and invalidated his expansive order concerning 
bilingual education provisions for the 1981-82 academic year. 
 In the end a moderated SB 477 emerged from this political context. However, it 
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was still expansionary compared to its predecessor, the Bilingual Education and Training 
Act (S.B. 121). English remained the stated language of the school and bilingual education 
was for the purpose of acclimating students to the academic environment, assisting them 
in the mastery of core academic subjects and eventually transitioning them to mainstream 
course work. The text did, however, mention that the students’ culture should be considered 
in instruction and, thus, it did consider cultural empowerment as a pedagogical goal — and 
this was policy expansion compared to the Bilingual Education and Training Act (S.B. 
121), which made no such mention. Additionally, exit criteria were increased to the those 
scoring at least in the 40th percentile and the multi-criteria assessment formula used for the 
eligibility criteria (although the former two would be short lived victories — see next 
section). Thus, despite the elite disagreement and the changing politics in the federal and 
state venues towards more restrictionism — via the increased salience of other issue 
dimensions — SB 477 still represented an expansionary moment (if only a minor one). 
This speaks to the influence of Judge Justice (the result of venue shifting by Mexican-
American advocacy), whose ruling — although overturned — influenced the reach and 
eventual content of SB 477. 
 
Continued Conflict over Reclassification in the Implementation of SB 477 
 The elite conflict that had been evident in SBOE implementation prior to the 
passage of SB 477 continued, affecting its implementation. The SBOE adopted the new 
rules concerning bilingual education on an emergency basis in July of 1981. Two 
provisions caused Senator Truan to claim that they intended to undermine the intent of SB 
477: first, the rules continued to allow (under certain circumstances) the reclassification of 
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LEP students who scored as low as the 23rd percentile in the reading and language arts 
sections of the achievement test (Policy Research Report, 1998 9).  This was contrary to 
the SB 477 requirement of scoring at least in the 40th percentile, which had changed the 
23rd percentile bar that originated with the SBOE Texas State Plan for Bilingual Education 
issued in 1978 (Policy Research Report, 1998 9). Second, the LEP eligibility criteria for 
assessing students in kindergarten and first grade was based solely on an oral English 
proficiency test; reading and writing proficiency were not included as part of the 
assessment criteria. Despite more than 300 letters and telegrams protesting the inclusion of 
these controversial rules, the rules were left unchanged and the SBOE officially 
implemented the rules in November of 1981 (Policy Research Report, 1998 12).   
 Thus two of the main points of policy expansion won in SB 477 were eliminated in 
its implementation. The politics of policy rollback that was evident in the events leading 
up to the passage of SB 477 came to fruition in its implementation. Elite division 
concerning bilingual education played out in the politics of the SBOE, as its policy 
implementation moved rollback provisions of SB 477. 
 
Continued Expansion Despite Reduced Federal Enforcement of Bilingual Education 
 The meetings between TEA and OCR in 1982 would depict the changed politics in 
the executive that took place after Reagan’s election in 1980. The OCR in the 1970s was 
at the vanguard of aggressive federal enforcement of the Lau remedies, which called for 
bilingual education. In the late 1970s, the OCR had also been quite critical of Texas’ 
response to OCR directives and, in 1978, had threatened to withhold $14 million in federal 
funds made available under the Emergency Education Act of 1972. The Reagan-led OCR 
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was a different institution, ideologically, by 1982. In March of 1982, TEA met with the 
OCR to renew its collaboration in the “voluntary enforcement of civil rights” (Policy 
Research Report, 1998 12). After a two day session, TEA and OCR agreed that school 
districts found in compliance by TEA of SBOE rules would also be in compliance with 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Policy Research Report, 1998 12). Thus, OCR 
had delegated its enforcement power to the state — indicative of the devolutionary 
approach to social policy favored by Reagan and the Republicans of the 1980s.   
 Nevertheless, incremental policy expansion in bilingual education continued 
despite the reduced role of federal enforcement. During a special session in the summer of 
1984, the legislature passed sweeping education reforms in the HB 72 bill, including two 
amendments for young children with language difficulties (Policy Research Report, 1998 
12). A prekindergarten program was started for four-year olds with limited English 
proficiency or from low income families. The bill also directed districts to offer summer 
programs for LEP students aged 4 through 6 who were scheduled to enter kindergarten or 
first grade the following fall. HB 72 also dramatically increased funding for bilingual 
education. State funds were to increase in the district on a weighted scale that increased 
funding by 0.1 for every LEP student in the district. This subsequently led to the increase 
of state funding from $7 million in the 83-84 school year to $37 million in the 86-87 school 
year (Policy Research Report, 1998 12).   
 This amounted to incremental expansion of the state’s commitment to bilingual 
education. Concurrently, however, a growing counter movement was growing in political 




English Only Movement in the 1980s 
 During this time, anti-bilingual forces began organizing around efforts to make 
English the official language of the state via constitutional amendment. If passed, this 
constitutional amendment would affect bilingual education policy as the proposals put 
forward called for English to be the language used by the government, and this would 
include schools. Although Crawford (1999) argues that English Only movements took 
pains to avoid direct public confrontation concerning the fate of bilingual education, this 
was not the case in Texas (see Tatalovich, 1995). It was never specified exactly how an 
Official English constitutional amendment would manifest in bilingual education policy 
but its consequences for bilingual education was part of the debate (Tatolovich, 1995).   
 It would be this episode where the lack of direct democracy policy making 
mechanism would begin to influence the politics of English Only politics in Texas going 
forward. English Only was politically popular with the electorate according to polls.  
However, it was not with the state’s Republicans, who feared supporting Official English 
and taking on an entrenched, mobilized Latino advocacy network. This would influence 
how English Only pedagogical campaigns would play out in the 1990s. 
 The first proposal, House Concurrent Resolution 13 was put forward by its lone 
sponsor, state representative Kae T. Patrick (R-San Antonio). It died in the Committee on 
State Affairs (Tatalovich, 1995 161). In 1987, House Resolution 55 called for English to 
be the official language of the state. It would require the Legislature and government 
officials to take actions to bring this into effect and that the Legislature would not be 
permitted to enact rulings that contradicted English as the official language (Tatalovich, 
1995 161). It would also authorize residents of the state of Texas the power to bring legal 
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action against those seen to violate the resolution (Tatalovich, 1995 161). It was sponsored 
by L.P. “Pete” Patterson (D-Brookston) and co-sponsored by Billy Clemons (D-Pollock), 
Jim Horn (R-Denton), Jerry Yost (R-Longview), Foster Whaley (D-Pampa), M.A. Taylor 
(R-Waco), Tom Waldrop (D-Corscicana), Talmage Helfin (R-Houston).46 This bipartisan 
bill would have added an amendment to Section 70 of the state constitution. Its sponsors 
argued that minorities in Texas could not reach their full potential without having full 
command of the English language. This amendment proposal was to appear on the ballot 
on Election Day, November 8, 1988. The bill was eventually referred to the House 
Committee on State Affairs where it died. The opposition was led by the Mexican 
American Legislative Caucus (chaired by Representative Al Luna, D-Houston) which upon 
announcement of the bill held a press conference to announce that they had gathered 
signatures from 61 representatives on a petition in opposition to the bill. This effectively 
killed the legislation before it was even sent to committee— the requirement for proposals 
to amend the state constitution required a two-thirds vote in support in both chambers of 
the legislature. House Resolution 55 did not even have a sponsor in the state senate. 
Opponents such as the Democratic House Speaker pro tem, Hugo Berlanga called the bill 
“divisive” (Tatalovich, 1995 161-162).   
 In the hearing on April 20, 1987, called by the House Committee on State 
Legislative Caucus, the issue of bilingual education was broached by Representative Lena 
Guerrero (D-Austin). While testifying about how she learned English without the presence 
of an official English amendment, Guerrero asked Patterson if he was opposed to bilingual 
education and was this part of his rationale in proposing the amendment. Patterson replied 
                                                 
46 Ben Campbell (R-Flower Mound) and Jim McWilliams (D-Hallsville) also initially co-sponsored the bill 
but later withdrew their support.  
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that bilingual education was “useful” but needed to be improved so that English fluency 
among Mexican students could be better achieved (Tatalovich, 1995 163).   
 Others supporters who spoke at the hearing included members of the American 
Ethnic Coalition, English First, Pro America, the Parents Union of Texas, and the National 
Association of Retired Federal Employees. Opposition speakers included members of 
Bilingual Classroom Teachers at Allen Elementary School, the Texas Association for 
Bilingual Education, the Texas Baptist Christian Life Commission, the Hispanic Chamber 
of Commerce, the Texas Association of Mexican-American Chambers of Commerce, the 
Austin Area Association of Bilingual Education and the Texas Civil Liberties Union 
(Tatalovich, 1995 163).   
 Ahead of the 1988 Republican presidential primary season, Vice President George 
Bush was forced to comment on the pending proposal. Bush did not offer his support for 
the bill, stating that he believed every child needed to learn English but that he did not 
believe that an amendment was necessary to accomplish this goal (Tatalovich, 1995 163).   
 Despite bipartisan resistance to the English Only amendment, there was evidence 
of strong support among the Texas electorate. A 1987 poll conducted by researchers at the 
University of Texas A&M found that nearly three-fourths (74 percent) of Texans supported 
the Patterson bill; twenty percent opposed the bill and six percent did not have an opinion 
(Tatalovich, 1995 164). Eighty percent of whites supported the bill; 69 percent of blacks 
but only 40 percent of Hispanics — 56 percent opposed the bill. Eighty percent of self-
identified Republicans supported the bill as well as 70 percent of Democrats (Tatalovich, 
1995 164). Support was stronger in the north (where there were larger white populations) 
than in the south (where larger Hispanic populations resided) (Tatalovich, 1995 164). This 
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made evident that although the bill was polarizing among party leaders in both the 
Democratic and Republican Party, the bill enjoyed overwhelming support among the 
electorate (Tatalovich, 1995 164).   
 Republican Governor Bill Clemens received pressure to put the bill on the agenda 
of the special session of the legislature. Clemens, however, refused, citing the importance 
of other bills. Clemens refused to take a stand on the bill (even before the state Republican 
Executive Committee). Some Republicans feared that the bill would divide the GOP. 
Republican leaders were sensitive to the appearance of the bill as anti-Hispanic 
(Tatalovich, 1995 164-165).   
 Democrats, however, unanimously opposed the bill (Tatalovich, 1995 164). The 
Chairman of Mexican American Democrats, for example, publicly opposed the bill and 
called for Democrats who were serious about statewide office to publicly come out in 
opposition to the bill. By early 1988, all Democratic state leaders were publicly against the 
bill. Opponents, such as Democrat Ruben Bonilla (chair of the Mexican American 
Democrats), Representative Luna (Chair of the Mexican American Legislative Caucus), 
and Governor Clemens called the bill divisive and racist (Tatalovich, 1995 164-165).   
 The State Republican Executive Committee was fully supportive of the bill, 
agreeing (with little debate) to put it on the Republican primary ballot as a non-binding 
referendum. The non-binding referendum stated “English should be established as the 
official language of the state of Texas and the United States of America” (Tatalovich, 1995 
165). They argued that segregation caused by lack of English proficiency was just as 
undesirable as segregation because of race, religion or sex (Tatalovich, 1995 165). The 
ballot question was crafted by the American Ethnic Coalition, chaired by Lou Zaeske of 
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Bryan, Texas. Zaeske countered that the racist label was because the bill was mislabeled 
as English Only legislation. According to the Zaeske, it was an Official English legislation 
— implying that the use and existence of other languages would still be respected. GOP 
state chairman George Starke concurred arguing that Official English was not a racist 
initiative but one in pursuit of societal and cultural unity under one language. The purpose 
that Zaeske had in mind for the non-binding referendum question was to put pressure on 
the legislature to take up an Official English initiative since legislatures had been reluctant 
to do so and since Texas lacked an initiative process whereby such a policy initiative could 
be enacted directly by the electorate via the ballot (Tatalovich, 1995 165-166). This was a 
form of venue shifting with the hope of creating issue salience for the Official English 
ballot initiative in a venue where it was expected to be more favorably received than it had 
been in the legislature. 
 Some informal surveys supported the notion that the electorate favored an official 
English policy. In February of 1988, the Dallas Times Herald conducted a ‘Sound Off 
Survey’ which found that 83 percent of those surveyed answered ‘yes’ to the survey 
question, “Should Texas pass a law making English the official language of the state” 
(Tatalovich, 1995 166). And in the GOP primary, 92 percent of Republicans supported the 
official English ballot proposition (Tatalovich, 1995 166). However, neither the ballot 
proposition nor the evidence that Official English resonated with the public coerced 
lawmakers into pursuing an official English amendment or legislation.  Subsequently, 
neither were pursued in the 71st session of the legislature (Tatalovich, 1995 166).   
 Attempting to capitalize on the political momentum created by official English 
referenda in Colorado, Arizona, Florida, and California, Zaeske announced that he had 
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twenty-three additional signatures from newly elected representatives pledging their 
support for official English legislation. Additionally, Zaeske threatened to run for state 
senate against Democrat Kent Caperton from Bryan, Texas (Zaeske’s hometown). Zaeske 
claimed that 70 percent of the electorate from Caperton’s district favored Official English 
legislation, putting Caperton at odds with his constituency since he did not support Official 
English (Tatalovich, 1995 166).   
 Countering Zaeske, Senators Carlos Truan and Chet Edwards (D-Duncanville) 
announced that they and eleven other senators had signed a letter sent to Lieutenant 
Governor Bill Hobby expressing their opposition to official English legislation. Edwards 
and Truan publicly argued that Official English legislation was not necessary because 
English was already the official language of the state — the language used in public and 
private use (Tatalovich, 1995 167).   
 At the start of the 71st session, two official English initiatives were introduced, 
House Joint Resolution 48 and House Bill 2467 (Tatalovich, 1995 167). House Joint 
Resolution 48 was again sponsored by Rep. Patterson and most of his Republican allies 
from the 1987 bill. These included Rep. Heflin and Rep. Horn, Rep. Jeff Wentworth (R- 
San Antonio), Bill Hollowell (D-Grand Saline), Bill Thomas (R-Greenville), Glenn Repp 
(R-Duncanville), John Wily (R-Angleton), Randy Pennington (R-Houston). As seven of 
the nine were Republicans, the bipartisanship of the 1987 Bill had mostly evaporated in 
the time between. House Joint Resolution was identical to the 1987 constitution 
amendment proposal (Tatalovich, 1995 167).   
 House Bill 2467 was only sponsored by Randy Pennington. HB 2467 attempted to 
gather the two-thirds vote requirement needed to place a constitutional amendment 
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proposal on the ballot. It was a non-binding referendum which simply allowed voters to 
indicate their support or opposition for the following question: “English shall be the official 
language in which the business and affairs of the government are conducted in Texas” 
(Tatalovich, 1995 167). Again, the idea was to pressure the legislature to take action on 
Official English legislation through showing the support for such legislation.   
 Both proposals were sent to the Committee on State Affairs and public hearings 
were again held to debate the proposals. Those in support of the bill included the American 
Ethnic Coalition and English First. Local organizations opposing the initiatives were joined 
by national organizations (Tatalovich, 1995 168). The opposition included Texas Baptist 
Christian Life Commission, Texas Civil Liberties Union, Texas State Teachers 
Association, the National Association of Latino Elected Officials, the Mexican American 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Texas Catholic Conference, the Hispanic Women’s 
Network of Texas, the League of United Latin American Citizens of Texas, and People for 
the American Way (Tatalovich, 1995 167).   
 During the hearing Zaeske testified that official English enjoyed wide support in 
Texas and that Texans deserved the chance to vote on Official English (Tatalovich, 1995).  
An undecided member of the committee testified that he had not received a single letter 
concerning the issue. When asked about bilingual education, Zaeske responded that 
bilingual education is often “monolingual education” in Spanish and that this was doing a 
disservice to the Mexican-American school children and “diminished the status of English” 
(Zaeske quoted and paraphrased in Tatalovich, 1995 168). The committee adjourned with 
both measures still open. No Official English legislation was pursued in the 72nd 
legislature (Tatalovich, 1995 167-168). 
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Analysis of the Failure of Official English in Texas 
 The failure of proponents of Official English initiatives to convince the legislature 
to take on an Official English constitutional amendment is indicative of the politics of 
retrenchment and the lack of the plebiscitary referendum option in Texas. The passage of 
Official English would inflict costs on the non-English speaking population. In Texas, 
Mexicans are the largest non-English speaking population and are well entrenched in Texas 
politics (even more so than in California due to the larger presence of Mexican-American 
political officials).47 Policy that inflicts costs on this group is sure to guarantee electoral 
retribution. Politicians generally avoid policies that elicit electoral retribution from a well-
organized constituency (Pierson, 1994). Thus, despite polls that showed overwhelming 
support for official English among Texans, Republican lawmakers were divided 
concerning support for Official English. The divisions were enough to guarantee that such 
bills would not even come to the floor of the state legislature for a vote. And since Texas 
does not have a referendum option for policymaking, the amendment proposals dead on 
arrival.   
 This episode depicts the difference with California. California had the referendum 
option and passed Official English via Proposition 63. The passage of Proposition 63 in 
1986 legitimated policy rollback in the issue area of bilingualism in California. A year 
later, Republican Governor Deukmeijan vetoed legislation that would have reauthorized 
the Chacon-Moscone Act. The act would sunset in 1987, setting the stage for the passage 
of Proposition 227 eleven years later after the legislature could not pass a bilingual 
education bill that a Republican governor would sign into law. In Texas, however, the 
                                                 
47 Texas led the US in the number of Latino officeholders, by the beginning of the 21th century, according 
to Marquez (2014 172). 
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political of retrenchment politics would dictate the politics of bilingualism in the more 
closed Texas policymaking setting.   
 
English Only Movement in the Houston Independent School District 
 In the 1990s, bilingual education came under attack nationwide by English Only 
initiatives aiming to replace bilingual education with English Only instructional policy 
arrangements. One such movement occurred in the Houston Independent School District 
(HISD) (San Miguel, 2011 48). Relations between the Latino community and HISD had 
been strained since the late 1960s. Latinos had expressed their concerns about inferior 
education opportunities for Mexican-American students, but HISD ignored their 
complaints. In the 1970s, district officials classified Mexican students as white to have 
them attend segregated schools with blacks, thus skirting desegregation orders.48 Also, in 
the 1970s, HISD established its magnet schools in all-white areas despite opposition from 
all Latino members of the HISD advisory committee. In the 1980s, the school board 
ignored the concerns expressed by the Latino community concerning the changing 
demographics brought about by white flight and increasing immigration. Changing 
demographics led to increased segregation of Latinos and growing educational inequalities 
for Latino students residing in the East End. In the latter half of the decade, the board 
promised to use bond funds to build a new school in the East End, but the reneged on this 
promise (San Miguel, 2011 48). The school could have relieved overcrowding created by 
the increase of Latinos to the East End brought on by immigration and white flight (San 
                                                 
48  The logic here is that if Mexican were classified as Latino, Texas officials could be charged with 
segregating Latinos and blacks [from whites]—a violation of federal segregation orders. If they are classified 
as white, however, this would be legally be an ‘integrated’ school. 
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Miguel, 2011 48).   
 In the 1990s, mistrust was deepened by the HISD’s selection of Rod Paige, an 
African American, as the districts new superintendent (San Miguel, 2011 48). The search 
for a superintendent was conducted without a national search. Latino community leaders 
felt that if a national search had been conducted, a Latino candidate would have emerged 
from the search. Later in the decade, the school board appointed Latino/a members to the 
board without consulting Latino community leaders (San Miguel, 2011 48).   
 These incidents created the context for the board’s 1999 attempt to pass 
Multilingual Education Policy without significant input from the Latino community (San 
Miguel, 2011 48). The bill would have enhanced English Only policy arrangements and 
reduced those of bilingual education. In January of 1999, HISD formed the Subcommittee 
on Bilingual Education to review the district’s current practices in bilingual education and 
their effects on student performance (San Miguel, 2011 48).  The Subcommittee concluded 
its study in May of 1999. It found that bilingual education had improved the educational 
outcomes of Latino students but more needed to be done in order to make students 
proficient in English, allowing them to reach their full academic potential. The 
subcommittee recommended ending the bilingual education program and replacing it with 
a pedagogical approach focused on Spanish speaking students learning English as quickly 
as possible. However, the Subcommittee did not publicly refer to the new pedagogical 
approach as English Only. They referred to it as reformed bilingual education. Gabriel 
Vasquez, a moderate Democrat, and Jeff Shadwick, a conservative Republican, wrote an 
editorial in which they laid out their new “blueprint for bilingual education” (San Miguel, 
2011 48). They argued that the elimination of social promotion, the TAAS exemptions and 
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the public support for English Only called for reforms to bilingual education in which 
English acquisition became more of a focus. This would better prepare them to be 
productive citizens while also improving educational outcomes further (San Miguel, 2011 
48).   
 Peter Roos from Multicultural Education Training and Advocacy, an organization 
involved with anti-bilingual legislation in California, issued a review of the proposal that 
argued that the proposal was identical in language to California’s anti-bilingual Proposition 
227. Roos argued that the proposal was an English Only proposal in disguise.  Additionally, 
Cynthia Cano, a staff attorney for Mexican American Defense Legal Education Fund, 
concurred with this assessment of HISD bilingual education reform proposal. Their 
analysis of the proposal became the talking points for the opposition.  Eleven legislators 
from the Houston area including Senator Mario Gallegos, Reps. Jessica Ferrar, Rick 
Noriega, and Joe Moreno publicly denounced the bill as an English Only legislation veiled 
as bilingual education reform. They sent a joint letter to the HISD superintendent Paige 
expressing their opposition. Gallegos also sent a letter to the board requesting that they 
remove the proposal from the agenda, arguing that the proposal was not a reform of 
bilingual education, but an attempt to replace it with an English Only policy (San Miguel, 
2011). LULAC and the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials 
(NALEO) also expressed their opposition to the bill and requested its removal from the 
board’s agenda (San Miguel, 2011 49).   
 In the face of the opposition, Vasquez and Shadwick introduced the proposal at the 
board’s next meeting (San Miguel, 2011 49). According to San Miguel (2011 50), their 
proposal limited bilingual education to only language learning, stressed English Only 
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pedagogy for LEP students and bilingual education for English speaking students, and 
ignored the role that a child’s native language played in the learning of a second language. 
 In an unusual move, Vasquez and Shadwick requested that voting on the proposal 
occur after the first reading. Normally proposals are introduced without any comments 
after the first reading. Proposals are then presented twice more to the board members before 
they vote on the proposal. This affords the opportunity for community groups to comment 
on the proposal. According to San Miguel (2011), the move by Vasquez and Shadwick to 
have members vote on the proposal after the first reading was to avoid community input 
on the bill (49). Community protests of this move, however, resulted in Vasquez and 
Shadwick having to postpone the vote until the following month (San Miguel, 2011 49).   
 According to San Miguel (2011 49), the manner in which the Subcommittee crafted 
and placed the reform proposal on the HISD school board agenda offended and united the 
Latino community as it had not in many years. Their reaction to the manner in which the 
proposal was submitted to the committee would shape the opposition reaction to the 
proposal. First the bill was developed without any input from Latino community leaders 
and without informing the two Latina members on the board. The Subcommittee also failed 
to seek input from any Latino elected officials. The latter was especially offensive as it was 
the responsibility of the state legislature to be abreast of reforms to bilingual education. 
The legislature was kept in the dark until after the legislative session ended (San Miguel, 
2011 49). San Miguel (2011) argues that had the Latino members been abreast of the 
development of the reform proposal, they would surely have not given their support for 
HISD’s legislative agenda. He continues that the move was made by proponents of the bill 
to circumvent the advise and consent power of the legislature over educational policy 
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changes (San Miguel, 2011 49).   
 Second, the rushed nature of voting on the bill did not provide sufficient time for 
community input on the bill. In addition to requesting a vote after the first reading, the 
school board also decided not to have any district-wide meetings concerning the bill as was 
customary (San Miguel, 2011 49). The decision to have district meetings was left up to the 
individual board members and community groups. This also precluded community input 
on the bill. San Miguel (2011 49) also questions the motivation of board proponents for 
taking this route as it appeared designed to mitigate community involvement in the passage 
of the bill. 
 Lastly, the Latino community found the English Only themes of the proposal 
offensive, harkening back to the 1950s when Mexican-American students were segregated, 
provided inferior education resources, subject to punitive punishment for speaking 
Spanish, culturally degraded, and were force-fed an assimilationist curriculum (San 
Miguel, 2011 50).    
 During the next several weeks, the school board expressed its desire to work with 
community leaders. However, Latino community leaders refused unless the school board 
agreed to remove bilingual education from the agenda of the next meeting in July.  Despite 
opposition from the Latino community, the school board negotiated in secret with the 
Latino Education Policy Council (LEPC) which consisted of Latino educators and 
academics. Initially, the Latino community opposed LEPC involvement. Eventually, 
however, LEPC gained the support of the Latino community and in their negotiation with 
the school board happened to secure moderations in the school board proposal. It secured 
the removal of the most stark English Only tones and the addition of language that 
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enriching bilingual education was encouraged for all students (San Miguel, 2011 50).   
 However, the Latino community still disagreed with some of the remaining 
provisions in the proposal (San Miguel, 2011 50). First, the criteria for reclassifying a 
student from bilingual education to mainstream instruction was solely based on English 
reading comprehension. This violated an agreement between OCR and HISD concerning 
best practices for bilingual education programs. The agreement called for a multi-criteria 
assessment of LEP students to reclassify them to mainstream, all-English instruction.  
Assessments were to include reading, oral and writing assessment examinations in English 
and the native language, and parental consultation among other assessment tools.  
Additionally, the goal of the proposal to accelerate the acquisition of English flew in the 
face of research at the time which found that accelerating English was not feasible nor 
desirable as students learned at an individual pace (San Miguel, 2011 50).   
 While negotiations continued, LEPC hosted a community-wide forum to discuss 
the proposed policy (San Miguel, 2011 50). It was the only public forum offered before the 
proposal was voted on. Speakers from both sides of the issue presented their case for and 
against the bill. Proponents (HISD and sympathizers of English Only pedagogy) reiterated 
the need for a program that would accelerate the learning of English for non-English 
speaking students. Speakers for LEPC acknowledged the progress that had been made in 
negotiations but argued that there were still troublesome aspects still included in the policy 
proposal (San Miguel, 2011 50).   
 The next school board meeting was on July 22nd when a vote was scheduled to be 
held on the proposal. The proposal passed by a vote of 7-2 — the two Latina representatives 
provided the two votes opposing the proposal. Up until the vote, an LEPC representative 
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had continued to negotiate with Vasquez behind closed doors. Vasquez pressed for more 
English Only provisions while the LEPC representative pressed for less (San Miguel, 2011 
50).  
 However, when the final bill approved by the board was finally revealed to the 
public, it was far less English Only focused than the original Vasquez-Shadwick proposal 
(San Miguel, 2011 50). According to San Miguel (2011 50), some of the more English 
Only themes were mitigated and the final bill expanded the goals and objectives of 
bilingual education, specifically recognizing the importance of bilingual education to all 
students and the important role it plays in second language acquisition. Pursuit of English 
fluency was also part of the core goals of the approved proposal. It also recognized the 
importance of compliance with state and federal laws, the need to promote gifted and 
talented programs for LEP students and increasing English language acquisition within 
bilingual education programs as an aspect of parental choice. The bill also stressed the 
importance of standardized assessments for all multilingual programs, the need to 
encourage bilingual proficiency for all HISD students, the importance of parental 
involvement for LEP students, and the need to address the shortage of bilingual teachers 
(San Miguel, 2011 50-51).   
 According to San Miguel (2011 51), the bill, emerging from political compromise, 
still contained aspects (contained in the bill’s fourth and fifth provisions) that rankled the 
Latino community. Those included its focus on using English reading proficiency as the 
sole criteria for reclassification of LEP students to mainstream instruction and the 
continued focus on English acquisition (especially accelerated English acquisition) which 
ignored research that stressed the importance of a student’s native language in second 
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language learning and the longer period required for proficiency in academic English (as 
opposed to the less difficult acquisition of spoken English). The single assessment criteria 
led MALDEF to file a grievance (on behalf of Gallegos and other proponents of bilingual 
education in Houston) in August of 1999 with the Office of Civil Rights concerning what 
the plaintiffs felt was a violation of the HISD-OCR agreement on reclassification of LEP 
students. HISD responded by saying it would comply with federal mandates concerning 
reclassification and use a multi-critieria-based assessment for reclassification. This 
essentially voided the single assessment criteria of the approved bill (San Miguel, 1999 
51). 
 
Analysis of the Actions Involved in the Salvaging of Bilingual Education in HISD 
 The events surrounding the passage of the bilingual education reform bill in HISD 
show the value of the legislative process in shaping the eventual legislation that the system 
produced. According to Roos and Cano’s analyses of the original proposal by Vasquez and 
Shadwick, the proposal was identical to Proposition 227 in terms of its policy goals. 
However, because the proposal was subjected to the legislative process where proposals 
are publicly debated and negotiation is institutionalized into the process, the end product 
was a compromise bill in which pro-bilingual forces won major concessions from English 
Only forces. By the 1980s and 1990s, the English Only movement had gained the political 
upper hand with the public. However, because of the dynamics of concentrated costs and 
diffuse benefits (Pierson, 1994; Sheingate, 2000), affected minorities mobilized and 
subsequently could affect the legislative process where public officials operated via the 
dynamics of blame avoidance. If the proposal were simply put to the voters, the outcome 
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would certainly have been different (also see Santoro, 1999). The result was still a move 
in a more restrictive direction as the single assessment criteria for reclassifying LEP 
students and the focus on English acquisition were core aspects of the final bill. But the 
MALDEF threat to file suit caused the bill’s sponsors to relent on the single assessment 
criteria, further depicting the institutional influence that mobilized minority advocacy can 
have in the more close legislative policymaking institution.   
 
Further Policy Developments in Bilingual Education 
 Over the next decade the SBOE and the legislature supplemented bilingual 
education policy with initiatives in the areas of curriculum development and student 
assessment (Policy Research Report, 1998 12). Following a pilot study, the SBOE began 
developing a Spanish version of the state-wide assessment test, Texas Education 
Assessment of Minimum Skills (TEAMS), to assess the progress of LEP students.  
Concurrently, the SBOE adopted rules that permitted school districts, under certain 
conditions, to exempt some LEP students from assessment via TEAMS (Policy Research 
Report, 1998 12).            
 In 1989, SB 246 sanctioned the eligibility of children aged 3 and above who lacked 
proficiency in English or came from a low income family for enrollment in a pre-
kindergarten program to prepare them for mainstream instruction (SB 246 text). The bill 
was authored by Senator Barrientos and co-authored by Senators Edwards and Truan (SB 
246 text). SB 246 authorized TEA to establish and evaluate pilot prekindergarten programs 
for three-year olds with an official program going into effect in the 1993-94 academic year 
upon funding appropriation by the legislature (Policy Research Report, 1998 12; SB 246 
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text). By 1990, SBOE adopted new curriculum essential elements for bilingual education, 
and ESL in 1991, and continued to develop alternative teacher certification programs to 
address the shortage of trained bilingual teachers (Policy Research Report, 1998 12). Also 
in 1991, the legislature passed a HB 2144 establishing summer bilingual education (Perez, 
2009 66). The course had to be offered for one-half day for 8 weeks during the summer 
break. Enrollment was optional with parental consent (HB 2144 text). In 1994, the SBOE 
approved a plan to develop Spanish-language versions of the Texas Assessment of 
Academic Skills (TAAS), which had replaced TEAMS in the 1990-91 academic year 
(Policy Research Report, 1998 13). Spanish versions of the TAAS reading, writing and 
mathematics were developed for grades 3 through 6, and results were reported on the 
Academic Excellence Indicators System (AEIS) reports beginning with the 1996-97 
academic year (Policy Research Report, 1998 13). The implementation of TAAS shifted 
the focus of assessment from minimum skills to academic skills to comply with changes in 
state law in 1990 that required a criterion-referenced testing program (Smith, 2012 33). SB 
477 was amended in the 74th Legislature in May of 1995 (TEA et al, 2006 17). TAAS 
testing involved a more comprehensive assessment of the state-mandated curriculum 
(Smith, 2012 33).  
 The state had also initiated development of a standardized reading proficiency test 
in English (RPTE) which would be given to all LEP students who did not take the English 
TAAS reading proficiency examination to assess progress towards English reading 
proficiency (Policy Research Report, 1998 13).  As of 1999, with the passage of SB 103, 
LEP students in grades 3-12 were required to take the RPTE until their reading proficiency 
in English was sufficient to take the TAAS in English. With 2000-2001 academic year, 
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LEP students in grades 3-8 were required to take the TAAS in English or Spanish. As the 
Spanish version of the TAAS is only available for grades 3-6, LEP students in grades 7 and 
8 are required to take the TAAS in English (Combs, 2001)  
 In July 1997, the SBOE adopted new Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills 
(TEKS) for Spanish Language Arts (Policy Research Report, 1998 12). TEKS are used in 
Spanish bilingual instruction and ESL, which replaces essential elements of the state-
mandated curriculum which had been in effect since 1986 (Policy Research Report, 1998 
12). In 1998, Texas adopted ESL Standards as part of the TEKS for Spanish language arts 
and English language arts (Smith, 2012 31). Few teachers outside of Spanish language arts 
and English language arts made use of TEKS when planning instruction (Smith, 2012 31). 
In 1999, legislation was passed, implementing TAKS testing, a new expanded criterion-
referenced testing (Smith, 2012 33). Beginning with the 2002-2003 academic year, TAKS 
replaced TEKS which was developed to fully integrate state-wide testing with TEKS 
(Smith, 2012 33). The goal of TAKS was to assess student progress towards achieving 
academic excellence, specifically in the subject areas of reading, writing, mathematics, 
social studies and science (Smith, 2012 34). The test results were also used for institutional 
accountability of the state and for assessing AYP measures (Smith, 2012 34). Also, in 1999, 
SB 103 mandated moving exit level testing from grade 10 to 11 (Smith, 2012 33). Texas 
law required that students pass exit level tests in language arts, mathematics, science and 
social studies to be eligible for graduation (Smith, 2012 34).  HB 103 legislated that 
students would be assessed in mathematics from grades 3-10; in reading from grades 3-9; 
in writing in grades 4 and 7; in English language arts in grade 10; in social studies in grades 
8 and 10; and in science in grades 5 and 10 (Smith, 2012 34). Furthermore in 1999, Senate 
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Bill 4, the Student Successive Initiative, required that satisfactory performance in Grade 3 
reading assessment, Grade 5 reading and mathematics assessment, and Grade 8 reading 
and mathematics assessments were mandatory requirements for promotion to the next 
grades (Smith, 2012 34). The law went into effect with the 2002-2003 academic year. In 
2010, the mandates for Grade 3 were dropped (Smith, 2012 34).     
 Exceptions were built into the law for LEP students recognizing the difficulty in 
reaching these standards for LEP students (Smith, 2012 34). Foreign-born immigrant 
students were exempted from the TAKS test if they had resided in the US for less than 
three years unless their English progression was sufficient enough to deem them prepared 
for the testing. Immigrants in grades 7 and 10 that were in the country less than three years 
were also permitted linguistic accommodations on the required TAKS testing in order to 
meet the AYP requirements (Smith, 2012 34). 
 In 2001, Senator Judith Zaffarini introduced HB 2144 (Perez, 2009 67). The bill 
would have established dual language immersion programs in some schools and requested 
a review of existing SBOE rules. The bill was defeated, but Perez (2009) claims that it led 
to the adoption of dual language programs in districts (67). Senator Zaffarini also 
introduced SB 1510. This bill was passed and it extended the monitoring period of bilingual 
education and special education programs from 3 to 5 years (Perez, 2009 67).   
 Additionally, in the 77th session in 2001, State Representative Rick Noriega 
sponsored HB 1403. The bill passed and made undocumented students eligible to attend 
state institutions of higher education and pay the in-state tuition rate paid by Texas 
residents. Many of the students, according to Perez (2009 67) were former students of 
Texas’ bilingual education programs and the bill made higher education in the state 
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accessible and affordable for this undocumented population.    
 In the 78th session, Representative Roberto Alonzo sponsored HR 104. This bill 
authorized the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board to allocate funds for the 
promotion and increase of the number of certified bilingual education teachers. Alonzo 
also sponsored HB 1 which authorized funding for tuition and loan assistance to juniors 
and seniors pursuing teacher certifications in bilingual education and ESL (Perez, 2009 
68).   
 In 2006, the TEA revised the ESL standards and these became the official new 
English Language Proficiency Standards (ELPS) in December of 2007. ELPS were meant 
to detail the instruction required to provide LEP students with pedagogy to assist their 
acquisition of content area knowledge and academic language. ELPS were to be integrated 
to all subjects of the curricula, ultimately making all teachers responsible for assisting LEP 
students and not just bilingual and ESL instructors (Smith, 2012 31-32).   
 In 2006 MALDEF petitioned Judge Justice to intervene arguing that poor test 
scores among Latinos in Texas was evidence of educational inequity in Texas schools— 
that Texas was not enforcing the 1973 law (Blakeslee, 2009 147). In July of 2008, Justice, 
citing marginally improving tests scores among the state’s Latinos in elementary school, 
ruled that the elementary bilingual program was adequate but the state needed to do more 
to reverse the high drop out rate and the poor performance of Latinos in secondary schools 
(Blakeslee, 2009 147).   
 Legislation in 2007 and 2009 established the State of Texas Assessment of 
Academic Readiness Testing System (Smith, 2012 35). In 2007, SB 1-31 mandated 
assessment testing for twelve end-of-course assessments. Commissioner of Education, 
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Robert Scott, stated that these new tests would be more rigorous, measuring student’s 
performance as well as academic growth. In 2009, SB 3 mandated these assessment tests 
for grades 3 through 8. Commissioner Scott reported that these STAAR tests would replace 
TAKS. The new tests began with the 2011-2012 academic year. The class of 2015 will be 
the first class to have to successfully pass both the end-of-course tests and as well as their 
classes to earn a high school diploma. It has not yet been determined how STAAR will 
effect LEP students (Smith, 2012 35).   
 
Analysis of Policy Developments in the 1990s and 2000s 
 The bulk of legislation concerning student testing and the adoption of modified 
testing requirements to account for the special needs of LEP students speaks to the role of 
the student accountability movement, the No Child Left Behind Act and the 1973 bilingual 
education act. The former two stressed testing students as a way of improving and 
accounting for quality education as education accountability became the salient issue 
dimension from the 1990s forward. Additionally, after the No Child Left Behind Act was 
passed, the issue of how LEP students could be both accommodated and encouraged to 
meet the AYP benchmarks that the Act called for became a primary issue in the bilingual 
education debate. Most of the laws passed in the 1990s attempted to accommodate LEP 
students in meeting these goals. Subsequently, these depict how the entrenched proponents 
of bilingual education have continued to influence legislative outcomes in a conservative 
state (and thus one with a strong English Only advocacy movement), adopting their policy 




 The entrenchment of Mexican advocacy is evident in the legislation passed in the 
2000s. Despite the passage of No Child Left Behind which eliminated the Bilingual 
Education Act, Texas’ Latino representatives were able to sponsor and pass legislation that 
increased monitoring of bilingual education programs, extend eligibility to higher 
education to undocumented students, and increase state funding for supporting the training 
of bilingual education instructors. In the post-Proposition 227 climate, this speaks to 
efficacy of Texas’ Mexican-American advocacy coalition.   
 
Conclusion 
 The politics of bilingual education is just one part of the debate over immigration 
and what kind of state Texas will be in the future (Blakeslee, 2009 149). Conservatives 
opposed to bilingual education in Texas are in part fearful that bilingual education is just 
part of a progression towards the state having two official languages; proponents are fearful 
that a lack of proper attention to the educational needs of English language learners is the 
main cause of the performance gap between English-language learners and their Anglo 
peers (Blakeslee, 2009).   
 These elite divisions are indicative of Texas in the early 21st century and 
manifested in the content of policy outcomes from the 1970s forward. However, because 
Texas lacks a referendum policy option, the presence of entrenched Latino advocacy and 
the presence of Latino representatives in the state legislature have made the Latino political 
network a formidable force in Texan politics. Despite the political resonance of English 
Only pedagogies since the 1980s, bilingual education policy arrangements in Texas still 
persist even if they have become moderately more restrictive in their pedagogical goals 
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since the 1980s. The expansionary years for bilingual education may have ended with the 
dissolution of elite agreement in the late 1970s, however, the entrenchment of Latino 
advocacy — in the absence of plebiscitary policymaking — has mitigated the politics of 
policy rollback in bilingual education in Texas that have led to distinctly restrictionist 
trajectories at the federal level, in court rulings and in other state policy trajectories such 




















CHAPTER 7  
 
THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION 
 
 The politics of religious education viewed historically reveals two characteristics 
concerning the issue: elite consensus eventually settling in support of religious instruction 
as a positive form of civil education and the corporatist nature of incorporation politics 
(with the exception of the Third Reich years).   
 Elite consensus concerning the church-state relationship in general and religious 
instruction in particular has long historic roots in German political history. The German 
state was born during a period of church dominance in politics where society was divided 
along ideological and religious lines (Zimmer, 2000 84). Early in the 20th century, 
reconciling the church-state relationship was an important aspect of the state building 
process. This resulted in the structure of Article 7 III which institutionalizes a corporatist 
relationship between the state and recognized religious communities and the process 
through which other religions could be incorporated. 
  The following chapter discusses the politics of religious instruction in Germany. 
The chapter aims to lay out the history of elite agreement concerning the integrative roles 
of religion and education as well as the tradition of corporatism that structures these 
institutions in the polity. The chapter begins with a discussion concerning the historic 
relationship between religion, the state and education. Here, the special historic roles of 
religion and education in the German state is established as well as how their purposes are 
redirected in post-Third Reich Germany as a means of reclaiming Germany’s moral 
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compass after the atrocities of Nazism. The second half of the chapter deals with the guest 
worker program and the immigration of the Turkish population. The discussion in this 
section deals with how incorporating Islam into the German polity presents challenges to 
the normative conception of German culture. The guest worker program ushers the German 
democracy into modernity as elites are forced to confront the state’s ethnocultural 
paradigms as it attempts to remake itself as a tolerant, democratic society.  The chapter 
ends with the role that religious instruction plays in efforts to incorporate Turkish 
immigrants. Religious instruction is viewed as a German way of reconciling the challenges 
that integration presents.  
 
The Historic Relationship between Religion, Education and the State in German History 
The relationship between the church and state dates back at least until the Protestant 
Reformation of 1517 after which the provision of education to the common man became a 
priority and responsibility of the state and increasingly became obligatory via church 
statute (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 9). This fostered cooperation between the church 
and state in the provision of education and religion to the masses. At this time, the focus 
was on educating the elite students in reading, writing and arithmetic. However, this was 
then expanded to provide compulsory education for the commoner (Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010 10). The state assumed marginal responsibilities in the provision of 
education while the churches offered more worldly subjects to assist in the expansion of 
education (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 9). Later during the reign of Frederick the Great, 
the education statute, General School Regulations for the Entire Monarch 
(Generalschulreglement fuer die gesamte Monarchie) of Prussia transitioned education 
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from a church to a state responsibility (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 9).  
 Since the dawn of compulsory schooling in the 18th century, education had been 
seen as the primary institution for the socialization of the youth (Avenarius, 2006 143). 
Subsequently, many interests had competed to control this institution. By the 19th century, 
the churches (Protestant and Catholic) had retained control of the school system despite 
losing complete authority to the state over its provision (Avenarius, 2006 144). The modern 
German school system evolved out of the struggle between Protestants and Catholics for 
control of the school system (Ewing, 2000 40). In Germany, Catholicism was associated 
with traditionalism and Protestantism with rationality, modernism and the “true” German 
character. Under Otto von Bismarck’s reign, efforts were made to contain the Catholic 
Church. The Catholic Church responded by spawning a network of Catholic organizations 
with an organizational structure designed to maintain its strength. Protestants subsequently 
responded with their own organizational structure, the Protestant League. National 
intellectuals believed mixed confessional, compulsory schooling was the best way to 
resolve tensions between Catholics and Protestants while also reshaping an “ignorant and 
apathetic population” into a “respectable and responsible citizenry” (Ewing, 2000 40). 
Compulsory schooling would eventually emerge but denominational segregation persisted 
as well as the organizational structures which would become the requisite structural 
features for state recognition of religious communities. 
 Since the beginning of the 19th century, the Volksschule (the most attended type of 
school especially in rural areas) had been segregated according to denomination 
(Bekenntnisschule) (Avenarius, 2006 144). This remained the case in West Germany — 
for the exception of the Third Reich period — until the 1970s. West German state 
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constitutions eventually made the Bekenntnisschule system binding in some states. 
Education in West Germany was thus denominational education, where education and 
socialization were delivered according to a particular confessional orientation of the world. 
At the same, depending on the region, interdenominational common schools 
(Gemeinschaftsschulen; also referred to as Simultanschulen) existed (Avenarius, 2006 
144). 
 In East Germany, the GDR abandoned this system at its inception as the GDR 
depoliticized the churches and strongly encouraged allegiance to the state and not the 
churches (Avenarius, 2006 144). Subsequently, the population in the Eastern parts of 
Germany is still decidedly less church affiliated than in the West.     
 Post-war migration began to alter the regional demographics, making monolithic 
regions more diverse (Avenarius, 2006 144). This as well as the politics of the 1960s began 
to make the Bekenntnischule system seem to be a misfit for modern West Germany. By the 
1970s, states began amending their constitutions and replacing the Bekenntnisschule 
system with Christian common schools (christlische Gemeinschaftsschule). Although 
these schools were not committed to a particular religious creed, they were rooted in 
Christian cultural traditions. The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 
deemed these schools constitutional as they did not oppress non-believers despite their 
religious orientation (Avenarius, 2006 144).   
 
Religion and the State in the Post-Third Reich Era 
 The German democracy was built on the grave of one of history's most violent 
political systems (Knauth, 2007 284). In the post-Third Reich era, overwhelming elite 
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consensus supported the idea that, most importantly, this history shall not be repeated and 
that Germany should strive to live harmoniously with its neighbors and other ethnic groups. 
Subsequently, the Constitutional Committee on the Basic Law and other elites searched for 
ways to reduce state power and shape the dominant morals that constituted post-War 
German society (Knauth, 2007 284). Many elites believed that religion could provide a 
counter to the temptations of political and social persecution by providing an alternative 
narrative of the good life (Knauth, 2007 284). Many also believed that a strong religious 
community could counterbalance a potentially strong, oppressive state. This elite support 
stemmed from the large role played by the Christian churches in the polity throughout 
Germany’s history— a role so substantial, it was believed to be too prominent and 
subsequently weakened by the Nazi state (Knauth, 2007 284). 
 Religion and education were two institutions seen as capable of contributing to this 
goal.  Education was seen as an institution that could inculcate particular values in the 
youth; Religion was viewed as an institution that could instill a Christian ethical/moral 
foundation — preventive measures aimed at precluding the societal moral lapses that were 
viewed as a foundational aspect of the Third Reich’s destructive regime. Religious 
education, subsequently, was seen to play an important role—socializing the youth through 
confessional education— in achieving these goals (Knauth, 2007 284). 
 
Separation of Church and State in Germany - An Incomplete Separation  
 Germany has a unique separation between the church and state — an incomplete 
separation (Hofhansel, 2010 194). Religious communities can be granted the status of 
public corporation under the public law (Koerperschaften des oeffentlichen Rechts). This 
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permits the national government to earmark taxes on behalf of the recognized communities 
and grants religious communities official participation in politics (mostly in the provision 
of social programs), and the right to offer (with state supervision) religious instruction in 
public schools (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 18; Hofhansel, 2010 194).   
 The status of religious corporation under the public law developed during the 
debates over the Weimar Constitution (Hofhansel, 2010 194). The Weimar Constitution 
marked the end of the period of church dominance in the polity and instituted a separation 
between church and state. Still, the separation instituted was not a complete separation. 
The Social Democrats (SPD) advocated for a more complete separation between church 
and state. The conservative parties — the German’s People’s Party (DVP), the German 
National Party (DNVP), and the Catholic Center Party, however, advocated for 
maintaining some form of official status for the churches. The conservative parties won the 
political battle but conceded to the SPD, to provide a process where outside religious 
communities could apply and attain this status (Hofhansel, 2010 194).  
 In 1919, the aim of Article 137 was to check the power of the churches. Yet, in 
1948, the Constitutional Committee on the Basic Law sought to empower the church to 
check the power of the state (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 12). As the power of the 
National Socialist Party increased in the Third Reich after 1933, the Party weakened the 
political influence of the church and, as a result, religious instruction was not as present in 
the regular curriculum in public schools during that period. Hence, the post-war officials 
in charge of the new constitution contemplated that one method of increasing church 
influence was through reviving the church influence in the formal education setting. 
Religious instruction (provided by the religious community), thus, was reestablished as a 
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mandatory subject in schools. The neutrality clause opened the door for religious 
communities outside of Christian religious communities to make claims on the state for the 
provision of religious instruction (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 12). And this would 
become relevant in the decades to come as Germany’s post-World War II economic miracle 
fostered an increase in immigration from Muslim populations. 
 The inclusion of religious instruction in school curricula evolved with the state’s 
assumption of responsibility over compulsory education (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 
12). Article 137 of the 1919 Weimar Constitution formally established the church-state 
relationship upon which Article 7 of the Basic Law was based. Article 137 established a 
church-state partnership for recognized religious/ philosophical communities but called for 
neutrality from the state towards all religious communities and philosophical world views 
(Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 10; Robbers, 2001 645). The Weimar Constitution defines 
this privilege of religious corporations under public law and the process for attaining this 
status in the following:  
 Religious societies shall remain corporations under public law insofar as they have 
been in the past. Other religious societies shall be granted like rights upon application, if 
their constitution and the number of their members offer assurance of their permanence 
(Hofhansel, 2010 191). 
 
The Basic Law adopted this language verbatim in carrying over this privilege for 
recognized religious communities into the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. Although 
the Basic Law sanctions state neutrality in religious affairs, it does allow for this official 
recognition of religious communities. While there is no official state church, the Basic Law 
 
365 
reserves a place for religion so it can inject the state with a moral guide in the provision of 
its duties (Hofhansel, 2010 191). This differs from other secular western democracies such 
as France where the church-state separation is more sharp (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 
9). 
 
Institutionalization of Religion in Education 
Article 7 III sanctions that religious instruction is a mandatory part of the 
curriculum of all public schools. Similar to the public corporation status, responsible 
members of the Constitutional Committee on the Basic Law drafted the Article using much 
of the same language from Article 137 of the Weimar Constitution (Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010 12). Article 7 III guarantees the provision of religious instruction in all 
public schools (except in non-denominational/secular schools, which are few) (Hofhansel, 
2010 194).  The provision reads as follows: 
Religion classes shall form part of the ordinary curriculum in public schools except 
in secular (bekenntnisfreie) schools. Without prejudice to the state’s right to 
supervision, religious instruction shall be given in accordance with the tenets of 
the religious communities  
(Hofhansel, 2010, 194). 
 
Although the course is a mandatory part of the curriculum, parents and eventually students 
(once they reach the age of 14) have the right to opt out (Avenarius, 2006 145).49   
                                                 
49 Upon turning 14 years old, children have the so-called uneingeschränkte Religionsmündigkeit. This means 
that they can decide for themselves whether they want to be part of the religious community they are members 
of or not and whether they want to join another religious community. This also entails that it is the child’s 
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 Generally, the individual Bundeslaender are solely responsible for educational 
matters per Article 7 of the Basic Law (Jozsa, 2007 102). As the article declares that 
religious education is an “ordinary school subject” and mandatory (in that it must be 
offered), religious education also falls under the jurisdiction of the individual 
Bundeslaender (Jozsa, 2007 102). 
 Religious groups seeking such status must submit an application to the relevant 
Bundesland.  Religious communities must meet the following criteria for official 
recognition:  
1. The religious community has existed in Germany for at least 30 years 
2. Its members comprise at least 1/1000 of the state’s total population 
3. The religious group respects the German law 
 (Fetzer and Soper, 2005 107-108). 
Hence, normally, religious instruction is provided by religious communities nationally 
recognized as public law corporations or those communities recognized by the individual 
Bundeslaender. However, Germany has yet to recognize an Islamic religious community 
according to Article 7 III50 (Jozsa, 2007 102) — something that will be discussed in detail 
below. 
 The religious community is guaranteed the right of cooperation in determining the 
                                                 
decision whether s/he wants to participate in religious education in school. Only in Bavaria and Saarland, do 
children need their parents’ consent if they want to opt out of religious education in school. Before the age 
of 18, the only way for Bavarian and Saarlandian children to gainsay their parents’ is by exiting the church 
altogether. All this is regulated by the Gesetz über die religiöse Kindererziehung of 1921. 
 
50
 Berlin’s recognition of the Islamic Federation of Berlin falls outside of an Article 7 recognition of an 
Islamic religious community. Berlin is not bound by Article 7 and so its recognition of the IFB is voluntary 
(Jozsa, 2007). Berlin’s religious instruction situation will be discussed further later in this chapter and in the 
Berlin case study part of the German Cases chapter. 
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curriculum and the qualifications of the teachers (Avenarius, 2006 145). The individual 
Bundesland still retains its right of supervision over curriculum, but since Article 7 III 
guarantees that religious instruction shall conform with the tenets of the relevant, 
representative religious community, the religious community and not the state determines 
the curricula content (Avenarius, 2006 146). Generally, the religious community is 
responsible for the content of the course, the choice of textbooks and the training and 
certification of teachers (Jozsa, 2007 102). The state handles the costs associated — 
providing the facilities and funding the provision of textbooks and personnel (Jozsa, 2007 
102; Avenarius, 2006 145). 
 The open definitions of religious instruction and religious community in Article 7 
III have allowed for states to implement the law differently (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 
12), which will be illustrated by the case studies presented in the chapters to follow. 
Religious instruction in those Bundeslaender governed by Article 7 III has either taken on 
the form of religious studies (Religionskunde) or confessional religious instruction 
(Religionsunterricht) (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 13). These are differentiated by the 
pedagogical goals of informing (informieren) versus persuading (ueberzeugen) (Dromhold 
and Schneider, 2010 13-14). The confessional religious instruction model is further 
differentiated between Christian and non-Christian religious instruction (Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010 14). In the confessional model, religious instruction is not an objective 
course about religion; this is a course where religious instructors educate believing youths 
in a particular denominational existential paradigm — a model favored by the religious 
communities (including Muslim religious organizations) and social conservatives 
(Avenarius, 2006 145). In the religious studies model, the course is about the religion and 
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focuses on applying the tenets of the religion to life as a European citizen in a pluralistic 
society (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 14).  
 As students can opt out of religious instruction most Bundeslaender have set up 
ethics class as a mandatory alternative to religious instruction (Avenarius, 2006 147). This, 
however, has been controversial as well. Critics argue that making an ethics course 
mandatory is discriminatory against the non-believing. Additionally, they argue that 
making ethics mandatory for those opting out of religious instruction precludes the 
voluntary nature of these courses. The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesver-
fassungsgericht) ruled that under the state’s responsibility for education, it could make 
ethics class mandatory as long as they maintained state neutrality and adhered to the same 
basic ethical standards — provision of the encouragement of basic human rights and 
tolerance — as religious instruction. Additionally, the court ruled that these ethics courses 
could reflect Christian cultural values as long as they did not advocate or even proselytize 
Christianity (Avenarius, 2006 147- 149).   
 As discussed above, religious instruction and its incorporation within public 
schools is reflective of the German tradition that sees education as a means of integrating 
and encouraging understanding in a pluralistic society (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 20). 
Although the religious community provides religious instruction, it is to be supervised (or 
in collaboration) with the respective Bundesland, thus, giving the Bundesland a role in 
shaping how religion is taught to its students. Additionally, it is argued, religious 
instruction provides a means for Muslim students to assist in formulating an identity as 
European inhabitants — Muslims, living in Europe often feelsdisconnected from the 
homeland of their ancestors and from European society. Specifically, many Muslims in 
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Germany identify with Euro-Islam — an Islamic identity distinct from traditional Islam 
which acknowledges partial European heritage or residential location. Islamic religious 
instruction, thus, is often sold as a state initiative to create a European Islam — as the 
curriculum is (ideally) created by a Muslim religious community but ultimately sanctioned 
by German state officials. Additionally, this public recognition and provision of a public 
space is at the heart of Muslim support for Islamic religious education (Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010 20, 22). Hence, there is a potential win-win situation with Islamic religious 
instruction for Muslims and the German state: recognition/ incorporation of Islam and 
immigrant integration.  
  
Post-War Economic Miracle and the Guest Worker Program 
 In the 1950s, the German economy was booming. A labor shortage followed and 
Germany responded by implementing a bilateral guest worker (Gastarbeiter) program with 
several neighboring states including Turkey in 1961 to fill employment needs in particular 
industries. The immigration cycles were originally circular and temporary as migrant 
workers were given finite contracts and visas to immigrate to Germany for periods of 1-3 
years after which they would return to their homeland. 
 Hence, since the 1960s, Turkish immigrants have been migrating to Germany 
(Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 2). Through the 1960s, labor demand remained high and 
guest workers extended their stays through visa extension and subsequently deepened their 





Secularization and the Evolving Role of Religion 
 In the late 1960s, political protest swept Germany as it did the European continent 
as a whole. These protests focused on the institutions of society, materialism, inequality or 
lack of justice. Protesters called for democratization of political institutions and appeals for 
social brotherhood and harmony, domestically and abroad. Education was a focus for 
protestors with claims that the system was classist and outdated. Reforms followed that 
encouraged more egalitarian access to higher levels of education (Knauth, 2007 285-287).  
 During that period, Germans were also moving away from church affiliation, which 
was discussed by academics.  Their emerging theory came to be known as the the 
secularization thesis (Knauth, 2007 288). According to this secularization thesis, the 
church’s focus on traditional doctrines was alien to the processes of modernization, making 
apparent the anachronistic nature of religious doctrine in modern life (Knauth, 2007 288). 
The l960s protests also ignited debate in Western Germany as to whether doctrinal religious 
education was still appropriate in a more secular, diversifying Germany (Knauth, 2007 
286). Religious communities (specifically the Protestant Church) responded by the end of 
the 1960s, reorienting religion towards the development of moral character for citizens of 
the new pluralist German democracy (Knauth, 2007 286), something that was also then 
reflected in the manner in which religious education was taught in German schools (as 
mentioned above). Religion would focus less on doctrinaire instruction and more on 
interfaith dialogue51 and the application of religious doctrine to everyday life. Religious 
education in school was to play a role in this proper nurturing of moral character and in the 
interfaith dialogue. The latter was officially proclaimed as a goal by the Protestant Church. 
                                                 
51 Religious faith was thought to be a factor in global contestations during the 1960s (Knauth, 2007). 
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With the secularization of society and political protest, religious education officials hence 
broadened the curriculum away from purely traditional doctrine. As religion was seen as a 
core element in global conflicts and as the concept of religious instruction and its 
educational goals were broadening, different variations of religious instruction emerged — 
the aforementioned religious studies and confessional religious instruction. This widening 
interpretation of its form and the belief that religious instruction could facilitate inter-faith 
relations would play a role in the 1980s in shaping how state officials used religious 
education as a tool of integration for the growing immigrant populations (Knauth, 2007 
286, 288; Dromgold and Schneider, 2010).   
 Proposals for reform of religious education ranged from interdenominational 
religious instruction to religious studies — a course about religion (Knauth, 2007 291). 
This included debate concerning the role of the state and religious communities in the 
process. The latter sparked a lively debate within the legal community — did religious 
instruction need to be confessional instruction delivered and created by the relevant 
religious community. In 1974, the Bundesverfassungsgericht ruled that religious 
instruction should be confessional instruction delivered by the relevant religious 
community. The legal interpretation evolved to allow for inter-religious confessional 
instruction that focused on inter-religious relations if sanctioned by the relevant religious 
communities (Knauth, 2007 291-292). This would manifest how the different 
Bundeslaender implemented religious instruction and how these Bundeslaender would 





Muslim Mobilization for Islamic Religious Instruction 
Since the 1970s, a decade into the arrival of Turkish guest workers in Germany, 
Muslim groups have campaigned for Islamic Religious Instruction in German public 
schools. In 1973, the OPEC-induced economic slowdown ended the labor shortages that 
had originally encouraged German officials to recruit guest workers from other nations 
(Joppke, 1999). Germany, subsequently, terminated the guest worker program in 1973. 
However, as Germany was not a formal immigration state, the German government lacked 
centralized plenary power in immigration law. Most critically, there was not a centralized, 
federal bureaucratic agency to manage the entry and exit of immigrants. Subsequently, 
immigration was administered at the state level. Adhering to the emerging influence of 
human rights norms and because of the collective guilt over its past atrocities, family 
reunification guided the administrative decisions concerning requests for entry by family 
members outside German boarders to reunite with their kin who resided within Germany 
as guest workers. This led to rapid increases in the Turkish population in the 1970s and 
1980s. These immigrant families would eventually produce offspring at rates higher than 
the native German population. Thus, even though the guest worker program was 
discontinued in 1973, the Muslim population continued to increase (Joppke, 1999).   
 As the German society began to diversify it became apparent that as a collective 
the Basic Law’s Article 4 (which requires the state to make space for religious practice free 
of state intervention), Article 140 (which binds the state to neutrality towards all religious 
groups), and Article 7 III (which guarantees religious instruction to recognized religious 
communities) formed a legal foundation that secured the right of religious instruction to 
religious communities other than Christians (Knauth, 2007 283; Dromgold and Schneider, 
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2010 16-18).   
 
History of Turkish Islamic Groups in Germany 
 In the 1970s, when it became apparent that the Turkish immigrants were in 
Germany for the long term, they began campaigning for access for the provision of Islamic 
religious instruction (Fetzer and Soper 2005 103; Rosenow-Williams, 2012 2; Sovik 2008 
241). German officials assumed that such needs would be met by the Turkish state (Fetzer 
and Soper 2005). Religious affairs in Turkey, however, was not sufficiently organized in 
the 1970s to implement such services for its German diaspora. In the absence of assistance 
from the Turkish state, Muslim immigrants in Germany established organizations in 
Germany to respond to the Muslim community's religious, cultural, and political needs 
(Fetzer and Soper 2005 103). Since the structure of Islam is decentralized and there are 
many different interpretations of Islam, these groups have proliferated — Germany has 
over 100 Muslim organizations nationwide (Richardson, 2000). Two of the largest groups 
Muslims in Germany, subsequently formed in the 1970s were the Verband Islamischer 
Kulturzentren (VIKZ, Union of Islamic Culture Centers) and the Islamische Union 
Deutschland, each with approximately 20,000 members (Fetzer and Soper 2005 103). The 
Turkish state eventually organized religious instruction under the Diyanet Isleri Turk-Islam 
Birligi (DITIB) — Turkish-Islamic Association for Religious Affairs. It became the largest 
of the Muslim groups (Hofhansel, 2010 193).  Still, its secular stance with respect to the 
separation of religion and politics was unappealing to the more ideological Islam practiced 
by Turkish immigrants in Germany (Fetzer and Soper 2005 103).52  
                                                 
52 In 2010, the Liberal-Islamischer Bund e.V. was established as a reaction to the leading Muslim organiza-
tions which were perceived as too conservative. 
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 Several other lead organizations have emerged since the 1970s which have 
campaigned for official recognition to provide Islamic religious instruction.53 The second 
largest Muslim organization is the Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş (Hofhansel, 2010 
193) which translates to “National Vision.”54 It was originally connected with the Turkish 
politician and former prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, and the numerous political 
parties with which he was affiliated (Hofhansel, 2010 193). Erbakan established Millî 
Görüş in 1969 as a reaction to what he perceived as the weakening of the Muslim faith as 
a result of Turkey’s imitation of Western norms. 55  Millî Görüş is also an important 
component of the peak association Islamrat (Islamic Council), which represents all 
Muslims in Germany (Hofhansel, 2010 193). 
 The third largest Muslim association is the aforementioned VIKZ (Union of Islamic 
Culture Centers) (Hofhansel, 2010 193). The Alevite Community of Germany (AABF) was 
established by Alevites of Turkish origin (Hofhansel, 2010 193). Lastly, there is the 
Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (ZMD, Central Council of Muslims in Germany).  
This peak association represents Muslims of non-Turkish origins (Hofhansel, 2010 193).56 
                                                 
53 The emergence of various representative lead Muslim organizations in Germany originally mirrored those 
of domestic political factions in Turkey (Hofhansel, 2010). The ties to the homeland, however, would weaken 
with the succeeding generations. 
 
54 The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution stated in their Verfassungsschutzbericht (Annual 
Report on the Protection of the Constitution) of 2009 and 2011 that Millî Görüş represents antidemocratic 
understanding of the state.  
 
55 After only one year in office, Erbakan was asked to step down as prime minister as his political views 
clashed with the core principle of secularism in the modern Turkish state. 
 
56 A variety of Arabian, German and multi-ethnic organizations are members of the council. The last two 




The Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland (Coordination Council of the Muslims 
in Germany) was founded in 2007 by the lead umbrella organizations in Germany: Islamrat 
für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V., Islamische Konzil in Deutschland, Zentralrat der 
Muslime in Deutschland, Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e. V.. Thus 
far (as mentioned), a Muslim community has yet to be designated corporate status 
according to Article 140, which would allow them to provide Islamic religious eduction in 
schools (Fetzer and Soper 2005 107) despite this being a major focus of the Muslim 
community since the 1970s (Sovik 2008 241). The primary reason given for rejecting the 
applications of Muslim organizations (as stated earlier) is the decentralized nature of Islam 
which makes it difficult to find a representative religious community that satisfies Article 
7 III requirements. They have also supposedly failed to meet other criteria (lack of 
permanency; not representative of a religious community; and/or undemocratic) of Article 
140. Other problems include creating a curriculum that is palatable to Bundeslaender 
officials and the religious communities, and the availability of teaching personnel 
(Honfhansel, 2010; Henze, 2004). In addition, since Islam is decentralized and not 
organized in a hierarchical structure (such as Catholicism with a Pope and various 
interconnected, hierarchically organized churches), German officials have claimed that an 
appropriate religious organization cannot be recognized as representing the true Islam 
(Sovik 2008 244).  
      
German Corporatism and the Institutionalization of Christianity 
 Religious instruction has been predominantly Christian throughout German history 
as detailed above (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 11). Although the Jewish population, 
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the only non-Christian minority in Germany until the immigration of Muslims, has always 
been recognized as a religious community, Jewish parents typically sent their offspring to 
private Jewish schools (prior to the rise of the Nazi regime) with only a small number 
sending them to public school (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 11). Hence, religious 
instruction in Germany’s public schools has been mostly a Christian affair. 
 Currently, Germany only recognizes two Christian denominations (the Catholic 
Church and the Protestant Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland) and Judaism (Dromgold 
and Schneider, 2010 18). Additionally, despite the secularism of the ethnic German 
majority population, Catholicism and Protestantism (and to a lesser extent Judaism) have 
been institutionalized in the German polity — German custom and national identification 
have a symbiotic relationship with tenets of these Christian faiths (Alba, 1998 32). Due to 
the increasing Muslim populations and the formation of religious communities 
campaigning for recognition, the issue of how to incorporate Muslim immigrants has 
become a regional and national political priority (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 15). 
Additionally, the demographic changes of the last 60 years, outlined above, have 
challenged this Christian hegemony (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 15). The symbiotic 
relationship between Christianity and the German culture and polity, however, has made it 
problematic for the Muslim faith to achieve institutional parity or even the junior partner 
status of Judaism (Alba, 1998 32). 
 
The Political Incorporation of Islam 
 With respect to the religious community, as of 1994, the Protestant Evangelische 
Kirche in Deutschland supports religious-ethic instruction with a focus on inter-religious 
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exchange and education. The Protestant Church views this approach as the best approach 
to satisfy Article 7 III requirements. The Catholic Church supports Islamic religious 
instruction, focusing on a strict adherence to Article 7 III, and subsequently supports the 
recognition of an Islamic religious community. Furthermore, both the Catholic and 
Protestant churches have collaborated with Muslim interests in localities where a 
representative Muslim community could not be formed. The religious community sees the 
benefits of collaboration — reinforcing the legitimacy of Article 7 III is good business for 
organized religious groups in general considering secularization among ethnic-Germans 
since the 1960s of the majority ethnic German population. Instead of competing for pieces 
of the pie, religious communities are collaborating to maintain the pie (Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010 27- 28).  
 Today, Muslims are the third largest religious community in Germany (Henze, 
2004 237).  Approximately, 80 percent of the Muslims are of Turkish descent of which a 
majority are Sunni (Henze, 2004 237). Their elevation to social and institutional parity, 
however, is not favored by the majority of Germans (Alba, 1998 32). As of 1996, 60 percent 
of West Germans were against Islamic religious instruction in schools (Alba, 1998 32). 
Although Alba qualifies these findings by stating that a substantial portion of this 
opposition coincides with opposition to religious instruction in general, since the 
institutional advantages of the Christian churches are unlikely to be reversed, the 
opposition at the very least disproportionately affects support for Islamic religious 
instruction — as it is excluded from the status quo of state recognition (Alba, 1998 32-33). 
And such sentiments have not warmed with time. According to the latest available data on 
the issue (from 2012), when Germans were asked about former German President Wulff’s 
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remark in his 2010 Reunification Day speech that Islam is by now a part of Germany, 
comparable to Christianity, only 22 percent agreed, while 64 percent disagreed. When 
questioned about tensions with the Muslim community, only 29 percent responded that that 
there will not be tensions with the Muslim community in Germany, while 48 percent 
assume there will be.57  
 Since citizenship reform in 2000 and the terror attacks in Europe and New York in 
the first half of the 2000s, the issue of immigrant integration has moved to the front of the 
agenda for all the major national parties (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010). And although 
an Islamic religious community has not been granted public corporate status at the national 
level, localities have moved to informally recognize particular representative organizations 
with whom to collaborate on the provision of Islamic religious instruction (Rosenow-
Williams, 2012 2). 
 Subsequently, debate centers around whether Islamic religious instruction can be 
offered adhering to Article 7 III or can it assume another form (Dromgold and Schneider, 
2010 16).  However, this failure has also called into question current religious instruction 
arrangements in Germany, since most existing provisions of Islamic religious instruction 
have operated without an officially recognized Muslim religious community (Dromgold 
and Schneider, 2010 18).   
 Another related issue is how to reconcile the institutionalization of Christianity with 
the diversification of German society since the 1960s. Article 4 calls for state neutrality 
concerning religion (Avenarius, 2006 149). This is contained in section 1 of the article 
                                                 
57  Petersen, Thomas (2012): Die Furcht vor dem Morgenland im Abendland. Frankfurter Allgemeine 




which guarantees freedom of faith, conscience, religious creed and/ or ideology — a space 
where the state cannot intervene (Avenarius, 2006 149). However, as public education was 
a domain of the church through the 1970s and the Christian churches made up (de facto) 
the only recognized religious communities, the presence of Christian symbols have been 
omnipresent in public schools especially those in the southwestern states (Alba, 1998 33). 
In Bavaria, this issue of state neutrality came into question concerning the presence of a 
crucifix in Bavarian public school classrooms (This will be discussed in detail in the 
chapter on Bavaria.).  Theosophist (followers of Rudolf Steiner) parents (the plaintiff for 
the aggrieved students) claimed that non-believers were forced to be instructed “under the 
cross” (Avenarius, 2006 149). The administrative court initially dismissed the case. In May 
of 1995, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in a 5 to 3 margin that the Bavarian practice 
violated Article 4 section 1, requiring state neutrality in educational matters. The issue was 
highly debated among the media, the public, and jurists. Supporters of the practice argued 
that the cross was not a religious symbol in this context, but was only representative of the 
Christian influence in [German] occidental culture and thus was only a symbol that served 
an educational but not coercive purpose (Avenarius, 2006 149).   
The state neutrality issue has come more to the fore with the growth of the Muslim 
population (Avenarius, 2006 150). As some interpretations of Islam assume a value 
orientation in which Islam governs behavior in the private and public life, this has brought 
into relief how the cultural aspects of the Basic Law are problematic for other value 
orientations. The issue of religion and education has emerged in issue areas involving 
students and teachers. With respect to students, Muslim parents have pulled their children 
from mixed physical education classes, arguing that participating with males in such a 
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physical activity violates their religious beliefs concerning female conduct. 58  The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht has sided with Muslim parents arguing that the state cannot 
force their children to attend co-ed physical education classes (Avenarius, 2006 150).   
 Another issue is the wearing of headscarves by Muslim teachers. The initial case 
involved an Afghan teacher who was denied employment by a school in Baden-
Wuerttemberg as she refused to remove her headscarf (Avenarius, 2006 150). The 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court) ruled that the freedom of 
religious expression granted in Arcticle 4 had to be balanced with Article 4’s state 
neutrality clause (Avenarius, 2006 152). As a teacher, the employee represented the state 
and thus could not advocate a particular religious stance (Avenarius, 2006 151). The 
Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) of Stuttgart (the capital of Baden-
Wuerttemberg), the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Higher Administrative Court) of Baden 
Wuerttemberg and the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court) upheld 
this ruling in March 2000, June 2001, and July 2002, respectively (Avenirus, 2006 151). 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht ruled that parliament (not the executive) needed to resolve 
this tension in Article 4 between the teacher’s right to freedom of religion and the schools’ 
responsibility to state neutrality (Avenarius, 2006 152). Baden Wurttemberg, subsequently, 
amended the Schulgesetz für Baden-Württemberg (SchG) (The Bundesland’s laws that deal 
with education) in 2004 forbidding teachers from wearing headscarves.   
 
 
                                                 
58 However, this seems to be more anecdotal. According to a survey on Muslim life in Germany, only 1.9 
percent of parents polled stated that they are not allowing their daughters to participate in swimming classes 
(which are part of the mandatory curriculum in German schools) for religious reasons (Haug et al, 2009).   
 
381 
Problem of Incorporation  
 As of 2010, there were 700,000 Muslim students (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 
16). This increasing population with a different religion and culture than the ethnic German 
majority has prompted debate concerning how to incorporate Muslim immigrants into the 
German polity (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010; Fuess, 2007; Hofhansel, 2010). The debate 
is evident in issues such as the construction of Mosques, the headscarf debate concerning 
teachers, and the extension of religious instruction to include Islamic religious instruction 
(Fuess, 2007; Dromgold and Schneider, 2010).  
 The heterogeneous nature of Islamic groups in Germany contributes to the fear 
among many of granting the “wrong” group official status — as many German politicians 
and officials fear that Islamic instruction will help promote Islamic radicalism on German 
soil (Ewing, 2000). This is especially the case since German authorities are closer 
ideologically with the DITIB and the lack of the Turkish state’s endorsement of most of 
the other domestic Islamic organizations — often the associations most popular with the 
Turkish population — has made granting official status to these other groups politically 
problematic. 
 These fears and concerns about addressing the religious needs of Muslim 
immigrants have been heightened with the Islamic extremist terrorist attacks in the US and 
Europe, which occurred in the 2000s by Muslims with legal residence in Europe (Fetzer 
and Soper 2007 933). However, the growing Muslim presence and the fear of Islamic 
radicalism has increased the desire for state surveillance of Islamic organizations. Thus, 
from the national security perspective cited above, incorporating religious instruction 
within the public education system (regardless of the organization providing the service) 
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also presents an opportunity for the state to monitor such activities and, thus, potentially 
ensure that such instruction is benign (with respect to extremist indoctrination). 
 Other concerns regarding the suitability of Muslim groups for corporate recognition 
include the view of many German officials from the late 1970s forward that Islam is a rigid, 
undemocratic system that has failed to keep up with modernity (Sovik 2008 248). This 
makes it an unsuitable as a civil religion for a modern democratic polity. Moreover 
according to this view, Islam lacks the separation of the political from the theological, a 
crucial prerequisite for a civil religion in a Western, liberal democracy. German Muslims, 
however, counter that the Bundeslaender have treated their applications for corporate 
recognition in a discriminatory manner (Fetzer and Soper 2005 107). Furthermore 
Hofhansel (2010) argues that the extension of religious instruction to Islam has been varied 
in the Bundeslaender. This has varied with the historical political leanings and the degree 
to which the Article 7 III religious instruction criteria is adhered by the respective 
Bundesland government (which also correlates with the historical political leanings of the 
state) (Hofhansel, 2010). Regarding the former, Christian Democrat-led governments have 
been in favor of Article 7 III adherence but less willing to extend the right to Muslim 
religious communities (Hofhansel, 2010).  
 The plight of official recognition might also be complicated by the secular trending 
of the German citizenry since the 1960s, which contrasts with the public religiosity 
required by the various but orthodox interpretations of Islam practiced by many Turkish 
Muslims in Germany (Fetzer and Soper 2005 111). It is further complicated by the various 
Bundeslaender interpretation of the religious instruction mandate of Article 7 (Fetzer and 
Soper 2005 114). As discussed above, religious instruction in the Bundeslaender varies 
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between comparative religious ethics courses and religious instruction courses similar to 
that offered by officially recognized religious communities. The Bundeslaender, on their 
part, have decided these individual applications in concert, realizing the symbolic cultural 
and political precedent granting corporate status to the first Islamic religious community 
will mean (Fetzer and Soper 2005 107). 
Nevertheless, the concentration of Muslim populations in urban areas creates 
demands for Islamic religious instruction. Here, the increased populations of Muslims of 
school age — where parents wish for Islamic religious instruction — present local officials 
with a dilemma. Their increased numbers in public schools merit the case for religious 
instruction. The non-hierarchical structure and multiple interpretations of Islam has 
spawned a multitude of religious organizations campaigning, claiming to represent a 
Muslim community. With the German concern for terrorism and the fear that any of these 
groups could use religious instruction as a guise for terrorist indoctrination, the issue of 
granting corporate status to any one Muslim religious community has become domestically 
and internationally contentious. The latter is so because the Turkish state categorizes some 
German Muslim religious communities — those often with the most support from the 
Turkish communities — as terrorist organizations. On the contrary, the groups recognized 
as “safe” Islamic groups do not have the support of the majority of the Turkish immigrants. 
As established above, the German Basic Law, however, mandates that religious 
communities that meet certain conditions must be recognized by the state as corporations, 
thus, allowing them to provide religious instruction in school. Thus, Bundeslaender 
officials are often placed in a precarious position of either potentially violating immigrant 
rights or stoking national security concerns by recognizing the “wrong” Islamic religious 
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community.   
 Despite the resistance concerning the recognition of various Islamic groups, many 
German officials recognize the benefits of granting access to Islamic instruction. Since 
religious instruction is important for Islamic immigrants, many private Koranic schools 
have developed in lieu of the religious instruction option in public schools (Barker, 2004 
173). These schools, being private and beyond the auspices of the respective 
Bundeslaender, have led to consternation among German officials concerned with the 
purpose and pedagogy of these schools (Sovik 2008 244). For these officials, incorporating 
Islamic instruction into the public school system is seen as a way in which the 
Bundeslaender can play a role in the acculturation of this rapidly growing immigrant group 
with a culture different to the Judeo-Christian culture of most native Germans. This has led 
to the partial incorporation of Islamic instruction (or quasi-Islamic instruction) in some 
Bundeslaender where the Bundesland provides (as opposed to a recognized Islamic 
community) an approximation of religious instruction (Sovik 2008 244). This has not 
appeased Islamic religious groups and, thus, they have continued to press for the 
recognition of various Islamic communities. 
Currently, German lawyers and jurors are contesting the definition of a religious 
community. For instance, they debate whether it has to concur with the exact definition as 
spelled out under the Corporation under Public Law language or whether a community can 
consist of a local Mosque organization (Fuess, 2007 226).59 
 
                                                 
59 The Turkish Alevis — a more homogenous community than other Muslims — has been recognized. They 




State Accommodation of Muslim Demands for Islamic Religious Instruction 
 Beginning in the 1980s, however, states began collaborating/ informally 
recognizing Muslim religious communities and designing courses that approximated 
Islamic religious instruction (Jozsa, 2007 102). These initiatives originally began as part of 
the native tongue courses available to students with non-German origins (Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010; Henze, 2004 240). These supplementary language courses were standard 
for the guest worker children. Islamic instruction was incorporated under the ethics and 
moral values curriculum of these language programs (Henze, 2004 240). In some cases, 
the curriculum was developed by the Turkish consulate with little involvement from the 
respective Bundesland (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010). In others there was more of a 
collaboration between the Bundesland and the Turkish education ministry, which also 
involved the training of teachers to offer Islamic religious studies in Turkish under the 
mother-tongue curriculum (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 30). This mother-tongue 
approach concurred with the political consensus at the time that Germany was not an 
immigration state and these populations would eventually return to their homeland. These 
classes were designed to prepare the immigrant students for their eventual return to their 
Turkey. 
 However, after it became apparent that a sizable fraction of Turkish immigrants 
were not returning to Turkey and with calls from Turkish organizations and legal concerns 
about the claims of Turkish religious communities to the provision of Article 7 III religious 
instruction, arrangements between the local, Bundesland and Muslim religious groups 
fostered the development of religious instruction more along the lines of Article 7 III 
requirements (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010). These mother-tongue programs eventually 
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transitioned to independent courses in religious studies outside the mother-tongue 
curriculum— offered with German as the language of instruction (Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010 31). Since the 1990s, states have embarked on trial programs where lead 
Muslim organizations, academics and state officials have developed curricula and begun 
the process of training instructors. These initiatives have ranged from solely state-led 
initiatives to collaborative efforts with chosen religious communities (Jozsa, 2007 103). 
The state-led initiatives have usually involved steering groups/ round tables that have 
brought the aforementioned parties together to develop such programs in concert. Mostly, 
this involved the consultation with Muslim interests, but in which the state was ultimately 
responsible for teacher training and curriculum development (Dromgold and Schneider, 
2010 31). Collaborative efforts involved quasi-formal recognition of religious communities 
by local state governments where religious communities played a prominent role in teacher 
training and curriculum development (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 31). Although the 
participation from lead Muslim groups in the creation of these programs has varied from 
no community involvement to state-religious community partnerships, these trial programs 
do still represent a trend towards the provision of Islamic religious instruction as called for 
by Article 7 III (Fuess, 2007; Hofhansel, 2010; Henze, 2004).  
 Normally, these religious instruction arrangements have evolved from particular 
pre-existing local models for addressing the needs of Turkish students. After an initial trial 
period in a few schools, the arrangements eventually expand to meet more of the demands 
of religious communities, increasingly evolving towards arrangements resembling Article 
7 III (confessional) religious instruction (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 31). However, 
with the issue of a recognized religious community still unresolved, these courses still do 
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not adhere to the Article 7 III requirements of religious instruction— as they are not truly 
confessional courses provided by a recognized religious community 
(Bekenntnisunterricht). It has been the ultimate goal of those in support of Islamic religious 
instruction, however, that religious instruction in Islam would be offered on par with the 
religious instruction provided by Christian communities. 
 
The Controversy of Religious Instruction after Reunification 
 With the reunification of Germany in 1990, religious instruction rose on the 
political agenda as the question of religious instruction in the newly incorporated Eastern 
states had to be reconciled (Knauth, 2007 291). Debate centered around whether the new 
Eastern states should also legislate confessional religious instruction or if perhaps a 
different approach was merited (Knauth, 2007 290). Article 141 of the Basic Law exempts 
Bundeslaender that were governed by another law concerning religious instruction as of 
January 1, 1949 (the date the Basic Law came into effect). Before reunification in 1990, 
Article 141 (also known as the Bremen Clause) applied to West Bremen and Berlin. Instead 
of religious instruction, these states offered ethics instruction.   
 
The Case of the Eastern German Bundeslaender 
 The cases of the former East Germany (GDR) are less clear from a legal standpoint 
(Avenarius, 2006 146). After reunification, 4 of the 5 Eastern German Bundeslaender 
adopted religious instruction legislation similar to the criteria stated in Article 7 III 
(Hofhansel, 2010 194). This established the precedent that a religious community only had 
to satisfy the criteria of Article 7 III — and did not have to obtain official corporate status 
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from the German state — to offer religious instruction in German public schools 
(Hofhansel, 2010). This in turn permitted the individual Bundeslaender to recognize 
religious communities. However, the criteria used for official recognition of a religious 
community (also implied in the language of Article 7 III) at the state level has been 
practically identical to that of Article 140 (Hofhansel, 2010 195). 
 The case of Brandenburg has been particularly controversial (Avenarius, 2006 
146). The Bundesland decided not to legally mandate religious instruction. Instead, the 
religious communities are responsible for religious instruction. They have the legal right 
to use public facilities for this purpose. The state instead mandates an ethics course titled 
Lebensgestaltung— Ethik— Religionskunde 60  (Avenarius, 2006 147). This has been 
controversial in Brandenburg. The situation was brought before the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) in 2000 by a parliamentary group 
of the CDU/CSU of the Federal Parliament. The CDU/CSU group cited constitutional 
complaints from parents and students. After debating the case, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht offered a compromise proposal to all parties involved. It 
suggested that Brandenburg add an amendment to the Brandenburg School Act that 
exempted students from this particular class who desired not to participate (Avenarius, 
2006). The compromise proposal, however, left the issue concerning the legal 
responsibility of the former Eastern German states unresolved (Avenarius, 2006 147). 
 A similar controversy exists in Berlin where a similar framework exists between 
religious instruction and a mandatory ethics course. Religious instruction is also not legally 
mandated but offered by religious communities with the state subsidizing the costs of its 
                                                 
60 Which roughly translated means preparation for life, ethics, a course about religion. 
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provision. In Berlin after 1970, the state began subsidizing religious instruction offered by 
religious communities informally recognized by state officials. Subsequently, subsidizing 
the various provisions of religious instruction constituted an unofficial practice of 
recognizing particular religious communities (Hofhansel, 2010 203).  
 In the 1970s as the Turkish population expanded in Berlin, Muslim representative 
organizations began lobbying and applying for unofficial recognition from the Berlin state 
so they too could receive subsidies and permission from the state to provide religious 
instruction in Berlin public schools. However through the 1990s, Berlin state officials 
denied these applications claiming that the Muslim communities did not satisfy the criteria 
of a corporation under the public law. The Islamic Federation of Berlin (IFB), one of the 
lead Muslim organizations in Berlin, embarked on a 20-year campaign for recognition as 
a religious community in order to provide Islamic religious instruction in Berlin's public 
schools. Berlin officials rejected their applications in 1983 and 1987, citing that the 
community did not belong to a hierarchically organized religious community, an Article 7 
prerequisite for recognition. The politics surrounding the IFB’s application took on 
national importance as its recognition would be the first for a Muslim organization in 
Germany (Hofhansel, 2010 203). 
 In addition to the organizational issues cited in the initial application rejections, 
Berlin officials also worried about granting recognition to the Islamic Federation of Berlin 
as it is closely linked with Millî Görüş. This issue has been a prominent aspect to the 
politics of recognizing Islamic religious communities across the Bundeslaender — the 
consternation among German officials over potentially sanctioning an extremist group to 
educate Turkish migrants in German public schools (Hofhansel, 2010 203). 
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 In 2000, the highest court for administrative law in Germany, ruled in favor of 
Berlin’s Islamic Federation (IFB). The court ruling overruled a Berlin Verwaltungsgericht 
(administrative court) ruling upholding the education ministry’s rejection of an IFB 
(Islamic Federation of Berlin) application to provide Islamic religious instruction. In 1994, 
the Islamic Federation sued the Berlin officials citing the rejection as a violation of Article 
140— that the state must be neutral towards religious communities. They won the suit, 
which set off an appeals process that culminated in the aforementioned 2000 ruling 
(Hofhansel, 204).  
 The ruling permitted the IFB to offer religious instruction in a number of Berlin 
schools. The education ministry had claimed that the IFB did not satisfy the official 
definition of a religious community in the Berlin school constitution. The actual definition, 
however, was not specific concerning what constituted a religious community (Hofhansel, 
2010). The court ruled that since Berlin was not governed by Article 7 III, it could not deny 
recognition to the IFB based on an Article 7 III type criteria. The succeeding SPD-led 
government passed legislation formalizing the process of religious community recognition 
similar to that of Article 140 from the Basic Law (Hofhansel, 2010 203). Subsequently, 
despite not being governed by Article 7 III, the politics of religious instruction in Germany 
brought the institutional practices of religious instruction in Berlin to a close approximation 
of Article 7 III.  
 In addition to the controversy concerning recognition of religious communities, the 
issue of voluntary religious instruction and mandatory ethics instruction has also been 
controversial in Berlin. Religious communities would like to reform the law so that 
religious instruction is also offered as a mandatory course (as in the Lander governed by 
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Article 7 III). In 2008, the issue was put to a referendum vote. The Pro Reli referendum 
was narrowly defeated and religious instruction has remained on a voluntary basis in 
Berlin. 
 
The Incorporation of Islam after Reunification 
 Hofhansel (2010) argues that since German reunification in 1991, citizenship 
reform of 1999 and the resolution of the asylum question, political attention has turned to 
integrating the Muslim population in Germany (also see Dromgold and Schneider, 2010). 
Dromgold and Schneider (2010 18) add that the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 in 
New York also urged German officials to focus on the issue of integrating its Muslim 
population, as mentioned above. Citizenship reform in 2000 made citizenship possible for 
immigrants and their offspring (Hofhansel, 2010; Dromgold and Schneider, 2010). The 
terror attacks prompted elite concern about terror among the ostracized of this immigrant 
population (Jozsa, 2006 95; Hofhansel, 2010; Dromgold and Schneider, 2010). As the 
terror events involved extremist interpretations of Islam, the issue of education and Islam 
naturally came to the forefront (Jozsa, 2006 95).  
 The Bundeslaender are not legally obliged to offer Islamic religious instruction per 
Article 7 III as no Muslim community/ representative organization (outside of the 
Ahmadiyya Muslims in Hessen) has met the Basic Law criteria according to the German 
courts and the various Bundeslaender education ministries across Germany. However, this 
is changing as the courts are increasingly siding with the claims of Muslim religious 
communities (Fuess, 2007). After decades of legal contestations, policy round tables, and 
trials, Fuess (2007 232) asserts that Islamic religious education will become common in 
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schools with sizable Muslim populations in the near future. Fuess (2007) argues that since 
the court system has increasingly ruled in favor of granting Muslim organizations their 
constitutional right to provide religious instruction, states have increasingly tried to 
accommodate these communities in their jurisdiction. 
 
Positions of the Parties and Various Religious communities on Islamic Religious 
Instruction 
 Subsequently, understanding the position of the major parties is important to 
understanding the local variation in models of Islamic religious instruction across the 
Bundeslaender. The historic political leaning of the Bundeslaender governments is one 
factor cited in the literature as a major factor in this interstate variation (Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010; Fuess, 2007; Hofhansel, 2010). This study will argue that this is an 
incomplete explanation for the variation and for explaining policy trajectories. Instead, this 
study is based on the assumption that elite consensus concerning religious instruction 
provides a better explanation. As the demonstration of the party positions will make clear 
below, the major parties are all in support of extending religious instruction to include 
teachings in Islam. Elite consensus and/or division concerning religious instruction along 
with historic institutional arrangements is a better explanation for the varying forms of 
religious instruction across the Bundeslaender.   
 Prior to 1998, the CDU position on Islamic religious instruction was that all classes 
pertaining to Muslim immigrants should be absorbed within the mother-tongue classes of 
the curriculum (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 25). This logically fit within their official 
immigration position (prior to 1998) that Germany was not an immigration state. Islamic 
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instruction within the mother-tongue course fit with the logical extension of their 
immigration stance that immigrants should be prepared to return to their homeland, as 
discussed above. After 1998 with the prospect of citizenship reform imminent (with the 
election of the SPD/ Green coalition in 1999), the CDU and Catholic Church came out in 
support of Islamic religious instruction with German as the language of instruction 
(Dromgold and Schneider, 2010). The CDU viewed education as integral to the process of 
immigrant integration (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 25) and saw the provision of Islamic 
religious instruction as a means of creating a suitable German Islam which could be 
employed for this task. The CDU favored reducing the number of immigrants as the 
optimal strategy for the “integration and tolerance” of immigrants and using the inclusion 
of Islamic religious instruction as a tool for the “ethical orientation” of students with 
migrant backgrounds (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010, 25). Christian Democrat-led 
governments, according to Hofhansel (2010), have been in favor of Article 7 III adherence 
but less willing to extend the right to Muslim religious communities (Hofhansel, 2010). 
The example of Bavaria in this study provides counter-evidence to that claim. The Bavarian 
education ministry (controlled by the CSU) rubber-stamped local arrangements between 
local governments (including the SPD-controlled Munich government) and local Muslim 
religious communities to provide Islamic religious instruction.   
 The SPD also supports Islamic religious education but it stresses the legal right of 
Muslim religious communities. As a consequence, it stresses a strict adherence to the Basic 
Law Article 7 III. Thus, Islamic religious instruction should be provided by a recognized 
religious community (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 25). This concurs with what this 
study found in the cases of North Rhine Westphalia and Berlin. Although their policy 
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outcomes differed, Bundeslaender governments controlled predominantly by the SPD 
practiced a strict adherence to Article 7 III criteria in recognizing religious communities 
and subsequently did not recognize Muslim religious community over the period of study. 
 The FDP (the Liberal Democrats) sees a central role for education as a job creator 
(Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 26). The issue of Islamic religious instruction, however, 
has been divisive. Those in support of Islamic religious instruction cite its potential as a 
tool of immigrant integration and cultural identification. Those in opposition argue about 
its costs and the lack of trained personnel to adequately deliver Islamic religious instruction 
(Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 26).   
 For the Greens (Gruene), education is seen as the the foundation for the future of 
society (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 26). With respect to religious instruction and 
immigrants, they see religious instruction as a central pillar for immigrant integration, 
intercultural understanding and multiculturalism — core philosophies of the party’s 
ideology. The Greens’ position on Islamic religious instruction is that it should be provided 
wherever a Muslim religious community demands it; it should be instructed in German 
adhering to the legal requirements of Article 7 III; it can be provided by a local Muslim 
religious community and [if necessary] in collaboration with a local Church in the absence 
of a nationally recognized Islamic religious community. Party leaders differ on the 
implementation of this general policy stance and thus vary in the localities in which they 
are in the governing coalition (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 26).   
 The leftist party (Die Linke) holds the same view as the The Greens concerning 
Islamic religious instruction. The far-right parties which include the Republicans (REP), 
the National Democratic Party (NPD), and the German People’s Union (DVU) are for 
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severe limits to immigration and against Islamic religious instruction (Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010 27).   
 Thus, since the mid-1990s, the major political parties and recognized religions have 
supported the incorporation of Islamic religious instruction in some form. There is a 
general understanding that the provision of Islamic religious instruction in collaboration 
with Muslim religious communities is a responsibility of the state (Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010 27). They also view Islamic religious instruction as an important tool in 
the integration process. And lastly, the established religious communities consider the 
incorporation of Islamic religious instruction as potentially reinforcing the legitimacy of 
Article 7 III and religious communities as public corporate entities especially. According 
to Dromgold and Schneider (2010), this support from the parties and Christian religious 
community has resulted in more experimentation (when representative communities 
cannot be formed) in finding workable arrangements between the Bundeslaeder and the 
various Muslim communities to provide religious instruction in the teaching of Islam 
(Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 27).   
 However, this only pertains to the Western parts of Germany (where the base 
constituents of the major parties reside). In the East, the issue of religious instruction is 
more disputed due to the areligious legacy of the GDR. And, thus, the issue of Islamic 
religious instruction has evolved differently in this part of the country. Most of the Eastern 
Bundeslaeder do not have sizable Muslim populations and so the provision of Islamic 
religious instruction is not an issue. Berlin and Brandenberg are the exceptions (and, hence, 
the former will be discussed in more detail in this study). Both opted to leave the provision 
of religious instruction to the religious communities — religious instruction is a voluntary 
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course provided by the religious community. The state heavily subsidizes the provision of 
this course. Subsequently, elites, contrary to the West, are split concerning compulsory 
religious instruction. And in Berlin the issue is polarizing as will be seen in later parts of 
this study. 
 
The Literature concerning the Modest Expansion of Islamic Religious Instruction 
 Henze (2004) sees trends towards religious instruction as representative of political 
ascendancy of immigrant integration (education of Muslim children) in public discourse. 
Also in the post-September 11 era, the German public has concerns about teacher 
qualifications and curriculum content (Henze, 2004 242). Per Henze (2004), the 
participation of Muslim organizations are seldom supported by the public and elites, and 
thus the Bundeslaender have moved to establish university programs to train German 
schooled professionals (and potentially imams) (Henze, 2004 242). The Muslim 
community also has these concerns and thus these are contentious aspects of the debate. 
 Progress is being made towards Islamic religious education despite the problem of 
finding representative communities. Fuess (2007 229) argues that the Bavarian example 
may provide the best route forward in finding representative communities. The Erlangen 
trial project emerged from the creation of the Erlangen Islamic community (a collection of 
lead organizations at the local level). Finding local groups that could establish a 
compromise among themselves on curricula matters and were palatable to Bavarian 
Bundesland officials at the state level was a less problematic route to incorporating some 
form of religious instruction in Islam. Fuess (2007 229) argues that religious instruction 
perhaps could emerge similarly from localities in other Bundeslaender as opposed to 
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forming umbrella groups at the state level — as consensus would be easier to attain 
between the Muslim groups themselves and with local officials. 
 According to Fuess (2007 234), a clear sign that Germany is trending towards 
offering religious instruction is because of an increasingly sympathetic judicial system 
willing to grant Muslim communities their Basic Law guaranteed right to the provision of 
religious instruction. As this occurs, Fuess (2007) sees that religious instruction will be 
provided by the three largest Muslim communities, Sunnis, a Shia Muslims, and Alevis. 
Fuess (2007 234) argues that these trends date back to the international ramifications of the 
terrorist attacks in 2001. Officials at the Bundeslaender level believed that Islamic religious 
instruction could be used as a mechanism to better integrate Muslim youth and preempt the 
growth of terrorist cells. 
 In addition, Islamic religious instruction is beginning to garner attention from 
national political elites (Fuess, 2007 234). In September 2006, German Interior Minister 
Wolfgang Schaeuble organized a German Islam conference in Berlin. Schaeuble, one of 
the leading CDU politicians, proclaimed that the German Staatskirchenrecht (state-church 
law) will have to demonstrate its future viability by making the integration of Islam 
possible (Horstkotte, 2011).61 The interior minister invited 15 representatives from the 
Muslim communities and 15 Bundeslaender representatives from throughout Germany 
(Fuess, 2007). Religious instruction and the training of imams was a high priority item at 
the conference. Fuess (2007 234) holds that although religious instruction policy is handled 
entirely at the Bundeslaender level, the existence of such a national organization is a sign 
                                                 
61 German version: „Das deutsche Staatskirchenrecht wird seine Zukunftstauglichkeit dadurch erweisen 
müssen, dass es eine Integration des Islam ermöglicht.” Schaeuble was later cited by Michael Solf, a church-
loyal CDU parliamentarian in NRW, as he explained in front of the NRW parliament in 2011 why the CDU 
needs to start offering Islamunterricht. 
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of the increasing political credibility of Islamic religious instruction.   
 A problem still remains with the availability of trained teachers to deliver Islamic 
religious instruction (Fuess, 2007 228; Henze, 2004 236). The quasi religious education 
programs that were offered as part of the mother-tongue instruction were taught by teachers 
usually provided by the Turkish state via bilateral agreements between Turkey and 
individual Bundeslaender (Fuess, 2007 228). Because of the lack of trained teachers, when 
Bundeslaender have established trial Islamic religious education programs, they have 
normally transitioned these teachers to provide religious instruction even though they were 
trained for language and not religious instruction (Fuess, 2007 229). Several 
Bundeslaender have established training programs in universities within the Land (Lower 
Saxony, Bavaria, North Rhine Westphalia, and Baden-Wuerttemberg). These programs 
aim to train teachers in Islamic religious instruction. Most of these programs were 
developed in consultation with lead Muslim organizations. As these programs mature, the 
potential is there for the training of Imams. This could lead to the development of Islamic 
theological pedagogy in Germany, lessening the need for Muslims to rely on theological 
institutions in the Muslim world. The development of Muslim scholars may take some time 
as there has been a dearth of Muslim scholars as the newer generations have yet to mature 
sufficiently to provide these scholars (Fuess, 2007 232).   
 Currently, there are 4 million Muslims living in Germany (Dromgold, 2011 1). As 
of 2007, the Muslim student body was approximately 700,000. This would require 4,500 
Muslim religious instruction teachers. To provide this training, Fuess (2007) calculates that 
this will require around 15 chairs of Islamic theological departments in universities across 
Germany. As there are only 4 now, the lack of trained teachers will continue for some time 
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(Fuess, 2007 232). 
 A potential problem looms, however. As several of the more conservative 
Bundeslaender have passed headscarf bans for teachers, this potentially precludes the 
hiring of Muslim women. As Article 7 calls for the instruction of believing people by 
believing teachers, this presents a problem in addressing the lack of trained, qualified 
professionals (Fuess, 2007 228). The other problem with these headscarf bans is that they 
only ban headscarves and not other religious symbols from other religious groups such as 
Christians and Jews. The claim often made is that the Christian and Jewish symbols are not 
religious symbols but expression of the German Judeo-Christian culture (Fuess, 2007 230).   
 Fuess (2007) believes that the two professorships in Islamic religious instruction at 
the University of Frankfurt will be programs focused on training Imams for the several 
hundreds of mosques in Germany associated with the Turkish Islamic Union of the 
Institution of Religion e.V. (DITIB). DITIB is the German representative of the Turkish 
Department of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi). The latter sponsors the two 
professorships. As of 2007, 600 Imams of the 900 mosques in Germany were sent from 
Turkey on 4-year stints. The Diyanet sponsors their stay in Germany and they return to 
Turkey after completing their tenure in a DITIB-affiliated mosque. 62  Mosques not 
affiliated with the DITIB have provided and support their own imams from collections 
from the respective Muslim communities (Fuess, 2007 233).   
 As of 2007, the only large scale training of Imams was provided by the Association 
of Islamic Cultural Centres (Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren (VIKZ) in Cologne 
(Fuess, 2007 233). The program trains imams for 300 VIKZ mosques throughout Germany. 
                                                 
62 The DITIB controls about 800 of a total of 2.500 mosques in Germany, 250 of those under their control 
are located in NRW. 
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The Association stresses a more traditional sense of religious instruction and rejects the 
modifications made by the educational sector in Turkey — via the Kemalistic revolution 
(Fuess, 2007). Instruction is in Turkish or Arabic but a majority of the students were 
German-born and thus most have only German linguistic and cultural knowledge (Fuess, 
2007 233).   
 There are few private schools in Germany and so there are few Muslim private 
schools where religious instruction could be provided outside of the Article 7 purview 
(Fuess, 2007 233). However, there are two private schools which operate in Berlin and 
Munich. The school in Munich was closed in 2005 after it had been operating since 1982. 
Bavarian officials claimed the sponsoring religious community, the Islamic Council, had 
close ties to the Islamic community in Germany (IGD- Islamische Gemeinschaft in 
Deutschland). The latter was said to be closely associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The controversy emerged suddenly from media reports of the alleged connections (Fuess, 
2007 233).   
 
Conclusion 
 As can be noted in the history of incorporating Muslims, the issue has been 
controversial in Germany. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was public consternation 
concerning the growth of the Turkish community. In the 1990s, the issue of immigration 
transitioned to the incorporation of Muslim in the German polity. This also proved 
problematic as there was much public consternation concerning Islam’s compatibility with 
the secular Christian German polity. Elites decided that religious instruction — an 
institution that had historic support from elites as a means of forming good citizens — was 
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one means for incorporating Muslims. However, the German federal and Bundeslaender 
officials were unable to find lead Muslim organizations to recognize as public corporations 
to provide Islamic religious instruction. Nevertheless, the Bundeslaender have moved to 
find alternative arrangements to provide quasi-Islamic religious instruction courses.  And 
this was despite public aversion to the idea as recent as the mid-1990s. This history speaks 
to the importance of elite consensus in moving this project. The other ingredient is the 
corporatist policy arrangements that permitted elites to operate in relative isolation from 
the public will. This will be a focus of the case studies on North Rhine Westphalia, Bavaria, 
and Berlin. Nevertheless, without elite support for expanding religious instruction to 
include teachings in Islam, local initiatives may never have occurred as the public has never 

















THE GERMAN CASE STUDIES 
 
Introduction- Turkish interests in favorable settings in North Rhine Westphalia, 
Bavaria, and in Berlin 
 Turkish-German interests in the German cases under investigation here are better 
positioned than their Mexican-American counterparts in the US cases discussed in the 
previous chapters to attain their policy goals in Islamic religious instruction. This is due to 
elite agreement concerning the integrative benefits of religious instruction and the closed, 
corporatist, German policymaking system in religious instruction — cooperative 
federalism and corporatist policymaking creates a closed policymaking setting where 
policymaking involves policy negotiation in a non-competitive interest context between 
representatives of the state and a designated interlocutor/ representative for the affected 
constituency primarily in a single policy venue at the Bundeslaender level. Thus, a small 
consistent set of characters is involved in policymaking, reducing the potential for 
expanding the scope of conflict, a main ingredient in the transformation of the issue 
definition and a policy regime's loss of issue autonomy (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991; 
1993; King, 1997). This created a context where state officials were more open to establish 
relations with a representative of the Turkish community to develop policy arrangements 
that were mutually beneficial — arrangements that encouraged immigrant integration 
through taking steps towards establishing religious instruction in Islam. 
 The three cases presented in this chapter offer varied political and institutional 
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settings within the closed, corporatist policymaking model. The goal is to show the effects 
of elite consensus on policymaking prospects for Turkish interests in Germany (as the 
effect of the closed, corporatist system on the policy prospects of Turkish interests will be 
revealed via the comparison of the German cases with the US cases, which is a focus of 
the Discussion chapter).   
 The cases chosen vary concerning elite agreement/ disagreement regarding 
religious instruction and the Bundesland government’s partisan leanings during the period 
of study as the latter has been cited as an influential factor in the likelihood of a Bundesland 
to embrace religious instruction (Joppke, 1999; Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010; Fuess, 2007; Hofhansel, 2010). In two cases (NRW and Bavaria), there 
was elite support for religious instruction, and in the third (Berlin), there was elite division 
concerning religious instruction. In the two cases with elite support for religious 
instruction, NRW was governed by the SPD (the major center-left party in Germany) for 
all but two years during the period of study and Bavaria was governed by the CSU (the 
more conservative sister party of the CDU, the major center-right party in Germany) over 
the period of study. Berlin, the Bundesland with elite disagreement over religious 
instruction has historically been led by the SPD.63 This study will provide evidence that 
elite agreement concerning religious instruction is more determinative of the Bundesland’s 
response to Turkish interests than the Bundesland government’s partisan history.  
                                                 
63 There is no German Bundesland that has historic elite division concerning religious instruction in which 
the Bundesland government has historically been led by a conservative government. In the Eastern Bun-
deslaender, where elite support for religious instruction is tepid, these Bundeslaender have historically had 
left-leaning governments. In the West, although the partisanship of the governments have been more varied, 
elite consensus has been in support of some variation of religious instruction. Thus, this case cannot be in-
vestigated in Germany. Consequently, Berlin will serve as the sole representative of the Bundesland with 
historic elite conflict over religious instruction. 
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 German corporatism and cooperative federalism create a closed policymaking 
system for religious instruction. These two factors create a non-competitive policy 
negotiation context for Turkish interests and limit the number of participants involved in 
policymaking, thus precluding an increase in the scope of conflict by the addition of new 
actors (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991; 1993; King 1997). This helps to maintain the the 
problematization of religious instruction (defined by Article 7 III), which because of the 
aforementioned elite consensus has been beneficial for Turkish interests. Although the 
problematization of Islamic religious instruction has been problematic for the provision of 
religious instruction according to Article 7 III — with a recognized Muslim corporate 
partner and the provision of confessional religious instruction — Bundesland officials in 
the two Bundeslaender with historic elite agreement concerning religious instruction have 
continued to search for ways to provide some form of religious instruction in Islam. 
Moreover the provision of religious instruction via Article 7 III has been the ultimate goal 
of state and Muslim elites and thus the current problematization of Islamic religious 
instruction can be characterized as favorable for Turkish interests. 
 As religious instruction is an educational matter, cooperative federalism structures 
policymaking in religious instruction. Subsequently, religious instruction is solely 
governed by the individual states. German corporatism in religious instruction is 
institutionalized via Article 7 III — institutionalizing a corporatist church-state 
policymaking structure in the provision of religious instruction. Religious instruction in 
North Rhine Westphalia and Bavaria is governed by Article 7 III. The Basic Law Article 
legally guarantees that officially recognized religious communities are entitled to provide 
religious instruction via this partnership with the state.   
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 In Germany, debates in political incorporation concern corporate recognition to 
secure the policy and institutional benefits of German corporatism/ welfare state. The 
subsequent para-public institutions (state-interest concertation) control allocation of these 
benefits. And this is precisely how religious instruction policymaking works. Article 7 III 
of the Basic Law calls for a corporatist policymaking arrangement for the provision of 
religious instruction. The Article, hence, demands a partnership between the state (charged 
to the state education ministry) and the relevant religious community where the state retains 
its authority in all matters related to education but the religious community provides 
religious instruction. This requires the Bundesland to assume the fiscal costs for its 
provision (providing the space and paying for the teachers and instructional resources) 
while the religious community develops the curriculum and provides the teachers. The 
Bundesland in retaining its authority in all matters concerning education authorizes the 
decisions made by the religious community concerning curriculum, pedagogy, and issues 
concerning teacher certification, and thus has the final say concerning these decisions. 
However, this arrangement is predicated on the federal government recognizing a religious 
community as a corporation under the Basic Law. The law has evolved where the 
individual states can also grant this status (Fuess, 2007 225-226, see the Politics of 
Religious Instruction Chapter for a fuller explanation). This recognition requires that the 
religious community demonstrate its permanency, that it is representative of a religious 
community of requisite size, and is hierarchical in structure. No Muslim organization nor 
umbrella group (for the exception of Ahmadiyya Muslims in Hessen) have satisfied these 
three goals and so a Muslim organization has yet to be recognized as a public corporate 
entity. Nevertheless, state officials in most Western Bundeslaender have chosen to pursue 
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expanding religious instruction — via alternative policy arrangements — to include a 
Muslim version. Bavaria and NRW are two examples of such Bundeslaender. The two 
factors— the closed, corporatism of the religious instruction policy process and elite 
agreement concerning extending religious instruction to include Islam— have been the 
primary forces that have shaped expansionary policy in religious instruction in Bavaria and 
NRW.   
 The setting in Berlin differs from that of NRW and Bavaria. Berlin is not governed 
by Article 7 III and the majority of its population is not affiliated with a religious 
community. Additionally, elites are divided concerning the place of religious instruction in 
general. The latter two are due to Berlin’s (the Eastern half) history as part of the GDR, 
which weakened the church so that the population's allegiance would be to the state and 
not the two main churches. As with NRW and Bavaria, however, German corporatism and 
cooperative federalism have been the governing paradigms of religious instruction policy. 
And thus issues of incorporation in Berlin are similarly negotiated as previously described. 
 In using these three cases with their varying settings, the chapter aims to show how 
elite agreement/ political consensus concerning religious instruction within the varied 









8.1 NORTH RHINE WESTPHALIA 
Introduction - The Effects of the Closed Policymaking system and Elite Consensus on 
the Evolution of Islamic Religious Instruction Policy 
 North Rhine Westphalia’s (NRW) political setting has been favorable to Turkish 
policy interests in Islamic religious education. Elite consensus concerning the integrative 
benefits of religious instruction and German corporatism created a political setting whereby 
NRW’s state officials made several overtures over the period of study to create religious 
instruction policy that was mutually beneficial to them and Turkish [and other Muslim] 
interests seeking religious instruction in Islam. 
 Two factors have influenced policy evolution in Islamic religious instruction in 
North Rhine Westphalia (NRW): the closed, corporatist nature of the policymaking process 
in religious instruction and elite agreement concerning religious instruction in general and 
the expansion of religious instruction to include teachings in Islam in particular. With 
respect to the closed policymaking system, this refers to two aspects of policymaking in 
religious instruction in NRW: corporatism and cooperative federalism. The corporatist 
dynamic (driven by both the existence of Article 7 III and Germany’s corporatist system 
in general) meant that the corporatist policy regime type — policy negotiation in a non-
competitive interest context between representatives of the Bundesland and a designated 
interlocutor/ representative for the affected constituency —would greatly influence the 
contours of any new policy regime. This has resulted in NRW officials’ outreach to find 
Muslim representatives even when official designation of a lead Muslim organization was 
not possible. Cooperative federalism meant that policy venues would primarily reside at 
the Bundesland level with venue shifting to a venue beyond the state venue only occurring 
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when the administrative courts became involved. And as policymaking in religious 
instruction is sanctioned by the education ministry—having monopoly power over the 
issue — the policy venue would be determined by or reside in the education ministry. This 
closed policymaking process also meant that the participants in policy making would be 
restricted to Bundesland officials, academics, Muslim interests and religious interests. 
Only venue shifting to the courts would bring the judiciary into this process. Thus, an 
expansion of the scope of conflict through the inclusion/intrusion of outside actors and 
other policy venues — an integral part of the processes of policy change in the American 
cases — is mostly absent in NRW. 
 Elite consensus meant that the major parties (most importantly the SPD and CDU 
as these were the NRW government coalition leaders over the period of study) supported 
the idea of religious instruction as an integrative institution for the youth. Subsequently, 
both favored extending religious instruction to include teachings in Islam as a means of 
integrating the Turkish-German student population.64  Even though neither the federal 
government nor NRW recognized a lead Muslim organization as an official corporate 
Muslim representative — thus absolving the Bundesland of its legal responsibility to 
provide Islamic religious instruction — officials (from both parties) sought to find ways 
(and representatives with whom they could work) to extend religious instruction to include 
teachings in Islam. This consensus also included academics and leaders of the Christian 
religious communities — the latter viewing the incorporation of Islamic religious 
instruction as beneficial for the continued legitimacy of Article 7 III and for all religious 
                                                 
64 This concurs with Dromgold and Schneider (2010). They argue that this consensus is a combination of 
elite views towards the role of religious instruction in integrating the youth in general and Muslim students 
in particular (in the wake of the terrorist attacks since 2001). 
 
409 
communities which offered state subsidized religious instruction.  
 Initially, NRW state officials chose to pursue expanding religious instruction to 
include teachings in Islam by attempting to find lead organizations with whom they could 
work (in the spirit of Article 7 III) to provide Islamic religious education. When a lead 
organization could not be found (due to disputes within the Muslim community over 
curriculum and/or NRW state mistrust of the available lead organizations), NRW state 
officials chose to develop a course — which evolved over the period of study, spawning 
three iterations of the course — focusing on Islam via the creation of curriculum 
commissions. The sundry commissions that developed the various versions of the course 
included state officials, education officials, scholars of Islam, and general religious 
scholars. They would later expand to include Muslim congregations and associations, but 
they never attempted including the two lead organizations in NRW. Furthermore, the 
various curriculum commissions remained under the aegis of the NRW education ministry. 
Thus, although the aim of NRW has been to establish a corporate model, the policy regime 
that governed religious instruction in Islam during the period of study was more state 
driven.65 
 Another aspect of the closed policymaking system is the role of cooperative 
federalism in educational affairs in Germany and its effect on the evolution of Islamic 
religious education policy. There was no federal involvement in policy evolution of Islamic 
religious instruction in North Rhine Westphalia over the period of study. The Basic Law 
designates most decisions concerning education to the state level. Subsequently, the 
                                                 
65 Kraft (2006) argues that the Muslim influence incorporated via the NRW model has garnered more broad 
based inclusion of the Muslim community than any of the other more traditional Article 7 III Islamic religious 
instruction arrangements in Germany. 
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implementation of Article 7 III is a state function, mostly the charge of the education 
ministry. The national government only involves itself in the official recognition of 
religious communities — recognizing a religious community as a public corporate entity. 
Since a Muslim religious community has not been recognized at the national nor at the 
state level, state governments have taken it upon themselves to work out arrangements with 
Muslim umbrella groups. 66  Policymaking in Islamic religious instruction in NRW 
subsequently involved a relatively small and stable group of players (as previously 
mentioned) under the aegis of the NRW education ministry. In the religious instruction 
policymaking process, the Bundesland and local policy venues (charged to the respective 
education ministries) are the only venues involved and the local policy venues are far more 
subservient to the state policy venue (directives) than in the US. No other state policy 
venues are involved as para-public institutions (and in the NRW, the education ministry 
and its curriculum commission) once given policy autonomy generally become policy 
monopolies. Federal and executive mandates are seldom involved in state education 
policymaking. Venue shifting to the federal level only occurs when suits are brought 
against the Bundesland, and courts are thus summoned to make constitutional rulings 
concerning the legitimacy of claims by umbrella groups regarding official recognition, and 
the legality of informal arrangements between the state and religious communities. This is 
contrary to the American system where venue shifting occurred in bilingual education in 
comparable instances (from actors in local/ state policy venues to the courts and federal 
policy venues) but also through the involvement of the national executive and legislative 
                                                 
66 The state’s adoption of this recognition function also evolved through legal precedents after German reu-
nification in which the newly incorporated Eastern states adopted practices similar to Article 7 III and inde-
pendently recognized religious communities (see The Controversy of Religious Instruction after Reunifica-
tion section in the Politics of Religious Instruction chapter). 
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policy venues, the state plebiscitary venue (in California) and the issue expansion resulting 
from the overlapping structure of policy venues in the American bilingual education 
policymaking system and the subsequent legitimation of actors and causes at the local, state 
and national level. In Texas and California, intergovernmental interaction between policy 
venues and the openness of the policymaking system were primary drivers of policy 
development. In the NRW example, such a dynamic policymaking system was not the 
impetus for policy change. The NRW policymaking system primarily resided in the local 
and state policy venues with policy change generally driven by the NRW education 
ministry  
 These two factors — the closed, corporatism of the policymaking process and elite 
agreement concerning religious instruction — have led to a general expansion of Islamic 
religious instruction in North Rhine Westphalia since the late 1970s. After its initial 
introduction within the mother-tongue portion of the curriculum in the early 1980s, Islamic 
studies expanded to over 130 schools as a separate subject, Islamic Studies, given in 
German. Islamic Studies, however, was a course about Islam and was mostly developed by 
a curriculum commission under the aegis of the NRW education ministry. Thus, as its title 
(Islamic Studies) and the structure of the policy regime suggest, Islamic studies in North 
Rhine Westphalia is not Islamic religious instruction as called for by Article 7 III of the 
Basic Law. Nevertheless, the Bundeslands’s effort to make provisions for a Muslim version 
of religious instruction in the absence of a recognized religious community can be 
described as expansionary policy (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010; Hofhansel, 2010; Kraft, 
2006). 
 The remainder of the chapter will in further detail how the two factors— the closed, 
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corporatist system and elite agreement influenced policy development in North Rhine 
Westphalia. 
 
North Rhine-Westphalia- political context and population demographics   
 From 1966-2005, Social Democrats (SPD) have controlled the government and 
have generally supported developing programs of Islamic religious instruction (Hofhansel, 
2010 193; Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 32). However as of 2006, the Christian 
Democrats have led the governing coalition of the NRW government (Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010 32; Hofhansel, 2010 193). The Bundesland is confessionally mixed 
although Catholics outnumber Protestants (Hofhansel, 2010 193). Catholics and 
Protestants are the two largest religious communities and the population has a high rate of 
religious membership — 75 percent are affiliated with a religious community (Dromgold 
and Schneider, 2010 32). North Rhine Westphalia also has the highest concentration of 
Muslims of the German Bundeslaender with approximately 297,000 Muslim students of 
which 63 percent were of Turkish origin (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 32; Josza, 2007 
106). Since 1970, the number of Turkish Muslim students had increased from 7,500 to 
100,000 by the end of the 1970s, 180,000 by 1997 and 260,000 by 2010 (Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010 32). In 28 schools, more than two-thirds of the students were Muslim and 
in 162 schools, half of the students were Muslims (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 32).    
 Dromgold and Schneider (2010 15) have also argued that this concentration of 
Muslims in North Rhine Westphalia has also encouraged NRW state officials to respond 
to the demands of the Muslim community. However, this also speaks to the corporate 
nature of the religious instruction policymaking process as well as to elite agreement 
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concerning the role of religious instruction in the integration process. Concerning the 
former, the increasing presence of Muslim students and the legal pressures posed by the 
existence of Article 7 III amid demands from lead Muslim organizations for recognition to 
provide religious instruction created pressure among NRW officials to make 
accommodations to extend religious instruction to include teachings in Islam. 
Subsequently, NRW officials moved towards establishing the corporate relationship 
between the state and a recognized religious community as called for in Article 7 III 
(Dromgold and Schneider, 2010). Concerning elite consensus, the increasing Muslim 
presence also presented the need to integrate these students. Religious instruction has been 
viewed historically by NRW elites as an important tool in this process. Hence, extending 
religious instruction to include teachings in Islam first via the mother tongue curriculum 
and then as an independent course taught in German depicts elite commitment to 
integrating this growing Muslim community (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 19-24). 
 
A Summary of Policy Evolution of Islamic Religious Instruction in North Rhine 
Westphalia   
 The political interests involved in North Rhine Westphalia have varied from the 
typical state-religious community partnership legally required in the provision of religious 
instruction as the process of establishing Islamic religious instruction did not follow the 
traditional Article 7 III process. Initially, the Duesseldorf Ministry of Education took the 
lead role in creating an Islamic religious instruction program (Dromgold and Schneider, 
2010 32). This was under the aegis of the NRW Education Ministry. The NRW Education 
Ministry would eventually assume more of a lead role via a curriculum commission with 
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the incorporation of influence from local Muslim organizations increasing as the course 
matured (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 32; Kraft, 2006 5). After discussions with lead 
Muslim organizations fell apart because of intergroup contestation, the state adopted 
religious instruction without recognizing or coordinating with lead Muslim organizations 
(Hofhansel, 2010 199). The structure and content of Islamic religious instruction was 
worked out via the curriculum commission, as briefly mentioned above (Kraft, 2006 6). 
The course generally focused on teaching the basics of Islam and how these precepts 
applied to everyday life for German students of Turkish origin (Fuess, 2007 228; Kraft, 
2006 6). The language of instruction was later changed to German and the course modified 
to make its content more appropriate for non-Turkish Muslims. The modified curriculum 
was also developed by a curriculum commission authorized by the education ministry. 
When the CDU took control of the government in 2006, they renewed efforts to recognize 
a lead Muslim organization at the state level. However after their efforts failed they 
continued the Islamic Studies course, expanding it to more schools.  
 Thus, this form of policy expansion was a departure from Article 7 III requirements, 
which required confessional instruction delivered by a recognized religious community. 
The Bundesland Ministry of Education (via curriculum commissions) has generally 
maintained a lead role in curriculum development and teacher training (Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010 32).  Subsequently, the operative policy venue has been at the Bundesland 
level where it has remained as curriculum commissions assumed the lead role under the 
aegis of the NRW education ministry. 
 The two main lead organizations brought suit against North Rhine Westphalia and 
the Bundesland’s central role in developing Islamic studies. These two groups sued for 
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recognition in 2005 so that they could play a more central role in shaping and providing 
Islamic religious instruction. The Bundesverfassungsgericht (federal constitutional court) 
ruled in their favor in 2005 but left it to the lower courts to decide whether these two groups, 
in particular, would be recognized. Thus, venue shifting to the federal courts may 
eventually determine the future direction of Islamic religious instruction and whether it 
structurally assumes the corporatist model called for in Article 7 III — a partnership 
between NRW and a recognized Muslim umbrella group. Nevertheless, the state-centric 
character of policy development led to incremental policy expansion driven by consensus 
among the small group of actors involved in the state curriculum commission under the 
aegis of the NRW education ministry (Dromgold, 2010 32). 
 
The History of Policy Development in North Rhine Westphalia 
 North Rhine Westphalia was the first Bundesland to address the issue of expanding 
religious instruction to include teachings in Islam (Hofhansel, 2010 199). This began in 
1978. Salim M. Abdullah, a representative of the Islam World Congress, supported by 
Turkish organizations, such as predecessors to contemporary organizations VIKZ and Millî 
Görüş, and the Nurculuk movement, surveyed parents to gauge support among Muslims 
with school-aged children for Islamic religious instruction. The group delivered the parent 
survey to state education ministry officials and it showed strong support for Islamic 
religious instruction among the Muslim community. This inspired the state to found an 
institute devoted to developing a religious curriculum in Islam and the formation of a 
working group which included the lead Turkish organizations and curricula experts of the 
aforementioned institute. Intra-Muslim contestation over the curricula led to the disbanding 
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of this group (Hofhansel, 2010 199).  
 The second attempt at developing a curriculum involved only the Education 
ministry. In December of 1979, in response to the failed attempt of the previous year, the 
education minister instructed the new state institute to develop a curriculum independently 
— thus, proceeding without Muslim representation (Hofhansel, 2010 199). The curriculum 
was developed via a curriculum commission (Kraft, 2006 6). The working group included 
school administrators (predominantly from the Duesseldorf Education Ministry), Turkish 
teachers, scholars of Islam, religious instruction educators, Muslim teachers, and Muslim 
and non-Muslim scientists in cooperation with the Universities of Istanbul, Ankara, Konya, 
and al-Azhar in Cairo (Jozsa, 2007 106; Kraft, 2006 6; Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 33). 
This course, “Islamic Teaching in the Context of Additional Native Language Education,” 
(ITCANLE) was delivered in Turkish for students in grades 1 through 4 by instructors from 
the mother-tongue portion of the curriculum (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 33; Josza, 
2007 106). The course operated under the then held assumption that the Turkish 
immigrants would eventually return to Turkey (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 33). It was 
mostly focused on a Sunni interpretation of Islam (Josza, 2007 106). The aim of the course 
was to deliver religious knowledge within the framework and spirit of the Article 7 III and 
cultural and education goals of the state constitution without being a course in which 
“believers of a faith taught to the believing”— the normative pedagogical paradigm of 
Article 7 III religious instruction (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 33). 
 The Christian churches, however, were critical of this example of Bundesland 
autonomy (Kraft, 2006 172). The Protestant church, in particular, rejected this approach 
from the education ministry as a solution to the problem of finding a representative 
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religious community to create an Islamic instruction curriculum (Hofhansel, 2010 199). 
The Bundeslaender, subsequently, decided to subsume ITCANLE within the 
supplementary mother tongue instruction already in place for children of Turkish migrants.  
 In 1986, the syllabus for the primary school, “Religious Studies for Students of 
Islamic Faith,” course was published (Josza, 2007 106). From 1986 - 1989 an additional 
teacher training program was set up to train approximately 600 teachers. In 1990, books 
covering the syllabus for the primary school were published and the syllabus was 
implemented in 40 schools (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 33). In 1991, syllabi were 
created and courses were extended for students in grades 5 and 6, and from the 1996-1997 
academic year, to grades 7-10 (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 33; Jozsa, 2007 106). 
Approximately 50 percent of the Muslim primary school students participated in 
ITCANLE grades 1-4 through 1999 (Jozsa, 2007 106). 
 The course with its Turkish focus, however, excluded non-Turkish Muslims 
(Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 33). As a consequence, in 1999, the state began offering 
an additional religious studies course, Islamic Teaching (Islamische Unterweisung), in 
German (Hofhansel, 2010 1999; Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 33-34). This allowed for 
Muslim students (regardless of nationality and language skills) from grades 1-10 to 
participate (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 33). The course also differed from Article 7 III 
religious instruction in that the Education Ministry was solely responsible for the course as 
opposed to a recognized religious community (Jozsa, 2007 107). The curriculum for this 
course was also developed by a curriculum commission under the direction of the education 
ministry (Kraft, 2006 6). The commission was made up of representatives of the school 
administration, Turkish teachers, scholars of Islam, and religion educators (Kraft, 2006 6). 
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In drafting the curriculum, the group also sought buy-in (by consulting with them on 
curriculum drafts) from religious congregations and Muslim associations. This circle of 
consultation would later expand to include the Islamic theological faculties, the Turkish 
state (via the Office of Religious Affairs) and German representatives from the Muslim 
World Congress. The course continued the pedagogical orientation of teaching the basics 
of Islam and how these tenets were relevant or could be applied to the students’ everyday 
lives as European residents. ITCANLE syllabi were initially adapted for Islamic Teaching 
(Jozsa, 2007). Having evolved out of the ITCANLE (which had evolved from the mother 
tongue course) model, the pedagogy was mostly oriented towards Sunni Islam (Jozsa, 2007 
107).   
 This version of Islamic religious instruction was initially offered in 25 primary and 
secondary schools (in 1999) and then expanded to 50 schools by 2002 (Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010 33) and 110 schools by 2005 (Jozsa, 2007 107). Approximately 75 
teachers served in these 110 schools consisting of 7,000 - 8,000 students (Jozsa, 2007 107). 
The teachers were either Islamic scientists who received additional pedagogical training or 
former/ current mother-tongue instruction teachers. As of 2010, the course was offered at 
130 schools (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 34).67 
 Changing the language of instruction to German in 1999 initially attracted criticism 
from DITIB (Hofhansel, 2010 199). They were also critical of teacher qualifications—as 
instructors were chosen by Bundesland officials without consultation from any Islamic 
representative. Hofhansel (2010) argues these groups may have been fearful that 
Bundesland officials would Germanize Islam and/or compromise core Islamic precepts for 
                                                 
67 As of 2002, North Rhine Westphalia also continued to offer two hours of religious instruction via the 
mother tongue courses. 
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their own didactic interests. They would later drop this opposition to German as the 
language of instruction (Hofhansel, 2010 199-200). 
 State officials defended their development of Islamic religious instruction without 
a representative Muslim religious community, arguing that a representative community 
according to the criteria of Article 7 III criteria could not be found (Kraft, 2006 6). Lead 
Muslim organizations contested this account. By the late 1990s Muslim organizations 
including the ZMD (Central Muslim Council and the Islamrat (Islamic Council) 
campaigned for Islamic instruction as defined by Article 7 III. Parents, students of Islamic 
faith, the Islamic Association of Germany (Dachverbaende Islamrat fuer die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland), and Central Association of Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat 
der Muslime in Deutschland) organized with the intent to form a religious community to 
deliver Islamic religious instruction per Article 7 III by the 2000-2001 academic year 
(Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 33). Their application, however, was denied. In 1998, 
these lead Muslim associations filed a lawsuit with the courts demanding that North Rhine 
Westphalia offer religious instruction according the Article 7 III (Kraft, 2006 6; Hofhansel, 
2010 200)      
 In 2000, the Bundesland organized a round table consisting of the major Islamic 
organizations to discuss Islamic religious instruction. After the largest group, DITIB, failed 
to attend the meeting, the Bundesland abandoned the idea of a round table on religious 
instruction (Hofhansel, 2010 200).   
 In 2001, independent from Muslim attempts at offering religious instruction, the 
Minister of Education, Gabriele Behler, announced an initiative to reform Islamic Teaching 
(Islamische Unterweisung) so that it met the major curricula demands of the lead Muslim 
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organizations (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 34). Minister Behler’s initiative was 
launched amid strong challenges from the CDU in the previous election concerning the 
lack of Article 7 III Islamic religious instruction. Dromgold and Schneider (2010) argue 
that this was in line with Behler’s party, the SPD, to increasingly involve the demands of 
lead Muslim organizations in an attempt to move the state towards recognizing a religious 
community and thus offer Islamic religious instruction according to Article 7 III (34).  
 In 2005, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court) ruled that 
peak associations were permitted to form religious communities to satisfy Article 7 III 
criteria for the provision of religious instruction. However, the court left it to a lower court 
to rule on whether the Islamrat or ZMD satisfied the Article 7 III criteria (Hofhansel, 2010 
200). 
 
Alevite Religious Instruction in North Rhine Westphalia 
 During this same period (2000 and 2001), the AABF, the main organization 
representing Alevites in Germany, also campaigned for religious instruction in North Rhine 
Westphalia (they also campaigned in Baden Wuerttemburg, Bavaria, Berlin and Hesse) 
(Hofhansel, 2010 201). North Rhine Westphalia hired two academic experts (Ursula 
Spuler-Stegemann and Stefan Mucke) to write academic and legal opinions on the 
legitimacy of their application for recognition as a religious community. Both experts 
expressed their support for the AABF application and by 2008, NRW began Alevite 





The CDU Takeover and their Attempt at developing an Article 7 III Islamic Religious 
Instruction 
 From 1966-2005, Social Democrats controlled the government. In 2005, a CDU 
government came to power promising to establish Islamic religious instruction along the 
Article 7 III criteria (Hofhansel, 2010 200). Subsequently, upon assuming power in 2005, 
CDU officials changed the title of Islamic Teaching to the Study of Islam (SI) 
(Islamkunde).  This was to further emphasize that this was a religious studies course — a 
course about Islam — as opposed to confessional religious instruction — the CDUs 
preferred religious instruction course option— as called for in Article 7 III (Jozsa, 2007 
106; Hofhansel, 2010 199; Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 33). The course continued the 
didactic orientation started in 1999 of providing students with the basic foundations of 
Islam and showing how these were relevant for the pupils’ lives in Germany (Kraft, 2006 
7).  This was again a course that applied the teachings of Islam as opposed to religious 
instruction in Islam (Hofhansel, 2010 199). The course used the Koran, the Sunnah and 
legal texts as its main sources for the curriculum’s substantive content (Kraft, 2006 7). 
However, only those aspects from Islam that had implications for real world application 
were included in the curriculum. 
 The CDU’s ultimate plan, however was to pursue establishing Islamic religious 
instruction according to Article 7 III. The interim plan was to consult with mosque 
associations in Cologne and Duisburg to encourage the formation of local religious 
communities — encouraging the formation of shuras — to facilitate the creation and 
implementation of Islamic religious instruction in these two cities (Hofhansel, 2010 200). 
Two issues made the process of creating Islamic religious instruction difficult. First, there 
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were the problems of developing a curriculum and training teachers. The second involved 
the issue of Muslim group participation in the process. There was mistrust from both 
Bundesland officials and Muslim groups. Government officials did not trust any of the 
available Muslim organizations. The Muslim organizations feared Bundesland officials 
would push to compromise core precepts of Islam and if NRW officials did not attain their 
objectives, freeze the lead organizations out of the process through the inclusion of local 
Muslim groups from the Cologne and Duisburg Muslim communities (whom the new 
NRW had initiated contact with as part of the aforementioned interim plan). Thus, these 
organizations perceived the interim plan as a move by the Christian Democrats to freeze 
the lead Bundesland-level Muslim groups out of the creation of religious instruction 
curricula and pedagogy in North Rhine Westphalia.  Because of these hurdles, in July 2009, 
Bundesland officials announced the expansion of the Islamkunde school trial to more 
schools, but delayed the introduction of Islamic religious instruction (according Article 7 
III) until the aforementioned issues were resolved (Hofhansel, 2010 200). Thus, for similar 
reasons to the SPD — the inability to find an appropriate Muslim lead organization to 
recognize at the Bundesland-level — the CDU also chose to go it alone. 
 Thus far, North Rhine-Westphalia has adopted the largest implementation of 
religious instruction. Through 2007, a form of Islamic religious instruction was 
implemented at 130 schools (out of the 5,000 total for the Bundesland), with plans to 
expand the program to 200 schools by 2010 (Fuess, 2007 228; Dromgold and Schneider, 
2010 34). However, these courses have not involved a representative Muslim organization 
in the development of curriculum (Fuess, 2007 228). Muslim religious groups have 
continued to campaign for involvement in Islamic religious instruction.  The lead Muslim 
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organizations have argued that the religious instruction offered by NRW state officials — 
since it neither includes input from designated lead organizations nor is a confessional 
course — does not satisfy the requirements of Article 7 III and thus is legally suspect 
(Fuess, 2007 228). Court cases in which the leading Muslim groups were litigants were 
pending as of 2010 (Fuess, 2007 228; Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 34).  
 
Teacher Training Provisions 
 Currently, instructors are trained at the NRW School Institute in Soest (Fuess, 2007 
228). In 2004, the University of Muenster in North Rhine-Westphalia hired its first 
professor, Dr. Muhammad Kalisch, to chair the Religion of Islam department making him 
the first Muslim Theologian in Germany (Fuess, 2007 228; Jozsa, 2007 107). The program 
is an initiative to train 30 Muslim teachers per year to become instructors in Islamic 
religious instruction and aims to eventually train enough teachers to instruct all Muslim 
students in the Bundesland (Fuess, 2007 228).  As this program was approved by the 
leading Muslim organizations, this might resolve the problem concerning their lack of 
participation — through the training and employment of teachers via a program approved 
by Muslim organizations — through satisfying the Article 7 III requirement that instructors 
are provided by the affected religious community (Fuess, 2007 228).  
  
Assessments From the Literature Concerning the NRW Record in Islamic Religious 
Instruction 
 Dromgold and Schneider (2010) argue that this record of state initiative in 
incorporating Islamic religious instruction and in reaching out to lead Muslim 
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organizations results from the large concentrations of Muslims in the state and party goals 
of both the SPD and CDU (35). These parties support Islamic religious instruction with the 
goal of finding a recognized Muslim religious community so that Islamic religious 
instruction can adhere to Article 7 III. The continual struggle of lead Muslim organizations 
for official recognition is not because of disinterest from the Bundesland officials, but from 
the ideology (from both parties) of strict adherence to the criteria of Article 7 III. 
Bundesland officials (from both the SPD and CDU) would like to move towards an official 
Article 7 III religious instruction, but they want to be able to work with lead Muslim groups 
that share their views on curriculum. However, party officials have been more than willing 
to include the interests of the Muslim community as the current form of religious 
instruction involves a relatively broad range of Muslim interests in the NRW community 
(Kraft, 2006 6). NRW officials thus have used Islamkunde as a substitute until the legal 
parameters of corporate recognition can be met (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 35).   
 Kraft (2006) also argues that this state-led form of religious instruction is setting a 
new standard (5-6). First, the curriculum was developed by a curriculum commission that 
included school administration representatives, Turkish teachers, scholars of Islam, and 
religion educators. This group worked out draft curriculum which were throughly 
discussed with Islamic congregations and associations. The curriculum commission group 
would later expand to include Islamic theological faculties, Office of Religious Affairs in 
Turkey, and German representatives from the Muslim World Congress. According to Kraft 
(2006), the level of consensus on curriculum achieved within the Islamic theological 
community surpasses any attempt made by the major Muslim umbrella groups. Still, the 
lack of formal inclusion of the large Muslim umbrella organizations as well as the religious 
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studies focus of the course (as opposed to confessional religious instruction as called for 
by Article 7 III) has continued to make the North Rhine Westphalia version of Islamic 
religious instruction controversial (Kraft, 2006 6).   
 
Conclusion - Policy Development in a single Policy Venue that Operates within a 
Corporatist Paradigm 
 Concerning the central argument of this study, the closed, corporatist policymaking 
system and elite consensus around religious instruction provided Turkish interests with a 
favorable setting to achieve favorable policy outcomes in religious instruction. Concerning 
the former, policy evolution was driven mostly by policy actions in a single policy venue 
— the NRW ministry of education. NRW officials (under the aegis of the education 
ministry) were able to coordinate the actions of state, religious and Muslim elites (those 
invited by the state) in efforts to provide some form of Islamic religious instruction with 
little threat of outside actors (with the exception of the courts) influencing the politics of 
religious instruction. The comparative lack of venue shifting and the involvement of policy 
venues other than the state has meant that policy evolution has proceeded mainly from the 
politics of the various curriculum commissions, organized by the education ministry, the 
politics resulting from the campaigns of the lead Muslim organizations to gain recognition 
from NRW state officials, and how these played out in party politics. Yet, concerning the 
latter, since both the CDU and SPD pursued securing Article 7 III, partisan politics mainly 
added urgency to their goals rather than fundamentally changing their approaches to 
Islamic religious instruction.   
 Lastly, as court rulings concerning the legal legitimacy of these claims by Muslim 
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organizations are still pending, venue shifting to the courts may ultimately influence policy 
direction. Still, regardless if Islamic religious instruction remains the state-led version of 
Islamic studies or becomes one that strictly adheres to Article 7 III — a confessional 
religious course delivered by a recognized Muslim religious community — policy will 
move in an expansionary fashion with attempts to increase Muslim involvement (if a lead 
Muslim community cannot be found) for the foreseeable future as Islamic religious 
instruction enjoys the support of the NRW political establishment. 
 Concerning German corporatism, the state-centric approach does not negate its 
influence on the developments in Islamic religious instruction. German corporatism 
especially the corporatist aspects of Article 7 III has kept the goal of establishing religious 
instruction according Article 7 III as a top priority for elites in NRW. This meant that 
securing a lead Muslim organization at the Bundesland level as a corporate partner to 
provide Islamic (confessional) religious instruction was/is the ultimate policy goal. And 
this policy goal has meant that the state-centric approach has continually aimed at 
becoming more inclusive of Muslim congregations in lieu of finding a Muslim corporate 
partner at the Bundesland level. This has ultimately been beneficial for Muslim interests 
(Kraft, 2007 6). 
 Concerning elite agreement, German political elites from the SPD and CDU as well 
as Christian religious leaders have supported extending religious instruction to include 
teachings in Islam. However, by taking such a state-centric approach, its response has 
departed from strict adherence to the corporatist nature of Article 7 III. This has been 
controversial not only with Muslim organizations, but also with Christian religious leaders 
despite this being the stated the goal of both the SPD and CDU. As this led to venue 
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shopping by lead organizations via legal suits, policy direction may ultimately be 
determined by venue shifting. This will, however, not be contrary to elite consensus 
concerning Islamic religious instruction as elites in NRW are in pursuit of establishing 
religious instruction according to Article 7 III.  
 Ultimately, this corporatist state policy venue characterized by elite agreement 
around the idea that Islamic religious instruction is beneficial for the integration of students 
of Muslim faith (and immigrant background) results in Muslim interests being better 
situated in the NRW polity to obtain their policy goals in Islamic religious instruction than 
their Mexican counterparts in Texas and especially in California with respect to bilingual 
education. In California and Texas historic elite disagreement over bilingual education and 
the competitive nature of the American political marketplace mean that Mexican interests 
have had to perennially defend the policy regimes they won during the brief period of elite 
relative agreement in support of bilingual education in the 1960s and 1970s. In Texas, 
mobilized minority interests, entrenched in policy regimes, have been able to use the 
institutional advantages afforded policy regimes — the political dynamics of concentrated 
costs and diffuse benefits typical of retrenchment politics. In California because of the 
voter referendum policymaking mechanism, bilingual education policy regimes were not 
afforded such, and thus bilingual education was outlawed in 1998 as anti-bilingual forces 
were able to find a favorable policymaking venue for their English Only problematization 
of bilingual education. In NRW, elites from both major parties viewed the expansion of 
religious instruction to include instruction in Islam as beneficial. And despite their inability 
to find an appropriate Muslim corporate partner, chose to develop religious instruction 
while also increasingly incorporating more influence from the Muslim community as the 
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Islamic Studies course matured. The fact that NRW established a teacher training program 
at the University of Muenster to train Muslim teachers is indicative of this commitment. 
And this highlights the lack of commitment of Texas and California as even during the 
period of elite consensus in support of bilingual education, teacher training remained a 
hurdle that neither state committed significant resources to overcome. 
 
8.2 BAVARIA 
Introduction - The Effects of the Closed Policymaking System and Elite Agreement on 
the Evolution of Islamic Religious Instruction Policy 
 The Bavarian political setting is similar to that of NRW but differs in the dynamics 
of elite agreement as well as the political leaning of the governing coalition. Concerning 
the similarities, Bavaria is also governed by Article 7 III, a majority of its population is 
affiliated with a religious community, and there is elite consensus in support of religious 
instruction as an integrative force for youth in general and Islamic religious instruction for 
Muslim youth in particular. It differs from NRW in that it had a conservative government 
over the period of study and elite agreement took on more of a state-local dynamic. 
Nevertheless, Bavaria was also a favorable setting for Turkish interest: despite not being 
able to establish a corporate Muslim partner at the Bundesland level, Bavarian officials 
found ways to establish Islamic religious instruction in isolated localities.   
 Two factors have influenced policy evolution in Islamic religious education in 
Bavaria: the relatively closed, corporatist nature of the policymaking process in religious 
instruction and elite agreement among policy players concerning extending religious 
instruction to include Islam. With respect to the closed policymaking system, this refers to 
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two aspects of policymaking in religious instruction in Bavaria: corporatism and 
cooperative federalism. With respect to the former, the corporate nature of the 
policymaking process in Bavaria resulted in policy venues that consisted of the state 
education ministry delegating policy authority to chosen lead Muslim organizations 
through informal recognition. This first involved the education ministry working with the 
Turkish consulate and Turkish parents and then being open to working via collaborations 
between local Muslim lead organizations and local academics. Although Bavarian state 
officials departed from classic Article 7 III corporatism through not designating complete 
policy authority to a single Muslim representative at the Bundesland level and developing 
programs independent of a Muslim lead organization at times (especially early on), 
Bundesland officials continued to search for or were open to working with several local 
Muslim representatives and academics to provide Islamic religious instruction in localities 
where such collaborations were possible.   
 With respect to cooperative federalism, the Basic Law declares that education and 
specifically religious education is solely the jurisdiction of the Bundeslaender. In Bavaria, 
over the period of study, this has meant that the Bundesland policy venue has been the only 
venue involved in policymaking as neither national nor judicial policy venues played a role 
in policy evolution over the period of study. The local policy venue was also involved in 
religious instruction policymaking. However, the local policy venue in the German setting 
is more subservient to the policy of the education ministry. Thus, as with NRW, 
policymaking was restricted to a small number of policy actors, whose involvement was 
sanctioned by the Bundesland Education Ministry. As in the NRW case this allowed for a 
consistent problematization of extending religious instruction to teachings in Islam and 
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precluded the expansion of the scope of conflict through the entry of unwanted policy 
actors with different problematizations concerning the incorporation of Islamic religious 
instruction. 
 Elite agreement among policy players in Bavaria entailed consensus among state 
and local politicians along with academics around the idea of extending religious 
instruction to include teachings in Islam. This remained constant throughout the period of 
study. 
 
Islamic Religious Instruction in Bavaria— A Summary of Developments 
 Bavaria chose to pursue expanding religious instruction to include teachings in 
Islam by first establishing a course under its mother-tongue curriculum (similar to NRW). 
This course was eventually paired with an Islamic course taught in German. And lastly, 
Islamic religious instruction was implemented via the Erlangen pilot, which originated in 
Erlangen (a city in the Middle Franconian region of Bavaria) via the cooperation of the 
State Education ministry, local academics and a Muslim umbrella group in Erlangen. The 
successful pilot program would later be replicated in other localities. 
 The first two programs were implemented by the Bavarian education ministry in 
response to demands by the Muslim community for religious instruction. With the mother 
tongue course, the Bavarian education ministry worked with the Turkish consulate in 
developing a curriculum, providing instructors and course materials. For the Islamic 
Religion Course in German (IRIG), the Bavarian education ministry crafted its own 
curriculum with assistance from the Turkish consulate. For the Erlangen pilot program, the 
Bavarian education ministry engaged in a collaborative effort in Erlangen between the 
 
431 
locality’s lead Muslim organizations and local academics — corporatist arrangements 
between the state and localities. The local Muslim organizations were granted complete 
authority over curriculum matters. This pilot would eventually spread to Munich, Fuerth, 
and Bayreuth where Bavarian educational officials established similar arrangements with 
local Muslim organizations and academics.   
 Concerning the influence of German corporatism, although state education 
ministers did not work with state representatives but instead with local representatives, the 
dynamics of policy formation were still corporatist in nature. Policy evolution occurred 
within the parameters of these state-local corporatist relations. Early iterations were mostly 
state initiatives (especially IRIG) but still incorporated assistance and advice on curriculum 
from the Turkish consulate.    
 Additionally, a teacher training program/ curriculum was developed at the 
University of Erlangen-Nuernberg through consultation with the German Muslim 
community and the Turkish consulate (Fuess, 2007 232). As this is a further example of 
cooperation between state officials and the Muslim community, this is another step towards 
satisfying the corporatist dynamics of Article 7 III whereby the religious community 
handles the certification of teachers under the aegis of the state. 
 Concerning the cooperative federalist aspect of the closed nature of policymaking 
in religious instruction, the Basic Law designation that all education matters are the 
province of Bundeslaender governments resulted in the policy venue primarily residing at 
the state level.  Additionally, in the Bavarian case, Muslim organizations did not file legal 
suits against the state to push the recognition of a Muslim corporate partner at the state 
level, and thus the judiciary was likewise not involved in policy development. As a result 
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all policy decisions were a function of the state education ministry: first partnering with 
the Turkish consulate, then working more or less independently, and later working with 
various localities to establish various forms of religious instruction and a teacher training 
program at the University of Erlangen-Nuernberg. Thus, the Bavarian education ministry 
sanctioned all policymaking in religious instruction with involvement from other policy 
actors only at their discretion. This precluded the entry of outside actors and thus the 
expansion of the scope of conflict. The maintenance of a consistent issue definition to the 
problem of expanding religious instruction to include Islamic religious instruction was thus 
enabled. The Bavarian education ministry could repeatedly pursue alternative corporatist 
arrangements in the provision of Islamic religious instruction in various localities despite 
such practices varying from Article 7 III criteria.    
 Elite agreement among the policy players was also an aspect that drove policy 
development in Islamic religious instruction in Bavaria. Consensus existed among state 
education ministry officials, the various local politicians (some as in Munich serving for 
the SPD), and academics concerning the expansion of religious instruction to include 
teachings of Islam. This ultimately contributed to the gradual expansion of Islamic 
religious instruction despite the inability to find a lead Muslim partner at the state level 
with whom to work. Subsequently, Bavarian elites sought or were open to finding Muslim 
lead organizations at the state or local level, respectively, with whom they could collaborate 
to develop religious instruction in Islam in localities where such partnerships were feasible. 
 Combined, these two factors — the closed policy process and elite agreement — 
allowed Bavarian officials, who were in favor of expanding Islamic religious instruction, 
to seek out or welcome local partnerships in order to accomplish these policy ends and to 
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pursue policy ends without challenge from other policy venues. This resulted in a slow but 
steady policy expansion that has been local in nature. 
 The remainder of the chapter will detail how the two factors influenced policy 
development in Bavaria. 
 
Bavaria- Political Context and Population Demographics   
 Bavaria has offered Islamic religious instruction since the mid-1980s but only in 
sub-Bundesland localities (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 35). By 2006, there were at least 
300,000 Muslims in Bavaria (making the overall Bavarian population 2.2 percent Muslim); 
70,000 of them were public school students. Most of these immigrants were from Turkey, 
the Balkans, North Africa, and Asia. These populations vary in concentration per locality 
(Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 35).     
 Christian Democrats, specifically the CSU, have dominated the politics of the state 
since 1957 (Hofhansel, 2010 193; Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 35). The CSU is largely 
in support of Islamic religious education and has been since the late 1990s.  Schools in 
Bavaria are bound by Article 135 of the Bavarian Constitution to educate and nurture 
children according to Christian precepts — Christian themes are supposed to permeate into 
the general atmosphere of the schools (Simel, 1996 35). Article 136, however, mandates 
that Bavarian schools should exhibit tolerance for religious minorities. The conflict of these 
Articles has at times made the incorporation of Muslim students problematic (Simel, 1996 
34-36). 
 Additionally, Bavaria is considered one of the more conservative integration 
regimes in Germany (Koopmans, 2004 458). Koopmans (2004) in his comparative study 
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of claims-making in German localities found that Bavarian public discourse is most in 
support of restrictions in migrant rights. Its ethnic minority population tend to be less 
involved in public discourse concerning immigrant rights and issues of integration than in 
other localities in Germany (Koopmans, 2004 458).  
 
Policy Development in Islamic Religious Instruction in Bavaria- Islamic Studies in the 
Mother-Tongue Part of the Curriculum 
 Bavaria aimed to adhere to the traditional path of Article 7 III in moving towards 
the establishment of Islamic religious instruction. This is consistent with the CSU’s stance 
on Islamic religious instruction (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 25). Article 7 III requires 
that curriculum can be created by a religious community which satisfies the criteria for a 
representative religious community. Yet, the decentralization of Islam presented the 
problem that a true representative religious community could not be determined — a re-
occurring issue (Simel, 1996 33). In lieu of this problem, school officials, the Turkish 
Consulate and Turkish parents tried to develop a curriculum for Islamic religious 
instruction. A compromise was reached in 1985 to offer a form of religious instruction 
implemented by Bavarian educational officials beginning with the first grade, with the 
addition of a grade every year up to the 4th grade (Simel, 1996 33). This program only 
developed in isolated areas, however (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 35).  
 In this initial version of Islamic religious instruction, the Bavarian education 
ministry began offering Islamic religious instruction as part of the mother tongue language 
classes (Hofhansel, 2010; Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 35). From the 1987-1988 
academic year, the next iteration of the course was offered under the title, “Islamic 
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Religious Instruction for Turkish Pupils of Islamic Belief” (IRITPIB) (Islamische 
Religioese Unterweisung fuer Tuerkishe Schueler Mulimischen Glaubens). They settled on 
not using an actual curriculum (Josza, 2007 103). Instead, the program operated via 
guidelines which adhered to a syllabus prepared by the Turkish Ministry of Education and 
Cultural Affairs in Turkey. The course aimed to use the guidelines (titled, “Guidelines for 
Religious Instruction of Turkish Students in Islamic Faith”) to integrate Islam with real life 
issues encountered by students of Turkish origin living in Western Europe (Josza, 2007 
103; Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 35). Thus, similar to NRW’s mother-tongue iteration, 
the course was less a confessional course and more a course about Islam with a practical 
element — contrary to the confessional course called for in Article 7 III (Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010 35; Josza, 2007 104).   
 The course is instructed in Turkish by Turkish teachers trained in Turkey and 
supervised by the Bavarian education ministry using Turkish textbooks approved by the 
same ministry (Kraft, 2006 5; Josza, 2007 103). The course, which was initially offered 
only for grade 1, was expanded with course offerings on an optional basis for grades 1-3 
by the 1987-1988 academic year; grades 4-5 were added the following year, and eventually 
it expanded to include up to grade 9 on an optional basis (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 
35). As of the 2005-2006 academic year 13,023 Muslim students of Turkish origin 
participated in the mother-tongue classes. Mother-tongue religious studies have continued 
despite the expansion of the Islamic religious instruction in the German model (see below) 
(Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 35). 
 To recap, similar to NRW early iterations, this initial offering of Islamic religious 
instruction operated mostly under the direction of the Bavarian ministry of education. The 
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course was the product of its partnership with the Turkish Ministry of Education and 
Cultural Affairs in Turkey, which provided the teachers, syllabus, and instructional texts. 
The policy arrangement was corporatist as substantive and resource responsibility 
concerning the course were delegated to the Turkish ministry. The policy venue consisted 
of the partnership between these two players.   
 
The Introduction of Islamic religious instruction in German (IRIG) 
 From 2001, religious instruction in Bavaria expanded with the addition of an 
Islamic religious instruction class in German (Hofhansel, 2010 202; Dromgold and 
Schneider, 2010 35). The program, Islamic Religious Instruction in German (IRIG) 
(Islamische Religioese Unterweisung in deutscher Sprache), was developed under the 
direction of the Bavarian education ministry and began as a pilot project in 5 schools in the 
2001-2002 academic year and would eventually expand to 35 schools (Jozsa, 2007 103; 
Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 35). For the purposes of comparative research, IRIG was 
only offered in schools which offered IRITPIB and an Ethics course as well (Josza, 2007 
103). Initially these courses were only offered to first graders but expanded to grades 1-5 
in these schools by 2004 and to secondary schools participating in the pilot in 2005 
(Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 35). This course was open to Muslim students of all 
ethnicities and actually was well-attended by Muslims of non-Turkish origin (Dromgold 
and Schneider, 2010 35; Jozsa, 2007 103). This is important as non-Turkish Muslim 
students range from a small minority to the majority of Muslim students depending on the 
locality (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 35). Courses, thus were varied in their focus 
depending on the demographics of the Muslim student population in the locality. The 
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curriculum initially followed the curricula guidelines of the IRITPIB, but once this proved 
inadequate for the needs of 21st century students of migrant background (who would not 
return to their parents’ homeland), the education ministry developed a curriculum for IRIG 
(Josza, 2007 103). The teachers hired generally had no formal religious pedagogical 
training.  
 As with the initial iteration of Islamic religious instruction under the mother tongue 
portion of the school curricula, this second chapter in the expansion of Islamic religious 
instruction was also driven by the Bavarian education ministry. In this case, however, the 
ministry acted more independently with decreasing influence from the ministry of 
education and Cultural Affairs in Turkey. In this second iteration, the policy arrangement 
was subsequently less corporatist — as in addition to decreasing input from Turkish 
ministry of education it also lacked a recognized representative of the target constituent 
group which was delegated responsibility for the course’s provision. Yet, the policy 
response was still a response to calls from the Turkish community for an Islamic version 
of religious instruction — although it was likewise responding to CSU officials who 
favored Islamic instruction in German once it became apparent that the immigrant 
population was permanent. And as with the initial mother tongue course, the policy venue 
resided solely within the Bavarian education ministry. 
 
The Erlangen Pilot Project 
 In the 2003-2004 academic year, Islamic Education (IE) (Islamunterricht) was 
implemented in the city of Erlangen, a city with an especially large concentration of 
Muslims for Bavaria (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 35). Given the large presence of 
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Muslims, lead groups emerged and worked in concert to address the concerns of their 
constituents. This program would develop the most towards adhering to Article 7 III 
requirements (Josza, 2007 103). The pilot program emerged from a petition submitted in 
1999 by the Islamic Religious Community Erlangen (Islamische Religiongemeinschaft 
Erlangen) to provide Islamic religious instruction at schools in Erlangen (Hofhansel, 2010 
202). The petition received support from academics at the University Erlangen-Nurnberg, 
local politicians, and the local foreigner council (Ausländerbeirat) (Hofhansel, 2010 202).  
 IE in Erlangen is a confessional course as opposed to IRIG and IRITPIB which are 
courses about Islam (Jozsa, 2007 104). Subsequently, IE adheres more to the substantive 
requirements of Article 7 III religious instruction. The Bundesland implemented the pilot 
program in Erlangen and worked with the Unified Association of the Islamic Community 
in Erlangen to offer Islamic religious instruction at two local schools (Hofhansel, 2010 
202; Fuess, 2007 229; Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 37). The community was specifically 
formed for the implementation of the trial program (Fuess, 2007 229). 
 The pilot was the result of a collaboration between the aforementioned religious 
community, academics from the University of Erlangen-Nurnberg and the Bavarian 
Education Ministry (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 35). This tripartite arrangement is a 
slight departure from the federal/state-recognized religious community partnership called 
for by Article 7 III.  However, as called for in Article 7 III, the Association of the Islamic 
Community in Erlangen was given complete autonomy over the curriculum and (as 
mentioned) the course was a confessional religious instruction course and not a course 
about Islam. Dromgold and Schneider (2010 37) argued that the the political opportunity 
structure which was more open to informal alliances between the state and NGOs (such as 
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the local lead Turkish organizations) allowed for the real participation of Muslim 
organizations, academics and Bavarian officials at the local level despite the non-existence 
of a Muslim lead organization at the Bundesland level. Dromgold and Schneider (2010) 
likewise maintain that the lack of a Bundesland initiative (a corporate partnership at the 
Bundesland level with a lead Muslim organization) retarded efforts in other localities. 
However, they also concluded that because of the fragmented structure of Islam and the 
chronic problems of Muslim in-fighting that perhaps these local initiatives are the best way 
forward for expanding religious instruction to include instruction in Islam in other states 
(Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 40). The subsequent adoption of the Erlangen trial in other 
localities speaks to their assertion. Once the first trial proved successful, the program 
expanded to more schools in Erlangen and eventually to other localities with continued 
expansion expected (Fuess, 2007 229; Hofhansel, 2010 202). 
 In this third phase of expansion in Islamic religious instruction, the Bavarian 
education ministry welcomed the collaboration of academics at the University of Erlangen-
Nurnberg and local Muslim lead organizations. Similar to the first two iterations, the policy 
venue remained at the Bundesland level, under the aegis of the Bavarian education 
ministry, but with the Erlangen pilot, it involved academics and Muslim elites from the 
Erlangen locality. The pilot would eventually expand to include arrangements in 
Nueremberg, Fuerth, Bayreuth and Munich as local Muslim-lead umbrella groups were 
identified by local officials or successfully campaigned for local recognition. These would 
all assume similar Bundesland-local religious community arrangements. And adhering to 
the Article 7 III corporatist requirement, the recognized local Muslim umbrella groups were 
given full autonomy concerning the curriculum. Thus, the local arrangements of the 
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Erlangen Pilot project were more corporatist than the IRIG iteration. 
 
Attempts to Find a Muslim Representative at the Bundesland Level 
 Concurrently while the Erlangen pilot program was coming to fruition, the 
Bavarian education ministry attempted to establish Islamic religious instruction on a 
Bundesland-wide basis by seeking to work with Muslim associations in developing a 
curriculum. To kickstart the development phase, the ministry invited all Muslim 
associations to a round table in 2001 (Hofhansel, 2010 202). Most Muslim associations 
participated with the exception of DITIB. In August of 2001, these associations joined 
forces to form the Islamic Religious Community of Bavaria (IRCB) (Islamische 
Religionsgemeinschaft Bayern). In October of the same year, the round table again 
convened. Months later, in February of 2002, the IRCB then submitted an application to 
the education ministry (then headed by Minister Ulrich Seiser) to provide religious 
instruction on a Bundesland-wide basis. But since the IRCB submitted this application 
without first consulting with the Bavarian education ministry the application was ultimately 
turned down, leaving only the Erlangen experiment as the only form of confessional 
religious instruction in Bavaria (Hofhansel, 2010 202).  
 Dromgold and Scheider (2010) (as mentioned above) and Fuess (2007) argued that 
the piecemeal, iterative local expansion of Islamic religious education was probably the 
best way forward in securing such corporatist policy arrangements because of the 
fragmentation of the Muslim community that has felled other efforts to establish a 
representative Muslim community at the state level. Their argument is based not only on 
the described failed attempt in Bavaria but the attempts in other German Bundeslaender 
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(including North Rhine Westphalia), citing the difficulty of overcoming the structural 
mismatch between Islam — a decentralized, heterogenous religious community — and 
Article 7 III requirements which privilege homogenous, hierarchal religious communities. 
The leading organizations in Erlangen and then in the other localities that adopted the 
Erlangen project overcame the usual rifts and conflicts with state officials that often 
preclude the formation of an inclusive representative organization (Fuess, 2007 229; 
Hofhansel, 2010 198). 
   
The Establishment of Teacher Training for Islamic Religious Instruction  
 The University of Erlangen initially introduced a visiting professorship for Islamic 
Religious Teaching (Islamische Religionslehre) in 2002. In 2006, the University of 
Erlangen-Nuernberg appointed Dr. Harry Harun Behr to chair the newly established 
program of Islamic religious instruction, the Interdisciplinary Center for Islamic Religious 
Teaching (Interdisziplinaeres Zentrum fuer Islamische Religionslehre) (IZIR) (Fuess, 2007 
229; Josza, 2007 104).  Behr became the second Muslim Theologian in Germany, second 
to Kalisch in Muenster (Fuess, 2007 229). Since its inception, the program has been 
training 30 teachers per year to eventually teach Islamic religious instruction. The training 
is similar to the training that Protestant and Catholic teachers receive: for general subjects 
(such as education, history of religions, etc) that are part of the curriculum, students can 
enroll in general courses which are part of the university course offerings; special subjects 
(such as Arabic, prophetic traditions (hadith), biography of the profit (sira), Islamic law, 
etc.) are offered in cooperation with the Faculty of Law and Islamic Sciences (Josza, 2007 
104). The training center for teachers was the first of its kind in Germany (Dromgold and 
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Schneider, 2010). Once the curriculum for Haupt- and Realschule have been created, it 
will also offer teacher training for secondary school instructors (Dromgold and Schneider, 
2010 37).  
 Behr, like Kalisch, is a German who converted to Islam. Fuess (2007 232) argues 
that this speaks well of the German Muslim community as he is a part of the community 
and can represent the interests of the community until the Muslim immigrant population 
matures and a larger pool of educated Muslims organically emerges. The development of 
this teaching program also moves the future development of Islamic religious instruction 
closer to the Article 7 III requirement of the religious community playing a role in teacher 
training. This program has the support of the state and the Muslim community and is 
expected to continue to expand (Fuess, 2007 229; 232). 
 
Conclusion - Bavaria  
 The Bavarian example is an example of the slow, iterative expansion of Islamic 
religious instruction via the hegemony of a single policy venue. The operable policy venues 
were at the local and Bundesland-level under the aegis of the Bavarian education ministry. 
Initial efforts involved partnerships between the Bundesland and the Turkish Ministry of 
Education and Cultural Affairs. The latter were designated with responsibility in 
curriculum development, teacher provision and instructional texts. The state generally 
approved these decisions and handled the fiscal responsibilities. Thus, this first effort was 
corporatist and the policy venue was solely within the Bavarian education ministry. This 
continued with the second roll out of Islamic Religious Instruction in German (IRIG), 
which was also only limited to isolated localities and again featured the partnership of the 
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Bundesland and the Turkish Ministry and Education and Cultural Affairs. As this program 
matured, however, the education ministry took more of a lead role. Hence, this was the 
least corporatist of the three iterations of religious instruction in Islam although it operated 
under the corporatist paradigm of addressing a policy issue because it fit a particular issue 
categorization as opposed to purely resulting from interest competition (as in the American 
cases).   
 The Erlangen pilot project represents the most developed form of Islamic religious 
instruction (of the three cases presented in this study) as it more closely adheres to the 
criteria called for in Article 7 III. Dromgold and Schneider (2010 38) contest that perhaps 
this results from the openness of Bundesland officials. They argue that the Bavarian case 
represents a more collaborative model of religious instruction. While the education 
ministry was not in the lead in providing religious instruction, it was open to addressing 
the demands of the emerging religious communities and including them and academics in 
formulating a policy response. In the Bavarian case, the education ministry placed less of 
an emphasis on the legal definition of a religious community, thus, allowing for a more 
collaborative environment between local officials, academics and Muslim groups 
(Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 38).     
 In a similar vein, Fuess (2007 229) argues that although the Bavarian model has 
expanded at a slower rate than some other examples in the German Bundeslaender, it might 
have the most staying-power. Religious instruction in Bavaria has grown organically, 
expanding as local Muslim communities find consensus and work with local educational 




 These arrangements are corporatist even if they do not specifically adhere to the 
Article 7 III calls for the recognition of a Bundesland or national Muslim lead 
organizations. Policy venues have been under the auspices of the Bavarian education 
ministry but in fact reside at the local levels where these policy arrangements have been 
formed. But again, there has been no venue shifting or state policy expansion brought about 
by intergovernmental policy venue interaction — issue expansion — as in the American 
case.  In Bavaria, issue expansion was locally based and more iterative— local corporatist 
arrangement in Erlangen legitimated similar arrangements in other localities. State and 
local policy venues have been the driving force of policy development both operating via 
the lead or approval of the Bavarian education ministry. No other venue has made 
challenges to affect these state and local arrangements.   
 Policy expansion in Bavaria has thus been piecemeal and iterative under the aegis 
of the Bavarian Ministry of Education. The policy has expanded as new local collaborative 
efforts have developed. This can still be considered a closed policymaking system as the 
Bavarian Ministry of Education has sanctioned the inclusion of new actors — these local 
arrangements required the ministry’s blessing to proceed. As Dromgold and Schneider 
(2010) have argued, perhaps this has resulted in a slow, scattered policy expansion. Venue 
shifting — to an increasingly sympathetic judiciary (Fuess, 2007 234) — would possibly 
lead to more rapid policy expansion as was the case in Texas and California because of 
venue shifting to federal and judicial venues in the 1970s. In the Texas and California cases, 
prior to federal and judicial mandates in the 1970s, bilingual education policy expanded in 
a similarly sporadic local manner. Although there was bipartisan support in California and 
Texas in the late 1960s and early 1970s for bilingual education, policy expansion — 
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involving more than isolated localities — did not occur until venue shifting to the federal 
and judiciary venues (as well as issue expansion across state and federal venues) 
encouraged more state commitments to bilingual education. As Bavaria has similar levels 
of elite support, perhaps judicial rulings to quicken the pace of official recognition of a 
Muslim lead organization at the state level would lead to more rapid expansion of Islamic 
religious instruction throughout Bavaria (Dromgold and Schneider, 2010 37).   
 Nevertheless, the Bavarian example also speaks to the importance of elite 
agreement. Elites from both major parties (CDU/CSU, and SPD) were all in favor of 
expanding religious instruction to include Islam. This consensus allowed for three 
iterations of religious instruction in Islam and an attempt to find a Muslim corporate partner 
at the state level.   
 
8.3 BERLIN 
Introduction - Policy Development in Islamic Religious Instruction in Berlin 
 Contrary to NRW and Bavaria, Turkish interests are in a slightly different 
institutional and political setting in Berlin. In the former two Bundeslaender, elite 
agreement concerning the integrative potential of Islamic religious instruction and the 
closed policy making system — cooperative federalism and German corporatism — made 
a favorable context for Turkish interests to attain their policy goals in religious instruction. 
These two states are governed by Article 7 III and thus religious instruction is a mandatory 
course in these two Bundeslaender.  The closed policy setting — determined by the legal 
and corporatist paradigms of Article 7 III and cooperative federalism — along with elite 
agreement concerning religious instruction made these states favorable towards 
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establishing mutually beneficial policy arrangements in religious instruction. Although 
lead Muslim organizations were unable to satisfy the criteria for state recognition outlined 
in Article 7 III, elite agreement and the closed policymaking setting encouraged and 
permitted state officials to make accommodations to provide some form of religious 
instruction in Islam.   
 Religious instruction in Berlin is not governed by Article 7 III but is instead offered 
as a voluntary course. This policy results from historic elite disagreement concerning 
religious instruction. Although religious instruction is voluntary, the education ministry 
still has relative monopoly power over granting permission for religious communities to 
provide religious instruction. The real difference in the Berlin setting is that elite views are 
ambivalent towards religious instruction. Nevertheless, the Article 7 III corporatist 
paradigm was still influential in the development of policy arrangements and as a result 
prevailing policy arrangements in religious instruction closely resemble those of 
Bundeslaender governed by Article 7 III. However because of elite ambivalence 
concerning Islamic religious instruction, policy negotiation between the Berlin Bundesland 
officials and Turkish lead organizations was less creative/ experimental and more 
contentious than in NRW and Bavaria. 
 Two factors influenced policy development in Islamic religious instruction in 
Berlin over the period of study: elite ambivalence concerning religious instruction and the 
closed nature of the policymaking process in religious religious instruction (despite not 
being governed by Article 7 III). Concerning elite ambivalence, on the one hand, there has 
been elite division concerning the place of compulsory religious instruction (akin to Article 
7 III) in general. The major parties have been split concerning the appropriateness of 
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Article 7 III-type compulsory religious instruction in Berlin. This manifested in religious 
instruction becoming a voluntary course but with with the development of policy 
arrangements that closely mimic the corporatism of Article 7 III. This created an 
institutional and legal expectation among Muslim interests of incorporation in a similar 
manner enjoyed by other religious communities. 
  On the other hand, there was elite ambivalence concerning the expansion of 
religious instruction to include teachings in Islam. First, there was elite agreement among 
the German political elite in their opposition to recognizing the Islamic Federation of Berlin 
(IFB) — the Muslim umbrella organization that had campaigned for this unofficial 
recognition — as an appropriate corporate partner for the provision of Islamic religious 
instruction in Berlin’s public schools. This led to the denial of IFB applications over a 
period that extended over twenty years. The application saga wound up in administrative 
court and ended with policy expansion in Islamic religious instruction as the IFB won their 
suit against the Berlin state to be recognized as a religious community. Second, contrary to 
NRW and Bavaria, which also faced campaigns for recognition from lead organizations of 
which they did not approve, Berlin authorities made no efforts to reach out to more 
favorable organizations or experiment in alternative policy arrangements to establish 
religious instruction in Islam on terms more palatable to the Bundesland.  
 Concurrent to these developments, elite disagreement concerning religious 
instruction in general came to a head in the Pro Reli voter initiative. The initiative gave the 
Berlin electorate the opportunity to make religious instruction compulsory. Muslim 
interests teamed up with conservatives and other religious communities in support of the 
Pro Reli voter initiative. The initiative was narrowly defeated in 2008, leaving religious 
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instruction as a voluntary course. 
 Concerning the closed nature of the policymaking system, religious instruction is 
not mandated by Article 7 III. Nevertheless, through the informal evolution of policy 
arrangements, the education ministry maintained monopoly power over the actors who 
could provide religious instruction. The Bundesverwaltungsgericht (federal administrative 
court) eventually found this to be based on suspect legal ground, leading to the recognition 
of the IFB through court order in 2000. Berlin officials would subsequently amend the 
education constitution, officially establishing corporatist criteria akin to Article 7 III and 
reestablishing the education ministry’s monopoly power in recognizing religious 
communities that could partake in the voluntary religious instruction system. 
 Thus, elite ambivalence concerning religious instruction and Berlin’s closed policy 
making system set the stage for venue shifting as the means for forcing policy change amid 
elite ambivalence concerning religious instruction. The Berlin case is an example of how 
a closed policymaking system and elite disagreement within a corporatist context resulted 
in more contested policy negotiations and policy expansion via venue shifting.   
 Policy expansion in religious instruction in Berlin brought it closest (of the three 
cases) to Article 7 III requirements as the federal administrative courts granted the IFB full 
autonomy in the provision of Islamic religious instruction — elevating it to a corporate 
partner at the state level. As in the Texas and California cases, successful venue shifting 
achieved policy goals for its supporters that were not possible in the original policy venue. 
And contrary to NRW and Bavaria it was a necessary ingredient in policy expansion and 




Summary of development of religious instruction And the Muslim campaign to provide 
religious instruction 
The Bremen Clause of the Basic Law exempts Berlin from the provisions of Article 
7 III. Despite the Bremen Clause exemption, the education ministry enjoyed similar 
monopoly power over religious instruction as in Western Bundeslaender. Berlin state 
officials (charged to the education ministry) allocated the space and controlled the 
distribution of subsidies for the provision of religious instruction. This created an unofficial 
process of state recognition for religious communities sanctioned by the Berlin state. And 
those communities recognized in this informal process enjoyed monopoly power over 
community membership — the individual students that could partake in religious 
instruction. Due to the similar institutional set up of religious instruction in Berlin, the 
political interests and institutions involved in religious instruction arrangements also 
resembled the other Bundeslaender. These actors included government officials from 
across the political spectrum — the SPD, Left Party, and CDU — the education ministry, 
the Federal and Bundesland administrative courts, and the appellate courts. Muslim groups 
were represented by lead organizations—the IFB and DITIB. The electorate also directly 
influenced policy development in religious instruction in general via the Pro Reli voter 
initiative (although their involvement played no role in the Islamic religious instruction 
policy debate).68 
 Despite the exemption from Article 7 III, policy arrangements in religious 
                                                 
68 Hence, Berlin can be characterized as a comparably closed policymaking system in religious instruction. 
The Pro Reli initiative was about the role religious instruction should play in the Bundesland (as a voluntary 
or compulsory course). However, the education ministry maintained monopoly power over actor entry 
throughout the study (for the exception of the brief period between the 2000 Administrative court ruling and 
the amending of the education constitution). This, thus, made Berlin as closed a policymaking system as the 
NRW and Bavaria. 
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instruction evolved to closely resemble those of Bundeslaender governed by Article 7 III. 
This was due to Germany’s corporatist tradition in policymaking and the Article 7 III 
church-state institutional paradigm established in the Western Bundeslaender (see Pierson, 
1994 for his discussion of policy feedback learning effects). Religious instruction was 
offered as a voluntary course and the Berlin state heavily subsidized these courses for 
recognized religious communities. The other variation from NRW and Bavaria besides the 
voluntary status of religious instruction courses was that the religious community was 
completely responsible for its provision (differing from the western Bundeslaender where 
the state was more of an active partner in the provision of the course; see Politics of 
Religious Instruction chapter for a more complete explanation of the church-state 
relationship). This arrangement dated back to the 1970s and by the 1980s, the two main 
Christian churches, the Jewish community, the Humanist Union and other philosophical 
traditions had their religious instruction courses heavily subsidized by the Berlin state.   
 By the 1970s and 1980s, the Muslim population had grown substantially in Berlin. 
At this time, IFB began a 20-year campaign to provide religious instruction at public 
schools in Berlin — campaigning for the same recognition and state subsidies that other 
religious communities enjoyed. Their applications were repeatedly denied by the Berlin 
education ministry as the ministry ruled that the IFB did not satisfy the requirements of a 
religious community according to Berlin law. Additionally, the IFB is considered an 
extremist organization by the German federal constitutional authorities, and so their 
recognition was opposed across the political spectrum. After appealing this decision to the 
federal administrative court, the IFB ultimately won their suit and were awarded the right 
to provide Islamic religious instruction (see above). Beginning with the 2000-2001 
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academic year, the IFB began providing Islamic religious instruction in Berlin public 
schools.   
 Elite ambivalence over religious instruction is further depicted in the Pro Reli 
initiative campaign. In 2005, legislation was passed making ethics a mandatory course, but 
leaving religious instruction as voluntary. Church groups protested what they interpreted 
as a second class status for religious instruction, arguing that religious instruction also 
needed to be compulsory. This reignited a debate concerning religious instruction policy 
that had began during the period of German reunification — what was the place of religious 
instruction in modern Germany? As Berlin lacked both a religious population and history 
because of the GDR’s anti-church stance, the policy was open for debate. The debate split 
the parties and in 2008, a referendum campaign was launched by pro-religious instruction 
forces, Pro Reli, to legally make religious instruction a compulsory course in public school 
curricula. The initiative was narrowly defeated in 2009.   
 Subsequently, the picture this paints is that Berlin’s exemption from Article 7 III 
left the question of religious instruction unresolved even as informal policy arrangements 
coalesced because of German corporatism and the institutional inertia created by Article 7 
III church-state relations in most other German Bundeslaender. Contrary to the other 
German cases of this study where religious instruction arrangements were governed by 
Article 7 III (and thus constitutionally guaranteed) and situated in a setting with elite 
support (and a population with a majority affiliated with a church), Berlin (mostly ruled by 
the SPD who were lukewarm to religious instruction in Berlin) chose not to seek alternative 
policy arrangements when the IFB candidacy proved untenable. The rejection of the IFB 
applications led the IFB to try the courts — venue shifting (as was the case in the American 
 
452 
setting as both Latino interests and later English Only interests sought out more favorable 
venues to advance their causes) to the courts. Ultimately, the courts granted the IFB the 
right to provide religious instruction and receive state subsidies.   
 As the issue of religious instruction reemerged because of new legislation making 
ethics classes mandatory, venue shifting to the plebiscitary venue by pro-compulsory 
religious instruction interests nearly resulted in policy change concerning the status of 
religious instruction.   
 Shortly after the court granted the IFB the right to provide Islamic religious 
instruction, the Alevites were recognized by the Berlin state and began offering religious 
instruction in 2002.  The Alevites — a minority Muslim sect with ambivalent acceptance 
by other Muslim communities — however enjoyed elite support and were a homogenous 
religious community. They were thus incorporated into Berlin’s informal religious 
instruction policy arrangements with little fanfare. Viewed comparatively to the IFB 
campaign for recognition, their successful candidacy depicts the importance of elite 
support in German corporate policy arrangements.   
 After a brief discussion of the political context and population dynamics, the 
remainder of the chapter will detail how elite ambivalence concerning religious instruction 
and the closed character of the policymaking system influenced policy development in 
Islamic religious instruction and religious instruction in general. 
 
Berlin- Political Context and Population Demographics 
 Berlin has the second highest percentage of foreign-born residents in Germany 
(approximately 13 percent) (Pfaff and Gill, 2006 815). There are over 200,000 Muslims in 
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the city with 70 percent being Turkish immigrants or their German-born children. 
Approximately one-third of the Turkish population was born in Germany and another 
forty-five percent has lived in Berlin for at least 10 years. Nearly 80 percent of Turks in 
Berlin are Sunni. However, there is tremendous diversity in belief among the Turkish 
community (Shiites, Alevites, and groups linked to Islamist reform order among others) 
(Pfaff and Gill, 2006). The four largest religious communities are the DITIB (affiliated 
with the Turkish State Office of Religious Affairs and thus moderate), the Islamic 
Federation of Berlin (IFB, an Islamist reform group; will be discussed below), the Union 
of Islamic Cultural Centers, and the Turkish Federation. Berlin has 75 registered mosques 
and prayer rooms; 35 (45 percent) are unaffiliated with a religious denomination, the 
remainder are associated with the four main Turkish religious communities: DITIB (19 
percent); IFB (15 percent); Union of Islamic Cultural Centers (12 percent); and the Turkish 
Federal (5 percent) (Pfaff and Gill, 2006 815).   
 Social Democrats and the Left Party have been politically dominant in Berlin 
although the polarizing nature of Left Party politics have periodically resulted in grand 
coalitions in which the CDU assume the minority party role in an SPD-led coalition 
(Hofhansel, 2010 193). Additionally, according to Koopmans (2004), Berlin (along with 
Frankfurt) are considered to have Germany’s most liberal incorporation regimes 
(Koopmans, 2004 457). Berlin’s Commissioner of Foreigners, Barbara John, is considered 
Germany’s most influential and active Commissioner of Foreigners despite being a 
member of the CDU. She has been an active proponent for the extension of migrant rights. 
In Berlin, similar to other Eastern German Bundeslaender, a majority of the population, 60 
percent, are not affiliated with a church (Hofhansel, 2010 199; Barker, 2004; Trempkamp, 
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2009). This is a legacy of the GDR which aimed to weaken the church to assure state 
predominance during its existence (Barker, 2004). Among the religious believers, 
Protestants outnumber Catholics (Hofhansel, 2010 199).   
 
Policy Development in Berlin- The influence of Article 7 III and Corporatism 
 The Berlin government established agreements with the Protestant and Catholic 
religious communities in 1970 and began heavily subsidizing their religious instruction 
programs (Hofhansel, 2010 202). Thus, to use school property, the Berlin state education 
ministry first [informally] recognized these religious communities. In addition to providing 
the classroom space, the state of Berlin finances teacher salaries (Josza, 2007 104). In 
addition to providing religious instruction, the religious community is responsible for the 
curricula, the training of teachers and the books. Currently, similar religious instruction 
program arrangements exist for the secular Humanist Union (Humanistischer Verband 
Deutchlands), the Jewish community of Berlin, the Islamic Federation of Berlin, Greek 
Orthodox Community, Buddhists, Alevites, and a group associated with the tradition of 
Rudolph Steiner (Hofhansel, 2010 202), as briefly outlined above. 
 That religious instruction policy arrangements in Berlin so closely resemble the 
church-state relations in Bundeslaender governed by Article 7 III speaks to the influence 
of Article 7 III in German religious instruction policy (Pierson, 1994). However, the 
evolution of policy arrangements did not settle the elite debate concerning the status of 
religious instruction in the Bundesland. Berlin’s religious communities are proponents of 
the adoption of similar compulsory religious instruction and policy arrangements as 
dictated in those Western Bundeslaender governed by Article 7 III (Barker, 2004 104). 
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Their pursuit of such arrangements is not surprising. After the reunification, there was a 
nationwide debate concerning the place of religious instruction in modern Germany amid 
the perceived secularization of the German population. In Berlin, the debate split the 
parties: The SPD and the Left Party were for an inter-faith ethics class; The CDU and 
religious groups were proponents of an Article 7 III form of compulsory religious 
instruction; The Greens favored voluntary religious instruction offered by the various 
religious communities. In the end, Berlin settled on permitting religious communities to 
use public schools to provide religious instruction and maintained ethics and philosophy 
courses on a voluntary basis (Hofhansel, 2010 202; Barker, 2004 172).   
 That the Berlin education ministry (mostly governed by the SPD which prefers an 
inter-religious, inter-ethics compulsory course option) pursued church-state relations so 
similar to Article 7 III is more curious. However, as 40 percent of the population is 
affiliated with the church, the dynamics of concentrated costs-diffuse benefits (see 
Sheingate, 2000) most likely influenced the various governments that continued this 
arrangement once the state began subsidizing the provision of religious instruction for 
various religious communities in the 1970s. Additionally, the preponderance of grand 
coalition governments between the SPD and CDU ensured that the CDU — advocates for 
Article 7 III religious instruction — would often have veto power over eliminating such 
arrangements.   
 
The IFB Campaign to Provide Islamic Religious Instruction in Berlin 
 The twenty–year Islamic campaign to offer religious instruction was led by the 
Islamic Federation of Berlin (IFB) (Hofhansel, 2010 202). The IFB identifies itself as a 
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regional representative to all Muslims in Berlin (Kraft, 2006 8). As an umbrella 
organization it consists of 26 member associations, which are all Turkish-Islamic groups. 
Considered an extremist group by Germany’s constitutional authorities as well as the 
Turkish state, the Berlin education ministry rejected three applications from the IFB to 
provide religious instruction (Hofhansel, 2010 202).  The first time occurred in 1980 with 
the ministry arguing that the IFB did not constitute a religious community 
(Religionsgemeinschaft) according to section 23 of Berlin’s statute on schools. The 
ministry argued that the IFB lacked the organizational structure, according to section 23, 
to serve as a representative of the Muslim community. The School Senate argued that the 
IFB were not a religious community (Gemeinschaft) but were simply an association 
(Verein) (Ewing, 2000 46). Section 23 at the time stated that the provision of religious 
instruction was the charge of the churches, religious communities, and ideological 
communities, but did not specifically detail a working definition for a religious community 
(Hofhansel, 2010 203). Meanwhile the IFB continually rewrote its charter and submitted 
unsuccessful applications in 1983 and 1987 in addition to the aforementioned application 
in 1980 (Ewing, 2000 46). Each time the School Senate argued that the IFB did not satisfy 
the criteria for a religious community and that the only common denominator between the 
heterogeneous groups that made up the IFB was the Koran. The School Senate claimed 
that the various groups under the IFB had different legal systems, different organizational 
structures and sociocultural forms. In 1987, the IFB appealed this decision in 
administrative court and again lost (Hofhansel, 2010 203). In the 1987 rejection, the School 
Senate also argued that the IFB was only representative of a minority of the Berlin Muslim 
population and was more similar to a secular interest group (as one group was identified as 
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a political organization, which was further evidence that the IFB was more similar to a 
secular interest group) (Ewing, 2000 47). The 1987 rejection kicked off IFB appeals to the 
administrative court in 1987, 1993, 1997 and 2000 (Ewing, 2000 46). The 1997 decision 
was overturned by an appellate court that ruled that the lower court had wrongly used 
Article 7 III criteria to assess IFB’s legitimacy as an Muslim religious community 
(Hofhansel, 2010 203; Ewing, 2000 48). The Bremen Clause exempted Berlin from Article 
7 III and so the criteria used by the education ministry (Religionsgemeinschaft- religious 
community) was legally dubious (Hofhansel, 2010 203). The federal administrative court 
upheld the 1998 appellate court decision, ruling that the Bremen Clause exempted Berlin 
from relying on Article 7 III to define religious communities (Hofhansel, 2010 203; Josza, 
2007 104). Following this decision, the Berlin education ministry granted IFB the authority 
to provide voluntary religious education classes (Hofhansel, 2010 203). As a result, the 
IFB became the first Muslim organization to be formally recognized as a religious 
community according to Berlin law (Josza, 2007 104).  
 Subsequently, politicians from across the political spectrum were critical of IFB-
provided Islamic religious instruction. Politicians had issue with IFB’s pedagogical intent, 
the qualification of teachers, the teachers’ German linguistic skills, and the negative effects 
that IFB delivered religious instruction would have on the integration of Turkish migrants 
(Hofhansel, 2010 203).   
 Another issue that affected the debate was the perception of IFB as an extremist 
organization. German constitutional authorities claim the IFB are associated with 
Islamische Gemeinschaft- Millî Görüş e.V. (Hofhansel, 2010 203). Millî Görüş has been 
classified by the Bundesverfassungsschutz (Office for the Protection of the Constitution) 
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as an extremist organization (Kraft, 2006 7). It is supposedly also linked to Turkey’s 
Islamist Welfare Party (Ewing, 2000 47). The Welfare Party (renamed the Virtue Party 
after it was banned in Turkey in 1998) controlled the Turkish government for a brief period 
and aimed to replace Turkey’s laicism with a church-state policy more favorable to Islam. 
Thus, the court ruling had legitimized recognition for a group the state defined as a terrorist 
organization and which was under the surveillance of the German Constitutional Police 
(Hofhansel, 2010 203; Fuess, 2007 232). Ewing (2000) states that media reports in the 
wake of the successful IFB appeal were split: some argued that in addition to being critical 
of the IFB, the Berlin government still had concerns about the lack of integration of the 
city’s Muslim community, who were split into competing umbrella organizations; Others 
argued that the Berlin ministry focused solely on the candidacy of the IFB as a means of 
ignoring the issue of Islamic religious instruction (Ewing, 2000 47). The IFB’s association 
with Millî Görüş is also problematic for many in Berlin’s Muslim community and is part 
of the reason that IFB classes have experienced poor attendance from the Muslim 
community (Kraft, 2006 7).  
 The main rival Muslim umbrella organization in Berlin is DITIB. DITIB has direct 
ties to the Turkish government through Turkey’s Directorate for Religious Affairs 
(Diyante) and practices a more moderate, progressive Islam (Ewing, 2000 47). Its leader 
Ali Kilinc, Director of DITIB in Berlin, believed his more moderate organization should 
have been the organization recognized by the Berlin authorities to provide Islamic religious 
instruction in Berlin’s public schools (Ewing, 2000 47). Yet no efforts were made by the 
state to accommodate this more moderate Muslim umbrella group. 
 When the new Social Democratic government assumed power in 2005 (led by 
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Klaus Wowereit), it passed legislation, amending section 13 to Berlin’s statue on schools 
(Hofhansel, 2010 203; Kraft, 2006 8). The amending of section 13 essentially changed the 
law so that the process for granting religious communities the right to offer religious 
instruction corresponds with Article 7 III (Hofhansel, 2010 203). Subsequently, the IFB 
precedent has raised the bar for corporate requirements that Berlin’s religious communities 
must satisfy for official recognition (Hofhansel, 2010 203). This thus keeps Berlin’s 
religious instruction policy arrangement a closed policy arrangement by formally giving 
the education ministry gatekeeping power on par with its Western counterparts governed 
by Article 7 III — a power it had informally assumed before the 2000 court ruling ended 
it.    
 IFB-provided religious instruction (on a voluntary basis) expanded to 37 schools, 
serving around 4,000 Muslim students by the 2004-2005 academic year (Kraft, 2006 8; 
Yukleyen, 2010 451). Approximately, three-fourths are Turkish and the remaining fourth 
are Arab (Pfaff and Gill, 2006 819). Teachers are hired and trained by the IFB without 
input from the Berlin authorities (Kraft, 2006 9). Per the 2000 ruling, the Berlin education 
ministry could only verify the fitness of teachers (their allegiance to the German 
constitution) and their qualifications (Kraft, 2006 9). This was consistent with the church-
state arrangements enjoyed by the other religious communities in Berlin. 
 The course operated according to the curriculum titled, the "Temporary Framework 
Plan for Islamic Religious Instruction of Berlin" (Kraft, 2006 8). Typically, after a 
recognized religious community develops a curriculum framework plan, the established 
practice was that the curriculum had to be submitted to the Berlin Senate Administration 
for approval (Kraft, 2006 8). The Education Ministry rejected the IFB proposed curriculum 
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arguing that basic respect for the German constitution and equality of the sexes was not 
guaranteed (Barker, 2004 173). The IFB appealed this decision and the Constitutional 
Court ruled that curriculum content was the province of the religious community, not the 
state. Because of the court’s 2000 ruling that the Bremen Clause exempted Berlin from 
Article 7 III requirements, the Senate Administration could only review whether the 
curriculum was in accordance with the constitution and not concerning other matters of 
content (Kraft, 2006 8).  
 The IFB proceeded with developing the curriculum (Kraft, 2006 8). In their first 
attempt drafting the curriculum, they did so independently until interim results were leaked 
to the public. Because of negative public reaction, the IFB then changed course and 
delegated the task to the Institute of Interreligious Pedagogy and Didactics (IPD) to develop 
a curriculum appropriate to the Berlin pedagogical paradigm. The issue with the curriculum 
was that it did not merge content with the didactic requirements of religious instruction — 
which aims to not only teach core concepts of the religion but instructed on how these 
religious tenets should be applied in everyday life in Germany. The IPD was also brought 
into to assist the IFB with didactical approaches. Similar to the IFB, the IPD has 
connections with Millî Görüş, and still, the two parties could not agree on their 
interpretations of the Koran. The curriculum was more focused on providing a survey of 
Islam’s tenets without a didactic philosophy of how to apply the tenets (as was the typical 
didactic approach of modern confessional religious instruction in Berlin). In this sense, 
Islam was treated as a theology with immutable truths that were self evident. In the final 
curriculum, it was not clear how these tenets would be interpreted by instructors nor the 
didactic approach that would be taken. As the Berlin ministry did not have the legal 
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authority to influence the curriculum, the didactic approach remained unexplained, which 
contributed to its cool acceptance by the German political establishment (Kraft, 2006 8-9).  
 
Policy Expansion in Islamic Religious Instruction via Venue Shifting 
 Policy evolution in Islamic religious instruction, which culminated with the federal 
administrative court ruling that the IFB had the legal right to provide religious instruction 
according to the Berlin law, was an example of the effects of elite ambivalence within a 
closed policymaking system: policy expansion via venue shifting to the courts. This was 
the only viable option for policy expansion (similar to the situation African Americans 
faced in the pre-Civil Rights years when Congress was controlled by southern 
segregationists). There was consensus across the political spectrum in opposition to the 
IFB candidacy. However, as Berlin was exempt from Article 7 III, using Article 7 III 
criteria to deny the IFB proved to be legally suspect. The courts ruled that the Article 7 III 
legal rationale could not be used to deny new interests. Additionally, the precedent set by 
the Berlin state in recognizing Christian and other church groups meant that denying 
Muslim groups was discriminatory, subsequently revoking (temporarily) the gatekeeping 
power the education ministry had unofficially assumed. Thus, venue shifting led to the 
recognition of the IFB, also providing them with full curriculum authority as was afforded 
the other religious communities.   
 
The Alevite’s Campaign 
 Shortly after the court ruled in favor of IFB-provided Islamic religious instruction, 
in 2000 the Culture Center of the Anatolic Alevites (CCAA) (Kulturzentrum Anatolischer 
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Aleviten) applied for recognition as a religious community which they were officially 
awarded in 2002 (Josza, 2007 104). As of the 2002-2003 academic year, the CCAA 
provided Alevite 69  religious instruction in 7 Berlin public schools (Josza, 2007 104; 
Barker, 2004 174). This expanded to 10 primary schools for 110 students as of the 2004-
2005 academic year (Josza, 2007 105). 
 The curriculum resulted from a collaborative effort between the CCAA and the 
Alevites Community in Germany (ACG) (Josza, 2007 105). The latter had produced a 
curriculum that had gained wide approval from academics throughout Germany. This and 
the fact that the community is more homogenous and moderate in its interpretation of Islam 
led to its acceptance by the Berlin education ministry.   
 Alevitism can be seen as a branch of Islam (Josza, 2007 105). Their beliefs 
regarding the prophet, relations between God and man, the image of men (Menschenbild) 
lead some to argue that they are not Muslims. This had led to past persecutions by other 
Muslims communities. Alevis see themselves, however, as a branch of Islam and the World 
Muslim League (following a conservative interpretation of Islam) concurs.  However, due 
to the IFB curriculum focus which neglects Alevis interpretations of Islam, because of 
significant differences in interpretation of Sunni Islam and some Shia schools by the 
Alevis, and the homogeneity of the Alevis community, IFB and CCAA are considered 
separate Muslim religious communities before the German law (Josza, 2007 105).   
 In some sense the CCAA were the flip side of the IFB — a religious community 
that enjoyed widespread elite support among the German political establishment. Thus, 
they were easily absorbed into the informal church-state relations established in Berlin — 
                                                 




venue shifting was not necessary.  
 As of 2006, there were approximately 200,000 Muslims living in Berlin (Josza, 
2007 105). Most of these are of Turkish descent, 20 percent of whom are Alevis. As of 
2007, the IFB offered Islamic religious instruction in 37 primary schools to approximately 
4,000 students (Fuess, 2007 232). The CCAA offers Alevis religious instruction in 10 
public schools to approximately 110 students. Thus, as of 2006, only a small percent of 
Muslims living in Berlin attend either IFB or CCAA religious instruction (Josza, 2007 
105). And an even smaller percent (as compared to the total Muslim participation) of the 
Alevis take part in Alevis Islamic religious instruction in Berlin.   
 
The Unresolved Question concerning Religious Instruction in Berlin—Elite 
Ambivalence Persists 
 Concurrently during this period, debate heated up concerning Berlin’s lack of a 
religious instruction mandate (Barker, 2004 172). The IFB ruling added to an already 
reemerging debate over religious instruction in general (Ewing, 2000 49). The merging of 
East and West Berlin after reunification had brought the issue of religious instruction to 
the fore. The East formerly part of the areligious GDR did not believe state sponsorship of 
religion was an appropriate state role. Those affiliated with a religious community in West 
Berlin and religious groups publicly argued that too few students were reached by the 
voluntary religious instruction system, thus meriting compulsory religious instruction 
(Barker, 2004 172). As the IFB decision was about to come to its conclusion, this debate 
about the place of religious instruction in Berlin was also beginning to heat up (Ewing, 
2000 49). The IFB decision would help to change the terms of this debate as it added 
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another recognized religious community from an ethnic community that mostly supported 
mandatory religious instruction and was becoming increasingly vocal about its perceived 
discriminatory treatment in Berlin’s religious instruction policy regime (Ewing, 2000 50). 
 In the winter of 1999-2000, Berlin’s new CDU senator for education announced 
that he planned to campaign for compulsory religious instruction in Berlin (Ewing, 2000 
49). The announcement sparked controversy and a response from a diverse range of 
organizations and interests in opposition to the proposal. This reignited the debate 
concerning whether Berlin should introduce mandatory religious instruction, adopt the 
Brandenburg LER (Life, Ethics, and Religion) course option — inter-faith- inter-ethics 
course — or whether the voluntary system should continue (Barker, 2004 172). The debate 
split the parties: The CDU has supported an option closer to Article 7 III compulsory 
religious instruction; the SPD has supported an ethics class closer to the LER Brandenburg 
model; the Green and Left Party oppose compulsory ethics and/or religious instruction, 
arguing that the current voluntary model is consistent with the Article 4 requirement of 
state neutrality in religious affairs (Barker, 2004 173).   
 Currently, the religious organizations believe that the status quo of voluntary 
religious instruction discourages course enrollment since the course is offered at the end of 
the day and opting out of the course leaves students with a free period — thus there is an 
incentive to opt out (Barker, 2004 172). As of 2002, 116,000 students attended religious 
instruction despite the unfavorable time slot (Barker, 2004 173). These religious groups 
favor a religious instruction option that closely resembles Article 7 III.   
 In 2002, the Bishop of the Protestant Church for Berlin/ Brandenburg and the 
Catholic Archdiocese of Berlin drafted a letter soliciting parental support for a religious 
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community proposal (Barker, 2004 173). The proposal offered a compulsory group of 
religious courses offered in Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, and a class in 
philosophy. States would retain their power of authority over education matters, but the 
curriculum would originate from the representative religious community. This would be a 
model similar to Article 7 III. The proposal was not taken up by the legislature, but the 
religious community continued its campaign for compulsory religious instruction (Barker, 
2004 173).   
 In 2005, Legislation was passed making it mandatory that, from 2006 on, all 
students from seventh grade forward would have to enroll in an ethics class with religious 
instruction available on a voluntary enrollment basis (Hofhansel, 2010 202). This prompted 
consternation from religious groups concerned that students would forego religious classes 
completely if left as a voluntary course option. Since 2006, debate regarding religious 
instruction has continued concerning religious instruction policy and whether both ethics 
and religious instruction should be mandatory (having students choose between the two 
compulsory courses) or if religious instruction should remain voluntary (Barker, 2004 172; 
Trenkamp, 2009).   
 In 2008, the Pro Reli citizen initiative challenged Berlin’s model of mandatory 
ethics class and voluntary religious instruction. The initiative aimed to reform the 
arrangement, elevating religious instruction to a mandatory class along with ethics — thus, 
students would have the option to choose between two mandatory courses (Hofhansel, 
2010 203). The initiative was chaired by Berlin CDU parliament member (and lawyer) 
Christian Lehmann (Trenkamp, 2009). In addition to the religious communities, Pro Reli 
had the support of the CDU (the opposition party), the Free Democrats, the FDP, and 
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bourgeois West Berliners (Trenkamp, 2009). Pro Reli was opposed by the SPD, the Left 
Party — the governing coalition; the Green Party, SPD mayor of Berlin, Klaus Wowereit, 
and proletarian East Berliners (Hofhansel, 2010 204; Trenkamp, 2009). The anti-Pro Reli 
campaign called itself Pro Ethik as the campaign called for the rejection of the referendum, 
leaving only the ethics course as mandatory (Trenkamp, 2009). Pro Ethik was chaired by 
Walter Momper, president of the Berlin state parliament. The initiative was mostly 
supported in the Muslim community, but was opposed by the Anatolian Alevite 
Community (one of the core groups of the CCAA), the Turkish Association of Berlin-
Brandenberg, and the Turkish Parent’s Association (Trenkamp, 2009).   
 During the initiative campaign, the Christian Democrats, led by Lehmann, argued 
that making both ethics and religious instruction mandatory and allowing students to 
choose afforded students free choice (Trenkamp, 2009). The Pro Ethik side argued that 
making both mandatory created a “forced choice” (Trenkamp, 2009). The campaign 
rhetoric took on an aggressive tone for German politics with each side caricaturing the 
other side with cliched stereotypes, such as the Pro Ethik side referring to the Pro Reli side 
as turning the campaign into a “crusade” and the Pro Reli side arguing that ethics classes 
instill a conformity in thinking reminiscent of the GDR (Trenkamp, 2009).   
 The initiative gathered enough citizen signatures to force a vote on the matter.  
Additionally, per Berlin’s rules for referendums, at least one-quarter of the electorate 
needed to turn out and vote in the referendum election for it to be valid (Trenkamp, 2009). 
This threshold was also reached: on April 26, 2009, 51.3 percent of Berlin voters rejected 
the initiative— a narrow defeat (Hofhansel, 2010 204). 
 The Pro Reli initiative campaign showed that religious instruction policy is still in 
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flux in Berlin—as nearly 50 percent voted for the compulsory religious instruction option 
and as the initiative campaign exposed the polarization among elites (Hofhansel, 2010). 
However, with the growing Muslim populations that have now (at least a portion of the 
Muslim population via IFB) been afforded the benefits of state subsidized religious 
instruction, the compulsory versus voluntary religious instruction debate is far from 
decided.    
 
Conclusion - Berlin 
 The debate surrounding religious instruction in Berlin shows the effects of the 
closed policymaking system and elite dissension. Facing political opposition across the 
political spectrum to their candidacy within a closed policymaking system, the IFB was 
forced to try the courts to enact policy change— a strategy that was 20 years in the making. 
The courts were the only other venue available. Nevertheless, the closed nature of the 
policymaking process insulated the IFB candidacy from the electorate. If IFB had been 
within a policy context such as California, the widespread discontent for their candidacy 
may have also been eventually saved by the courts but not without a negative political set 
back akin to the Proposition 187 ruling that temporarily barred illegal and legal immigrants 
from much of the the American welfare state (most of the legislation was eventually ruled 
unconstitutional by the courts). And as was the case with Proposition 187 much of the anti-
Muslim politics may have been legitimated by such an outcome, negatively affecting the 
politics of future Muslim campaigns.   
 Concerning elite ambivalence towards religious instruction, this played out in the 
debate over whether religious instruction should be a voluntary or compulsory course. 
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Conservative pro-religious forces had been dissatisfied with the direction of religious 
instruction policy. Existing as a permanent minority, having achieved little traction for their 
proposals to make religious instruction mandatory via the legislative route, they aimed to 
take their case to possibly a more friendly policy venue, the referendum. Referendum 
voting is not common in Germany, but since the 1980s, reforms at the Bundeslaender level 
have afforded referendum voting to elicit policy change directly from the electorate when 
the party system fails to produce. But the relevant issue here, is the sharp elite divisions 
concerning religious instruction policy that the debate exposed— which is not present in 
North Rhine Westphalia nor Bavaria. In NRW and Bavaria, compulsory religious 
instruction is a settled issue and incorporating Islamic religious instruction is a policy goal 
with elite support.   
 The differences between Berlin and NRW and Bavaria with respect to elite 
sentiment concerning religious instruction is also evident in the actions of Berlin and NRW 
when both were faced with unfavorable Muslim lead organizations. Other than continually 
rejecting the candidacy of the IFB, Berlin authorities did not seek out other lead or local 
organizations with whom they could work to provide Islamic religious instruction despite 
having the largest concentration of Muslims in a European city and a moderate organization 
publicly campaigning for recognition. The lukewarm sentiment to Islam is captured in an 
excerpt from an interview with Berlin’s commissioner for immigrant affairs, Barbara John, 
from 1999 in which she offered the following:  
 Islam did not fit religiously or institutionally into our conception of a religious  
 community. . . in particular, Islam in its European diaspora lacks a clear and  
 binding organization as do comparable Christian churches. As a result, it lacks a  
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 single legitimate representative (Ansprechspartner) to communicate with the state 
 administration  
 (Jonker & Kapphan, 1999 21 excerpt in Pfaff and Gill, 2006 817). 
 
 This sentiment was also held by the religious communities of Berlin. Roman 
Catholics viewed the Muslim community as a “community of interest” with pious Muslims 
who shared common issues of “moral concern” (Pfaff and Gill, 2006 817). Yet Catholics 
were fearful of alliances because of the potential of Islamic fundamentalism and the 
fractious nature of the Berlin Muslim community (Pfaff and Gill, 2006 817).70   The 
Protestant Church believed that without a centrally organized corporate organization under 
the leadership of district authorities, Muslim communities could not properly assume the 
responsibilities of a religious corporation (as called for in the Basic Law) nor could they 
serve as a reliable negotiating partner with the state over religious affairs (Pfaff and Gill, 
2006 821). Although this sentiment has been shared by elites in NRW and Bavaria 
concerning particular Muslim lead organizations, this was not the sentiment towards the 
community overall. 
 Additionally, according to Koopmans (2004), Berlin migrants (along with those in 
Frankfurt) play a disproportionally larger role in public discourse concerning migrants and 
ethnic relations and more frequently focused on issues of immigrant integration and rights 
than anywhere else in Germany (457; see Koopmans, 2004 for the entire comparative study 
of immigrant claims making in German localities). Nevertheless, the Berlin political 
establishment simply denied the IFB application. This despite having supposedly the most 
                                                 
70 A. Schmid, Berlin Diocese, personal communication, June 22, 2004 quoted in Pfaff and Gill, 2006 (821). 
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progressive immigration incorporation regime in Germany (Koopmans, 2004 457).  
 This speaks to the lukewarm embrace of religious instruction by Berlin’s elites and 
notably the SPD. Concerning support from the religious community, in NRW, the religious 
community fully supported the state extending religious instruction to teachings in Islam 
with the Protestant community, in particular stepping in when it thought the state pursued 
establishing a variant of Islamic religious instruction with insufficient input from the 
Muslim community. Additionally in NRW, SPD-led governments faced with lead 
organizations that were not to their liking, but with the largest Muslim population of any 
German Bundesland, pursued other avenues to provide Islamic religious instruction.   
 Lastly, NRW’s SPD was not only more favorable towards religious instruction and 
situated within a legal context that mandated compulsory religious instruction via Article 
7 III, but a majority of the population was also church-affiliated (compared with Berlin 
where only a minority of the population was church affiliated). Subsequently, the elite 
consensus in NRW and the elite ambivalence in Berlin were based on their varying 
historical contexts and the subsequent demographic developments in relation to religion, 
resulting in state officials from the same party taking opposite routes when faced with lead 
Muslim organizations that were not to their liking.   
 
Conclusion - Final Thoughts on the German Cases 
 Despite not being governed by Article 7 III, Berlin’s policymaking system was as 
closed as North Rhine Westphalia and Bavaria. The policymaking system had evolved 
whereby policy arrangements closely resembled those of NRW and Bavaria and most 
importantly, the education ministry had plenary gatekeeping power on the interests 
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permitted to provide religious instruction and subsequently the generous subsidies of the 
Berlin state. This unofficial recognition also granted monopoly representation to the chosen 
interests. Additionally, this policy arrangement was comparably informal and no more 
legally suspect as those which had coalesced in NRW and Bavaria in which the latter 
pursued creative measures to provide a semblance of a religious instruction course with 
Muslim influence that was palatable to Bundesland authorities. The fact that Muslim 
interests in NRW brought suit against the state and won a modest ruling concerning their 
right to Article 7 III mandated religious instruction speaks to this. Recognizing this, both 
NRW and Bavaria continued to pursue finding a corporate partner at the Bundesland level 
despite failing to have success.   
 What differed in the Berlin case was the elite agreement concerning religious 
instruction (as discussed in the Berlin conclusion). Elites were divided concerning the role 
of religious instructions in the state. Although Koopmans (2004) argued that Berlin had the 
most liberal integration regime (along with Frankfurt) in the state, this liberal approach did 














CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
Introduction  
 The three case study chapters of this study treat policy trajectories in the individual 
local cases as well as subjecting these analyses to intra-national cross local comparisons. 
This is to show how variations in the local contexts with respect to the open/closeness of 
the policymaking systems and/or variation in elite relations affect policy prospects for 
Mexican and Turkish interests in the US and Germany, respectively. The first part of the 
discussion chapter deals primarily with rendering cross-national comparisons from these 
local policy trajectory case studies. The aim is to more clearly show how prospects for 
Turkish and Mexican interests differ in the two national institutional and political settings. 
Analysis will focus on particular periods. This allows for national comparisons of the 
effects on policy trajectories caused by the interaction of elite views and open/closed 
policymaking systems. The second part of the chapter discusses the practical implications 
of this study. The third part involves a short discussion concerning further areas of research 
that this study suggests. Lastly, the chapter will conclude returning back to the main 
argument of the dissertation for a closing discussion on why Turkish interests are better 
positioned in Germany than their Mexican counterparts in the US to attain their policy 
goals in Islamic religious instruction. 
 Akin to the main conclusion in Koopmans’ (2004) cross-local, cross-national 
comparison of immigrant claims making in localities in Germany, the UK and the 
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Netherlands, this study finds that although there are variations in policy trajectories across 
localities intra-nationally, these variations are relatively small compared to the national 
variations. In the US, elite views concerning bilingual education combined with the open 
political system led to more dynamic policy trajectories over the period of study. This has 
been both positive and negative for Mexican interests. This was found in both California 
and Texas. The period from the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s was a period of dramatic 
policy expansion. Relative elite support for bilingual education combined with the open 
policymaking system led to an expansionary dynamic where the multiple venues of policy 
change created opportunities for venue shifting and where proponents of bilingual 
education found favorable venues at the local, state, and federal levels as well as the courts. 
Additionally, the overlapping nature of policy venues at the local, state, and national level 
led to issue expansion — expansionary policy change in one venue legitimated pro-
expansionary actors and interests in others. The primary impetus of policy change at the 
state level were federal and court mandates. These were the byproducts of the interactive 
nature of the various policy venues and had the effect of coercing states to address the 
needs of its LEP population, primarily with the implementation of bilingual education 
pedagogies.   
 After the 1970s, elite support for bilingual education dissipated with the backlash 
against liberal (Big Government) interventionism and the emergence of the education 
accountability movement. These shifted issue salience away from the education 
opportunity policy dimension — which had been so beneficial to Mexican interests — to 
the education accountability dimension. The open policymaking system which had 
provided a forum for issue expansion amid elite agreement, provided the same institutional 
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opportunities for elite disagreement. From the late 1970s forward, anti-bilingual education 
interests were increasingly able to find policy venues at the local, state, and federal levels 
as well as the courts favorable for their anti-bilingual education preferences and 
problematizations of LEP student needs. Additionally, policy rollback in one venue 
legitimated the interests/ actors and politics of policy rollback in others. However, since 
bilingual education regimes were well-entrenched by the late 1970s, policy rollback was 
moderate as pro-bilingual education forces were able to mitigate reform efforts through the 
mid-1990s. However, given the presence of the voter referendum as a policymaking 
mechanism in California — making the state a more open policymaking system — 
proponents of policy rollback were able to legitimate restrictionism in linguistic politics 
and eventually end bilingual education policy arrangements by the end of the 1990s. In 
Texas, which does not have the voter initiative as a policymaking option, policy rollback 
was incremental as bilingual education regimes were mostly able to fend off rollback 
efforts. 
 In Germany, the situation for Turks differed concerning Islamic religious 
instruction. The two Bundeslaender, North Rhine Westphalia and Bavaria, with elite 
agreement in support of Islamic religious instruction within the closed, policy making 
context, experienced iterative, moderate policy expansion in Islamic religious instruction 
throughout the period of study. In the third German case, Berlin, there was elite division 
concerning Islamic religious instruction.  Situated within a closed policymaking context, 
policy expansion occurred by a 2000 court ruling — venue shifting — that gave the IFB 
the right to offer religious instruction.   
 When the American cases and German cases are compared the differences in policy 
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trajectories clearly show a national variation. The US has periods of substantial policy 
change buffered by extended periods of policy incrementalism while in Germany 
incremental/ moderate policy expansionism typified policy trajectories over the period of 
study. With respect to Mexican and Turkish interests in the US and Germany, respectively, 
when times were good for Mexican interests, they were comparatively better than in 
Germany for Turkish interests. However, favorable political contexts were not long lasting 
as elite agreement (even in good times) was more precarious. In Germany, on the contrary, 
Turkish interests experienced consistent iterative policy expansion in Islamic religious 
instruction throughout the period of study as elite support for religious instruction (at least 
in NRW and Bavaria) was more substantial, rooted in historical elite views concerning 
religious instruction. However, as the system is more closed, the potential for more 
dynamic issue expansion in the American setting is absent in Germany, precluding the 
potential for periods of dramatic policy change.  
 The remainder of this section will focus in more detail on the specific periods to 
compare how elite agreement/ disagreement play out in the two policymaking systems. The 
first part of this analysis will compare the 1965-1975 period in California and Texas to the 
policy trajectories of North Rhine Westphalia and Bavaria over the period of study. These 
were periods of elite agreement over the respective issues in both nations. This national 
comparison aims to show how elite agreement concerning the respective policies areas 
played out in the two national policymaking contexts — how elite relations were facilitated 
by the respective policymaking contexts and the consequences this had for the respective 
immigrant interests. The second part of this national analysis focuses on elite divisions and 
how they played out in the two national settings. Here the study will look at the period after 
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the 1970s in Texas and California and Berlin over the period of study as these were periods 
of elite division concerning the policy areas. This aims to depict how the various national 
settings affected prospects for the respective immigrant groups when faced with elite 
opposition to their interests. 
 
Elite Consensus, Open System - California and Texas (1965 - 1975) 
 In both California and Texas, the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s was a favorable 
period for Mexican interests especially within the open American system. It was a period 
of issue expansion across venues at the local, state, national as well as the courts resulting 
in policy expansion at the state and federal levels. This was driven by elite agreement that 
viewed bilingual education as a means of compensating for past discrimination and 
segregation and as a pedagogy for providing a more quality education than punitive English 
Only methods. In addition, political elites calculated that bilingual education would benefit 
efforts to court the growing Latino population in both states. Because of the emerging elite 
agreement, in California and Texas, local experimentations in bilingual education attracted 
the attention of both state and federal officials. Proponents of bilingual education pursued 
venue shifting to these two levels hoping to garner favorable policy that would lead to 
fiscal support or policy mandates to underwrite their local initiatives. These efforts were 
largely successful, resulting in the passage of legislation permitting bilingual education in 
Texas and California, HB 103 and SB 53, respectively. These Acts overturned existing 
English Only laws, made bilingual education policy arrangements legal, and allocated 
funding for their provision. Local and state advocacy as well as the aforementioned 
influence of local experimentation in Texas and California were integral in the drafting of 
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the Bilingual Education Act of 1967 which would eventually become the federal bilingual 
education bill, the Bilingual Education Act of 1968. The federal bill further legitimized and 
encouraged (through fiscal support) expansionary policy at the state and local level 
resulting in the expansion of bilingual education programs at the local level. Thus, during 
this initial period in the 1960s, policy expansion was the byproduct of issue expansion 
across local, state, and federal venues and venue shifting to state and federal venues.  
 By the early 1970s, however, policy expansion was moving only at an iterative pace 
in California and Texas. Bilingual education advocates continued to lobby federal policy 
venues (including the executive branch because of Nixon’s desire to court Latinos) as well 
as the courts to coerce localities and state officials to focus more attention on the needs of 
LEP students. These efforts along with continued issue expansion resulted in federal and 
judicial mandates in the early and mid-1970s that coerced state action. These mandates 
included executive actions (1970 OCR Memorandum; Lau Remedies, 1975), legislative 
actions (the reauthorization of the Bilingual Education Act, 1974; the Equal Education 
Opportunity Act, 1974), and judicial rulings (the most important being the Lau rulings 
1974, 1975). These federal mandates deepened the responsibility of states and districts to 
their LEP populations. Specifically, these spawned the Bilingual Education and Training 
Act of 1974 and the Chacon-Moscone Bilingual-Bicultural Act of 1976 in Texas and 
California, respectively. Both of these policies were expansionary in that they practically 
mandated bilingual education for districts with high populations of LEP students. 
Additionally, both bills favored cultural maintenance, multiculturalism and bilingualism as 
end goals for bilingual education programs, which were also expansionary additions.   
 In summation, this period was the heyday for Mexican proponents of bilingual 
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education. This period of elite support for bilingual education in the open American policy 
setting netted substantial policy expansion in the two states of focus. Specifically, the 
presence of multiple, overlapping policy venues at the local, state and federal level proved 
quite favorable during this period for Mexican interests in their pursuit of bilingual 
education policy arrangements in California and Texas. 
 
Elite Consensus, Closed Policy Setting - North Rhine Westphalia and Bavaria (1975 - 
2010) 
 Although Turkish successes in securing religious instruction policy arrangements 
in North Rhine Westphalia and Bavaria were more modest than those of their Mexican-
American counterparts in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the favorable German setting 
proved more long-lasting for Turkish-Germans, extending through the period under study. 
Policy expansion in the two German Bundeslaender, NRW and Bavaria, with elite 
agreement in support of Islamic religious instruction differed from the previous account of 
policy trajectories in California and Texas during the period of elite agreement described. 
Policy trajectories were also expansive, but lacking the multiple venues of the American 
system, expansion was more iterative. Thus, policy expansion in NRW and Bavaria was 
similar to the period in the late 1960s in the US before venue shifting to and issue expansion 
across the federal venues and the courts legitimized bilingual education interests (at the 
state and federal level) and won federal and judicial mandates which then forced the states 
to enact more expansionary policy. Nevertheless, iterative expansion in NRW and Bavaria 
continued for the entire period of the study as opposed to the ten year window of substantial 
expansion in the American setting. 
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 The contentious issue in Islamic religious instruction has been finding appropriate 
lead organizations with whom the state could form corporatist partnerships. The mother 
tongue initiatives in both Bundeslaender were made in concert with the Turkish consulate. 
But these courses operated under the paradigm that Turkish immigrants would return to 
their homeland and so these courses were designed to prepare their children for this 
eventual return. Once Bundeslaender officials came to realize and accepted that these 
immigrants had become permanent settlers then the issue turned to finding appropriate 
Muslim lead organizations to serve as corporate partners. In NRW and Bavaria (as well as 
in all other German Bundeslaender) this has proven difficult. Hence, education officials in 
both Bundeslaender sought alternative means of providing these courses — as elites 
believed that religious instruction had a proven track record in integrating youth. NRW 
chose to establish a curriculum commission that included the education ministry, state 
officials, religious academics, scholars of Islam, and eventually expanded the commission 
to include Muslim congregations and associations. Bavaria’s second iteration of Islamic 
religious instruction was also state-led but continued the partnership with the Turkish 
consulate. As this program matured, however, the influence of the Turkish consulate 
lessened. Bavaria ultimately sanctioned corporate arrangements at the local level beginning 
with the Erlangen pilot project beginning with the 2003-2004 academic year. Here local 
officials, academics and local Muslim lead organizations partnered to provide religious 
instruction at the local level. Local officials unofficially recognized these lead 
organizations, giving them authority over curriculum content. These courses were 
confessional religious instruction as called for by Article 7 III. This project has since spread 
to other localities. However, as a whole, expansion in Islamic religious instruction in 
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Bavaria was iterative and moderate.   
 In NRW, the expansion has been more substantial. NRW has the largest 
implementation of Islamic religious instruction programs in Germany. However, this has 
only meant NRW has implemented 200 programs out of a total of 5,000 schools. Even 
compared to bilingual education’s reach (never rising above 30 percent of the student body 
nationally), this is still paltry. Perhaps venue shifting to the courts (in both cases) to force 
the state to adopt a Muslim lead organization at the state level might quicken the pace of 
expansion (Fuess, 2006). Nevertheless the commitment is there from elites to continue this 
moderate, iterative expansion. And as it will be evident in the next section, Mexican interest 
have not been privileged with such a long term commitment by American elites to bilingual 
education. 
 This commitment can be seen in the commitment to teacher training. In the 
American cases, the shortage of trained teachers was a perennial problem in expanding 
programs in both Texas and California. In Germany, NRW and Bavaria have recently 
established teacher training programs at the University of Muenster and University of 
Erlangen-Nuernberg, respectively. These programs are relatively new (beginning in 2004 
and 2006, respectively), but there is commitment from these states to expand them for the 
foreseeable future.71  
 During the period of elite agreement in Texas and California as well as with the 
federal Bilingual Education Act and its subsequent reauthorizations, funds were allocated 
for teacher training. However, teacher shortages remained a perennial issue even during 
                                                 
71 The German Federal Ministry for Education and Research has recently granted 20 million over the next 5 
years to the following universities to educate the much needed 2.000 Islamic theology teachers to guarantee 




this period of elite agreement and worsened during the period of elite disagreement after 
the 1970s.   
 In summation, elite agreement in the American setting, because of the multiple, 
interactive venues at the local, state, and federal levels led to more dramatic increases in 
policy than in the closed German setting for the four cases compared. However, elite 
agreement in the American setting was short-lived as the historically polarizing political 
dynamic of bilingual education in the US continued to be a political undercurrent even 
during the period of elite agreement over the pedagogical approach.   
 
Elite Division, Open System - California and Texas (1978 - 2010) 
 As the period of elite agreement resulted in dramatic policy expansion as the 
multiple policy venues afforded in American federalism provided a context for issue 
expansion and venue shifting through the interaction of policy venues at the local, state, 
and federal levels. During the period of elite division in the years after approximately 1978, 
anti-bilingual forces increasingly found policy venues favorable to policy rollback in 
bilingual education. This proved increasingly problematic for Mexican interests in the 
1980s, 1990s and 2000s.   
 The late 1970s began a period of political backlash against liberal interventionism 
and increased focus on issues of education accountability (focusing on education outcomes 
and how to make schools accountable for these outcomes). However, as bilingual education 
policy regimes were entrenched, these regimes mitigated policy rollback through the 
1980s. This was the case in both California and Texas. Through the mid-1980s, bilingual 
education regimes in both states were able to resist policy rollback attempts from English 
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Only forces which increasingly gained political resonance in the era of small government 
and education accountability. The politics of retrenchment (Pierson, 1994; Sheingate, 
2000, Starke, 2006) — policy-makers hesitant to pursue retrenchment policies, fearful of 
electoral retribution from taking on the entrenched Latino advocacy network — provides 
an explanation for the ability of bilingual education policy regimes to mitigate reform 
efforts during this period.   
 From the mid-1980s forward, however, policy trajectories in the two American 
states began to diverge because of the presence of the voter initiative as a mechanism of 
policy change in California. This makes California the more open system. The voter 
initiative allowed for the politics of policy rollback where government officials could shirk 
blame for such initiatives. The passage of an Official English constitutional amendment in 
California in 1986 via the voter initiative legitimized policy rollback in bilingual education. 
The Chacone-Mascone Bilingual- Bicultural Education Act was allowed to sunset, most 
notably with Governor Deukmeijan twice vetoing legislation that would have extended the 
act — all of this occurring within a year of the passage of the Official English initiative.  
Eleven years later after bilingual education continued without a governing bilingual 
education state law, California passed Proposition 227 which put an official statutory end 
to bilingual education. Again, this was accomplished via the voter initiative. Ron Unz's 
English for the Children ran a campaign that eschewed elite support, successfully arguing 
that elites were frustrating policy that had public backing. 
 In Texas, Mexican interests faired comparatively better. Proponents of Official 
English constitutional amendments were repeatedly frustrated in the legislature despite 
polling showing substantial support for an Official English constitutional amendment. 
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Sponsors of the initiative could never win the support of a majority of Republican 
legislators (including Republican governors) as there was fear within the Republican Party 
of alienating the well-entrenched Latino community. The same proved true of attempts to 
overturn bilingual education policy arrangements. The entrenchment of Latino interests 
allowed policy regimes to mitigate reform efforts.  
 
Elite Division, Closed Policy Making Setting - Berlin (1975-2010) 
 In Berlin, Muslim interests ultimately prevailed via a manner similar to English 
Only forces — via venue shifting — in attaining their policy preferences when faced with 
a well-entrenched regime in opposition to their incorporation. Elite division concerning 
Islamic religious instruction played out differently in Berlin. In California and Texas, 
bilingual education policy regimes were well-entrenched and interest in the opposition 
aimed to end these policy regimes. These, thus were projects of policy rollback. In Berlin, 
Muslim interests pursued incorporation into current policy arrangements so that they could 
also provide religious instruction for their communities. This was a campaign for policy 
expansion. Although comparing periods of rollback and periods of attempted expansion is 
methodologically problematic (Pierson, 1994), this comparison highlights how multiple 
venues or lack thereof affects prospects for interests attaining their policy goals in the 
respective policy settings. In both the Berlin case and the US cases of Texas and California, 
interests outside the policy regime (the IFB in Berlin and English Only forces in California 
and Texas) went up against well-entrenched interests determined to keep them out of the 
policymaking process. In the politics of policy rollback in California and Texas, English 
Only forces faced an entrenched bilingual education policy regime. However, the multiple 
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venues of the American system presented alternative forums where alternative issue 
dimensions could be received more favorably, subsequently expanding the scope of 
conflict and potentially (or ultimately in the case of California) leading to policy change. 
This proved fatal for Mexican interests in California and highly problematic for those in 
Texas as policy dimensions transitioned from education opportunity in the 1960s and 1970s 
to eduction accountability and fiscal restraint from the 1980s forward. In the closed 
German system, these alternative venues are not available. In the case of Berlin and the 
IFB candidacy, the IFB also faced an entrenched regime but because of the lack of 
alternative venues (other than the courts) and corporatist interest intermediation structures, 
the IFB could only continually apply for state recognition and then venue shift to the court. 
This eventually was a successful strategy, but it was twenty years in the making as the 
German courts have only recently began siding with Muslim interest in suits concerning 
corporate recognition. Additionally, the IFB process of entry into the governing policy 
regimes was far less dynamic than the English Only campaign, which involved federal 
venues, the courts, and the voter initiative.   
 In Berlin, religious instruction is not governed by Article 7 III and thus, it is not a 
mandatory course as it is in NRW and Bavaria. Nevertheless, policy arrangements have 
evolved to closely resemble the corporatist state-church arrangements of Article 7 III as in 
NRW and Bavaria. And since religious communities have come to be dependent on the 
state granting the provision of school space and generous subsidies to fund religious 
instruction programs, the Bundesland, subsequently, has assumed unofficial gatekeeping 
power over the entry of new religious communities.       
 In Berlin, however, there is elite division concerning religious instruction. The 
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SPD, which controlled the Berlin government for the entire period of the study was 
lukewarm to religious instruction — thus there was not the same consensus as in NRW and 
Bavaria that Islamic religious instruction was a means for integrating the Muslim student 
population.   
 Concerning the IFB, there was opposition across the political spectrum to its 
candidacy to provide Islamic religious instruction. The political establishment believed the 
IFB had extremist ties and so their candidacy was opposed by all the major parties, 
Christian religious communities, and even among most Muslims. The IFB eventually won 
the right to provide religious instruction in Berlin schools, but via a 2000 court ruling. As 
they were situated within the closed policy setting, the IFB could not venue shop to other 
venues except the courts.   
 More indicative of the SPD’s lukewarm embrace of religious instruction was their 
comparative lack of effort to make alternative arrangements for providing some form of 
Islamic religious instruction as was the case in NRW and Bavaria. Berlin authorities were 
afforded a more moderate Muslim lead organization, the DITIB, with whom it could have 
partnered. Yet, neither the state nor the Christian religious communities were interested in 
collaborating with DITIB or any other Muslim organizations. And since the Berlin policy 
system was closed, these other Muslim interests were also unable to shop for more 
favorable venues with the exception of the courts. 
 This aspect of Germany’s policymaking system allowed for less dynamic politics.  
Once a particular issue dimension was secured by policy regime participants, it was 
maintained by the gatekeeping power of these participants (in this case, the state and 
Christian religious communities). Additionally, because of the corporatist nature of 
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religious instruction policy arrangements, the voter initiative (attempted by the Pro-Reli 
forces concerning the status of religious instruction) was not an option for Muslims as state 
recognition of religious communities was not subject to the political market place as it was 
solely controlled by the education ministry.  
 Lastly, since policy concerning education only happens at the state level, issue 
expansion was less of a factor in influencing the debate (the possibility of policy actions in 
other venues legitimating policy actions in the Bundesland) at the Bundeslaender level. 
Perhaps if the IFB were recognized in another Bundeslaender this could have been 
influential (as Bundeslaender officials were conscious of the fact that recognition of a 
Muslim religious community would influence campaigns in other Bundeslaender).  
However, since there was elite division in Berlin concerning religious instruction, this is 
also doubtful as Berlin elites were cool to the idea of recognizing any of the Muslim 
communities. 
 In the American system, alternative venues are often available where more 
favorable conditions may exist for interests outside of governing policy regimes and these 
can influence political debate in other venues. Policy actions can take place in the executive 
branch, the federal legislature, the courts or in state venues. Policy outcomes/ political 
debate in one venue can also influence debate in other state or federal venues. Many 
commentators have opined, for example, that Proposition 187 in California influenced 
welfare and immigration legislation at the national level in the mid 1990s (see HoSang, 
2010; Crawford, 1999). In the closed German setting these alternate venues are less 
available. In the Berlin example, religious instruction was not favored by the party that had 
controlled Berlin’s government for over a generation. Muslim interests, subsequently 
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(despite the large Muslim population), were at a disadvantage: the IFB faced political 
opposition across the political spectrum and the religious instruction policy regime was 
uninterested in reaching out to the more moderate Muslim communities. In Texas and 
California, despite the fact that English Only interests faced an entrenched regime, multiple 
venues existed where they could have attempted to change the politics of bilingual 
education. California’s English Only interests used the voter initiative to legitimize the 
politics of English Only approaches and then to actually end bilingual education when the 
legislature could not be coerced to do the same. Additionally, policy outcomes or actions 
at the federal level were influential on state policy. For example, pertaining to the latter, 
after 1980 OCR basically stopped policing districts concerning their compliance with the 
Lau rulings. In California, this led to districts falling out of compliance with federal law by 
the time Proposition 227 was passed. Federal law in bilingual education increasingly 
shifted more money to transitional bilingual education and English Only approaches and 
ended funding for cultural maintenance approaches. By the mid-1990s, Congress placed 
three-year funding caps on federal bilingual education funding brought on by the transition 
to education accountability as the governing issue paradigm in bilingual education at the 
federal level. Each of these actions influenced the politics of bilingual education that led to 
the incremental policy rollback in California (preceding the passage of Proposition 227) 
and Texas (Crawford, 1999; HoSang, 2010). Although these factors did not lead to the 
termination of bilingual education in Texas, they did legitimize English Only approaches, 
providing the opposition with more issue salience for their English Only policy preferences. 
This resulted in more incremental policy rollback in Texas bilingual education from the 
1980s forward.   
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Practical Implications of this Study 
 The findings of this study speak to the importance of multiple venues in policy 
change. This study builds on Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) punctuated equilibrium 
theory, providing a research design in which it can be transported to other settings. In 
Germany, elite relations were determinative of policy direction. Once elite consensus was 
formed around particular problematizations of religious instruction with respect to the 
integration of Muslim students, policy arrangements coalesced, creating regimes that 
locked in these issue definitions with participants favorable to elites. Outside interests 
could only hope for favorable court rulings in the face of elite opposition in these closed 
policy environments. On the flip side, when elite agreement was favorable to Turkish 
interests, such as in the NRW and Bavaria cases, this led to iterative but expansionary 
policy even in the face of popular discontent to the increasing presence of Islam in public 
life. As the closed, corporatist setting insulates interest intermediation from popular politics 
and secures particular policy dimensions, religious instruction policy arrangement 
preceded the official national conversation about the importance of Muslim integration by 
10-15 years. This provides evidence of the favorable setting in which Turkish interests 
were situated.   
 In the American setting, the multiple venues were a double-edged sword for both 
Mexican and English Only forces. In the American setting, elite agreement is more fluid as 
the presence of alternative venues provides the opposition with many access points to 
change the politics of an issue and thus alter political consensus (Baumgarnter and Jones, 
1993). In the 1960s and early 1970s, this benefitted Mexican/ bilingual education interests 
and hurt English Only forces as there was elite support for bilingual education in multiple 
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policy venues. After the 1970s, the English Only proponents increasingly found favorable 
venues in the American system. As the Latino population continues to grow and gain in 
political influence, there is no reason to expect their political prospects not to change (as 
has been evident at the Presidential level over the last two election cycles — they are 
increasingly becoming the king makers; this is similar to the influence of the Reagan 
Democrats in the 1980s, the heyday of the Republican backlash). 
 
Areas for Further Research  
 This study has focused on the effects of elite consensus and the openness/ closeness 
of the policymaking process on policy trajectories in US bilingual education policy and 
Islamic religious instruction policy trajectories in Germany with a specific focus on 
localities. Concerning the American side, the obvious next step would be to explore policy 
trajectories in bilingual education in the new immigrant destination in the South and the 
Midwest 72  — two contexts which have been increasingly attracted the interest of 
academics in the last decade. The South would be especially interesting as the recent wave 
of Latino immigration to that region marks the first time since the colonial era that the 
Southern states have had experience with incorporating an immigrant group (as the 
immigration wave of the 1880-1930 period skipped the South) (Stamps and Bohon, 200673; 
                                                 
72 Studying the provision of bilingual education in the Midwest would likewise be very enlightening as the 
recent Latino migration to the Midwest has been cited as a welcome inflow that is largely responsible for 
invigorating many dying small and mid-sized Midwest cities.  
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Wainer, 200674). As racial problems still persist concerning the integration of African 
Americans, it would seem that at first glance that elite views would be united in opposition 
to bilingual education. Additionally, Latinos have limited political incorporation in the 
South and campaigns for bilingual education only date back to the 1980s (Stamps and 
Bohon, 2006; Wainer, 2006), missing the expansive period of elite agreement at the federal 
level of the 1960s and 1970s, which was integral in state expansionary policies in the mid-
1970s. Additionally, these policy systems lack voter initiative policymaking mechanism. 
Either a cross-local study with older immigrant destinations (such as Texas, which also 
lacks the initiative voter policymaking mechanism but has the presence of entrenched, 
incorporated Mexican interests) or a cross-national analysis with Berlin, a state with elite 
ambivalence towards Islamic religious instruction, may be illuminating concerning how 
the open versus closed policymaking systems and/ or the status of elite views towards the 
respective issues affect policy trajectories.  
 On the German side, comparisons of policy trajectories in religious instruction 
could be expanded to include Hamburg and Brandenburg. Both of these Bundeslaender 
offer an inter-faith religious instruction course (Religion for All in Hamburg and 
Lebensgestaltung— Ethik— Religionskunde (LER) in Brandenburg) where the focus is 
more on inter-faith dialogue than confessional study. However, elite consensus concerning 
their provision differs. In Hamburg the elites support Religion for All while LER is more 
contested in Brandenburg by the religious communities which would prefer confessional 
religious instruction. Both have incorporated teachings in Islam and thus this would prove 
as an interesting case to see how differences in elite consensus manifested to produce 
                                                 
74 Wainer, Andrew “The New Latino South and the Challenge to American Public Education” Tomas Rivera 
Policy Institute, School of Policy Planning and Development, University of Southern California; 2006. 
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incorporation of Muslim interests, perhaps adding to the findings of this study.   
 Another potential Bundesland of focus is Hessen. Hessen recently became the first 
state to officially recognize a Muslim community. It is similar to NRW in its elite support 
for religious instruction. Additionally, the Ahmadiyya Muslims appear to be similarly 
ostracized from the Muslim establishment as the Alevites, suggesting that they are a more 
moderate sect. This may speak to the ease with which Bundesland officials could find 
common ground on curricular and political issues to grant recognition.  Research 
concerning how Bundesland officials were able to come to terms with a Muslim 
community — something that has been elusive to other western Bundesland with similar 
elite support could also be enlightening. 
 Additionally, Ireland (2004) argues that as Germany made cuts to its welfare state, 
it did so via devolving responsibility of state welfare provisions to the Bundeslaender. The 
Bundeslaender increasingly used religious communities (as both the Catholic and 
Protestant Church are the main providers of care for children, the elderly and the sick and, 
hence, have always played a significant role in the provision of the German welfare state) 
to fill the gaps that states could not provide. This would be an interesting area of study to 
apply the methodology of this study as Ireland (2004) also argues that such state-interest 
arrangements in the provision of social welfare vary per locality. Would local fiscal 
conditions affect the politics of recognition for these Muslim communities — possibly 






Limitations of the Study 
 As this study only focuses on particular issue areas in immigrant integration, its 
findings are limited to these issue areas. It builds on Hofhansel (2010) and Freeman (2004) 
who argue that the literature on national integration regimes misses the complexity of the 
immigrant integration experience. They instead argue institutional arrangements that 
facilitate immigrant integration vary per issue areas or sectors of the polity, and that these 
institutional arrangements are determinative of the opportunity structures which facilitate 
immigrant integration politics. Nevertheless, although this study illustrates particular 
institutional configurations and elite relations in particular issue areas, the cross-national 
findings show that policy trajectories are generally indicative of national institutional 
regime types that have been identified in the integration regime literature.   
 Additionally, with respect to the Texas case, there is limited literature or accounts 
of policy developments in the state after 1981. Sanchez (2007) also mentions this hole in 
the literature. It is especially the case concerning accounts of English Only movements and 
how the Texas legislature has dealt with these trends while continuing to support bilingual 
education arrangements. I have attempted to do this in this study. However, as my resources 
and residence precluded an on-the-ground research project in Texas, obtaining information 
was difficult. This would appear to be a ripe area for historical institutionalist interested in 
immigration politics and immigration scholars. As Texas is a politically conservative state 
but did not experience the policy rollback in bilingual education as other states such as 
California, more research is needed in this area to compliment or challenge the work I have 
done. 
 Lastly, the study is heavily reliant on secondary sources. This methodological 
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choice was made due to the lack of resources and the breadth of the study — 5 cases looking 
at a 45 year period of policy development. A single case study that focused more in-depth 
on legislative debates or an empirical study of issue dimension saliency would compliment 
arguments established here as well as add more empirical vigor to these findings.   
 
Conclusion 
 Turkish interests are better situated in the German setting — this is the overall 
conclusion of this study. Due to Germany’s elite response to never repeat the atrocities of 
the Third Reich as well as national security considerations in the post 9/11 era, German 
elites are more determined to find ways to integrate their Muslim population. The long 
history of elite support for using church-state institutions as a means of integration further 
favors Muslims, whose different religion is viewed as problematic. Church-state 
institutions thus present a German way of dealing with the issue of immigrant integration.  
Ideally, in using church-state institutions to integrate Muslim youths, German elites attempt 
to express tolerance as well as create a German Islam — thus, both rendering the national 
security issues and perceived cultural incompatibilities moot. 
 In the US, perennial issues of problematic race relations (black-white race relations) 
that have historically extended to the immigration debate, situated within a more open 
political system with elite division over the issue of language puts Mexican interests in a 
more precarious position. The only thing that Mexicans have in their favor are their 
growing numbers and the potential political force this could render. However, in the new 
immigrant destinations where their numbers are growing this is as likely to lead to policy 
restrictionism as expansion due to the multiple venues available to both Mexicans and 
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opponents of Mexican political incorporation. Additionally, as Mexicans political 
incorporation has lagged behind their growing numbers, Mexican political mobilization is 
increasingly the crucial factor. However, as the increased naturalization and political 
mobilization in the wake of Proposition 187 showed, when Mexican perceive a real threat, 
they will mobilize. And because of the multiple venues available to opponents of Mexican 
interests and the perennial polarization that immigration renders, their ability to organize 
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